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ABSTRACT

This conference focused on the field of critical thinking emphasizing social and cultural inquiry, through the perspectives of scholars and practitioners in a variety of academic disciplines. Following an overview describing the mission of the institute, and an introduction entitled "Critical Thinking and the Improvement of Undergraduate Education," plenary papers are presented: "Literacy, Education, and the Struggle for Public Life: Towards a Pedagogy of Critical Thinking"; "Critical Thinking and Cultural Literacy: Where E. D. Hirsch Goes Wrong"; and "Critical Thinking across the Disciplines: The Search for an Archimedian Point." The volume is then organized into 9 sections reflecting the thoughts of more than 60 authors representing over 20 academic fields. It includes papers addressing a range of issues in critical thinking and undergraduate education, reflecting the many theoretical perspectives that relate critical thinking to social and cultural inquiry. The nine sections address the following topics: (1) social and cultural context of critical thinking; (2) social inquiry as critical practice; (3) critical thinking, social issues and communication; (4) critical thinking in instructional contexts: within and across the disciplines; (5) critical thinking and the teaching of social sciences; (6) critical thinking and narrative discourse; (7) critical thinking and gender; (8) leadership, authority and power; and (9) critical thinking theory. (LL)

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Conference 1989 Proceedings



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Mark Weinstein

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Critical Thinking: Focus on Social and Cultural Inquiry

Conference 1989 Proceedings

Edited by

Wendy Oxman-Michelli

Mark Weinstein

Institute for Critical Thinking
Montclair State

April, 1991

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Critical Thinking: Focus on Social and Cultural Inquiry
Conference 1989 Proceedings

Overview

The Institute for Critical Thinking at Montclair State has sponsored a conference, Critical Thinking: Focus on Social and Cultural Inquiry, in the hope that the field of critical thinking will be enriched through the perspectives of scholars and practitioners within a variety of academic disciplines and working from many perspectives. The papers included in the proceedings of this conference stand as an index of the usefulness of such a point of view. The volume reflects the thoughts of more than 60 authors representing over 20 academic fields. It is divided into nine sections that include papers addressing issues ranging across issues in critical thinking and undergraduate education, and reflect the many theoretical perspectives that relate critical thinking to social and cultural inquiry. The various perspectives represented here, along with the papers from our first conference, *Critical Thinking: Language and Inquiry Across the Disciplines*, add significant new ideas to the field of critical thinking. In these Proceedings, the positions presented tend away from the mainstream of critical thinking, as primarily represented by the work of philosophers, and present many new and potentially useful points of view. What we take to be of central importance are the offerings of many disciplines involved with critical thinking but generally underrepresented in its literature. These various approaches furnish standpoints that we believe deserve careful consideration. Critical thinking, despite its diversity of expression, points to its continuity of across the various disciplines.

At Montclair State, we have developed a notion of critical thinking that has at its center a concern with judgment. We maintain that students should see the content of the courses within a nexus of justification and application. This requires that students learn course content in relation to the methodological and substantive principles that support that content as justifiable--that is, permit the judgment that the information and procedures presented in the course have been appropriatelyjustified. Further, we maintain that students should be helped to link information taught to some domain of meaningful application, a domain which frequently extends beyond the boundaries of the discipline itself. Knowledge taught to undergraduates should address the *theoretic reason* of the student by having the underlying theoretic and/or empirical bases of that knowledge made explicit. It should also speak to the students' *practical reason* by being related to purposes for which the knowledge has potential significance.

Knowledge essentially tied to judgment, we believe, is thus at the heart of undergraduate education. But judgment, if it is to be acceptable, must rest appropriately on good reasons. This is the core of critical thinking, and why it is essential to undergraduate education. For critical thinking constitutes the ability and willingness to identify and apply the set of principles that support judgment through the best available reasons. Such reasons, we believe, are most often found in the canons of the various disciplines. Canons include such a variety of basic beliefs and principles as ethical and methodological assumptions and practices, theories and facts that are held as unexceptionable, and genre for the presentation of results. Such canonical principles constitute the criteria used to support judgments of the most responsible sort in the various areas of inquiry. We do not, however, think that such principles are unchanging or are tied to one perspective. Rather, we believe that canons for good judgment are to be found in all of the various forms of human inquiry and that they have histories that enable them and require them to change in the light of reason and practice. We maintain that the disciplines evolve in their objects of concern and in their conceptions of appropriate methodologies to better understand the range of issues and topics that are at the center of academic and practical learning.

These disciplinary modes of inquiry reflect what is seen as best in the current standards that govern work in the fields. But these are not univocal, between or within fields, nor are they arbitrary. The disciplines, at any moment, reflect the range of what has been deemed best. To the extent that they are critical in their thought, they also reflect the ongoing exploration of these methodological and substantive canons by reflection on the practice of the discipline itself, by interaction with and comparison to other scholarly fields and in response to the complex universe of application that is the common reality with which all disciplines are concerned.

The connection between critical thinking, judgment and methods of inquiry of the disciplines is to be found in the analysis of critical thinkng that the Institute for Critical Thinking owes to Matthew Lipman. In his analysis, critical thinking rests essentially on the identification and use of criteria for judgment, applied in a fashion sensitive to context, and with a commitment to ongoing self reflection and correction. This notion offers a unifying focus for critical thinking across the disciplines while recognizing the validity of responses that reflect different criteria for application within particular academic arenas.

Critical Thinking and the Improvement of Undergraduate Education

Gregory L. Waters

On behalf of the President, the faculty and staff, and the students of Montclair State College, I'd like to extend a heartfelt welcome to our campus, for the start of what I am sure will be a fascinating conference on the topic Critical Thinking: Focus on Social and Cultural Inquiry. Judging from the abstracts and the distinguished credentials of all of our speakers, I am confident that this will prove to be a remarkable event, rich in the exchange of ideas and experiences, theories and good practice.

This conference is just one of many activities sponsored by the Institute for Critical Thinking, a project funded with the help of a grant from Governor Kean's Challenge Grant Program. The primary purpose of the Institute, which is now in its third year at Montclair, is to serve as a kind of academic incubator on our campus, a vehicle for the further development of educational excellence. The Institute is a collaborative, multidisciplinary approach to faculty and curricular development, one that is designed to study both the theoretical and practical aspects of critical thinking across the disciplines, with considerable attention being directed at the implication of these theories for teaching and learning at all levels.

The process of fostering change on a campus, of getting faculty colleagues to examine how they teach and make decisions or judgments, is never an easy one. A friend outside academe once asked me why I was encouraging faculty to participate in the Institute - "Aren't they critical enough?" he asked. I responded that I knew they were critical - I just wanted to be sure they were thinking.

My own interest in the Institute goes back to the spring of 1986, when a committee of faculty known as the Committee on Academic Excellence began to wrestle with ways to improve our undergraduate program. Like most colleges we were concerned about the quality of our academic offerings, about the support provided to our faculty, and the extent to which learning occurs across the campus. We all agreed that while we recognized the quality of our colleagues' work and the distinguished nature of their many contributions, as an institution we could do more to make ourselves aware of our responsibilities as a learning community. We wanted to more systematically embrace our mission of "developing educated persons of inquiring, creative and disciplined intelligence." We wanted to find additional ways to improve undergraduate education, and the teaching of critical thinking skills in schools across the state.

In all of our planning, we were fortunate to be able to draw on the experience and work of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, headed by Dr. Matthew Lipman from whom you'll be hearing later on today. We could also draw on the work of Project THISTLE: Thinking Skills in Teaching and Learning (a project involving teachers in secondary schools serving minority students); the International Network of Teaching Thinking - a project sponsored by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development also currently housed at the college, as well as on the specialized interests in the thinking process on the part of numerous faculty from several disciplines.

Most of all, we had the commitment of the faculty to the importance of good teaching across all our disciplines. For many years Montclair has been nationally recognized for the quality of our teacher education program, and although we are no longer exclusively a teacher training institution, it is a part of our tradition we value. The commitment to the improvement of teaching is part of the fabric of our institution, it's at the center of our campus culture. The tradition, the commitment and the culture were just right for the Institute, and I'm very pleased about what has been created.

For many years Montclair has prided itself on the quality of our undergraduate program. Its purpose, and ours as a faculty, is really to teach students *how* to learn, by providing training in reasoning and critical thinking while introducing the essential discipline by which people try to understand themselves and their surroundings, and cultures different from their own.

In ancient and medieval universities, *all* students were instructed in the "quadrivium" (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music), as well as the "trivium" (logic, grammar, and rhetoric). With the invention of the printing press, the discovery of the atom, and the development of computers and artificial intelligence systems, the world of ideas has become too vast and differentiated for a single individual to master completely. As a result, we have had to develop programs in which students are helped to learn methods of inquiry in several fields, to ensure that they will not be at the mercy of continuing change later in life, but might themselves become masters of change.

It has been suggested that college students a generation ago could acquire a specific set of information and skills, enter a job and feel relatively secure about their training and future. In today's world, much less tomorrow's, that security is no longer guaranteed. Creativity, adaptability and flexibility have become the hallmarks of a college education, and colleges and universities have an obligation to ensure that graduates will be prepared to recognize problems that were not previously acknowledged, and creative enough to pose workable solutions.

It has been said that the amount of information available in Western society has doubled between 1850 and 1925; doubled again between 1925 and 1950; did so again between 1950 and 1970; and has doubled still again since then. The number of new books published in the United States alone rose from 36,071 in 1970 to 51,058 in 1984. This in addition to the 100,000 titles imported from foreign shores that year.

In the midst of the explosion of knowledge, what is a college or university to do? It was easier to maintain The Great Tradition when we all knew what it was. In our age, and at a college like Montclair, where we actually seek out diversity and multicultural perspectives, it is a real challenge to decide what to teach. With the wonderful scope of our academic program, defining *what should be known* seems almost existentially absurd. Perhaps the more important question is *how* we should teach.

Too many universities have become shops that exist only for the manufacturing of specialists. Often this is done for entirely laudable reasons. Our nation needs more nurses, engineers, and doctors. And to the degree that the university can teach the skills needed in those professions, it should. The faculty assists society in performing that task, since our colleagues have a remarkable amount of information and expertise.

Colleges are indeed centers of factual information, home of the correct, the current, the concise, and the unambiguous. But college classrooms are intended to be more than that. Correct, concise, and unambiguous information is not the only currency valued in learning. There is a kind of teaching that aims to *raise* questions rather than answer them. And there is a value associated with thinking that does the same thing.

Some professors are masters at surrounding ideas in nuance and suggestion, at challenging students without demanding precise answers. This kind of teaching and thinking is an art - itself a way to encourage lifelong learning.

Remember the library in *The Name of the Rose* - laid out in a way that guaranteed knowledge would always appear to be obscure. Only the librarian knew where everything was, and the secret was passed on from his predecessor only on his deathbed. Only the librarian had the right to move through the labyrinth of knowledge; he alone knew where to find the right books and where to replace them. Only he knew the proper location of the volumes, and from their location could tell what secrets, what truths or falsehoods, they contained. Only he had the power to decide who may consult them, because not all truths are for all eyes, not all falsehoods can be recognized by the uninitiated.

Fortunately for us, most faculty do not view their jobs in this way. The quality of the education we provide is greatly assisted by the information we possess, but at the center of the process the human spirit must prevail.

Despite the bad press from Bennett and his friends in Washington, our faculty colleagues are liberally educated persons, people who understand and are committed to collegiate education. They are consultants in ideas, thoughtful facilitators, helping students (and if the truth be told, other faculty as well) as they make the connections between the disciplines, between specialized and general knowledge, so they can become truly self-directed learners.

Long before all the national reports telling us how to do our jobs, many of our colleagues were promoters of active learning, helping to teach students how to think about data, knowledge and information, how to integrate ideas and share experiences.

As one making introductory remarks, I know you are not here to listen to me, and although my present position keeps me out of the classroom sometimes more than I like, I hope these thoughts are useful at a conference like this.

I see your work, and the work of the Institute for Critical Thinking, as a kind of Theatre of Ideas. As an administrator, I realize I have today merely a technical role, leaving the major insights for the faculty. But sometimes as an academic administrator, I am able to work the switches properly, to turn on the "House Lights."

A few years ago, at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Dr. Lewis Thomas, acknowledging that these are not the best of times for the human mind, went on to observe, "I cannot begin to guess at all the causes of our cultural sadness, not even the most important ones, but I can think of one thing that is wrong with us and eats away at us.

We do *not* know *enough* about ourselves. We are ignorant about how we work, about where we fit in, and most of all about the enormous, imponderable system of life in which we are embedded as working parts." Dr. Thomas concluded by saying, "if this century does not slip through our fingers it will be because learning will have directed us away from our splintered dumbness and will have helped us focus on our common goals."

It's my hope that this conference will help us focus on some of these common goals, and ultimately have the effect of improving undergraduate education.

Dr. Gregory Waters is Deputy Provost and Associate Vice President of Academic Affairs at Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, NJ.

The Plenary Papers

The first plenarist, Henry Giroux, addresses the tendency to see issues of education, literacy and critical thinking "as if they have no relation to issues of power, politics and struggle." In his address, *Literacy, Education and the Struggle for Public Life: Towards a Pedagogy of Critical Thinking,* Giroux rejects the current dominant view that sees education as "frontline institutions in the battle for international markets, or as dispensers of an unproblematic Western tradition housed as the cultural warehouse of the Great Books." He challenges the politically neutral view of the university as teaching knowledge and skills and claims that students are introduced to selective ways of life the "privilege the discourse and experiences of the dominant culture."

His analysis requires that academic work must be understood in terms of its "wider connections to public life." Critical thinking, on his view is needed "for people to engage in critical inquiry without fear and under conditions that support individual and collective critical inquiry," pointing to the material and historical conditions of the sanctioned forms of rational discourse and the "governing systems of order, appropriation and exclusion" that support them." Giroux developes a notion of critical literacy that sees itself as "a struggle over relations of meaning in which we make problematic how experience is named and legitimated." This leads him to develop a pedagogy of critical thinking that will "educate students to find their own voices while learning how to both understand and connect such voices to the exercise of social responsibility and civic courage."

Richard Paul, in the second plenary paper, *Critical and Cultural Literacy: Where E.D. Hirsch Goes Wrong,* continues the theme of cultural literacy by challenging Hirsch's view that literacy is based upon "specific shared information" and that education requires no more than "transmission of specific information to children." Paul's challenge is based on five main considerations: 1) distinguishiing possessing information from having knowledge; 2) recognizing social and cultural complexity; 3) seeing reading as critical questioning; 4) understanding the logic of concepts in use; and 5) substituting "background logic" for background knowledge.

Paul ends with examples that support his view that it is critical thinking, not background information from a field, that is required to understand the literature within it. Citing Mortimer Adler's program *Great Books of the Western World,* he claims that thousands of dedicated readers, "Armed with good dictionaries and the conceptual resources of their own minds ... [they] sloughed their way through culturally diverse texts with minimal background knowledge. He ends with a call for education to help students learn "that good readers look up unknown references when necessary, go back and reread, and don't simply keep moving on."

The final plenary paper, *Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines: The Search for an Archimedian Point,* by Mark Weinstein, connects critical thinking with the recent challenge to education based on post-modern theory and multi-cultural awareness. Weinstein sees education as "criticized on all sides for its failures," yet still "expected to perform the seemingly insuperable task of preparing new generations to participate in a rapidly changing world." Weinstein uses the metaphor of the Archimedian point to expose the inadequacy of traditional foundationalism in the face of post-moderism, especially as reflected in the variety of disciplinary approaches found in undergraduate education today. He then turns to the task of constructing a more modest foundationalism sufficiently flexible to address the complexity of the post-modern era, yet stable enough to furnish a "frame of reference seen as supporting an analysis and critique of educational practice."

Weinstein draws from two critical thinking theorists, Harvey Siegel and Matthew Lipman, in order to offer a vision of critical thinking that is "theoretically supportable and relevant to practice," and that supports "the most progressive ethical ideals relevant to education today. He connects the notion of critical thinking he presents to the work of Jurgen Habermas, indicating areas for future research, and presents the model developed at Montclair State. This model, unlike other approaches to critical thinking "makes no claims about the particulars, and so remains open for whatever details of reasoning typify individual modes of inquiry." Most important, all perspectives are subjected to on-going self-correction and are seen in light of contextual concerns, and so critical thinking is available to the standpoint that post-modernism affords.

Literacy, Education, and the Struggle for Public Life: Towards a Pedagogy of Critical Thinking

Henry A. Giroux

I am not going to focus my talk directly on a theory and practice of critical thinking. Many of you know much more about this field than I do, and I am sure that if I did focus exclusively on the issue I would not be able to provide more cogent analyses than those that have been developed in the work of Richard Paul, Robert Ennis, Michael Scriven and others. Instead, I want to advance the relevance of critical thinking as both a pedagogical and political practice through a broader consideration of the relationship between literacy, higher education, and democratic public philosophy. I will first focus on issues that I believe are central to understanding critical thinking as part of a wider political project. I will then attempt to develop some elements of what I will call a pedagogy of critical thinking and cultural politics. In what follows, I want to highlight some of the basic assumptions I develop throughout this talk.

First, in my mind questions concerning education, literacy and critical thinking are often discussed as if they have no relation to issues of power, politics, and struggle. Central to my talk is the argument that critical thinking must be posed as integral to understanding the construction of the political subject as a critical citizen. Within such a context, critical thinking can be situated as part of a broader theory of identity, literacy, and public life. More specifically, viewed within the context of a critical theory of literacy, critical thinking can be analyzed as part of a terrain of struggle in order to more fully understand how meaning and representation function to produce and legitimate particular forms of authority, culture and social practice. In the most general sense, literacy serves to make the connection between knowledge, critical thinking, and power more visible. Literacy in these terms has a problematic character and can never be taken as a given but must be expressed in its meaning and social practices. As such, literacy, like critical thinking, can be defined in pedagogical terms that either adapt people to existing configurations of power, as in the advocacy of functional literacy, or as in the notion of critical thinking as a skill divorced from considerations of power and ideology, or both, can be defined as a set of practices that function to empower people by helping them to read the world and their lives in a critical way so as to change the material and historical conditions that silence them. In the most emancipatory sense, literacy is a political and pedagogical process of naming the world as part of a wider biographical, historical, and collective process. We do not learn how to be literate, we become literate in order to learn how to reclaim our voices, experiences, and histories in order to both interpret the world and to change it. Literacy as an act of naming experience, producing knowledge, and defining what counts as a particular skill always implies a particular relationship between knowledge and power, and always presupposes and legitimates particular forms of history, community and authority. The question is, of course, whose history, community, and voice prevails. Unless this question is addressed, the issue of how we should teach, function as intellectuals, define critical thinking, or relate to our students and the larger society becomes removed from the wider principles that inform such issues. In short, literacy is about the issues of politics, power, and possibility.

Second, underlying the notion of politics and ethics at work in my view of literacy, schooling, and critical thinking is a rejection of the current dominant view in which schools are seen as either frontline institutions in the battle for international markets, or as dispensers of an unproblematic Western tradition housed as the cultural warehouse of the Great Books. What I am protesting here is a relationship between knowledge and power that not only attempts to separate reason from the concept of critical democracy, but also despises the notion of difference, treating it as a deficit and intrusion. In opposition to this view, I want to argue for the importance of developing a public philosophy in which higher education can be understood as a democratic public sphere in which social forms can be developed through forms of critical thinking and social practices that educate students to find their own voices while learning how to both understand and connect such voices to the exercise of social responsibility and civic courage.

Third, I want to argue that the universities do not merely teach knowledge and skills or generate particular pedagogical strategies- they also create and introduce students to particular "kinds of truth and the form of subjectivity and society they give rise to." In other words, they introduce students to selective ways of life and they often do so within asymmetrical relations of power that privilege the discourses and experience of the dominant culture. The point here is that universities not only affirm and privilege particular voices, they also marginalize and silence other voices, and these are generally the voices of subordinate groups whose cultural capital does not have the right exchange rate in both higher education and the society at large. At the very least we need to recognize that schools are about somebody's story, and that story, if it is to expand its possibilities for educating students to be critical rather than merely good citizens, must recognize the multiple narratives and histories that make this country a pluralistic society. This means that we need to educate students to view schools as places that are not merely about the acquisition of knowledge but also about the production of social practices which provide students with a sense of identity, place, worth, and value.

Fourth, I argue that academic work is a form of intellectual labor that can only be understood in terms of its wider connections to public life - and that teachers need to make clear the political and moral referents they use to legitimate the appeals to authority they make in teaching particular forms of knowledge, legitimating particular social relations, and acknowledging the importance of a particular vision of education. In other words, teachers need to have a discourse of ethics and substantive vision. Moreover, critical thinking must be viewed not only as an epistemological practice, but also as a referent for analyzing the social and political conditions needed for people to engage in critical inquiry without fear and under conditions that support individual and collective critical inquiry. Drawing upon Michel Foucault, I want to raise these issues through what he would call archaeological and ethical considerations. In the first instance, this points to the question of how the production in our societies of sanctioned forms of rational discourse can be analyzed according to their material, historical conditions of possibility and their governing systems of order, appropriation, and exclusion. In the second instance, the question to be raised is what kind of relations can the role and activity of the intellectual establish between theoretical research, specialized knowledge, and political struggles? In effect, I want to argue that the very notion of critical thinking has important implications for viewing teachers as engaged and connected intellectuals and that the most important referent for this positions rests in a commitment to eliminate the economic, political, and social basis of human exploitation, suffering, and possible annihilation that we all face in this country, This suggests an obligation to push both history and our own lives and beliefs against the grain, to recover collective memories that testify to the struggle against forms of subordination, and to work to connect our own work as both teachers and educators to ongoing forms of self and social empowerment.

Fifth, I will try to develop a notion of critical literacy as a narrative for agency and a referent for critique-one that defines itself as a struggle over relations of meaning in which we make problematic how experience is named and legitimated- this also suggests a notion of literacy that defines itself as part of a struggle over relations of power - how we mobilize and reconstruct power to work for us rather than against us.

Lastly, I finish up by speaking to some of the implications the above analysis has for developing some fundamental elements for a theory of critical thinking as a pedagogical practice. Here I argue that the academic subjects never speak for themselves and that we need to develop critical pedagogies that affirm student voices by acknowledging the categories of meaning and experience that they bring to the classroom so that we can make them meaningful in order to make them critical, in order to make them transformative. This means helping students to develop a voice capable of speaking in one's own terms, a voice capable of listening, re-telling and also challenging the grounds on which language and meaning are constructed and sustained. This points to developing voices around a politics of difference and community that takes seriously the importance of democratic public life, emancipatory community, and collective imagination and hope. It means developing voices in which we make despair unconvincing and hope practical.

If the relationship between literacy, education, and politics is to be reconceptualized as part of a wider discourse of democracy and public culture, it is important to note that the struggle to link higher education to a democratic public philosophy has a long tradition and can be seen in the work of educators such as John Dewey, George S. Counts, C. Wright Mills, Hannah Arendt and others. In spite of theoretical and ideological distinctions, all of these writers supported a democratic public philosophy in which universities were seen as the major institution for educating students for public life. More specifically, they believed that schools should function in the broader political and social sense to provide students with the knowledge, character, and moral vision they would need to exercise the civic courage, compassion, and leadership necessary to promote and advance the language of radical democracy and freedom. By viewing schools as democratic public spheres, these writers attempted to provide a theoretical foundation for linking power and knowledge to civic politics deeply rooted in a commitment to forms of community life based on the concerns of justice, equality, and solidarity. It is also worth emphasizing that within this public philosophy, democracy and citizenship were not defined as merely an adherence to established laws and constitutional procedures, but as a way of life that had to be fought for, that is, as a way of life that had to be made and remade for each generation. Central to this view of democracy was the belief that the pedagogical was always political because all learning was rooted in a set of fundamental beliefs and practices that served to legitimate particular forms of authority, sustain particular types of communities, and provide particular visions of the future. The point, of course, is that education, whether done critically or not, always presupposed some desired future and has moral and political implications.

I believe that this public philosophy is politically important and theoretically useful for thinking about the role and purpose of the university, particularly as it addresses the importance of producing active and self educating individuals as part of its broader commitment to animating a democratic public culture. That is, the legacy of this public philosophy points to universities as democratic public spheres that can be constructed around forms of critical thinking that dignify meaningful dialogue and human agency, that restores reason as an ally of freedom, and cultivates, broadens and strengthens democratic public life. More specifically, it points to the need for students to be given the opportunity to learn the discourse of public association and social responsibility, and to engage in public dialogue that would encourage forms of moral and political leadership capable of envisioning a world which is not yet, so as to be able to alter the grounds on which life is lived. Such a discourse seeks to recapture the idea of critical democracy as a social movement grounded in a set of practices that embody a fundamental respect for individual freedom and social justice. In addition, viewing universities as democratic public spheres provides a rationale for defending them, along with progressive forms of pedagogy and teacher work, as institutions that perform a public service essential to the construction of the democratic state.

Moreover by defining higher education around the principles of a democratic public philosophy, it becomes possible to illuminate the role that educators might play as engaged and transformative intellectuals who operate under specific conditions of work and who in doing so perform a particular social and political function. The category of transformative intellectual is useful in a number of ways for describing the nature and practice of work that goes on in the university. First, it provides a theoretical basis for examining teacher work as a form of intellectual labor linked to public life, as opposed to defining it in terms that celebrate its technical expertise, or its alleged free floating imperative to merely transmit values and skills. The notion that academics should be viewed as intellectuals points to the creative transformative role they should play in the educational process. Moreover, it is at odds with the idea of viewing teachers as objective, non partisan, dispensers of an unproblematic truth. The normative and political category of intellectual at the very least provides a theoretical starting point for recognizing ideologies which conceal their private interests under a universal rhetoric for recognizing the values which structure and authorize school discourse, and for acknowledging the creative role that academics should play in both producing and legitimating a discourse that speaks to the concerns of the larger society. Second, the concept of transformative intellectual carries with it the imperative to critique and reject those approaches to teacher work that reinforce a technical and social division of labor that disempowers academics by subordinating the discourse of ethics and substantive vision to the language of disciplinary specialism, cultural uniformity, clever methodologies, and operationalized research. In this case, the concept of intellectual provides both a referent and critique of those aspects of academic life which undermine the broader vision and imagination necessary to sustain a politics of democratic difference and hope essential to the very nature of intellectual life. Third, the category highlights the political and ideological interests that structure teacher work and illuminates the various social functions that intellectuals perform.

More specifically, in order to function as intellectuals, teachers must struggle to create the ideological and structural conditions necessary to write, research, and work with each other in producing curricula and sharing power. But in the final analysis, such intellectuals should be concerned with empowering students through the power of struggle and community. I want to elaborate on some of the concerns that are central to assuming the role of a transformative intellectual before I address the more specific concern of developing forms of pedagogy around a theory of critical literacy and cultural politics.

To speak of teachers as transformative intellectuals means that such educators are not simply concerned with forms of pedagogy that promote individual achievement and traditional forms of academic success. Instead, they should also be concerned in their teaching with linking empowerment--the ability to think and act critically--to the concept of social transformation. Teaching for social transformation means educating students to take risks and to struggle within ongoing relations of power in order to be able to alter the ideologic and structural grounds upon which life is lived. Acting as a transformative intellectual means helping students acquire critical knowledge about basic societal structures, such as the economy, the state, the workplace, and mass culture so that such institutions can be open to critical examination and potential transformation; a transformation, in this case, aimed at the progressive humanization of the social order. Moreover, as transformative intellectuals, teachers need to make clear the nature of the appeals to authority they are using to legitimate their pedagogical practices. In other words, such educators need to make clear the political and moral referents for the authority they assume in teaching particular forms of knowledge, taking a stand against forms of oppression, and treating students as if they ought also be concerned about the issues of social justice and political action. In my view, the most important referent for this particular view of authority rests in a commitment to a form of literacy that addresses the important social issues and many instances of suffering that are both a growing and threatening part of everyday life in America and abroad. The pedagogical rationality at work here is one that believes that academics as transformative and public intellectuals have an important and historic opportunity to reclaim the language of democracy, citizenship and social responsibility. Instead of weaving dreams limited to the private imperatives of material success, teachers as transformative intellectuals can work to become part of a collective effort to build and revitalize a democratic culture. Such teachers can work collectively to refuse the role of the disconnected expert, specialist, or careerist, and adopt in its place that of the practice of the engaged intellectual. This is not a call for educators to become wedded to some abstract ideal that removes them from everyday life, that turns them into prophets of perfection and certainty; on the contrary, as engaged and transformative intellectuals teachers undertake social criticism not as an outsider but as someone who addresses the most important social and political issues of their community and society, as someone who has intimate knowledge with the workings of everyday life, and as someone who makes organic connections with the historical traditions that provide students with a voice, history and sense of belonging.

I believe that it is in this combination of critique, the reconstruction of the relationship between knowledge and power, the commitment to enabling those who have been silenced to speak, along with a belief in the importance of reconstructing public life, that the basis exists for a theory of critical thinking, critical literacy, and pedagogy that is both empowering and transformative. Of course, developing a rationale for assuming the role of a transformative intellectual does not guarantee that a pedagogy of critical thinking will follow. But it does point to principles for making such a pedagogy possible. Furthermore, it establishes the criteria for organizing curricula and classroom social relations around goals designed to prepare students to understand and value the relation between an existentially lived public space and their own practical learning.

I want to further argue that if the idea of literacy is to be developed around principles consistent with a notion of higher education as a democratic public sphere and supportive of teachers as transformative intellectuals, it is important to develop and engage forms of critical pedagogy that embody these principles and practices. Central to the development of such a pedagogical practice is what I call literacy as a form of cultural politics.

Critical Literacy as a Precondition for Self and Social Empowerment

In the broadest political sense, critical literacy is both a narrative for agency as well as a referent for critique. As a narrative for agency, literacy becomes synonymous with an attempt to rescue history, experience, and vision from conventional discourse and dominant social relations. It means developing the theoretical and practical conditions through which human beings can locate themselves in their own histories and in doing so make themselves present as agents in the struggle to expand the possibilities of human life and freedom. Literacy in these terms is not the equivalent of emancipation. It is in a more limited but essential way the precondition for engaging in struggles around both relations of meaning and relations of power. To be literate is *not* to be free, it is to be present and active in the struggle for reclaiming one's voice, history, and future. Just as *illiteracy* does not explain the causes of massive unemployment, bureaucracy, or the growing racism in major cities in the United States, South Africa, and elsewhere, literacy neither automatically reveals nor guarantees social, political, and economic freedom.

If the concept of critical literacy is to be developed in conjunction with the theoretical notions of narrative and agency, then it is important that the knowledge, values, and social practices that constitute the story/narrative of schooling be understood as embodying particular interests and relations of power regarding how one should think, live, and act with regard to the past, present and future. At its best, a theory of critical literacy needs to develop pedagogical practices which further the need for teachers and students to recover their own voices so they can retell their own histories and in so doing "check and criticize the history [they] are told against the one they have lived." This means more, however, than simply the re-telling and comparision of stories. In order to move beyond a pedagogy of voice that suggests that all stories are innocent, it is important to examine such stories around the interests and principles that structure them and to interrogate them as a part of a political project (in the widest sense) that may enable or undermine the values and practices which provide the foundation for social justice, equality, and democratic community. In its more radical sense, critical literacy means making oneself present as part of a moral and political project that links the production of meaning to the possibility for human agency, democratic community, and transformative social action.

Literacy as Liberating Memory

Literacy in this sense means more than breaking with the predefined, or as Walter Benjamin has said, "Brushing history against the grain." It also means understanding the details of everyday life and the social grammar of the concrete through the larger categories of history and social context. As part of the discourse of narrative and agency, critical literacy suggests using history as a form of liberating memory. To reconstruct history in this view is to situate the meaning and practices of literacy in an ethical discourse that takes as its referent those instances of suffering that need to be remembered and overcome. As a liberating element of remembrance, historical inquiry becomes more than a mere preparation for the future by means of recovering a series of past events; instead, it becomes a model for constituting the radical potential of memory. That is, it is a sober witness to the oppression and pain endured needlessly by history's victims and a text for the exercise of critical suspicion, highlighting not only the sources of suffering that need to be remembered so as not to be repeated, but also the subjective side of human struggle and hope. Put another way, liberating remembrance and the forms of critical literacy it supports expresses its dialectical nature in both its demystifying critical impulse, bearing sober witness to the sufferings of the past, and in the selected and fleeting images of hope that it offers up to the present.

As part of the language of possibility, a critical theory of literacy and pedagogy provides a crucial insight into the learning process by linking the dynamics of learning with the dreams, experiences, histories, and languages that students bring to schools. In my view, it is important that teachers learn to confirm student experiences and voices so that students are legitimated and supported as people who matter, who can participate in their learning, and who in doing so can speak with a voice that is rooted in their sense of history and place. This is a view of literacy that recognizes that people read the world before they read the word, and that reading the word should further enable them not only to read the world but to engage the world as social and political agents.

In what follows, I want to develop the notion of voice as a central part of the discourse of literacy and pedagogy and extend its implications to curriculum development by arguing that if we, as educators, are going to give student experience a central place in our curricula and classroom practices, we have to redefine curriculum not as a warehouse of knowledge merely to be passed on to waiting consumers but, more importantly, as a configuration of knowledge, social relations and values that represent an introduction to and legitimation of a particular way of life. At the very least this means recognizing that colleges and universities are about somebody's story, and that story, if it is to expand its possibilities for educating students to be critical rather than good citizens, must recognize the multiple narratives and histories that make one's country a pluralistic society. Educational programs need to provide students with an understanding of how knowledge and power come together to both enable and silence the voices of different students. Coming to voice means moving from silence to speech as an oppositional gesture-as a metaphor for self-transformation; it assumes a primacy in talk, discourse, writing and action; it means connecting ourselves to forms of self and social empowerment that allow us to move from being an object to a subject, to speak to the varied dimensions of our lives. This suggests that learning is not merely about the acquisition of knowledge but also about the production of social practices that provide students with a sense of identity, worth, and value. In other words, we need a theory of pedagogy which alerts us and helps us to overcome how schooling makes some students voiceless, how teachers are reduced to technicians, how particular forms of authority subvert the ethical force and possibilities of educational leadership and learning, and how we might move beyond these types of pedagogical relations.

This means that the issue of student experience will have to be analyzed as part of a wider relationship between culture and power. Let me be more specific. Universities are not merely instructional sites designed to transmit knowledge, they are also cultural sites. As cultural sites, they generate and embody support for particular forms of culture, as is evident in the school's support for specific ways of speaking, the legitimating of distinct forms of knowledge, the privileging of certain histories and patterns of authority, and the confirmation of particular ways of experiencing and seeing the world. Universities often give the appearance of transmitting a common culture, but in fact they, more often than not, legitimate what can be called a dominant culture. Moreover, they are not uniform places simply catering democratically to the needs of different students, they are characterized by the presence of students from both dominant and subordinate cultures, with the dominant culture often sanctioning the voices of white, middle class students, while simultaneously disconfirming or ignoring the voices of students form subordinate groups, whether they be black, working class, Hispanic, or other minority groups.

At issue here is understanding that student experience has to be understood as part of an interlocking web of power relations in which some groups of students are often privileged over others. But if we are to view this insight in an important way, we must understand that it is imperative for teachers to critically examine the cultural backgrounds and social formations out of which their students produce the categories they use to give meaning to the world. For teachers are not merely dealing with students who have individual interests, they are dealing primarily with individuals whose stories, memories, narratives and reading of the world are inextricably related to wider social and cultural formation and categories. The issue here is not merely one of relevance but one of power. I believe that a theory of critical pedagogy gains an important political and cultural dimension when incorporating a more critical understanding of how experience is named, produced, sustained, and rewarded in schools. That is, teachers need a critical language that allows them to understand how school knowledge and classroom social relations are constructed, disseminated, and legitimated in everyday instruction and how the underlying interests embodied in them functions so as to enable or disable student learning. At the heart of such a pedagogical understanding are important ethical and political concerns.

I also believe that developing a pedagogy that takes the notion of student experience seriously means developing a critically affirmative language that works both with and on the experiences that students bring to the classroom. This means not only taking seriously and confirming the language forms, modes of reasoning, dispositions, and histories that give students an active voice in defining the world, it also means working on the experiences of such students in order for them to examine both their strengths and weaknesses. Student experience, like the culture and society of which it is a part, is not all of one piece, and it is important to sort through its contradictions and to give students the chance to not only confirm themselves but also to raise the question: *What is it this society has made of me that I no longer want to be?* There are two issues at work here. First, it is important for students to both understand and cleanse themselves of the hatred and contempt that often constructs the identity of those labeled as "the other" whether they be women, blacks, ethnics, or working class students. Pedagogically, this means teaching students to understand how difference is produced, legitimated, and sustained as part of the discourse of hatred and domination; and that this discourse reproduces particular interests and identities which must be challenged and transformed as part of a movement into self-love, self-respect, and self and collective determination. Second, it is important for students to affirm their histories and voices while simultaneously analyzing how the dominant powers and groups create experiences and policies that affect those who are powerless. This suggest teaching students forms of literacy that not only engage the richness of their own communities and the ideologies at work in the discourse of the dominant culture, it also means teaching students how to critically appropriate the codes and vocabularies of different cultural experiences so as to provide them with the skills they will need in order to define and shape, rather than simply serve, in the modern world. In other words, students need to understand the richness and strengths of other cultural traditions, other voices, particularly as these point to forms of self and social empowerment, that is, take seriously what it means to educate students *to learn how to govern in the broad political sense.*

It is important at this point to stress that a pedagogy of critical thinking and cultural politics is not merely about the discourse of skills and techniques administrators and teachers use in order to meet predefined, given knowledge and objectives. The teaching and learning of skills is insufficient for referencing both what educators actually do in terms of the underlying principles and values that structure their beliefs and work, and for providing the language necessary to critically analyze how school administration and classroom practice relate to future visions of community life. What critical pedagogy refers to in this case is a deliberate attempt on the part of teachers to influence how and what knowledge and subjectivities are produced within particular sets of social relations. It draws attention to the ways in which knowledge, power, desire, and experience are produced under the basic conditions of learning. It does not reduce educational practice to the question of what works, it stresses the importance of understanding what actually happens in classrooms by raising questions regarding "what knowledge is of most worth, in what direction should one desire, and what it means to know something" (Simon, 1988, p.2). But the language of pedagogy does something more. Pedagogy is simultaneously about the knowledge and practices that administrators, teachers, and students might engage in together and the cultural politics such practices support. It is in this sense that to propose a pedagogy is at the same time to construct a political vision. In what follows, I want to point to what I consider to be some of the basic elements of what can be broadly construed as a pedagogy of critical thinking.

Before I develop these considerations, a few qualifications are in order here. Critical thinking, as inferred from these pedagogical practices, is not about simply hearing opposing opinions. It is about being able to make judgments through reflection and civil dialogue about the substance of one's life, community, and the larger social order. Critical thinking is a necessary but insufficient condition for creating public citizens who can take risks, get involved, and learn how to make a difference. At stake here is the need to develop human capacities that allow students to not merely adapt but to challenge social forms, to both reason critically and to develop capacities for empathy, compassion, and commitment. The development of such capacities are not merely about questions of thinking and judgment, but also about the construction of needs and desires through the organization of social practices that allow students to immerse themselves in the dynamics of daily life, to place their bodies on the line, and to rub history against the grain of poverty, oppression, and subjugation. The point, of course, is that critical thinking as what Richard Paul might call its strong sense can never be beyond the reach of power; it must always engage the relationship between power and knowledge as a discourse of politics, ethics, and struggle. Critical thinking is irrelevant to the practice of freedom if it tells us nothing about how power and freedom work. In this case, critical thinking is about more than self-awareness or the awakening of consciousness, it is fundamentally about reading the world differently so that one can imagine and feel what it means to take responsible action, to allow our thinking to be grounded in forms of solidarity that support collective action and struggle, and to take risks that will enable the conditions necessary for realizing peace and justice.

First, teachers must create classroom social relations that allow students to speak and to appreciate the nature of difference as both a basis for democratic tolerance and as a fundamental condition for critical dialogue and the development of forms of solidarity rooted in the principles of trust, sharing and a commitment to improving the quality of human life. In this case, the notion of voice is developed around a politics of difference and community that is not rooted in simply a celebration of plurality but in a particular form of human community that allows and dignifies plurality as part of an ongoing effort to develop social relations in which all voices in their differences become unified in their efforts to identify and recall moments of human suffering and the need for the conditions that perpetuate such suffering to be overcome. This is a power-sensitive pedagogy that engages difference as part of the broader discourse of justice, equality and community.

Second, teachers should provide students with the opportunity to interrogate different languages or ideological discourses as they are developed in an assortment of texts and curriculum materials. This is important because it provides the basis for students to critically analyze the forms of intelligibility, interests, and moral and political considerations that different voices embody. Examining such discourses must be done not only as a form of ideology-critique intended to uncover and demystify how knowledge claims distort reality, but also as an attempt to recover and reconstruct knowledge that embodies interests which allows students to more fully understand their own histories in order to be able to analyze the dominant forms of history they are presented against the histories that actually construct their everyday lives. In this case, all aspects of curriculum knowledge and pedagogy can be examined as historical constructions that embody particular interests that not only shape the content and forms of subjectivity.

Third, such a pedagogy must take seriously the articulation of a morality that posits a language of public life, emancipatory community, and individual and social commitment. What is at issue here is a definition of citizenship that is inseparable from the project of radical and plural democracy. This represents a notion of citizenship that extends the democratic principles of liberty and equality to the widest possible set of relations. In other words, students need to be introduced to a language of morality that allows them to think about how community life should be constructed around a shared conception of social justice. It is worth stressing that there is no political community without a shared conception of social justice; one that is built on a reconstructed conception of political, economic, and social rights. Fundamental here is what it means to be a human being and to recognize those ideological and material constraints that restrict human possibilities, especially those that function to improve the quality of human life for all. A discourse of morality is important both because it points to the need to educate students to fight and struggle in order to advance the discourse and principles of critical democracy, and because it provides a referent against which students can decide what forms of life and conduct are most appropriate morally amid the welter of knowledge claims and interests they confront in making choices in a world of competing and diverse ideologies. At issue here is a conception of public life that refers to the shared political ends of a democratic political community. That is, that take seriously the principles of freedom and equality for all, that argues for forms of democratic citizenship that acknowledges the heterogeneous, the multiple, and the particular as part of a political community which produces a forum for creating unity without denying specificity.

Fourth, as part of the discourse of literacy and voice, critical educators need to examine the social and political interests that construct their own voices. It is especially important that teachers critically engage how such ideological interests structure their ability both to teach and to learn with others. A critical theory of literacy and voice must remain attentive to Paulo Freire's claim that all critical educators are also learners. This is not merely a matter of learning about what students might know. It is more importantly a matter of learning how to renew a form of self-knowledge through an understanding of the community and culture that actively constitute the lives of one's students. Along with the implication that educators need to engage in constantly both the word and the world is the less obvious assumption that teachers need to develop pedagogies in which teachers and students engage each other as agents of different/similar cultures. This points to how important it is for teachers to develop pedagogies that allow them to assert their own voices while still being able to encourage students to affirm, tell, and retell their personal narratives by exercising their own stories. It also suggests that the institutional and self-constituted authority that provides the basis for teacher discourse is no excuse for refusing students the opportunity to question its most basic assumptions. This is not an argument for undermining or eliminating the authority and basis for teacher voice as much as it is for providing the pedagogical basis for understanding how and why such authority is constructed and what purpose it serves. It is also important that teachers recognize how they often silence students, even when they act out of the best of intentions. This suggests being critically attentive not only to the immediacy of one's voice as part of the established apparatus of power, but also to the fears, resistance, and skepticism that students from subordinate groups bring with them to the school setting.

Finally it is important to stress that universities and colleges take seriously what it means not merely to link learning to the mastery of specific disciplines or subject areas but to educate students to undertake the language of social criticism, to display moral courage, and to connect rather than distance themselves from the most pressing problems and opportunities of the times. We need, at the risk of over-emphasizing this point, to provide models of leadership that offer the promise of reforming schools as part of a wider revitalization of public life. Central to this notion of leadership would be questions regarding the relationship between power and knowledge, learning and empowerment, and authority and human dignity. These questions need to be examined as part of a political discourse that organizes the energies of a moral vision that raises issues about how educational leaders can work for the reconstruction of social imagination in the service of human freedom. Some theorists have argued that it is enough to get teachers to merely acknowledge they have a point of view. I would argue that educators need to understand more critically what they know and how they come to know in a way that enables them to presuppose a notion of democratic public life that is worth struggling for. More specifically, this means providing prospective and existing educators a program that would offer, as vital to their self and social formation as educational leaders, the following elements of pedagogy of critical thinking.

First, they would be given the opportunity to develop *perspective*. By perspective I mean the awareness that the way things are is not the way they have always been or must necessarily be in the future. To have perspective is to link the notion of historical inquiry to the imperatives of moral and political agency; it is to locate ourselves and our visions inside of rather than outside of the language of history and possibility. Second, educational administrators, teachers, and students would be immersed in the language of social criticism, rendered here as a deliberate notion of unveiling, negation, and problematizing. This refers to developing the ability and skills to think in oppositional terms, to deconstruct the assumptions and interests that limit and legitimate the very questions we ask as educational leaders. It means understanding the limits of our own language as well as the implications of the social practices we construct on the basis of the language that can question public forms, address social injustices, and break the tyranny of the present.

Third, educators need to be skilled in the language of remembrance. Remembrance rejects the notion of knowledge as merely an inheritance and transmission as its only form of practice. Remembrance sees knowledge as a social and historical construction that is always the object of struggle. It is not preoccupied with the ordinary but with that which is distinctive and extraordinary - it is concerned not with societies that are quiet, which reduce learning to reverence, procedure and whispers, but with forms of public life that are noisy, that are engaged in dialogue and vociferous speech. In this view, truth is not merely contained in practice, it is also part of the world of recollections, historical memory, and the tales and stories of not only those who have established a well-known legacy of democratic struggle but also those who have too often been silenced, excluded or marginalized. It is part of a linguistic universe in which, as one philosopher put it, the citizen can recognize what it means to exist as partisans of a community that embrace the project of radical and plural democracy.

Finally, educators need a language of imagination, one which both insists and enables them to consider the structure, movement and possibilities in the contemporary order of things and how we might act to prevent the barbaric and develop those aspects of public life that point to its best and as yet unrealized possibilities. This is the language of critical thinking that points to the promise of democratic possibilities not realized.

Conclusion

I want to end by arguing that we must prevent democracy from retreating to the periphery of public life, from receeding further from the everyday life of the academy, and from collapsing into ideologies and practices that embody and perpetuate forms of social and moral irresponsibility. This means that we will have to fight hard to rescue the language of tradition, morality, and possibility from the militarists, ideological fundamentalists, and corporate technocrats who are more aggressive than ever in smothering those voices that don't represent their own interests and who threaten the quality of life and civil liberties that need to be preserved and extended in this country. This means that we will have to struggle collectively as educators. We must develop a social vision and commitment to make the liberal arts supportive of a democratic public sphere in which despair will become unconvincing and hope practical for students and teachers alike, regardless of race, class, religion, gender, or age. Within this project, the language of critique and hope can be united in the formulation of a new public philosophy in which higher education would contribute to the establishment of a just and compassionate community, within which a project of possibility becomes the guiding principle of teaching, learning, and social practice.

Critical and Cultural Literacy: Where E. D. Hirsch Goes Wrong

Richard Paul

Hirsch on Cultural Literacy

The term 'cultural literacy' has been popularized by E. D. Hirsch in a book of the same name. Its subtitle is "What Every American Needs to Know." The basic argument of the book is simple. Indeed, it is well characterized in the dust jacket of the hard cover edition as a "manifesto." Hirsch's call to arms is not addressed to the workers of the world but rather to the educators of the world, or, more accurately, *American* educators. Hirsch argues that there is a discrete, relatively small body of specific information possessed by all literate Americans and that this information is the foundation not only of American culture but also the key to literacy and education. Hirsch reasons as follow. Because there is a "descriptive list of the information actually possessed by literate Americans" (xiv), and because "all human communities are founded upon specific shared information" (xv) and because "shared culture requires transmission of specific information to children" (xxvii), it follows that "the basic goal of education in a human community is acculturation" (xvi) . Furthermore, because,

> Books and newspapers assume a 'common reader', that is, a person who knows the things known by other literate persons in the culture, ... Any reader who doesn't possess the knowledge assumed in a piece he or she reads will in fact be illiterate with respect to that particular piece of writing (p. 13).

In his reasoning, Hirsch links the having of a discrete body of information not only with learning to read but also with becoming educated and indeed with achieving success ("To be culturally literate is to possess the basic information needed to thrive in the modern world.") (xiii). Hirsch plays down the need for critical thinking and emphasizes instead that the information needed for cultural literacy does not have to be deeply understood:

> The superficiality of the knowledge we need for reading and writing may be unwelcome news to those who deplore superficial learning and praise critical thinking over mere information (p. 15).

The culturally literate, according to Hirsch, often possess common cultural content in a way that is "telegraphic, vague and limited" (p.26). Those concerned with critical thinking, on the other hand, Hirsch alleges, are exclusively concerned with "abstract skills" and are unconcerned with "cultural content" (p. 27). Yet, he claims, it is precisely this finite quantity of "cultural content" that empowers students to read, write, and achieve success. In Hirsch's mind, therefore, it is a mistake to criticize rote learning:

> Our current distaste for memorization is more pious than realistic. At an early age when their memories are most retentive, children have an almost instinctive urge to learn specific tribal traditions. At that early age they seem to be fascinated by catalogues of information and are eager to master the materials that authenticate their membership in adult society (p. 30).

The result is that Hirsch believes himself to have discovered the "key to all other fundamental improvements in American education," (p. 2) and "the only sure avenue of opportunity for disadvantaged children," (xiii) "traditional literate knowledge", and "the information attitudes, and assumptions that literate Americans share" (p. 127) which, if transmitted to students, - even superficially - will make them culturally literate. Once educators recognize these facts, Hirsch confidently believes that "a straight-forward plan" to reform education can be set out. In this plan educators would set aside "abstract formalism" and the ill-conceived focus on critical thinking, "abstract skills", and carry out instead three tasks: *1)* "reach an accord about the contents of the national vocabulary and a good sequence for presenting it (p. 141), *2)* "shift the reading materials used in kindergarten through eighth grade to a much stronger base in factual information and traditional lores" (p. 140), and *3)* "develop general knowledge tests for three different stages of schooling" (p. 143). These simple steps, Hirsch holds, will ensure that all citizens will become not only culturally literate readers but autonomous persons as well:

> It should energize people to learn that only a few hundred pages of information stand between the literate and the illiterate, between dependence and autonomy (p. 143).

What's Wrong with Hirsch's View

There are many problems with Hirsch's reasoning . In the first place, it is simplistic. It suffers from the same faults as all panaceas, all attempts to reduce the complex and multi-faceted to the simple and uncomplicated. Reading, culture, and education are more profound than they appear in Hirsch's neat and tidy world. There are many more distinctions to be drawn than Hirsch entertains and many of the concepts which he analyzes superficially need a more refined, a more precise analysis. To understand how to help students become empowered readers and autonomous persons who thrive in the modern world, we must lay our foundations more carefully and deeply than Hirsch suggests. We must draw careful distinctions and come to terms with complexities which he ignores.

1) We must take care to distinguish possessing information from having knowledge. Hirsch uses the terms 'information' and 'knowledge' synonymously throughout his book. Yet 'information' may be false, biased, incomplete, or misleading while the word 'knowledge,' in contrast, implies solid epistemic grounding. If I *know* something, I do not merely *believe* it. I grasp the evidence or reasons that account for or make intuitive its truth. 'False information' is intelligible. 'False knowledge' is not. As educators, therefore, we cannot be satisfied to merely transmit information. We must be concerned with how students receive and internalize information - if knowledge is an important end of education. As educators we want students to learn how to gain *genuine* knowledge, not simply what is commonly accepted as such. We do not want our students to become informational blotters, open to the manipulation of propagandists. We want them to learn how to question what is presented as the truth. We want them to routinely look for reasons and evidence to support, qualify, or refute what others simply accept uncritically and we want them to *understand* what they learn. This point can be put another way. There are significant differences between the processes of indoctrination, socialization, training and education. These words should not be used synonymously. Yet apparently Hirsch sees no reason to distinguish them. He recognizes, as far as I can see, no contradiction in the sentence "Jane is very well educated with only one proviso: she cannot think for herself."

2) We must recognize the complexity of society and culture and the extent to which they are necessarily a central point of intellectual and social debate. Since both society and culture, whatever their character, are dynamic, and different groups have an interest in how they evolve and change, these same groups have an interest in how their history is told.

A conservative's account of society and culture differs from a liberal's account. Conservatives play up what liberals play down. Liberals play up what conservatives play down. Often the difference is less a disagreement about what happened, than about whether this ar that happening should be included in the account at all. Moreover, after the problem of inclusion is settled, further problems arise regarding how much space to give an event, how it should be characterized, and what we should learn from it. Conservatives often emphasize how past practice is worth preserving; liberals often emphasize how it should be corrected or transformed. These opposing construals have implications for our analysis of social problems and issues.

Much depends on whether one defines culture in terms of articulated ideals (however little they were practiced) or in terms of living practices (however distant from the ideal). So when Hirsch says that "We (Americans) believe in altruism and self-help, in equality, freedom, truth telling, and respect for the national law" (p. 99), his statement is ambiguous. He does not say whether he refers to articulated ideals or living practices. And when he says,

> Besides these vague principles, American culture fosters such myths about itself as its practicality, ingenuity, inventiveness, and independent-mindedness, its connection with the frontier, and its beneficence in the world (even when its leaders do not always follow beneficent policies) (p. 98).

one does not know what status we should give to the term 'myths.' If it is part of our cultural tradition to foster false beliefs about ourselves, then it is odd to consider this dimension of our culture as a manifestation of our belief in "truth telling". Or is belief in our truth telling itself a myth to be transmitted? If so, is it to be transmitted *as a myth?* It is unclear how this dimension of our culture should be "transmitted" to the young. Hirsch tries to side-step this issue by arguing that our national culture is not coherent and therefore,

> What counts in the sphere of public discourse is simply being able to use the language of culture in order to communicate *any* point of view effectively (p. 103).

What he fails to take into account is that *how we pass on our culture* shapes what *our culture is.* If we pass on our culture so that they young uncritically accept myths as facts, then we cultivate uncritical thinking and uncritical conformity as part of our culture. If, however, we pass on our culture so that students must face the challenge of defining our culture, so that students hear and have to respond to alternative conceptualizations of our culture, then we cultivate critical thinking and independence of thought as part of our culture. These differing approaches to one's understanding of culture and its continuity have implications for our understanding of the process of cultural literacy as manifested in reading.

3) Reading as a mode of cultural literacy is intrinsically a mode of critically questioning what one reads. Hirsch repeatedly shows that reading is intrinsically a mode of thinking:

> The reader's mind is constantly inferring meanings that are not directly stated by the words of a text but are nonetheless part of its essential content. The explicit meanings of a piece of writing are the tip of an iceberg of meaning; the larger part lies below the surface of the text and is composed of the reader's own relevant knowledge (p. 34).

Unfortunately, Hirsch understands this process of inference to be fundamentally an uncritical or robotic process, a process that relies on "telegraphic, vague, and limited" meanings and associations. The issue, as I see it, is not "Does the extraction or construction of meaning depend on inferences based on prior knowledge?" The issue is "How does the *good* reader extract or construct meanings through inference?" Hirsch appears to forget that the information we use to construct meanings are of multiple types, some (when misused in reading) lead us to distort or misconstrue the text. Reading a text is analogous to interpreting a situation. And remember we often construct interpretations as a result of our prejudices, biases, hates, fears, stereotypes, caricatures, self-delusions, and narrowmindedness. Our experience is not then less inferential. The poor reader makes inferences just as much as the good reader. The biased person makes inferences just as much as the relatively unbiased person does. Both reading texts and interpreting situations require insight into the multiple ways we can *mis-read* and *misinterpret.*

Reading is not a good in itself but only as it contributes to our understanding, only as it enriches us, enabling us to see things more truly, more faithfully. By the same token, experience is not a good in itself. Better no experience of a person or culture than a highly distorted experience of that person or culture. If reading and interpretation are to contribute to our education, they must reflect an emerging disciplining of mind and therefore of the mind's inferences. To do this requires a lot more than information that is "telegraphic" or vague". It requires what might be called, for want of a better term, *critical literacy.*

4) Critically literate readers must learn to distinguish the sources of the concepts they use to make inferences and most importantly must understand the logic of those concepts. The critically literate reader routinely distinguishes cultural association from empirical facts, data from interpretations, evidence from conclusions, believing from knowing, having convictions from being stubborn, having judgment from being judgmental, conversation from gossip, mastery from domination.

If in a text the word 'democracy' appears, critically literate readers do not ramble through a panoply of cultural associations such as images of Democratic and Republican conventions, balloons, ads on T.V., apple pie, motherhood, our government, Abraham Lincoln,..... Instead they probe the conceptual essence of the word 'democracy:' "the people govern." One constructs legitimate paraphrases of the word, such as "a form of government in which political power is in the hands of the people collectively rather than concentrated in the hands of a few." One recognizes that it stands in contrast to oligarchy, monarchy, and plutocracy. One achieves, in other words, command of what the word implies to educated speakers of the English language. One distinguishes educated uses of the word from uneducated or culturally narrowminded uses.

For example, in the U.S. careless speakers often assume a necessary semantic relationship between the word 'democracy' and the word 'capitalism' or 'free enterprise.' They assume that a particular economic system - a market economy - is part of the very meaning of the word 'democratic.' With this culturally biased conceptual assumption they pre-judge a variety of empirical issues.

Critically literate persons continually distinguish undisciplined and often misleading cultural associations from educated use. The word 'love' does not imply to educated speakers of the English language what it implies in Hollywood movies and soap operas. It takes intellectual discipline for speakers of a language to free themselves from the domination of the cultural associations that surround a word or phrase and grasp the trans-cultural meaning inherent in educated use. We tend to forget, for example, that there are educated speakers of English in virtually every country of the world and that the educated use of English, and all other natural languages, is not a simple reflection of the culturally dominant images and associations of any given culture that happens to use it. Learning to speak and write educated English does not presupposed U. S. or British or Australian of New Zealand cultural conditioning.

Hirsch seems oblivious of this essential insight, of this necessary discipline. He never mentions how an uncritical following of a cultural association that flies in the face of educated usage can cause a reader to misconstrue a text.

5) Background logic, not background knowledge, is the crucial element to reading for understanding. All writing that purports to convey knowledge or insight is structured by ideas and concepts in some logical relationships to each other. There are four dimensions of background logic that the educated, critical reader can probe: *1)* the source of the ideas or concepts, *2)* the substructure of the ideas or concepts, *3)* the implications or consequences of the ideas or concepts, and *4)* the relationships of the ideas to other ideas, similar and different. Since to read we must use our own thinking to figure our another's though, critical readers form hypotheses about the author's possible meanings by trying our models from their own thought and experience. What could be meant, what is being implied by this or that sentence? If this is implied how does that square with what appears to be implied in the next sentence? Let's see, could this or that experience of mine be what the author has in mind? If so, then he or she will also imply or assume this. Does he or she? Let me look further into the text.

One begins with the assumption that writers are logical and consistent. One begins with the most charitable interpretation of what they are saying, trying to come up with the strongest most insightful construal consistent with the text. One takes on the author's standpoint imaginatively and empathically. One tries to reason from the author's assumptions. One looks for evidence and experience to support what the author is saying. Only when one cannot find such evidence and support does a critical reader entertain the possibility that the text may be flawed conceptually or empirically.

This mode of critical reading was delineated many years ago by Mortimer Adler in his excellent book, *How to Read a Book*. In it he emphasizes how disciplined critical readers can figure out the basic logic of a text even when they don't have much of the background knowledge that would make it easier to read. This analytic process was used in the circle of peoples who read the Great Books of the Western World without the technical background in each book's field - psychology, philosophy, economics, physics,... Armed with good dictionaries and the conceptual resources of their own minds thousands of dedicated readers sloughed their way through culturally diverse texts with minimal background knowledge. What they did is similar to what I did when I spent three days reading technical articles in medical journals at the U. C. Medical School Library to help a family member evaluate the status of research on his medical problem. I had virtually none of the background knowledge of the typical readers (doctors), but I did know how to use a dictionary and the resources of my own mind.

With effort and struggle and some conceptual puzzlement, I was able to identify three distinguishable therapeutic approaches to the medical problem I was researching. I was also able to identify arguments that advocates of each were using in support of their own and in opposition to the other proposed treatments. I was then able to hold my own in subsequent discussions with medical proponents of those approaches. This ability to determine the basic logic of a text in the absence of the standard background knowledge of those it was written for is one of the hallmarks of critically literate readers. It enabled me to read technical articles by cognitive psychologists, anthropologists, economists, and others even though they each presupposed background knowledge within their fields that I lacked.

Having background knowledge presupposed in a text is a matter of *degree*. The less you have, the more you have to figure out. A critically literate reader, like a cryptographer, can reconstruct much of what is not given by reasoning analytically from what is given. It is much more important for students to learn that good readers look up unknown references when necessary, go back and reread, and don't simply keep moving on, than for students to be given lots of background. Even the best readers do not immediately understand everything they read. Students need practice learning this kind of reading, as well as practice reading material on which they have background.

Richard Paul is Director of the Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique at Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, CA.

Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines:
The Search for an Archimedian Point

Mark Weinstein

Criticized on all sides for its failures, education is still expected to perform the seemingly insuperable task of preparing new generations to participate in a rapidly changing world. Confronted with this demand, philosophically minded educators search for an Archimedian point: some standpoint from which justification for practice may ensue. The task, difficult under the best of circumstances, is confounded by criticism of the project itself, for the research program through which the project has been carried forward is itself under fire.

Analytic philosophy, the framework of choice for most recent philosophy of education, has proved too weak to address the complex epistemological and normative issues that educators have been forced to confront in recent years. Post-modernism, seen as a theory of culture, and the increasing awareness of multi-culturalism as constituting the reality of educational practice, have combined with feminist and other social critiques to challenge much of philosophical business as usual.

Psychology, the other pillar for the justification of educational practice, has fared as badly. Developmentalism is under siege. Educational measurement, the bulwark of practice in recent times, appears to exhibit socially unacceptable biases. Moreover, quantitative methodology and the positivist analysis of science that supported it has been challenged by qualitative methodologists and critical theorists. The available tools for furnishing adequate descriptions and plausible explanations within the theory and practice of education are no longer available without controversy.

In the following, I will attempt to describe a candidate for a suitable Archimedian point upon which a philosophy of educational practice can be constructed. The candidate I propose is some heir to the current movement for educational reform through critical thinking, increasingly influential in the United States. The availability of critical thinking as a foundation for education can be warranted in terms of a number of plausible desiderata for any frame of reference seen as supporting an analysis and critique of educational practice. First, a framework for understanding education must be theoretically supportable and relevant to practice. Second, it must address the current concern with multi-culturalism and the recent critique of Enlightenment universalism. Third, it should furnish some relatively objective standpoint, a standpoint that can be warranted by considerations not limited to some particular cultural context. Finally, it should support the normative stance that reflects the most progressive ethical ideals relevant to education today.

As we shall see, it is arguable that critical thinking satisfies these desiderata. In addition, it reflects back on the notion of the Archimedian point itself, reconstituting the notion in a manner that addresses the insights that underly the post-modern critique of enlightenment universalism.

Before we begin: Why the metaphor of the Archimedian point? The first reason is historical; the metaphor is a commonly used symbol of the enlightenment search for a standpoint whose robustness permits a stable and durable perspective from which critical reflection can draw its strength. To quote Descartes' classic statement: "Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way, I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain, and indubitable."[1]

Descartes' version of the Archimedian point is no mere historical curiosity, for it includes an element that has characterized foundational accounts throughout subsequent philosophical history. Descartes, like other enlightenment philosophers who sought an epistemological ground for inquiry, required that the ground be "certain and indubitable." This, as we shall see, is too strong a demand. Inquiry, and its epistemological foundations, are contextually embedded in discourse frames, and so must permit criticism and change in light of advances in the understanding of inquiry itself. What we will attempt here is to sketch a foundation for inquiry that is flexible enough to respond to new conceptions, while retaining a sufficiently robust core so as to serve as a basis for rational criticism and progressive change. Such a post-modern version of the archimedian point is the basis for a rational reconstruction of inquiry, adequate to recent challenges to the enlightenment tradition.

The second reason is the richness of the metaphor; it has sufficient internal structure to let the issues appear. I offer a graphic representation of the metaphor, included as figure 1. In this rendering, Achimedes is, as usual, a white (elderly) Greek male; he supports a globe, representing the universe of concern, with a lever which represents the strength of his standpoint. The first issue concerns the fulcrum. As the metaphor is usually interpreted, the fulcrum represents a point of stability, usually construed in philosophy as the a priori. The foundationalist debate has focused on the stablity of the fulcrum, critics of foundationalism pointing to the particularity of the enlightenment anchorage (eurocentrism, ratiocentrism and etc.). What is of, perhaps, greater interest if the Archimedian point is seen in relation to education, is the "cross-sectional" integrity of the fulcrum, that is, its ability to bear the load represented by the universes of discourse represented in contemporary education: the range of subject matters included within education today.



Of equal interest is Archimedes himself. Even with a place for the fulcrum, Archimedes must have a place to stand. The post-modern perspective asks that this standpoint be explored. The enlightenment point of view, to the contrary, sees his standpoint as representing a universal position, one that is in principle available to all rational inquirers, and therefore not entering essentially into the description of the Archimedian point itself. This must be addressed, for the heart of the post-modernist critique is the realization that all thinkers reflect a standpoint, a point of view that determines the particulars of the thinkers' claims and arguments. Any standpoint, post-modernists insist, is merely one among many, and so must be seen in the light of alternatives. And justifications within standpoints must be assessed with due consideration given to other possibilities.

The metaphor of the Archimedian point, as I have just interpreted it, yields a number of issues relevant to our discussion, issues that must be addressed if any particular standpoint is to be seen as adequate as a foundation for inquiry and as a basis for critique. The central issues raised by the claim that critical thinking furnishes an Archimedian point adequate for an assessment of educational practices are as follows. If critical thinking is to be an adequately placed Archimedian point, it must be grounded in a theory that supports its objectivity in the face of conceptual advances and multi-cultural differentiation. It must have sufficient cross-sectional integrity, sufficient conceptual richness, to bear the load of the full range of particulars included in educational practice. Finally, the situatedness of any theorist claiming the Archimedian point must be addressed.

1. Critical thinking today

What the critical thinking movement points to, albeit in nascent form, is a synthesis of a number of perspectives that speaks directly to educational theory and practice. What the synthesis yields is a theory drawn from a number of places, as well as recommendations for practice based on the articulation of an educational apparatus and model programs that reflect a range of experiences drawn from successful implementation of critical thinking programs in schools. What I will do in the following is describe the beginnings of such a theory. The assessment of recent attempts to implement such theories in educational practices will be left for another occasion. But first, what is critical thinking?

I will characterize the critical thinking movement in terms of two major components: the justification of the movement as an educational ideal by Harvey Siegel (Siegel, 1988) and an analysis of the conception offered by Matthew Lipman (Lipman 1988). These will enable us to bring in the work of others in the movement as needed, and more importantly, will give us a framework for seeing the extent of the movement and the plausibility of its basic concepts. What I will do with each of these components is offer an interpretation based on my own practice in recent years. Both Siegel and Lipman anchor the concept of critical thinking across the disciplines that has been the source of a faculty development experiment at Montclair State where I help direct the Institute for Critical Thinking.[2]

The concept of critical thinking across the disciplines is most at home in the instructional milieu of American undergraduate education. Colleges in America offer their students a wide range of courses in the general education curriculum, and require little more than beginner's competence in areas of specialization that are non-terminal for a field. General education is itself a result of progressive trends in American education, extending liberal education from the education of a privileged few to the entire college population. Little is known of the success of either the limited or the expanded enterprise, for it is hard to know what success could mean in the variety of contexts within which liberal education has been attempted. Nevertheless, introducing students to their cultural heritage, at some degree of sophistication, has always been a goal of education, whether in secondary schools and gymnasia in more restrictive contexts, or in undergraduate education in more egalitarion settings.

Critical thinking at Montclair State, reflecting the situation throughout western Europe, exists within what may be characterized as the de facto post-modernism of the university. For, if modernism includes the thesis that a unified theoretic frame will become increasingly available as a support for inquiries of all sorts, and post-modernism is typified by the rejection of the claim to such an underlying unity and an emphasis on the divergence of foundational and methodological elements increasingly apparent as inquiry progresses—then the university is clearly post-modern. The various disciplines and the educational practices that they support exhibit a wide variety of practices and standpoints. The post-modern perception has been reinforced by the rejection of positivism and the availability of theoretic analyses that emphasize divergent—even where complementary—epistemological norms, and sees diverse methodological procedures across the academic disciplines. Post-modernism becomes increasingly relevant in the face of the interaction between the disciplines that the program in general education entails. Even if differences can be overlooked within particular disciplines concerned with introducing students to their own characteristic practices, general education presents students with a seemingly incoherent range of practices and concepts whose relation is poorly understood, and rarely discussed.[3]

Unlike other members of the university community, for whom the insularity of disciplinary perspectives and internal disciplinary ambitions keeps the post-modern dilemma in the background, critical thinking advocates address the members of all disciplines and so must confront post-modernism directly. This is a consequence of the depth and breadth of critical thinking taken as an educational ideal. Critical thinking seen as an educational ideal, must speak generally, if it is to speak at all. This, as we shall soon see, is apparent in the analyses of Siegel and Lipman, for both see the consequences of the idea of critical thinking extending to education across the disciplines, and in all school subjects.

Situated in the post-modern environment that the university affords, critical thinking across the disciplines responds to factors that determine the form of its conception. Both educational realities and the ideals that underlie practice serve to determine the concerns of the critical thinking movement. Most apparent in the contexts within which critical thinking advocates strive is the justifiable suspicion with which critical thinking is received by members of the traditional academic disciplines. Critical thinking, like any comprehensive set of educational ideals with clear consequences for practice, must contend with the parochial environment of education as it exists in the disciplines today. And so, among the first tasks for critical thinking is the construction of a principled defense of its claims. Next, critical thinking must address the apparent dissimilarity of educational goals and practices exhibited by the variety of practices found within undergraduate education. Finally, critical thinking must support its claims to furnishing a more adequate educational agenda for education in some general sense, as well as for the specific educational objectives that govern instruction in particular fields.

The post-modern challenge, as represented by the diversity of disciplinary practice is directly relevant to critical thinking's day to day endeavors. Critical thinking advocates must speak to each discipline's particular methods and objectives, and so the differences across the fields becomes our stock in trade. The task for critical thinking is to develop an adequate theory that grounds a general strategy consistent with the particulars of education in many fields, while sustaining a clear and identifiable core that sufficiently distinguishes critical thinking from other general perspectives while offering guidance for practice unavailable elsewhere. We now turn to an analysis of two major components of critical thinking in America today.

2. Critical thinking and the ethics of education

Harvey Siegel has offered the most detailed defense of critical thinking as an educational ideal available in the current literature (Siegel, 1988). The justification for critical thinking that Siegel offers reflects points made by others in the field, but does so with a depth and breadth that is a welcome addition to the literature. Siegel sees critical thinking as resting on the respect for persons in the sense of Kant: "The Kantian principle of respect for persons requires that we treat students in a certain manner—one which honors students' demand for reasons and explanations, deals with students honestly, and recognizes the need to confront students' independent judgment" (ibid., p. 56). Siegel includes three other justifying considerations: (intellectual) self-sufficiency and preparation for adulthood, initiation into the rational traditions, and the demands on education that result from the requirements for an educated citizenry living in a democracy. Although he includes all of these in his account, he seems to take the Kantian requirement as most central, reflecting its foundational character. (See, for example, p. 71).

The last three justifying considerations that Siegel enumerates lend immediacy to the fundamental justification. But first a word about the core intuition. Siegel's Kantian appeal speaks to perennial philosophical intuitions about what makes persons the appropriate object of moral concern, that is, their rationality. But that is not the only version of the moral relevance of persons. Utilitarian and Aristotelian analyses support additional concerns. The more pragmatic objective of using education to better individual lives is central to utilitarianism, and education as socialization, invitation into the polis, is at the heart of Aristotelian conceptions. These underlying moral focuses create tensions within the educational enterprise as connections between strategies brought forward in the name of some one of these outcomes frequently require hard choices, choices that are often underdetermined by available theoretic and empirical evidence. This is reflected in current disputes relevant to educational reform through critical thinking theory and practice.[4]

Despite tensions between Kantian and other fundamental intuitions, Siegel's appeal to reason as the key attribute of persons reinforces currents in contemporary educational reform that speak to more broadly utilitarian objectives, including political participation in democratic communities. This becomes clear as we move on to the other justifying considerations.

Intellectual autonomy is of value in itself, but it also, given an empirical assumption, may be seen as instrumental for learning crucial within the knowledge environment into which students are to enter after graduation. Recent educational reformers, both progressive and conservative, are increasingly willing to characterize the information environment of the post-industrial era as being subject to increasingly rapid and unforseeable change. [5]

This position when conjoined with the emphasis on rational comprehension characteristic of many critical thinking advocates requires an empirical assumption that sees particular items of school learning serving as prototypes for analagous learning only when students are helped to see what is learned through understanding, rather than through, for example, mere recall. Although there is little empirical research on the condition of transfer from particular educational contexts to indefinitely varied settings, what little research there is seems to support the view that principled instruction with a focus on general procedures and underlying concepts is required to support students' ability to transfer learned procedures to new contexts, except perhaps for students who are particularly gifted. (See Perkins, 1990.)[6]

Although recent attempts to clarify the situation are welcome, and further analysis is to the point, the issue seems to be ultimately an empirical one. Research is required to determine to what extent various curricular proposals and their underlying theories yield an analysis and practice that will result in improvement of students' thinking generally and in particular subject domains as well. If understanding in the sense operationalized by particular critical thinking approaches are not found to further appropriate instructional aims, then the call for understanding as a fundamental educational goal must be justified without recourse to the achievement of practical ends, and the goal of understanding must be weighed as a desirable end against the goal of learning in some more traditional sense.

If intellectual autonomy, as I construe it, leads to an agenda consistent with pragmatic, economics-driven goals, initiating students into the rational traditions reinforces a deeply conservative intuition that requires that education reflect what has been learned about learning as typified by the major intellectual traditions encaspulated in the special disciplines. Despite the post- modern predicament, serious thought is still ordered by professional and intellectual arrangements that reflect the previous history of inquiry in particular fields, that is, inquiry in the special disciplines.[7] It is only the most foolhardy critical thinking advocate who would deny the role of the traditional disciplines as a major determinant of the content and practice of education.

The considerations just put forward echo the situation in respect of participation in democracy. The familiar claim that education is a necessary support of democratic government, playing the essential role of preparing citizens for participation in democratic political processes, does not speak to the particulars (Gutmann, 1989). The apparent relation between critical thinking and participation in democracy has, however, been reinforced by critical thinking theorists who offer an analysis of 'multi-logical issues,' issues whose internal complexity requires a variety of disciplinary and extra-disciplinary points of view (Paul, 1982). Multi-logical issues, it has been argued, constitute a domain within which critical thinking is essential, since they transcend the limited perspectives of any given discipline and require the ability to synthesize and apply a variety of kinds of information and principles (Paul, 1985; Weddle, 1984). The ability to work with many frames of reference in application to complex multi-logical issues is one of the intellectual outcomes that critical thinking advocates strive to achieve. Multi-logical issues are seen as involved in most real political and social disputes, and so critical thinking is seen as having an essential role in educating competent citizens.[8]

Siegel's four grounds have consequences for education that accepts the critical thinking ideals. The first is that students must be brought to rational acceptance of the information that they learn. The second requires that students see through the details of whatever they learn to principles that can be applied in new learning situations. Third, education must help students to see the rational grounds of the disciplines that they study and to participate in the discourse of the various fields. And last, education must help students to make reasoned judgments about the complex, multi-logical issues that characterize the concerns of contemporary democratic societies.

3. Critical thinking and its underlying theory

As is apparent from the discussion so far, critical thinking is a far-ranging ideal that speaks to the entire range of educational concerns, and addresses the particulars of disciplinary knowledge that constitute the content of instruction. As such, critical thinking advocates must transcend their own disciplinary perspectives and reach out to the variety of special knowledge that comprises the information and skill basis of education in general.

Such a broad arena of concern is available to critical thinking if only because the term itself, an honorific used to denote a high level of competence, denotes a common objective of the various disciplines themselves. Although critical thinking is bracketed in the various disciplines, having little overt content, it is a goal toward which most instructors in whatever discipline can aspire. Critical thinking, in the sense to be outlined immediately below, draws upon the best in disciplinary practice in order to warrant the epistemological and other normative claims that are implicit in a discipline's claim to adequacy. We now turn to an analysis of critical thinking adequate to this formidable task.

Matthew Lipman has contributed to the Institute for Critical Thinking's project of implementing critical thinking across the disciplines by constructing an analysis of critical thinking that includes a differentiable core, exhibiting the general nature of critical thinking, yet permitting particularization adequate to the demands of applying critical thinking within the various disciplines. His analysis sees critical thinking as: "skillful, responsible thinking that facilitates good judgment because it (a) relies upon criteria, (b) is self-correcting, and (c) is sensitive to context" (Lipman, 1988, p. 3). Each component serves as an indicator of the direction in which critical thinking must go, and in doing so points to the relevance of this conception of critical thinking to current educational concerns. We will explore the components of his account point by point.

Why criteria? Lipman merely offers a sketch of the reasoning behind the choice of criteria as a central aspect of his account. He does, however, indicate a number of suggestive directions in which a more elaborate account might be sought, and furnishes examples that are intended to indicate the role of criteria in making judgments. Criteria afford rational support for the thinking outcomes that require judgments: claims, decisions, determinations and the like. The examples of criteria that Lipman includes are: "standards; laws, by-laws, regulations, charters, canons, ordinances, guidelines and directions; precepts, requirements, specifications, stipulations, limits; conventions, norms, regularities, uniformities, covering generalizations; principles, presuppositions, ideals, purposes, aims, objectives; tests, credentials, experimental findings; methods, procedures, policies" (ibid., p. 4).

In developing the notion of criteria while working with my colleagues from many disciplines, I epitomize criteria as decisive considerations supporting judgments, considerations which upon reflection can be seen to structure the epistemological framework which helps to determine the status of claims (where truth is the issue) as well as other sorts of frameworks for legitimation (where non-epistemic adequacy is the concern).[9]

An account that sees criteria as the underlying structure that supports the adequacy of claims is most readily constructed in contexts where argumentation is "stylized," that is where argumentation is characterized by identifiable norms particular to a given tradition of inquiry. My own work has focused on the sciences, since I take the sciences to include clear instances of the most carefully articulated and socially monitored arguments available for analysis (Weinstein, 1990). In the sciences, the criteria brought forward as decisive considerations reflect issues that distinguish the content and style of claims and that support the particulars of arguments brought forward in challenge and support. These include logical/epistemological elements such as the relevance of evidence; the form and character of descriptions, the reliability of methods used in experiment and observation; and patterns of inference including mathematics. They also include considerations that, in contrast, can be seen as sociological/epistemological: decision procedures for peer review; the judgment of the field as expressed by citations in the literature; replications of experiments and other sorts of imitation; and acceptance as part of the received wisdom as evidenced by inclusion in textbooks and in what is taught to students learning the field.

I see an enumeration such as the one above pointing to an account of argument that places balances of consideration as the most salient logical form for understanding argumentation within contexts of judgment relevant to critical thinking.[10] Logical inference, including mathematics and statistics, is not the center of an analysis that seeks to describe the macro-structure of argument. That is not to deny a role to logic and mathematics in argument. Logic plays an essential role in argument, governing the micro-structure of argumentation moves. But an analysis and the assessment of the adequacy of claims requires a wide variety of epistemological and other normative considerations, depending on the sort of claim asserted (Weinstein, 1990). Such an analysis identifies the interaction of various considerations as they play various and changing roles in the ongoing dialogue that constitutes the assessment procedures in a field. Whence, balance of considerations play a fundamental role as the over-arching framework within which argumentation is to be seen.

The most crucial aspect of argument construction and assessment, in an account of the sort indicated here, are the range of considerations that constitute the criteria that are the basis upon which judgments rest. These criteria may include a wide variety of items. The ones mentioned above, relative to scientific claims, are not exhaustive of the possibilities, nor do they translate with equal relevance into criteria for arguments in discourse frames typical of the humanities, politics and the law. Critical thinking, nonetheless, points to the importance of analagous considerations for the reasonable assertion and evaluation of claims of all sorts. And by doing so, it indicates novel directions for educational practice, if students are to helped in becoming more aware of the considerations seen as decisive in their own thinking and the thinking of others within the various courses that they study.

The area that I have just indicated engages with one of the main theoretic pillars upon which current interest in critical thinking rests: informal logic.[11] Although there is ample room for dispute about details, something very much like informal logic seems required if we are to articulate the hosts of interelated considerations—both logical and rhetorical that constitute actual argumentation that relies on balance of considerations rather than formal implications. Many different policies on the role and character of informal logic are represented by both the critical thinking literature and critical thinking practice. At the Institute for Critical Thinking we have developed a model for understanding argumentation across the disciplines that has proven successful as a framework for dialogues with colleagues from many of the fields represented in undergraduate education. Based on our practice, it appears that the model we offer is able to capture the underlying structure of argumentation in the many disciplines with which we have engaged. Our model employs Stephen Toulmin's analysis of argument structure that distinguishes levels of reasons, rather than the more typical informal logic accounts that limit themselves to the identification of premises and conclusion (Toulmin, 1969). This has been seen by many of our colleagues as a more adequate framework for distinguishing the functional components of arguments in their field. In addition, it offers a structure that permits students to see information differentiated as to generality and robustness, and articulates the epistemological relations that offer support to claims in a field. Along with Toulmin's account, we include the work in argumentation theory of the Amsterdam school (Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983). The latter, concerned with the speech acts that underly argumentative discourse, addresses another central concern of informal logic: informal fallacies. Distinguishing functional stages defined in terms of the various speech acts appropriate to particular argument stages, fallacies are seen as failures of dialogue to conform to conditions that support the well-functioning of argument in terms of the objective of rational argumentation: that is, the evaluation of claims.[12]

What this complex model affords is a structure rich enough to capture the range of argumentation across the disciplines. It permits both epistemological and sociological aspects to be identified without setting a priori limits to the particulars, while sustaining a core of objectivity that supports the reasonable reconstruction and evaluation of arguments of all sorts.

If the notion of criteria is taken as an encapsulation of the underlying norms governing patterns of inquiry, including such things as: the range of considerations deemed relevant; the weights assigned to these; the logic and mathematics used; the form and range of acceptable descriptions; characteristic standards of probity; the nature and extent of theories; and social forms for the presentation, criticism and defense of positions, then critical thinking is involved when these elements are severally weighted and assigned a place (whether tacit or overt) in the defense of a judgment.

What of context? The notion of context is a significant addition to the analysis of reasonable inquiry, especially when contrasted with most available accounts that limit themselves to the identification and application of principles, and so see coherence as the primary index of rationality. Lipman's conception affords an independent focus on the context within which principles apply, and thus adds relevance to coherence as a desiderata of critical thought. His own account does not, however, emphasize relevance. He offers, instead, examples of contextual factors that limit the application of principles to cases. These include: "exceptional or irregular circumstances ... special limitations ... contingencies and constraints ... overall configurations ... the possibility that evidence is atypical ... (and) the possibility that some meanings do not translate from one context or domain to another..." (op. cit., p. 8).

Although these are all examples of contextual factors relevant to the application of principles, there are two more fundamental roles that context plays in determining the reasonableness of arguments. The context of application determines the appropriateness of the criteria employed in supporting a judgment. In addition, it indicates the circumstances of the individuals involved in making judgments. The former is essential and generally seen to be so, constituting standard accounts of relevance in informal logic. (See, for example, Johnson and Blair, 1983.) The latter is more controversial, engaging the issue of the Archimedian point in a particularly salient fashion. The post-modern critique sees the point of view of the thinker as essential, since points of view determine factors that are clearly relevant to the adequacy of the judgment. Such factors include: the social perspective of the judge; the choice of theoretic frame; perspective-bounded determinations of the relevance of evidence, and the character of the over-all framework for adjudicating competing claims. One hallmark of the adequacy of critical thinking is its ability to identify and address such issues.[13]

The ability to address issues that involve the standpoint of the critical thinker herself moves us in a direction relevant to post-modern and other socio-historical critiques of enlightenment-based educational practice. It is no part of critical thinking that the critical thinker comes to the task without particular perspectives that materially affect her judgment. Critical thinking does demand, however, that such perspectives be identified and subjected to appraisal. The appraisal must itself be defensible in terms acceptable to critical thinking (Siegel, 1987). And if the basic insight that grounds the sense of the problematic in the traditional interpretation of the Archimedian point is at all correct, such appraisals must reflect the abilities of the appraiser as judged within a relevant tradition; it must satisfy the demands of the community within which the appraisal is to be assessed. Critical thinking demands further that challenges to and defense of the standpoint as appropriate to the task for which it is employed must be grounded in appropriate criteria; applied in a context sensitive fashion; and be open to self-correction. This moves us in the direction of our concern, but is still open to the challenge that the framework within the appraisal is evaluated may still be so limited as to render the appraisal suspect.

Obviously, much more is needed if such a complex position is to be distinguished from similar views and responsively supported in the face of challenges. And more is available, as we shall see, when we connect critical thinking to the powerful theoretical analysis of Jürgen Habermas. But first, what of self-correction?

Self-correction is at the heart of critical thinking. Without it, critical thinking is indistinguishable from reasoned inquiry of the most conservative kind. Self-correction requires that the inquirer use the inquiry process reflexively, reflecting back upon itself in an ongoing critique of the procedures employed. Whatever the focus of an inquiry, the inquiry reflects back upon itself so as to expose aspects that require alteration in the name of perfecting the inquiry itself. This reflexivity is multi-faceted. The concepts used may be seen as lacking, criteria may have to be adjusted, the context may require reconsidering the weight assigned to elements; it may include atypical elements and point to novel considerations. But most importantly, the inquirer may find herself to be engaged in practices or making assumptions that limit the effectiveness of the inquiry. She may come to realize that her standpoint has materially affected the objectivity of the inquiry, limiting her perspective or biasing her knowledge base and procedures.[14] If critical thinking is to meet the challenge of recent critiques, it must be grounded in a theory that speaks to the availability of radical alternatives within reasoned discourse, and perhaps, even to challenges to reasoned discourse itself. Such a theory is available, in part, through the work of Habermas, to whom we now turn.

4. Critical thinking and the theory of communicative action

Although critical thinking theorists have not made the connection between their work and the work of critical theorists explicit, there are fruitful connections to be explored, especially with the work of Jürgen Habermas.[15] One finds an overlap of concerns within the two projects. At the deepest level, both see the centrality of reasonableness; more particularly, they both maintain the central role of dialogue. Both views appeal to some of the same theories of argumentation, especially informal logic. There is, however, apparent divergence as to the role of developmentalism in the characterization of reasoning through dialogue. Habermas cites Kohlberg and other developmentalists in many places (See, for example, Habermas, 1981, pp. 174ff.), while many critical thinking advocates have eschewed developmentalism (Lipman, 1980, pp. 153-154; Weinstein, 1988a).[16]

Habermas' theory of communicative action goes far beyond critical thinking theories in many ways. The most apparent is Habermas' concern with the historical and social grounding of communicative action and the role of discourse as exposing the repressed in socially constituted thought (Habermas, 1971, especially chapter 10). Some critical thinking theorists, most notably Richard Paul, have expressed similar points of view (Paul, 1982). But nowhere in critical thinking theory do we find the profound philosophical and sociological analysis that Habermas offers. There is, however, much in Habermas that should be considered by critical thinkers, particularly the role of discourse as a vehicle for exposing the unacknowledged problematic within contexts of inquiry (Habermas, 1987, VIII, 3). Factors repressed by society and cultural traditions, that need to be brought to social awareness and subjected to rational critique, require self-correction on a grand scale.

Self-correction on such a grand scale demands a process that is both rationally acceptable and flexible enough to incorporate the most divergent frames of reference. The rational acceptability of Habermasian discourse is based upon his notion of a procedure of discourse that makes rational critique available. This is characterized in terms of the universal pragmatics that underly discourse—that is the analysis of discourse that sees shared understanding as its objective (Habermas, 1981, pp. 98ff.). Such shared understanding is a presupposition of rational discourse and reflects the general thesis that linguistic competence is the outcome of a social process of participation (Habermas, 1987, pp. 22ff.).

Whatever the particulars, Habermas offers a theoretic base sorely needed by critical thinking. Critical thinking advocates have spent little time exploring the deep theoretical issues that their claims bring to the foreground. If critical thinking is to portray itself as defining a procedure for critique— general in respect of the disciplines and adequate to the range of contexts that multi-culturalism in education requires—some general account of reasoned dialogue needs to be put forward. The recent debates that form the post-modernist concern raise challenges to objectivity and to the possibility of rational discourse that requires a deeply theoretical and far reaching response from critical thinking advocates, if any plausible response is to be offered at all.

It is for this reason that my candidate for an Archimedean point is some future heir to the present critical thinking movement, some heir that includes both a sufficiently complex apparatus for the analysis and assessment of claims of whatever sort, and that speaks to the deep challenges that question the very possibility of rationality and reasonable discourse. To see this we must turn to the core of concern that characterizes post-modernism.

5. Critical thinking and post-modernism

Whatever else is involved, post-modernism points to the wide variety of justificatory frames identifiable in contemporary inquiry, the range of cultural standpoints today, and the waxing and waning of dominant views throughout intellectual history. It is, however, more than the mere variety of frames that supports post-modernist intuitions. Frames, when subjected to critical analysis, are seen to be socially embedded in the sense that they reflect particular interests and characteristic limitations. These are frequently unavailable for rational critique in the frames within which they occur.

The mere diversity of frames does not imply the relativism that is often seen as a consequence of post-modernist accounts. For the variety of frames does not imply their equal validity. Nor does variety support a claim that no frames suitable to assess other frames are available. As Harvey Siegel has pointed out, no amount of de facto variability, in whatever sense, supports the claim that rational assertion is free of the requirement of justifying reasons (Siegel, 1987). But arguments like Siegel's do not address the other side of the post-modern challenge, that is the claim that no particular reference frame is free of embedded interests and immune to charges of parochialism or other biasing elements. What critical thinking that is adequate to the post-modern challenge must do is admit all putative reference frames into the dialogue, particularly those that afford a principled critique of whatever framework the critical thinker espouses. That is, critical thinking must be neutral as to the particulars, even when exemplifying some particular choice of validating frameworks. For some framework is required whenever support is called for, but none is beyond the possibility of critique. This is the core of self-correction seen as the spirit of critical thinking.

If something like Lipman's account is warranted, then critical thinking points to a new conception of the Archimedian point that is both consistent with the post-modernist insight and with the enlightenment ideal of a trans-particular critical standpoint that is objectively defensible and available as a framework for evaluating inquiries of all sorts. This is because, unlike other foundationalist accounts, Lipman's makes no claims about the particulars and so remains open for whatever details of reasoning typify individual modes of inquiry. But although indifferent as to the details, the account places limits on what can count as critical thinking within a discipline. For to be critical, inquiry must satisfy the constraints enumerated in his analysis. That is, critical thinking within a justificatory framework, and most relevantly within the special disciplines, must appeal to a tradition of successful practice (skillfulness), it must address the community of competent inquirers (responsibility), it must be based on acceptable principles (criteria) in a fashion that takes into account the details that the particular issues involve (sensitivity to context), and it must be reflexive in a fashion that supports progressive change (self-correction). Thus, the post-modern insight that sees inquiry situated within historical and social settings relevant to the specifics of claims within a tradition of inquiry is retained, while the enlightenment requirement that an objective procedure for evaluating all claims is satisfied by the constraints placed on all inquiry whatsoever.

Endnotes

1. Meditations, vol. 1 of Philosophical Works of Descartes. trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969, p. 144.

2. See Weinstein and Oxman-Michelli (1989) for an overview of the Institute and its faculty development efforts.

3. See Perry (1968) for an account of the vicissitudes of typical student responses to the variety of disciplinary perspectives that undergraduate education includes.

4. I will not be able to elaborate this point in any detail. But here are a few indications of the tensions. Utilitarian considerations point to the role of education in increasing the common good by enabling students to take their place in the social and economic structure of the society within which they are to live their lives. Although critical thinking advocates assume that education that addresses students' rationality will further their ability to participate as productive members of society, it remains to be seen whether it will in fact increase students' competence in requisite ways, Similarly for initiation into the polis. In a democratic society critical thinking seems to afford the abilities most valued in political decision making. But this too awaits confirmation as critical thinking programs expand and yield a population of students educated in accord with critical thinking ideals and using critical thinking strategies. Another tension, internal to the heir of the Kantian tradition that sees logical structures as underlying schema, is the result of the most recent of the Kantian perspectives in psychology—that is, the work of Piaget. If Piaget is right in claiming that logical competence is not uniformly available to all students at all times, critical thinking must be modified in light of developmental considerations. Obviously, this is not an issue in undergraduate education where all students are possibly formal-operational, but see Perry (1968) for related developmental concerns.

5. An early statement of this claim is found in the influential and popular Third Wave by Toffler (Toffler, 1980). The catch phrase "learning to learn," indicates a common response to the problem that the rapidly changing information environment creates for educators. Learning to learn requires that students see the particulars of what they study in school as indicators of what they are most likely to need to learn in the future. The value of school subjects is found less in the particulars presented and more in the various styles of information and information processing that particulars reflect. Individual items, whether facts or procedures, need to be seen as exemplifications of particular kinds of learning. Thus, mechanical learning of whatever sort is beside the point.

6. The discussion in the body of the text is a gloss on one of the central issues in critical thinking today: the problem of domain specificity. Both conceptual and empirical arguments have been put forward supporting or attacking the adequacy of critical thinking (and informal logic) skills to the task of understanding the range of school learning. None of these have managed to convince all members of the field. A number of recent articles have begun the task of examining the literature prompted by McPeck's challenge to the critical thinking

movement's claim to have identified generalizable skills (McPeck, 1981). See, for example, Andrews (1990); Blatz (1989), Bless (1990). A typical account from an influential critical thinking advocate is Ennis (1989). What the literature indicates at this point is that there are plausible candidates for general skills, and that the sorts of skills indicated reflect different theoretic assumptions, informal logicians offering one sort of account, cognitive psychologists another. What the literature has still not adequately addressed is the saliency of the general thinking skills, analyzed at the level at which their generality is apparent, for critical thinking within the disciplines. That is, the literature has not explored to what extent general thinking skills need to be differentiated if they are to be useful within particular settings.

7. The issue of rational traditions recalls attempts to base education on an analysis of the conceptual frames of the various disciplines (Hirst, 1965). Many of these attempts have foundered on the difficulty of distinguishing disciplines in some principled fashion (Phillips, 1971), yet the basic insight that the disciplines are methodologically distinguishable seems credible on its face. The courses taught in various academic departments are sufficiently different to require distinct cognitive operations and to involve distinctive student tasks. This is particularly clear in more advanced studies where competence in some field is usually independent of competence in others. The details involved in competent performance in undergraduate courses are as different as analyzing a poem in contrast to analyzing a chemical compound or employing the apparatus of calculus to draw inferences as opposed to supporting a philosophical analysis through the tracing of conceptual connections.

8. Here, as in the preceding points, there is an underlying dispute. Is the education of citizens primarily socialization into particular norms and practices, or does it require the development of critical thinking and autonomous judgment? These need not conflict, but they may, and thereby create a tension that must be resolved by weighing the value alternatives and making hard decisions (Weinstein, 1988).

9. Lipman cites Slote (1966) and Scriven (1959) as relevant to his use of the concept of criteria. In addition, see Rescher (1982) for an account that links the issue of criteria to that of truth. Rescher's effort adds a feature that is useful if we are to understand the notion of criteria as central to critical thinking. Criteria do not furnish definitions, rather they point to the operant considerations that underly the application of a concept within a practice (ibid. pp. 1-4). Similarly, criteria within critical thinking do not suffice for the correctness of a judgment (its truth, perhaps), rather they determine the adequacy of a judgment relative to relevant standards, standards that characterize the discourse frame and the discourse community within which they are made. This should not be seen as limiting the assessment of claims to the discourse frame within which they are made. For claims and their supporting reasons can be viewed from a variety of frames (Toulmin, 1972). Rather, the centrality of criteria requires that assessments reflect some frame or other (Siegel, 1987). Judgments require reasons, and what counts as good reasons is always determined within a framework that furnishes the norms to be applied. But frames are not absolute; frames can be evaluated from other standpoints. Evaluation, however, is always relative to some frame or other. For it is the frame that furnishes the elements available to offer rational support, and it is these elements that criteria reflect.

10. For a recent account of arguments that rely on balances of consideration, see Govier (1987).

11. See Ennis (1987), where the connection between critical thinking and informal logic is apparent from the identity of the elements put forward in his enumeration of the particulars of critical thinking and the standard content of informal logic texts.

12. The analysis offered by the Amsterdam school characterizes argument in terms of four stages: opening stage, confrontation stage, argumentation stage and closing stage (Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1983). The opening stage involves the presentation of the issue for debate; the confrontation stage sets the framework of evaluation that determines various sorts of adequacy; the argument stage is the argument itself; and the the closing stage involves considerations of final assessment that determine the status of the claims argued so far. It

should be noted that in actual arguments these stages are frequently in different order and as frequently overlap. In addition, much of what is involved in actual argumentation is implicit, especially aspects of the confrontation stage (Weinstein, 1990). The conditions for the adequacy of argumentation in a field are generally accepted and are rarely explicitly negotiated in particular exchanges. Naturally, these are always open to renegotiation and are frequently rethought as argumentation progresses.

13.What must be confronted is the sense that university faculty, just as any other group, speaks from a standpoint that characterizes its members. Such a standpoint includes a commitment to rational dialogue within particular traditions and, typically, liberal-tending political views. This is frequently significantly different from the standpoints of both the students that they serve and the community that relies on them for the education of the new generation of professionals.

14. Self-correction plays an essential role in students' critical thinking, even where they are not competent judges of the criteria that they are given by teachers and taught to apply. They may use critical thinking strategies to identify and assess their own thinking processes when applying principles and procedures that they must accept on authority.

15. An attempt to indicate the relevance of Habermas' work to education is found in Young (1990).

16. Critical thinking complaints against developmentalism seem best lodged against logical and moral development. Social development, development in the ability to function within a rational community as an interlocutor (Selman, 1980), and descriptions of typical courses of development in student learning strategies, (Perry, 1968), seem more to the point. Students faced with cognitive dissonance as they progress through their learning environments reduce their learning experience to the essentials, identifying teacher demands and attempting to fulfill them. (See, Oxman, 1989 for a brief review.) Different styles of teaching, widely varying tasks, and a fundamental inability to meaningfully question the authority of teacher, text, and task appear to create uniformity in response as students process education. Harvard undergraduates come to their experience seeking the most salient commonality found so far: authority (Perry, 1968). But whatever the varieties in primary and secondary schooling, the undergradutate experience of American undergraduates includes a welter of disciplinary perspectives and teaching styles. That expertize and enthusiasm are the sole demands on American professors has created a condition permitting a thousand flowers to grow, providing us with professsors that range across the landscape of learning—medievals to sixties-folk— in both manner and substance.

How does Perry see students responding: failing authority, anything goes. Variety is seen to be endemic and relativism of varying stripes appears. ('Relativism' seems too refined a term for what occurs. Better, perhaps, is the learned disregard of foundational issues and other incongruities of the learning environment in the name of the management of academic tasks—that is, the rejection of critical reason for technical reasoning of a particularly superficial kind.) The slow march from the routine fulfillment of "course-work requirements" to reasoned understanding and commitment to rational traditions is what Perry chronicles. It is such a path that critical thinking seeks to make smoother.

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Mark Weinstein is Acting Director of the Institute for Critical Thinking, Montclair State.

Social and Cultural Context of Critical Thinking

The papers in this section present arguments and discuss issues related to the nature of social critique and the context of social inquiry.

Karl Hostetler, in *The Social Context of Critical Thinking*, discusses the non-objectivist orientation to critical thought, focusing on the nature of socially developed standards for inquiry, particularly hermeneutic forms of inquiry, in which the question of what constitutes an understanding —that is, the criteria for understanding— must itself be dealt with in the process of inquiry. A critical perspective, he notes, comes through the clash of divergent views; the conception of understanding guiding hermeneutic investigation is that to understand means to understand alien views. Critical thinking, therefore, is a dynamic, social process, rooted in community. With regard to social, and particularly ethical inquiry, a commitment to the "ethical values of community, democracy, freedom and equality undergird the very possibility of critical thought."

In *The Revolt Against Reason: Mistaken Assumptions in Post-Positivist Relativism*, Joseph Wagner notes that that post- positivist approaches to inquiry, with their emphasis on local norms has led to a series of recent works of scholarly criticism of reason that constitute a "neo-romantic emphasis on the importance of our subjective connection to the world and a special appreciation of the irrational ties which bind human relationships." He presents an analysis of the claims common to these works, identifying two related arguments against the primacy of reason; one relating to the empty formalism of reason and the other asserting its impracticality. He asserts that the principles of democracy and egalitarianism have sounder grounds in reason than can be afforded through subjectivist approaches.

Toleration of a diversity of manners and opinions may well be necessary for the maintenance of an open society; however, should acts of expression offensive to members of the society be tolerated? In the interest of tolerance, should expressions of intolerance, such as racial or ethnic hatred, be protected by the Constitutional right of freedom of speech? Morton Winston, in *Cultural Diversity and Moral Tolerance*, distinguishes between the context of inquiry and the context of action in addressing this issue. The context of inquiry refers to moral deliberation in which we examine and reexamine moral beliefs and values, and consider and reconsider rules or policies based on these beliefs and values, while the context of action refers to "the stage in which we act on our moral beliefs." Winston states that within the context of inquiry; that is, within the academy, the expression of all moral opinions, including those antithetical to our prevailing moral system should be tolerated and encouraged, but that there is no similar justification for tolerating actions based on these beliefs. To what extent should such actions as verbal abuse based on race or ethnic differences be tolerated in support of the principle of freedom of speech? On what basis should criteria be developed and judgments be made in order to balance the conflicting values of freedom of expression and protection from harm? He discusses these issues in the context of college and university responsibility for regulations governing freedom of thought and expression, concluding that the "intellectual toleration of heterodox moral views," in the context of inquiry represented by higher education, should prevail.

Jerome B. Wichelns, in his paper, *In Defense of the College Taking a Leading Role in the Community in Confronting Issues of Social Reform: A Contractarian Approach in Critical Thinking*, continues the discussion of the role of the university within the larger community. Wichelns takes for his problem: "To define for the college and the community exactly what comprises the leadership role of an educational institution." He takes as his focus the activation of a light-infantry division of some 10,000 soldiers, that with its dependents constituted "a real net increase of 30,000 people for this rural, northern New York region, in effect practically doubling the existing population of the tri-county impact area." This although viewed optimistically by the local community resulted in concerns as to the impact of this on the "quality of life" as reflected in such problems as housing, crime, racial tension, sexism, health car and education.

The paper explores the college response, "a continuing series of work-study, public forums." These resulted in "creating in the community a respect for reasoned debate" and a commitment to the view that "healthy, enduring social change could not be instituted without informed public consent."

The Social Context of Critical Thinking

Karl Hostetler

A strong tradition in philosophy holds that a critical perspective on social norms requires a point of view neutral to particular social situations. Without such a neutral high ground, thought cannot hope to escape from the mire of community biases and relativistic argument.

Recent work in philosophy challenges this objectivist view. While agreeing that objectivity is important for a critical perspective, it denies the objectivist claim that critical thought requires a neutral vantage point. It suggests that critical thought is and must be carried out in communal inquiry within and among particular forms of human life, not divorced from them. Objectivity is possible within such inquiry, but it is not achieved by reference to some perspective that is neutral to all views. Indeed, it is suggested that community "prejudices" are a necessary basis for critical inquiry. A critical perspective is not pursued by attempting to abandon these prejudices for a neutral view. Rather, it is achieved in the clash of divergent views that are always views from somewhere and so are not neutral.

This non-objectivist orientation to critical thought emphasizes two ideas relevant to the theme of this conference. First, it suggests that critical thinking is ultimately grounded in a social context. Critical thinking, though it can sometimes be done in individual isolation, is carried on in terms of language, problems, and standards that are socially developed and of which individual inquirers are the inheritors.

Second, this work emphasizes the importance of social and cultural inquiry, particularly hermeneutic forms of such inquiry, for providing the conditions under which critical thought can exist and flourish. A critical perspective comes through the clash of divergent views, and it is imperative that inquirers strive to understand views that are alien to them if they are to learn from them. Objectivist conceptions of social science judge when adequate understandings of alien cultures have been achieved in terms of supposedly neutral criteria, say in ability to predict behavior. But even if we grant that such is a tolerable conception of understanding, which indeed it may not be, it still is only one mode of understanding. The conception of understanding that guides hermeneutic investigation is that to understand means to understand *differently*.[1] Understanding is pursued in a hermeneutic process where the question of what constitutes an adequate understanding must itself be addressed in inquiry.

My project is to indicate the plausibility and importance of a non-objectivist orientation to critical thought. This orientation has important implications, not only for our understanding of critical thinking, which is our specific concern, but for our understanding of ourselves as moral beings. The first part of the discussion attempts to define the objectivist view which is the target of our attack. The second part outlines the non-objectivist alternative and how community plays a central role in it. I close by offering some reflections on what our discussion suggests for teaching critical thinking.

In the time we have it is not possible to consider all aspects of critical thinking, for certainly a number of significantly different processes and contexts are subsumed under that broad heading. The discussion here focuses on the sort of critical thinking that has as its aim the examination of social norms, in particular the ethical norms, present explicitly or implicitly in the language, traditions, and institutions of a society. Although this is only one sort of critical thought, I suggest that the discussion raises points that are applicable to other forms of critical thought as well. Also, the focus on ethical norms is significant in itself, not only for ethical reasons, but because it raises crucial philosophical and political issues.

As an example of an objectivist view in ethics, I will utilize Immanuel Kant. Kant provides a worthwhile example, not only because his work has been exceedingly influential in moral philosophy, but because with his notion of moral autonomy he provides a vital issue with which we should deal.

A central aspect of Kant's moral philosophy is the Categorical Imperative. For Kant, this principle provided the ground for critical reflection on the fundamental principles or maxims by which moral agents proposed to guide their lives. To critically consider whether one's maxims were ethically good or not, one had to pass these through the test of the Categorical Imperative: could these maxims be willed to be universal laws of nature?[2]

Kant's belief that critical ethical thought required a neutral test via the Categorical Imperative reflects an objectivist orientation with associated views on the restricted role of community in critical thought. Certainly, this did not imply disregard for community. Kant was deeply concerned with the human community in the sense that he saw ethics as being essential to improving the personal and social lives of people. Furthermore, it was not Kant's contention that the Categorical Imperative alone was sufficient for ethical judgment. For Kant, one's specific social context provided the content of one's particular ethical beliefs and served to suggest concrete forms in which broad ethical virtues were to be enacted.[3]

So Kant's objectivist ethic was not asocial or anti-social. Nevertheless, a critical ethical perspective required examining one's socially developed notions about ethically proper conduct from a point outside the social context, in terms of a neutral standard. This is the focus of our objection.

To be clear, while the objection here is focused on Kant's objectivist views specifically, the attack is aimed ultimately at the broader assumption Kant shares with others. Again, the central objection is to the idea that a critical ethical perspective requires recourse to some standard or set of standards that is neutral to any particular notion of what is ethically good or right. Kant manifests this idea with his Categorical Imperative, but so does Rawls with his neo-Kantian notion of the Original Position.[4] It is also manifested by non-Kantians such as utilitarians with their notion that the principle of utility provides a neutral ground for examining proposed standards or actions.

Now, while rejecting the objectivist aspects of Kant's philosophy, we should be careful not to reject another aspect of his thought, the notion of moral autonomy. This idea captures an essential element of critical thinking in ethics and raises a vital issue for a non-objectivist view. Kant argued that moral agents are autonomous beings in that they are legislators of ethical standards who give themselves these standards rather than having them determined by the mere fact that these same standards are accepted by other people. Socially accepted norms must themselves be critically judged. Moral action requires critical thought in that moral agents must themselves actively reflect upon the moral appropriateness of the actions they contemplate.

If the notion of moral autonomy is to be preserved, there must be some significant sense in which people can question their society's ethical norms. The crucial question to be addressed by the non-objectivist is how a person can question the norms of a society from within that social framework without recourse to some neutral vantage point. Objectivist critics of the non-objectivist view contend that the sort of questioning possible within the non-objectivist framework can only be relativistic.[5] They say that the non-objectivist view provides no way for norms fundamental to a society to be objectively examined. For that, neutral standards are needed.

The issue of relativism will serve as a focus as we move now to discuss an alternative to the objectivist view. The non-objectivist claim is that inquiry can be objective, and so go beyond relativism, while at the same time going beyond objectivism.[6]

Let us first do a bit to further detail the non-objectivist position and its criticisms of the objectivist view, and then consider how this responds to the charge of relativism. First, the non-objectivist view should not be equated with contextualism, although it is a sort of contextualist view. A contextualist view of knowledge has largely supplanted foundationalism. Foundationalism holds that claims to knowledge can only be justified on the basis of rationally indisputable standards or procedures. Thus the Categorical Imperative was taken to be the solid standard against which claims to ethical knowledge could be evaluated. Contextualism rejects the foundationalist assumption, suggesting that knowledge claims can be rationally justified on the basis of standards that may be disputable, but which are not disputed in the case at hand. Recent philosophy of science has done much to prompt this shift to contextualism. For example, in his notion of scientific research programs Imre Lakatos acknowledges that scientific theories are conventions and so cannot be considered unshakable, yet these provide rational guidance to scientific research and serve to justify claims to scientific knowledge.[7]

The shift to contextualism is significant, for the contextualist holds that knowledge is a human construction and that knowledge can be gained without requiring a foundation in certainty. This is an advance, but it does not go far enough in itself. Objectivism is consistent with contextualism in that one might grant that ethical norms one might appeal to in cases of ethical disputes are not timeless and infallible but yet can be neutral to any particular point of view in the dispute.[8] Contextualist objectivism retains the assumption that for moral agents to critically examine their personal and social norms they must appeal to some neutral ground.

The non-objectivist conception rejects appeal to neutral standards as either necessary or sufficient for the rational resolution of any particular dispute about ethical norms. To be clear, the claim is not that there are no standards that are in some significant sense neutral. Laws of logic would be candidates for standards that could be used to judge the rationality of a community's ethical standards and which could be deemed neutral to any particular community. Nor is the claim that such logical standards are in general dispensable in critical inquiry.[9] However, such standards are typically insufficient for carrying out critical ethical reflection to adequate depth. The central issue of ethical inquiry concerns the goodness of the form of life of a community, and logical standards have a limited role in informing that inquiry. Furthermore, such neutral standards are not necessary to the rational resolution of critical inquiry in the sense that when it is the substance of non-neutral standards that is in dispute, the dispute can be rationally resolved on the basis of those non-neutral standards without appeal to some further neutral adjudicating standards.

In examining these claims, we should first be clear about what sort of norms we are discussing and how they are non-neutral. The work of Thomas Kuhn in the history and philosophy of science has done a great deal to inspire the non-objectivist view, and I turn to him to explicate this position. First, we should be clear that to claim that vital standards are not neutral to particular communities is not to say that these standards cannot be *shared* by different communities. However, even in the case that standards are shared, these may be *applied* differently. Kuhn writes that scientists may share standards for theory choice such as accuracy, simplicity, and fruitfulness, but these

> function as values and . . . they can thus be differently applied, individually and collectively, by men who concur in honoring them. If two men disagree, for example, about the relative fruitfulness of their theories, or if they agree about that but disagree about the relative importance of fruitfulness and, say, scope in reaching a choice, neither can be convicted of a mistake. . . . There is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same decision.[10]

Kuhn argues that basic scientific norms are shared across scientific communities, and this is significant, for such shared norms prevent science from being merely arbitrary. Nevertheless, such shared norms rationally underdetermine theory-choices. At the level of generality at which these standards are shared, these standards cannot perform the critical function of resolving disputes between competing interpretations of the values. At the level of specificity required for critical application of standards to instances of choice, values are interpreted from a particular point of view. These interpretations may differ without any interpretation being incorrect. There is no recourse to neutral standards that will resolve these differences.

This is Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability.[11] This thesis has generated considerable controversy. We should be clear that, critics' claims notwithstanding, incommensurable forms of life can be rationally compared and evaluated.[12] However, these forms of life cannot be straightforwardly compared point-by-point against each other.[13] Comparison of incommensurable forms of life will be at least partially in terms of standards as these are interpreted by the particular communities attempting the comparison. The attempt to objectively examine one's scientific way of life by means of comparing it to alternative ways of life must be carried on, at least in part, in terms of standards constitutive of one's own particular scientific way of life. This claim prompts the charge of relativism. The objectivist charge has been that without a neutral basis for argument, critical thought about the adequacy of community standards must be circular.

In response, the non-objectivist acknowledges that inquiry into forms of life must be circular in some sense. Indeed, Gadamer suggests that we must begin inquiry from our "prejudices".[14] Critique must begin from where we are and not from some neutral place; "[w]hat we prepare to welcome is never without some resonance in ourselves."[15] But the circularity is not vicious, for one's prejudices can and must be "suspended",[16] critically examined in light of feedback from the object of study and from alternative understandings of that object. There is a hermeneutic circle of interaction between what is familiar and what is unfamiliar such that one's initial prejudices can be transformed. Through this interaction, disputes over values can be brought to rational closure as consensus about standards is built through argument, even if these arguments are not compelling in the manner of proofs.[17]

In this hermeneutic argumentation, community plays a key role in the quest for objectivity. Kuhn emphasizes that scientific activity is significantly guided by the "prejudices" of the scientific community into which one is initiated. Scientists must view the world from *some* perspective. But to say that scientists must begin from some perspective is not to say that these perspectives are arbitrary and without rational warrant. Kuhn characterizes the elements of scientific knowledge as a *group* possession, the "tested and shared possessions of the members of a successful group."[18]

This is a significant point in that it places community prejudices on a non-arbitrary ground. Still, it does not answer the charge of relativism. Community plays a key role in the non-objectivist response to this also. The contention is that a theory held by a particular community can be critically examined, but this examination is typically prompted and resolved by the emergence of a rival theory. Thus, science does not progress by offering theories whose adequacy is finally determined by direct comparison with nature. Such a comparison is not decisive. Rather, the comparison is made with nature and alternative interpretations of nature.[19] Thus we see the vital role played by communities of scientists in developing differing theories which permit critical reflection on the adequacy of any particular theory.

This need for clashing views brings out the importance of social inquiry, such as anthropological and historical research, for the conduct of critical inquiry into ethical norms. Bernstein argues, "It is precisely in and through an understanding of alien cultures that we can come to a more sensitive and critical understanding of our own culture and of those prejudices that may lie hidden from us."[20] Peter Winch suggests that through such studies we are confronted "with new possibilities of good and evil in relation to which men may come to terms with life."[21]

It is this quest for understanding that takes us beyond objectivism and relativism. It is crucial that we understand what this sort of understanding involves. The task is to understand an alien culture, and from the non-objectivist standpoint, this involves a particular conception of social inquiry. In the quest for understanding, the characteristics of an adequate understanding cannot be fully stated beforehand. The quest for understanding involves a hermeneutic process. The researcher aims to give a "reading" of the culture, but the adequacy of any reading must ultimately be evaluated vis-a-vis other readings, not some neutral framework.[22]

Thus, critical social inquiry is acknowledged to be a value-laden activity. Here lies both the opportunity and challenge of the conception of social inquiry as hermeneutic. It is an opportunity for it presses upon the researcher the need for self-reflection. Charles Taylor writes,

> in the sciences of man insofar as they are hermeneutical there can be a valid response to `I don't understand' which takes the form, not only `develop your intuitions,' but more radically `change yourself.' . . . A study of the science of man is inseparable from an examination of the options between which men must choose.[23]

In the objectivist conception of social science failure to achieve understanding, that is, failure to meet supposedly neutral standards of understanding, implies that the researcher must look for more data or a better research procedure.[24] This fails to recognize the fundamental importance of examining the normative assumptions that are brought to the research. Failing to do that, one misses the opportunity of more profound understanding involved in critical reflection on those norms.

Of course, with the opportunity come significant challenges. Bernstein emphasizes the clash of *alien* cultures. This highlights the challenge of confronting the incommensurability of conceptions of life, the fact that to some extent these different communities operate in different worlds. Critics of Kuhn's incommensurability thesis have suggested that Kuhn makes understanding impossible. This is a misunderstanding of his position. Rather than showing understanding to be impossible, what Kuhn and others show is that understanding must be pursued in a certain way, through a hermeneutic process. This is the essential meaning of the incommensurability thesis.

The philosophical work we have considered offers us invaluable insights into the possibility and challenges of critical thought within our social context. If a non-objectivist orientation to critical thinking is correct, we must see critical thinking as something rooted in community, and in which we cannot appeal to neutral standards to offer us security amid the many complexities that must be encountered. A critical perspective is developed as people struggle to understand forms of life that present them with "new possibilities of good and evil."

This work indicates the possibility of critical thought in a social context, and we should be firm in our commitment to that possibility. But at the same time, we must recognize that there are psychological and political obstacles to the realization of that possibility, obstacles to openness to divergent views. We cannot do justice to all the issues involved in this, but by way of closing remarks I wish to offer a few brief reflections on what our non-objectivist conception of critical thought implies for attempts to teach critical thought, attempts which would be part of the process of overcoming the psychological and political problems mentioned.

First, there are are significant implications for the subject matter appropriate for fostering critical thought. A skills approach, while perhaps having some place, cannot be the main approach. While there may be techniques or skills in critical thinking, there can be no technique _of_ critical thinking. Critical thought is a dynamic, ultimately social, process requiring judgment and deliberation on the part of people. Such cannot be formalized. This is not to say that critical thought cannot be taught. But teaching would typically take the form of facilitation and coaching as opposed to being didactic.

Another significant point about subject matter has to do with the importance of historical and cultural studies for critical inquiry. A critical perspective, as we have conceived it here, requires examination of alien forms of life. While some students do engage in such studies, I suspect that the link between these studies and critical ethical thought is rarely made. Making the link is important, for it puts these studies on a different level. It shows that these studies are more than sources of information; they are sources of fundamental questions as to how we should conceive ourselves and our society as moral entities.

One final observation I wish to make regards a further moral implication of critical thought as we have conceived it. This is that a commitment to a non-objectivist conception of critical thought entails certain ethical commitments; it is not itself an ethically neutral conception of intellectual and social life. Critical ethical thought depends upon the existence of communities of inquirers and honest and forthright communication within and among these communities. The possibility of critical thought hinges on commitment to the existence of a "communication-community".[25] This implies a commitment to democracy in Dewey's sense of an association of people who share interests among themselves and with other communities.[26] If this sharing is to be honest and undistorted, it must be guided by values such as freedom and equality of people. Thus, an essential part of initiation into critical thought is development of a commitment to these ethical values of community, democracy, freedom, and equality that undergird the very possibility of critical thought. This may be the most significant insight for education that comes out of the non-objectivist conception of critical thinking.

Notes

[1] Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 139.

[2] For the idea that Kant intended the Categorical Imperative as a test of maxims, see Onora Nell, *Acting on Principle* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1975); and Barbara Herman, "The Practice of Moral Judgment," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 82 (1985), 414-36.

[3] Onora O'Neill, "Kant after Virtue," *Inquiry*, 26 (1983), 392-97.

[4] This charge is accurate so long as the Original Position is interpreted as offering a neutral position for decisively evaluating different forms of life. Rawls argues that the Original Position has such a role. For example, he writes, "Conceptions of justice are to be ranked by their acceptability to persons so circumstanced [in the Original Position]." See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), p. 17. On another reading, though, the crux of the Original Position can be interpreted as a more general commitment to freedom and equality. See Joseph Beatty, "The Rationality of the `Original Position': A Defense," *Ethics*, 93 (1983), 484-95, for such an interpretation. Construed as such a commitment, the Original Position is consistent with a non-objectivist view, the key being that the commitment is to conditions where dialogue can occur without supposing that the content of what will emerge from the dialogue can be identified a priori. Consider Bernstein's summary of Arendt's argument that "[t]here is no test for the adequacy of an opinion, no authority for judging it, other than the force of the better public argument. The formulation of opinions therefore requires a political community of equals and a willingness to submit opinions to public exposure and debate." See Bernstein, p. 216.

[5] This charge of relativism is a common one leveled against Thomas Kuhn, whom I take to be a representative of the non-objectivist view.

[6] This possibility is the central theme of Bernstein's book.

[7] Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 91-195.

[8] For example, Siegel argues for a fallibilist absolutism that holds that "claims to knowledge can be neutrally and objectively evaluated and assessed." See Harvey Siegel, *Relativism Refuted* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987), p. 10. To reiterate, our objection is not to objectivity but to the idea that objective evaluation and assessment require *neutrality*.

[9] On this issue of the role of standards of logic in inquiry see Steven Lukes, "Some Problems about Rationality," in *Rationality*, ed. Bryan Wilson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 194-213.

[10] Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 199-200.

[11] For discussions of Kuhn's incommensurability thesis, see Kuhn; Bernstein; Siegel; and Gerald Doppelt, "Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense," *Inquiry*, 21 (1978), 33-86.

[12] For example, see Siegel's suggestion that "incommensurability signifies precisely the in-principle impossibility of such [rational] debate and comparison (p. 83). See Bernstein, pp. 84-

86, for a discussion of incommensurability and comparability and the claim that these are not mutually exclusive.

[13] Bernstein, p. 86.

[14] See Bernstein's discussion of Gadamer's notion of prejudice and its place in the hermeneutic circle (pp. 126-39). For other discussions of the hermeneutic circle see Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness," in *Interpretive Social Science*, ed. Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1979), pp. 103-60; and Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in *Knowledge and Values in Social and Educational Research*, ed. Eric Bredo and Walter Feinberg (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 153-86.

[15] Gadamer, p. 134.

[16] Ibid., p. 108.

[17] See Kuhn, pp. 144-59, for his discussion of the resolution of scientific disputes.

[18] Kuhn, p. 191.

[19] This is one point on which Lakatos and Kuhn agree. For example, see Lakatos, p. 130, and Kuhn, p. 77.

[20] Bernstein, p. 36.

[21] Quoted in Bernstein, p. 36.

[22] Taylor, p. 156.

[23] Ibid., p. 182.

[24] Ibid., p. 181.

[25] Karl-Otto Apel, "Types of Rationality Today: The Continuum of Reason between Science and Ethics," in *Rationality To-Day*, ed. Theodore Geraets (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Univ. of Ottawa Press, 1979), 307-40.

[26] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (1916; rpt. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1966), p. 83.

Karl Hostetler is Assistant Professor of Elementary/Secondary Education at the Center for Curriculum and Instruction, University of Nebraska, Lincoln. A revised and expanded version of this paper will appear in Educational Theory (Winter, 1990) under the title, "Community and Neutrality in Critical Thought."

The Revolt Against Reason: Mistaken Assumptions in Post-Positivist Relativism

Joseph Wagner

There is an affinity between critical thinking and relativism, which, on its face, is not surprising. The resurgence of seemingly new forms of relativism ranges across a variety of fields and seems to have grown out of the demise of positivism and the emergence of *avant garde* trends in continental philosophy (see Winch, 1958; Kuhn, 1960; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; Skinner, 1985). In ethics, for instance, contemporary relativism has developed from groundings as disparate as feminist psychology and analytic philosophy (Gilligan, 1982; Murdoch, 1985; Kittay and Meyers, 1987 exemplify the former while Mackie, 1976; MacIntyre, 1984; Taylor, 1984; Walzer, 1983; Hampshire, 1983 exemplify the latter). In most forms, contemporary relativism seems nurtured by an evolution in continental philosophy from deconstructionism to post-structuralism and post-modernism (see Derrida, 1978; Foucault, 1970; Rorty, 1979; Lyotard, 1988).

Like its predecessors, contemporary relativism appeals to those who view Western thought as incarcerated in the rigid and compassionless formalism of reason (e.g., Sandel, 1982; Barnes and Bloor, 1985; Connolly, 1985). Contemporary relativists believe that a commitment to universal truth and transcultural standards bespeaks an arrogance and insensitivity to group, class, and cultural differences. Not surprisingly they also find classical and enlightenment thought inhospitable to the interests, voices, and concerns of those whose visions and values are unarticulated within the dominant canon of the Western philosophical tradition. After all Geertz (1973), Taylor (1985), and Foucault (1980) remind us that power is knowledge and warn us of the violence done when we attempt to understand the beliefs and acts of others by imposing categories and standards external to the individuals or groups we seek to understand. [1]

Implicitly, observation and comprehension of human behavior requires "attunement" with the subjects of observation. Relativism counsels us to recognize that all knowledge claims are acts of interpretation, because there is no Archimedean point where one may stand and assess the world without being in a system. Instead the meaning and authority of those claims must be understood as products of particular authors emerging from a biographical context and conditioned by the personal, social, and cultural history of the individual. Because no group, class, or culture occupies a position that authorizes their judgments and evaluations as superior to the beliefs, principles, or values of another group or culture, because the world is a creation, because truth is relative to frameworks, *questions of meaning take precedence over questions of truth.*

In effect, there is no world, pure and simple. Worlds are created by observers; and understanding the world is a creative act tantamount to making the world. Because consequent knowledge claims are inherently "self-reflexive," post-positivism treats "the world as text." It treats knowledge as creative interpretation, metaphorically captured in the act of "reading the world" (Barthes, 1973). Prescriptively, we should try to understand and judge beliefs or systems of beliefs only from a point of view internal to the system in which they are conceived (Habermas, 1971). Within such an epistemology, art is considered a more appropriate paradigm for knowing than science. Not surprisingly, such an epistemology empowers each reader with the capacity to create and author the world (Lyotard, 1988).

Epistemically this suggests many different worlds of meaning and implies the ineliminable nature of interpretation. Normatively it suggests that the values and meanings of others deserve as much attention and appreciation as our own. Recognizing the authority of other perspectives and values elicits political questions of whose community, whose knowledge, and whose interpretation of the world is to prevail? According to post-positivism the answer is to call for a community based on justice, equality, and solidarity (Giroux, 1989). In this way, post-positivist relativism takes a theoretical argument (involving epistemic claims) and joins it with a practical argument (implying a set of claims that are moral and political).

Yet, despite the validity of such critiques and the attractiveness of the normative prescriptions, relativism is fatal to the project of critical thinking, to the recovery of meaning, and to the claims for recognition by those who suffer injustice or occupy subordinate, unrecognized, or unappreciated status in any particular community. In fact, the embrace of relativism as grounds for respecting cultural differences, interpretative creativity, moral sensitivity, or transnational justice is both inconsistent with and dangerous to these otherwise laudable and defensible ends. I hope to show that post-positivist relativism is indefensible on epistemic, moral, and political grounds. I intend to challenge progressive thinkers to consider how relativism ill-serves and dishonors these ends. Finally, in contrast to the defects of relativism, I hope to make the case for the universality of reason, for the humane imperatives of objectivity, and for the moral imperatives of logical consistency. I wish to show that universalism is the only coherent epistemic position that one can take, and also the only morally and politically sound foundation from which one can validly insist that everyone is obliged to honor the ends of equality, justice, and mutuality of respect.

On the Objective Origins of Subjectivity

To appreciate the nature of the problem, I wish to distinguish two forms of relativism: one is personal the other systemic. Personal relativism asserts the inherent subjectivity of claims to truth. It is *subjectivist relativism*, in its extreme and unsophisticated version, and knowledgeable relativists reject it as irremediably flawed (Barnes and Bloor, 1985; Krausz, 1989; also see Siegal, 1989). By contrast, sophisticated relativism, (e.g., the post-positivism described above) is systemic and holds that truth, right, and objectivity are meaningful terms, but only within a system or framework. In this version, relativism exists between systems and frameworks, not between individuals. Thus systemic relativism may be called *framework relativism*. As Michael Krausz (1989: 1) puts it,

> Such values as truth, meaningfulness, rightness, reasonableness, appropriateness, aptness, or the like are relative to the contexts in which they appear . . . Relativism denies the viability of grounding the pertinent claims in ahistorical, acultural, or absolutist terms.

Although no contemporary scholars defend the unsophisticated version, there are several reasons to pay at least some attention to its defects:

1. There are always naive relativists, some of whom may benefit from such a critique.
2. The failings of naive relativism help to identify important problems sophisticated relativism must avoid.
3. Since systemic relativism fails to repair the problems of the more naive version, the nature of the failings needs to be detailed.

Relativists assert that persons in nonliterate, non-Western cultures experience and understand the world in ways different from persons in advanced industrial societies. In one sense, the claim is simply gratuitous because even persons in the same society experience the world differently. The issue is not whether we experience it differently, but how we know that we do and whether our different experiences allow for common truths. In particular, the assumption of strict internality, even within frameworks cannot be maintained. Assumptions of internality rely upon a series of confusions and a mistaken notion of meaning revealed by Wittgenstein's (1958) private language argument. In presenting the private language argument as a refutation of relativism, I draw implications that carry farther than Wittgenstein himself recognizes or allows, for I apply the argument to frameworks as well as individuals; and I use it to deny not only a theory of internal meaning but also a theory of internal truth.

According to the private language argument, common sense and many, if not all, forms of relativism, imply that notions such as, "pain," "happiness," "good" etc. are intimately bound up with, and refer to our experiences as if they gain meaning from what is going on in our heads or in our hearts. After all, in the simplest case, the meaning of something as fundamental as the color blue is bound up with my experience of blue. Since my experience of blue is surely distinct from your experience, since the associations that I make with the color blue are unique and distinguishable from the associations you make with the color blue, doesn't it follow that *what blue means to me is different, must be different, than what blue means to you.* If so, then understanding the meanings (or intentions) of others would depend upon access to their private or internal meanings. But such a thesis is untenable.

This theory of meaning is untenable because our capacity to communicate about our personal experiences, "blue," "pain," "happiness," "sadness," "sweet," is possible because they are conditional, not upon private experience, but upon the publicly observable elements of experience. Conversely, it is plausible to argue that if there were no external, observable, public properties associated with these terms (i.e., if the meaning of terms such as "pain" and "happiness" were wholly dependent upon internal events) then we probably could not meaningfully and coherently identify these experiences even to ourselves.

These claims are part of Wittgenstein's private language argument, which for the purposes of this paper can be expressed in two versions. The strong version holds that the experiencing agent cannot meaningfully identify purely internal experiences in a consistent fashion, even experiences as profound as pain. It is unclear whether Wittgenstein holds that this is in principle the case or simply a practical impossibility. I call the "in principle" case the strong version of the private language argument. The strong version is not necessary to the present argument. All that is necessary is the weak version. The weak version[2] holds that 1) purely internal experiences cannot be objects of language, communication, or interpersonal meaning; 2) the meaning of a word or an action is contingent upon its use according to a consistent rule or convention; and 3) the rules or conventions of are in principle public, i.e., objective and accessible to anyone. Thus, contrary to popular belief, meaning is not a function of intention, will, or private internal states. If I used the word "sqblx" once to point out a picture, another time to refer to a smell, another time to identify the hypotenuse of a right triangle, and every succeeding time in a different fashion, "sqblx" could not be meaningful to you, or to me, unless uniting all its different uses were some principle, rule, or convention that explains what it could consistently mean in these different instances. Such a rule would, in principle, have to be expressible by me and accessible to others. Consistent usage, a necessary condition for linguistic or symbolic meaning, is subsequently referred to as the condition of *logical consistency.*

To explain *ordinary communication and meaning, reference or access to private language and private experience is irrelevant.* Consider the word, "blue." It has meaning for you and I even though I have no knowledge of what your experience of blue is and you have no knowledge of mine. The possibility and reality of meaning arises precisely because different individuals come to agreement in picking out blue things in the world. Granted, this implies that human beings are internally wired so that their experiences and responses to color phenomena are systematic within and between individuals' experiences. To claim responses are systematic "within" an individual means that Gainsborough's *Blue Boy* creates approximately the same color impression for me whenever I view it under normal lighting conditions (e.g., not bathed in red light) and free of visual impairments (without my rose colored glasses). To claim responses are systematic "between" individuals means that the same is true for other individuals as well. Whether different individuals have the same experience is irrelevant. All that counts is that each of our experiences can be consistently related to something shared and public, so that our linguistic behavior can be coordinated. This is the minimal condition of a meaningful language of color words.

It does not matter that whenever you see the blue in Gainsborough's painting, your private, internal experience is exactly the same as my experience when I see the color red. All that matters is that you and I have learned to call Gainsborough's painting blue; and that you and I describe a clear sky and the background of the stars in the U.S. flag as blue. We agree these things are blue even though if I had your internal experience I would call these things red. *Our internal experiences do not matter, and in themselves may not be the same* (there is no way we can know). What matters is, whatever our experiences, they occur in such a systematic fashion within and between individuals that we can coordinate our speech acts to achieve meaningful communication. Meaning clearly depends upon public not private features of experience in virtue of which coordination is possible.

What is true of "blue" is also true for "pain," "happiness," "depression," "frustration." Each of these experiences acquires meaning in precisely the same way. Thus we can meaningfully communicate about pain (even different kinds of pain) although our internal experiences cannot be compared any more than our internal experiences of blue. Yet talk of pain is meaningful. We can even teach a child the meaning of these words for sensations. We do so by identifying grimaces, smiles, and other observable behavior and infer appropriate descriptions of internal states. In this way, we can correct a child who misidentifies his/her internal states and we can help them make fine distinctions, e.g., between boredom and disappointment. As with color words, we have no knowledge (need not have, and could not have) of others' internal experiences, for it is not access to the internal experiences that form the basis for meaning. Even in the case of subjective experiences there is a public, objective rule, convention, or principle for the correct application of these terms, and without the rule there could be no possibility of meaningful communication.

The mistake of relativism is to think that our ability to use terms like "red" and "blue," "pain" and "happiness" depends upon what is going on in our heads. This is wrong. It is certainly wrong as an account of linguistic meaning. The possibility of communication between individuals, of translation between languages, and of shared meanings with other cultures is contingent and conditional upon that which is objective, public, and observable. In particular, the condition of objectivity makes it possible to share meanings and acquire other languages. The condition of objectivity obtains for translators just as it must for native speakers.

Even our capacity to meaningfully express and describe our internal states derives from our linguistic ability to consistently make objective, criterial distinctions. For example, consider the following pairs of sentences:

The soup is hot.	The soup seems hot.
The sun is red.	The sun seems red.
The box is heavy.	The box seems heavy.

In each case, the ability to shift from objective language to subjective language, from descriptions of the world to descriptions of inner states depends upon the words that could not be meaningful unless their meanings had been fixed in advance within the public realm. If the relativist cuts him/herself off from a public, nonsubjective, external world (i.e., the universally common, objective external world), then the relativist's prescription to seek attunement to the meanings and understandings of others becomes a logical absurdity (see Davidson, 1974 and Hollis, 1986 for a more extensive argument concerning the conditions of translatability).

Only the weak version of the private language argument is necessary to show that there could be no meaningful terms for expressing private sensations unless those terms had public properties. For it is demonstrable that we cannot know or have access to another's purely private, unique experiences, yet we can communicate meaningfully about our experiences with each other. It follows that a private experience is not wholly unique but is distinguishable only in virtue of the individual's unique location and unique combination of experiences, each describable in objectively, meaningful predicates. [3] As Putnam argues and Wittgenstein implies "meanings aren't in the head."

Notice, nothing in this argument depends upon explicit assumptions about what the world is like or what human experiences are like in order to reach its conclusions.[4] Language entails objectivity because the necessary condition of having a language is systematic responses within our own experiences and between the experiences of different individuals. This allows human beings to coordinate their linguistic behavior using words in a logically consistent fashion. Because our use of language implies objectivity, one cannot deny objectivity without self-contradiction. In effect, one cannot use language to deny the possibility of language. Therefore, even relativists must surrender to objectivity, at least to the extent necessary for language. Thus transpersonal objectivity is affirmed and the fallacies of naive relativism are revealed.

Detailing the fallacies of naive relativism makes explicit what is implicit in the private language argument. First, in its most extreme form, naive relativism does violence to the distinction between objective and subjective. Within this version of relativism there is no difference between "X is red" and "X seems red." The former reduces to the latter. From the perspective of subjectivist relativism, if the sun appears red to me, there is no contradiction or disagreement if it does not appear red to you. Without a conflict or a contradiction I have no trouble asserting the truth of my observation *and* embracing the truth of yours as well. No two individuals are ever talking about the same thing and there claims never conflict. All anyone can do is give reports about internal states. Yet subjective, self-references can never be the stuff from which relativism is made. Without external reference, no question of deciding between claims ever arises; the external world evaporates; and so does the question of relativism.

Yet "X is red" indubitably means something different than "X seems red." Subjectivism cannot adequately explain the difference or our recognition of it. In fact, without reference to an outside world, there is no way we could ever develop language, communicate with each other, or know to what others refer when they refer. Since external references are clearly meaningful, radical subjectivism fails by failing to recognize the distinctive implications of objective and subjective language. By reducing the former to the latter it suffers from *the confusion of discernibles.*

Second, if all claims are subjective, then the challenge for relativism does not derive because people have different tastes and preferences, but because they can only have tastes and preferences. The radical subjectivist cannot explain why any individual would ever come to judge his/her beliefs wrong. The radical subjectivist cannot leverage beliefs against an external world, because there can be no "external" world. From the stand point of radical subjectivism, we can only know the world as it appears to us. Yet to concede the world to subjectivism is to lose the world entirely and with it any reference for one's claims. Solipsism ensues and with it incoherence. Conversely to preserve the world as independent of oneself is to open the door to objectivity and the denial of relativism. In short, either all claims are subjective or they are not. If all claims are subjective then relativism fails, but if some claims are objective, then relativism fails. Either way relativism fails. This is *the fallacy of incoherence.*

Third, if relativism asserts the truth of the claim, "all beliefs are embedded in an individual's psychology and therefore relativistic," then relativism asserts a nonrelative claim. The relativist asserts this as truth, and, in so doing, utters a claim that is self-refuting. For s/he asserts as true that no assertion is true. The relativist thus faces the dilemma: of asserting: 1) that all claims are relativistic, in which case relativism is false; or 2) that not all claims are relativistic, in which case relativism is false. Either way, relativism is false. This is *the fallacy of self-refutation.*

Finally, relativism cannot be saved by asserting that the claim of relativism is the only exception to the relativity of all claims, for this misses the essence of the problem. Because subjectivism renders the concept of "true" meaningless, it makes no sense to assert that relativism is true. Relativism undermines itself by denying its ability to advance any claim (including the claims of relativism) as true, right, or meaningful. This is *the fallacy of incoherence.*

Framework Relativism

Subjectivism fails because it denies meaning to expressions that are clearly meaningful and because in doing so it undermines the coherence of its own claims. If some form of relativism is to be coherent, it must accord meaning to terms such as, "true," "false," "objective," and "right." Of course, some relativists would prefer to dispatch notions of truth and objectivity all together, but that path returns us to the absurdity of subjectivist relativism, a path that is unalterably closed. Post-positivist relativism represents a plausible way of accepting the challenge by conceding meaning to terms such as "true," while also preserving the case for relativism. To do so, sophisticated relativism suggests that meanings are not just in the world, but must be understood as arising within the context of a system or framework. Because it is always possible to adopt or create another framework from which to describe the world, any framework is said to underdetermine the world (Rorty, 1982; Connolly, 1985). Consequently, infinite worlds make infinite truths possible (Goodman, 1978).

Because the notion of framework is rarely specified by those who defend relativism, I will treat it as a covering term that may be loosely applied to any system of meanings. A framework may be as open as a language (English, French, Zulu) or as closed and specialized as a set of arcane or technical practices (religion, physics, etiquette). Frameworks give rise to meaning by embodying concepts, symbols, beliefs, methods, standards, theories, rules of inference and discourse, or norms of justification and action. From this perspective, rules and norms serve as fundaments of meaning allowing for "truth," and "objectivity" within frameworks, but not necessarily between frameworks. It makes little sense to speak about "the truth" or even to speak about "the world" in absolute, nonrelative terms. All truth and all descriptions of the world are relative. Between two systems or frameworks there can be no way to adjudicate truth or right, for the only way "truth" and "right" obtain meaning is within a framework. But no framework advances an uncontestable truth about the world, because between frameworks the assertion of "truth" or "right" begs the question.

Furthermore, all frameworks (and their implicit methods, reasons, theories and standards) are embedded in cultural histories reflecting the interests and perspectives of individuals participating in those cultures (Geertz, 1973, 1989). If there are no acultural or ahistorical standards to adjudicate competing claims, then any universal claims (of truth and reason) are inherently contestable. This, in effect, is also a psychological proposition.[5] It asserts that because an individual's beliefs are embedded within a framework, emersed within a culture and a history, individuals are incapable of taking a system-neutral stand. Because beliefs depend upon rules, concepts, standards, and theories, beliefs can only have parochial meanings. In this way, relativism does what it must to preserve itself. It provides meaning to notions such as "true," then renders all truth local and system-dependent.

The implication of this analysis locks meanings and truths inside frameworks. Because the truth of one framework is not superior to another, the task of knowledge is not to acquire truth, but to acquire understandings of different frameworks and of different ways to view the world. Hence the relativist prescriptions for attunement, appreciation, and equal respect. These are the conclusions of framework relativism and they allegedly flow from the following claims:

1. because frameworks are human conventions, they can be other than they are;
2. because they can be other than they are, then different meanings and different truths become possible within different frameworks;
3. because frameworks can be other than they are, the consequent meanings and truths can be other than they are;
4. therefore, nothing obliges one to accept the meanings, standards, or truths that emerge within a given framework unless one voluntarily accepts the framework.

Of course, the woolly relativist may believe every framework yields legitimate notions of true or right and that along such an avenue one might "justify" anything from infanticide to witchcraft. But such belief only points back to the persistent failing of relativism in all its varieties, namely the confusion of objective and subjective. In the arguments above this confusion takes the form of a failure to distinguish between psychological and epistemological groundings.

If we want to know why Able believes that within Euclidean geometry, $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$, we can explain that he took geometry his sophomore year, that his teacher used model triangles, that his mother helped him with his homework, etc. This account is biographical and implicitly historical, cultural, and psychological. Thus reasons for believing are accounted for in terms of the sociology and psychology of beliefs, as in the case of Able's belief in the Pythagorean theorem. A similar account can be used to explain why Able believes New York City is the capital of the United States. In this case, his second grade teacher, his very favorite teacher of all time, was confused about the capital of the United States, his father helped him with his homework, etc. The biographical account explains all beliefs; it explains true and false beliefs equally well; but it cannot explain why one belief is true and another false. If all we can appeal to is the biography of our beliefs, there can be no distinction between true and false belief since each has a biography. It also suggests that even if framework relativism is right about the significance of a framework, the emphasis on historical, cultural, and psychological underpinnings of every framework threatens to undermine the significance of any belief.

Consider the case of Western science. If truth is only relative to standards and standards must be chosen to be binding, then explaining scientific truth becomes problematic. How after all can the framework relativist account for the fact that the principles of aerodynamics work in all cultures at all times? In this case the scientific beliefs of avionics engineers arguably depend upon the truths of aerodynamic principles and not just the enculturation of engineers. How else can we account for the fact that airplanes do not fall from the sky for cases in which airplane pilots or passengers don't know the principles of aerodynamics or become confused about them while in flight. Surely this is not only because twentieth century avionics engineers believe in the standards of Western science. After all, there is a difference between the psychology or genealogy of belief on the one hand and the epistemology of belief on the other. We can validate this distinction in the same way we validate the difference between red and blue. Because language users reliably make this distinction, by implication such a distinction must be objective.[6]

The recourse for the relativist is to challenge the distinction between subjective and objective by denying the validity of the distinction between psychology and epistemology. At this point, we can again call upon the private language argument to destroy the challenge.[7] For it does not matter whether relativists want to grant the possibility of objective distinctions, so long as competent language users make objective distinctions. All the relativist may do is try to demonstrate that while ordinary distinctions are objective on the surface, upon deeper analysis a reduction occurs. For example, since science is the *bete noir* of relativism, relativists may adopt a Kuhnian view of science arguing that scientists are conditioned to believe in certain principles. Scientific beliefs, therefore, reflect personal and professional investments, so that scientists do not believe in their theories because the theories provide an "objectively" better fit with world. In this fashion the relativist reconstructs the scientist's discourse about objectivity and offers a meta-analysis. But relativists cannot do this.

In two important ways this meta-analysis is problematic for relativists. First, it violates critical normative principles that are central to relativism. Because meta-analysis implies that the scientists' misunderstand what they do when they judge theories and beliefs true or false, meta-analysis entails reductionism. By reinterpreting the scientists claims, the relativist employs an external standard to give new meanings to what the scientists say. These meanings are not the meanings given or acknowledged by the scientists themselves.

This is a meta-analysis and relativists generally object when this sort of reinterpretation is applied to the beliefs of the Azande or the Neuer. But perhaps we can let the relativist pass on the normative issue in this case. Perhaps we can let them violate their normative rule with respect to Western science, to preserve the rule in other cases and therefore remain attuned to the indigenous meanings of other cultures. However, this is not the only rule they must violate, for in order pull off the reduction, they also must violate their epistemic standard. To show that scientists' understandings of themselves cannot be sustained at a deep level, the relativist must apply a transystemic standard and assert what is the case. They must do so from a point of view that is not embedded in a particular culture or a particular history. Yet, if the relativist is applying only a preferred standard and framework, then the relativist's analysis can be discharged as framework bound. In other words, the relativist's explanation of scientific truth should be treated as a bad translation which fails to capture what the Western scientist are saying.

The result is a self-defeating paradox. If relativists judge science from a relativist framework, then their framework leaves them unable to comprehend or criticize the objectivity and truth of Western science; but if they judge Western science from a nonrelative framework, then they undermine relativism. Either way, relativism loses, for it must be the case that the relativist either has a meta-case or the relativist does not. If the relativist has a meta-case, then the meta-case demonstrates the falsity of relativism. If the relativist does not have a meta-case, then Western science demonstrates the falsity of relativism. Either way, relativism is demonstrably false.

Relative Standards and Nonrelative Truths

The problem of accounting for the success of Western science poses a dilemma with such stinging power because one must account not just for the beliefs of scientists but for scientific "truths." Just as naive relativism cannot account for the objectivity implicit in language, it can be shown that framework relativism fails because it cannot recognize the necessary and sufficient conditions of objectivity and therefore cannot resist the slide towards subjectivism. Claims about the psychology of belief simply will not bolster their case. Of course, all beliefs occur in individuals who are socialized in histories and cultures, but some beliefs are grounded in justifications that transcend particular histories and cultures. Western science is only one especially obvious example. The relativist problem lies in the mistaken inference that just because the meaning of a statement depends upon a framework, then the truth of that statement is dependent on the framework. Thus relativists are confused about the proper relationship of meaning and truth.

To clarify this problem, let us concede that meaning depends upon frameworks; and truths depend upon meaning; therefore truth depends upon a framework. There is, for instance, no way to answer someone who asks, "Tell me the plain and simple truths about mountains independent of any point of view." We cannot speak about mountains without a point of view. So we speak of them from geological, geographic, meteorological, environmental, historic, aesthetic, ecological, or religious points of view, just to name a few. In this sense there is no plain and simple truth about mountains. As there is no truth independent of a point of view, and there are no grounds for claiming that the geological point of view is superior to the geographic point of view. But neither is there any sense in saying that geological truths concerning mountains are not truths because you or I apprehend mountains from the geographic point of view. The geological truths are universal truths because the standards of geology are universal and objective. The standards of geology do not guarantee the truths that follow from their application, but the truths of geology are not undone just because some individuals don't know, don't understand, or don't like geology.

Thus even if we begin by acknowledging that frameworks are ubiquitous, and, in a limited sense, framework relativism holds, it does not follow that frameworks render objectivity or universality meaningless, even across frameworks. For example, if, as it happened, Germans lacked a word for "violet" until the 19th century, it did not follow that Germans were incapable of seeing violet, or that the French had a private experience of violet not available to the Germans. Rather the meaning of violet was in principle always available to Germans even if it did not exist in practice.

Furthermore, while every idea is expressed in some language or framework and therefore every belief has a genealogy, it does not follow that studying the language, framework, or the genealogy provides anything like a sufficient explanation of how geologists see mountains or Germans see violet. Genealogy can explain how any particular belief is possible or how a belief acquires the authority of truth. Consequently, one can always point to the space and time in which a belief comes to be held, but as one can see, this itself is insufficient to establish a relativistic conclusion. The notions of framework and genealogy are insufficient for several reasons.

1. An analysis of frameworks cannot explain why true beliefs are true across frameworks.
2. An analysis of a framework explains why some beliefs are false relative to a framework, but it cannot explain why some accepted true beliefs can come to be seen as false by those who accept the framework.
3. A genealogy of belief cannot explain why two persons at different places and times come to hold the same beliefs.
4. A genealogy of belief cannot distinguish between a true belief and a false belief.
5. A genealogy of belief cannot explain how individuals are capable of creating and sharing standards.

In truth, this is the relativism's argument turned against itself, for, as relativism claims,

1. because frameworks underdetermine the world, beliefs authorized by a framework can be falsified;
2. because frameworks underdetermine the world, there is, by implication, a world to which frameworks in some respect must be fitted.

This suggests that the conditions for a linguistic framework, objectivity and logical consistency, imply a complicated relationship between truth, coherence, and correspondence which post-positivism does not fully appreciate. This confusion derives in part because positivism employed a correspondence theory of meaning, and correspondence has been treated like a dirty word. Consequently, much of the subsequent discussion of epistemology has occurred in the terms of the "alternative" notion of "coherence" (Wittgenstein, 1958; Habermas, 1971; Sosa, 1980). However, the private language argument makes it obvious that there is no either/or choice. Without correspondence we would be driven back to the problem of talking about blue when blue is only a private internal experience, we would be driven back to the absurdity of private language. Frameworks must have both coherence and correspondence. *An incoherent framework cannot correspond to the world; while a framework that purports to be about the world and fails to correspond with the world, must be incoherent. Thus no framework which purports to be about the world permits a free choice for either coherence or correspondence. These conditions are interdependent.*

For example, consider how a concept or standard cannot create a truth or deny a truth. A Fahrenheit thermometer serves as a standard for a meaningful notion of "temperature." Nothing deters us from creating hollow cylinders filled with equal amounts of mercury and calibrated in equal interval segments. Yet if the use of the thermometer did not yield consistently comparable results, then it would not be a standard and one could not speak of objective truths concerning temperature or thermodynamics. Thus Toulmin (1958) tells us that if persons, reading well-made thermometers that record the boiling point of water, failed to report the same results in otherwise identical situations, and if one cannot account for this difference by pointing to any failing in the individual's use or reading of the thermometer or any relevant difference in the situation, then thermometers would not serve as a standard for measuring temperature nor serve as a way of ascertaining thermodynamic relationships. The chief failure of relativism seems to reside in its mistaken emphasis on the conventional (in effect *non-a priori*) nature of norms and standards. Relativism needs to recognize that *while standards are necessary for meaning and truth, meaningful standards are not whatever we will them to be. Instead the possibility of a standard is dependent upon objectivity, which in principle implies universality.*

Relativism's mistake derives from a confusion concerning how objectivity relates to the use of standards and frameworks. The objectivity of a standard is not simply a function of the rule or convention that governs its use and gives it meaning. The public use of a rule is contingent upon the fact different people are capable of coordinating their behavior in otherwise inexplicable ways to arrive at a common set of meanings and beliefs. Such behavior authorizes a standard of objectivity that carries beyond simple psychological agreement because objectivity permits logical consistency. Objectivity thus serves as a meta-standard and can be used to distinguish beliefs that are objective from those that are subjective. It is this extension of objectivity that makes rational justification and truth possible, that makes $g = mc^2$ universally true even if unknown or unrecognized by the Azande or the Seventh Day Adventists.

This possibility of universality through objectivity applies not only to scientific and descriptive discourse, but to all discourse that makes the pretense of having an objective referent or objective criteria. In fact, not even normative discourse is simply a matter of internal, subjective referent. For the meaning of words are conditional upon consistent usage (i.e., logical consistency) and objectivity. These conditions exercise their hold in such a fashion that even normative claims have more objective content than is often recognized. If so, then normative words such as, "best," imply a standard and achieve meaning in the same way thermometers do. Consider the claim, "Babe Ruth is the best baseball player ever." To prove this claim, I must explain its meaning and in particular the meaning of the term "best." What I mean by "best" will determine whether the statement is true. For instance, I may simply mean, "Babe Ruth is my favorite baseball player." If so, then claiming Babe Ruth is best does not conflict with Jones claiming "Willie Mays is best." or Smith's claim that "Reginald Blithers is best."

Yet "best" may mean something objective, as opposed to subjective. When meaning relies on nonsubjective criteria, it follows that disagreement entails someone is wrong, and this is true even for statements about "best" (at least when best is given objective meaning). For instance, best may mean "hits the most home runs," and if so, then "Babe Ruth is not the best" because Henry Aaron hit more home runs. To privilege my belief that Babe Ruth is best, I may then change my standard to mean "highest slugging percentage," and if I also exclude Japanese baseball players, then my claim is objectively and universally true. But this is only possible because my claim "Babe Ruth is best," must be understood to mean "Babe Ruth has the highest slugging percentage of any American baseball player." [8]

To object to this example because I have changed the meaning of "best," misses the point. I concede that the above point turns upon stipulating the meaning of "best" in a fashion that I like. But there is no trick in doing this; nothing is hidden. To object that there is some nonstipulable meaning of "best" that we all know but cannot express is to suggest a "magical" meaning in words. It is to assert that at least some words have special meanings with which human beings cannot tamper; that we use these words in magical and mystical ways conditioned by "things" we cannot fully explicate. The mistake, of course, is a naive view of meaning that has already been discharged. The "things" we cannot "fully explicate" are either public or private. If they are public then we can explicate them; and if they are private, we cannot explicate them, which is to say they cannot have meaning. Either way, magic meaning is discharged.

More importantly, even if "best" can be defined any way I like, its meaning is still not a matter of what I like. For "best" could have no meaning unless it is governed by an objective, public rule or convention; and even when "best" means "that which I like the most" its ability to mean is not a function of a private, internal will, volition, or intention. It has meaning only because we (normal users of English) know what it means for any of us to say "that which I like the most" and because "that which I like the most" means the same thing to each of us. Moreover, if by this definition it is true that "Babe Ruth is the best," I am not free to trade that meaning of best with the alternative "that which is most valuable all things considered, from the point of view of anyone" and still pretend that the statement is true. In the end, "Let 'best' have magical meaning for anyone who likes it that way. However, when I use 'best', I only mean by it what I specify and I never use it to access your magic meaning." If this standard is comprehensible, then to deny it's use is to be guilty of the confusion of discernibles. To allow its use will not license me to play any tricks on you or entail any conclusions you cannot comprehend and validate. Thus if I choose to use "blue" to mean "automobile," I cannot turn around and fool you into believing "the sky is an automated vehicle with at least three wheels." The lesson to be drawn is that standards and frameworks are human creations and matters of choice, but the beliefs and principles they authorize are not matters of individual will.

Therefore, if we choose to make "blue" mean the color blue, it will not mean "car" when I point to a car and call it blue, nor mean "wall" when I point a wall and call it blue, even if at the moment I point I intend my utterance of "blue" to mean "car" or "wall". In this sense my intentions are irrelevant to meaning. So too if, in the premises of an argument, morality means that which is "only a reason for me," then it will not mean "a reason for anyone" in the conclusions of the argument, simply because I would like it to be so. In effect, I can make any term mean what I like, if I choose an objective (publicly available, nonprivate) standard and use it in a logically consistent fashion. In that sense meaning is volitional, but it will only have the meaning I will it to have if I use it in the same way each time. Hence the necessity of logical consistency. For these reasons, meaning is not volitional. This is the lesson of the private language argument and the reason one may say, *"make your standards what you will, you cannot conclude whatever you like."* This is the case because the condition of uttering a meaningful statement depends upon logically consistent usage (i.e., use according to a standard) without which linguistic meaning is impossible.

All meaning frameworks *entail principles of logical consistency and objectivity because logical consistency and objectivity are necessary conditions for meaning. Consequently, relativism is false because logical consistency and objectivity constitute universal meta-standards which in practice are validated by the behavioral conformity of all language users. It matters not that there are an infinite number of norms and standards, or that the norms and standards themselves are not given or prescribed a priori. It matters not, because although one may make standards as one likes, one cannot reach whatever conclusion one likes.* Since logical consistency and objectivity are implicit in any language or framework, yet not given or stipulated by the framework, logical consistency and objectivity constitute universal standards that constrain meanings and claims within any framework.

On the Objectivity of Ethical Standards

Now the conditions of ordinary meaning make objectivity and logical consistency possible are also necessary for meaningful moral claims. Therefore, all moral claims must satisfy these conditions. The relativist cannot object these are simply conditions for one among many moralities; nor can s/he object that the criteria for objectivity and logical consistency are simply elements of a Western (or a male oriented) moral framework that is neither meaningful nor obligatory for persons who subscribe to other moral frameworks. The objection is not relevant because I am not trying to appropriate any "magic meaning" for the term moral. Moreover my claim is valid if logical consistency and objectivity are elements of any framework. This has already been shown to be the case.

To appreciate this argument, we might call objective and logically justified prescriptions instances of "zorality," and let it be understood that to call a claim "not zoral" asserts the absence of rational, objective justification - nothing more and nothing less. I also grant that people are free to be inconsistent and subjective. All I wish to claim is that in being so they are inconsistent and subjective, and that anyone capable of meaningful communication understands what that means. Therefore, the relativist cannot object that objectivity and logical consistency are arbitrary conditions of zorality and therefore simply standards that some may choose not to recognize. Nor can s/he claim that logical consistency and objectivity are framework relative and therefore not meaningful to people who don't subscribe to the framework of zorality. Neither complaint constitutes a real objection, because all human beings who understand language already have an intuitive sense of what is compelling about logical consistency and objectivity. They do so because logical consistency and objectivity are implicit in all frameworks as they are implicit in language.

To test the implications of this consider the case of the racist who holds that "blacks do not deserve equal rights which belong to all other human beings." If the racist wants moral to mean "what I prefer," then when the racist claims, "denying blacks equal rights is what is best," all s/he means is that "denying blacks equal rights is what I prefer." Given our appreciation of how one obtains meaning, it follows that the racist cannot acquire what s/he does not purchase. Therefore, let the racist claim that his/her principle is moral. The debate is not over who gets to use the word "moral." The question is, "what does moral mean?" or in new parlance, "Is racism zoral?"

We can see the simple requirements of objectivity and logical consistency oblige the racist to explain in virtue of what quality or characteristics human beings obtain rights and conversely why blacks can be denied rights. If the racist fails or refuses to satisfy these conditions, s/he may persist in wishing to deny rights to some human beings, but the racist must concede that the claim is not rationally consistent or objectively justified. In fact, no standard the racist offers will justify the racist's claim without so radically changing the meaning of "right" so that it no longer means what the racist intends when s/he proclaims "blacks do not deserve equal rights."

For instance, the racist may begin with the ordinary groundings for equal rights, by holding that all human beings by nature deserve equal rights. Logical consistency requires that s/he demonstrate why persons with black skin are not human beings. How can this be done? One possible avenue is to argue that the defining characteristic of human beings is rationality and blacks are not rational. But such a claim obliges the racist to explicate rationality in a fashion that excludes all blacks and includes all others. Any simple criterion of rationality (e.g., the ability to speak a language and do arithmetic) fails to exclude most blacks or include all whites. To preserve the principle, the racist must then change from rationality to a more restrictive standard, perhaps asserting that some specified level of intelligence is the basis for rights. Yet here too the racist must recognize that even if intelligence employs a high standard (e.g., the ability to speak two languages and do calculus), the standard will not divide the species along strictly racial lines. So the racist may then again switch grounds and argue "persons of African origin do not deserve equal rights." Yet if Richard Leakey is right, and human origins can be traced back to Africa, then the criterion of African descent fails to justify the racist's purpose. Perhaps, the racist will then try to argue that persons who do not care about their offsprings, or who fail to maintain a monogamous relationship, or who are not real Americans, or who immigrated to the U.S. from Africa do not deserve equal rights. In every case, the proposed standard will fail to distinguish groups along simple racial lines.

In the end, the racist will discover that the only standard consistent with his/her purpose is skin color. Yet if one's skin color is the standard, then the racist holds that "blacks ought to be denied equal rights because they are black," which is demonstrably inadequate because any inference from skin color to right is an arbitrary inference. It is arbitrary in two senses both of which are fatal to rational justification. First, if black skin is the ultimate reason why some persons should be denied rights, it is no reason. This follows definitionally from the notion of "ultimate reason," which means "that beyond which there is no reason." That there is no reason beyond "black skin" is implicit in the failed arguments of the racist. If there is no reason beyond skin color, then skin color must be the reason for rights. Yet if so, then nothing commends one color more than any another. If nothing commends black more than white, then there is just as much reason to prescribe that "whites should be denied equal rights because they are white" as to prescribe that "blacks should be denied equal rights because they are black." In other words, the case for choosing white is just as strong as the case for choosing black.

Second, the reason one cannot advance skin color as grounds for rights is that nothing in the notion of "right" permits any logical inference to color. What in the notion of "white" implies or entails anything about "rights?" Do white crayons have rights that other crayons do not? How about white paint? Albino tigers? Put simply, nothing in the explication of "right" or of "color" connects the two, and willing a logical connection does not make it so. Because logically consistent use is necessary for meaning there can be no logical connection between rights and color without radically altering the notion of "right" or the notion of "color." Any explication of right that connected it to color would so alter the meaning of "right" that it could no longer mean what the racist intends.

Consequently, all the racist can be saying is that s/he does not wish blacks to be granted equal rights. Such a claim is admittedly subjective and relative, and therefore not objective or universal. If so, no conflict or contradiction exists when I assert, "I prefer all persons, including blacks, be accorded equal rights." Neither claim is moral, for morality means something more than preferences (that "I like artichokes" is not a moral claim). Surely if moral claims prescribe obligatory actions for other persons, then Jones' declaration of dislike is not a moral claim. It prescribes nothing. Nor is it a reason to deny black human rights any more than the fact that I like artichokes is a reason why everyone should be obliged to eat them. Or put otherwise, the claims "I like X" and "everyone ought to recognize X is right" must rest upon different kinds of grounds. "I like X" is not a reason anyone else should accept "X" and by definition, fails to justify, "X is right". Conversely, if morality (zorality) provides reasons everyone should accept, then it must rest upon universally acceptable grounds, namely grounds of logical consistency and objectivity.

This objection notwithstanding, I concede that the racist may simply decide not to justify his/her claims, but advance them because s/he likes and commends the results to others. I will even concede its probable that irrational forces, self-deception, and psychological manipulation are each more "powerful" mechanisms in forming beliefs than are consistency and objectivity. Nevertheless, objectivity and logical consistency are universal touchstones, and this refutation of racism is objectively compelling. Even the racist must appreciate that nothing objectively explains why his/her preferences should take universal precedence over the preferences of anyone else. Will people go on being racists? Of course, but this will not justify their racism. The critical point is that we can know with certainty that the racists' claims are morally (zorally) unjustified, i.e., not logically consistent or objective.

Now I do not assume that the difference between relativism and the position is a difference over whether racism or equality is good or bad. Let us assume that both relativists and nonrelativists agree racism is bad and equality is good. Let us even assume both agree that ordinary people would more surely become egalitarians if we seduced them with clever manipulation, rather than reason. That is not the question. The question is whether the relativist can give a "reason" why manipulation of public opinion for egalitarian ends is superior to the manipulation of public opinion for personal, self-interested or racist ends? This seems not possible for relativists and so it reveals both the epistemic and the normative failings of relativism. It is an epistemic failing because refutation of racism is demonstrable; and it is a normative failing because relativism cannot give any reasons to persons who are not disposed to accept post-positivist egalitarian prescriptions. Where there is a will to injustice, a love of advantage, or a lust for power, relativism provides license.

Relativism cannot offer compelling reasons to the racist, because it rules out any reasons which bridge the sides. Relativism offers no bar to the prescriptions of Machiavelli, Hobbes, or Nietzsche, for each offers a framework. If frameworks by their nature make no universal claims, then a framework of justice or compassion creates no obligation for those who do not subscribe to it. Machiavelli's, Hobbes', and Nietzsche's prescriptions carry as much legitimacy as any other. Princes, leviathans, and supermen have as much a claim to moral and political legitimacy as does democracy, mutuality, or egalitarian justice. Most importantly this moral and political failing derives directly from relativism's epistemic failing, from relativism's failure to acknowledge what it cannot deny, namely that the standards of logical consistency and objectivity are implicit in any framework and, as such, create groundings no one is free to deny. These groundings are not volitionally chosen conventions, but meta-principles that apply to any framework.

Conclusions

In this paper I have tried to show that the relativist fails to appreciate the obligatory epistemic status of objectivity and logical consistency. Relativists fail to understand that while objectivity is implicit in any framework or language, and while frameworks and languages are human conventions, objectivity is not. In other words, whether we call blue, "blue" or "grue" is a matter of volition; but that we can pick out the same color and use the same color terms in a consistent fashion is not; and so too for every other claim made in any language. Language (the most open of frameworks) makes meaning possible; and particular languages make certain meanings more available, more easily expressible than others, but no language creates new things in the world to which other language users cannot, in principle, have access, and no language makes purely private experiences a matter for only parochial communication.

Therefore, although *different standards and frameworks determine what we say about the world, they do not determine the world.* To illustrate this analogically we need only recognize that while having a microscope is the precondition for discovering very small objects, very small objects are the precondition of perceiving them in the microscope. In other words, frameworks are chronologically prior to our descriptions of the world, but the world is the epistemic condition for the possibility of frameworks. Or put somewhat differently, while learning language is chronologically prior to expressing meaning, the possibility of meaning is epistemically prior to language. Relativism confuses chronological and epistemological order of knowledge, or what Aristotle would have called the formal and material conditions of knowledge. By failing to appreciate the distinction between chronology and epistemology, relativism commits a genetic fallacy. By confusing the formal and material conditions of knowledge relativism is guilty of the *confusion of discernibles.* Thus relativism fails.

Moreover, the necessary conditions for a framework or a language make universal meta-principles implicit in any framework. These meta-principles are not determined by the framework, but are the preconditions for meaning and the constraints upon what can be validly said. Because common meta-principles condition any framework, not only are meanings universally accessible, but the constraints can be universally applied. For instance, assume a language, Loco, in which all users believe "X is true." If no mistakes have been made in translation, and if X is, in fact, false, then any outside observers who knows Loco can correctly assert, in Loco, "X is false" even though no native Locoian believes it. Thus if Locoians believe the earth is a two dimensional plane, and if they advance no reasons beyond simple observation, we know they are wrong. Why should unanimity among Locoians cause us any doubt? The epistemic problem of asserting this across frameworks is no greater than the problem of asserting scientific truths within a culture in which some persons persist in pre-scientific beliefs. The underlying conditions of logical consistency and objectivity, our knowledge of Locoian physics and modern Western physics, our evidence from satellites allow us to judge truth in this matter.

Of course, deciding whether the Locoians are wrong is distinguished from deciding whether one should respect Locoian beliefs and customs, and whether one should tell them they are wrong. Relativism goes awry because of its tendency to confuse distinct categories and issues. In this case it confuses an epistemic issue with a normative one. Normatively, post-positivist relativism tells us that the universalism and objectivity of science and ethics seem insensitive to non-Western cultures or even subordinate subcultures, groups, and classes within Western societies. It reminds us that "knowledge is power," and that power is frightful. It commends relativism to those excluded groups and recommends that each group recapture the "fleeting images" and "subjective memories" that constitute its group meanings and form the basis for social and political solidarity. Each community is encouraged to articulate values implicit in such archeology.

Surely these are commendable prescriptions, especially if we believe there is value in solidarity and in capturing meanings that make life in a community worthwhile. But by themselves these are inadequate prescriptions for liberation or emancipation from domination. If the subordinate groups have one set of values and the dominant groups have another; if the subordinate groups have their fleeting images and the dominant groups have another; if the subordinate group has its collective memories and the dominant group theirs, then the question of politics and morals is, which values and images should rule? If subordinate groups find objectivity hostile, then they deny a common ground that is prior to or takes precedence over the parochial differences in beliefs and values. If they can only appeal to that which is unique in their group, if they can appeal to values that move only them, then they fail. They fail to appeal to the values of the dominant group; they fail to make any claim upon the dominant group; and thereby concede to a struggle that is simply a matter of power. Unfortunately, the dominant group, by definition has power. Thus the normative prescriptions of relativism are self-defeating.

Alternatively, objective principles of justice and mutual respect make moral and political claims which ought to be honored by all persons, nations, and cultures. These are universal claims, the only sorts of claims which oblige all individuals, those who are dominant as well as those who are subordinate. Only universal claims of justice are the kind that cannot be discharged by the rejoinder, "those are simply your tastes and preferences, not mine," because only universal claims are grounded on the fundamental commonality of human beings and human societies, not upon the ineradicable differences between them. Such universality resides in the common reason and common truths (empirical and moral), which make differences possible as well as shared understanding and appreciation. Identifying, understanding, and appreciating differences between groups and individuals depends the universal capacity for logical consistency and objectivity that every language user possesses. By this means I recognize that "happiness," "pain," "frustration," "friendship," "commitments" and "beliefs about justice" matter not only to me but to others. I recognize that "happiness" is desirable not because it occurs in me, but because happiness is a desirable experience in whomever it occurs. I recognize that if these matters are reasons to advance my interests or the interests of my society, they are also reasons to advance the interests of others and other societies. It is our commonality and universality that forms the basis for understanding and solidarity. Abandoning the common and the universal, as post-positivists, post-structuralists, and post-moderns do, not only rests upon a series of epistemic mistakes, but leads to a moral and political program that is as foolish as it is imprudent and unwise.

Joseph Wagner is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgate University.

Endnotes

1. This lesson echoes themes found in recent critiques of behavioralism and finds natural allies among those who are critical of quantatative efforts to build a theory of human behavior on the model of the physical sciences.

2. In fact, I believe the "in principle case" is too strong to be sustained.

3. To this point, discussion has focussed on the meanings of words, essentially a semantic analysis. Yet meaning also arises from the way words are arranged in sentences, syntactics. For our purposes, the important point is this. While it seems plausible (although demonstrably mistaken) that the meaning of words is given in feelings, sensations, and emotions, which we individually hook to those words, it also follows that no such case can be made for syntax. There is no coherent argument which seeks to explain the meaning of logical connectives 'is,' 'and,' 'not,' etc. as a function of private feelings, states, sensations, or even ideas. Therefore, while it is sufficient that internalism fails as an account of semantic meaning, it needs to be recognized that it fails even more strikingly as an account of syntactic and relational meanings.

4. While common external world is certainly a plausible inference, if the relativist does not wish to grant a common external world, s/he must account for how language is possible without one. Alternatively, a weak private language argument entails a distinction between self and world as well as an objective capacity which is the common form of connection between different selves and the same world.

5. In fact, I suspect the relativist epistemology reduces to psychology.

6. Those who wish a fuller explication are encouraged to consult works by Toulmin (1958), Baier (1958), Frankena (1963, 1970) or Raphael (1981).

7. By extending the private language argument to critique framework relativism, I am going beyond Wittgenstein's own conclusion concerning the limits of meaning, for Wittgenstein (1958) conceded to the possibilities of a plurality of incommesurable meanings captured in different languages representing different "forms of life."

8. Implicitly, I might add that "I believe slugging percentage is the most valuable quality in a baseball player." and "I believe Japanese baseball cannot be compared to American baseball for American baseball is and has always been far superior." this does not make my utterance more subjective, for all the relevant terms in either of these phrases can be subjected to the same kind of analysis. You may say "fielding percentage is what makes a baseball player the best." In the end, of course, we wish to know, which standard ultimately determines "best" baseball player. In effect, this asks whether an objective, universally compelling standard can be disjoined from personal preferences. I confess, that for baseball players there probably are no such standards. But are such standards possible? As I argue below, the answer is yes.

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Joseph Wagner is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgate University.

Cultural Diversity and Moral Tolerance

Morton E. Winston

> **"They are not skilful considerers of human things, who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin."**
>
> John Milton *Areopagitica.*

I.

There are signs that tolerance for diversity is eroding in our society. Racial slurs, sexist put-downs, homophobic graffiti, xenophobia, and an "us versus them" mentality appear to be on the rise. In American popular culture, rock and rap groups such as Guns N' Roses and Public Enemy, and entertainers such as Morton Downey Jr. and Andrew Dice Clay, pander to anti-black, anti-white, anti-Jewish, anti-Japanese, anti-female, and anti-gay sentiments that have been repressed but not removed by the prevailing liberal values of contemporary society.[1] Spike Lee's timely film "Do the Right Thing" focuses attention on the pernicious effects of racial and ethnic prejudice, only to end up suggesting that mindless violence is the proper conclusion to the ensuing spiral of hatred.

College and university campuses, generally regarded as bastions of tolerance in our society, have not be spared this wave of bigotry. On my own campus, there have been deplorable incidents involving pouring urine under the dormitory door of a group of black students, and the circulation of a mock job description advertising a position for "niggers" one of the qualifications being "must eat watermelon." Such incidents involving religious or ethnic slurs or the use of racist or sexist language, have begun to call forth a response from university administrations. The regents of the University of Wisconsin enacted a revision in the student code of conduct under which "certain types of expressive behavior directed at individuals and intended to demean and to create a hostile environment for education or other university-authorized activities would be prohibited and made subject to disciplinary sanctions." Before its rule was overturned by a federal court, The University of Michigan prohibited, "any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, creed, ancestry, age, martial status, handicap, or Vietnam-veteran status."[2]

Those who support such campus policies have argued that permitting the expression of such sentiments only serves to propagate racial hatred and prejudice, confirms invidious stereotypes, foments social discord, alienates the confidence of members of minority groups and women, and generally runs counter to the best interests of a liberal, democratic society, and particularly, the interest of the academy, in maintaining the kind of social environment required for intellectual inquiry. Citing the fact that toleration of a diversity of manners and opinions is necessary for the maintenance of an open society, they argue that acts of expression which are offensive, demeaning, or insulting to members of the academic community must not be tolerated. Supporters of these policies cite with approval Canada's anti-prejudice laws that provide criminal punishment for anyone convicted of "willfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group" through television, radio, telephone, recordings, pamphlets, and books. For Canadians, such laws are justified because they protect the core value of liberal democratic society -- the value of toleration itself.

But such well-intended attempts to discipline those who engage in racially offensive speech and behavior have been criticized by conservatives and civil libertarians as a violation of the First Amendment right of freedom of speech. In a recent article in *Commentary*, former Assistant Secretary of Education, Chester E. Finn, Jr., notes with heavy sarcasm the irony that the University of Wisconsin policy was enacted two weeks before the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech encompasses the right to burn the flag. However uncomfortable it may make us, he argues, under the US Constitution people do have the right to express opinions in ways that others may find deeply offensive, including the right to say ugly things about one another. While acknowledging the deleterious effects of such behavior on the campus atmosphere, Finn doubts that campus anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies can be effected without doing damage to the liberal values of freedom of opinion and of speech which lie at the heart of the intellectual enterprise.[3]

> Having enjoyed almost untrammeled freedom of thought and expression for three and a half centuries, and having vigorously and for the most part successfully fended off efforts by outsiders (state legislators and congressional subcommittees, big donors, influential alumni, etc.) to constrain that freedom, American colleges and universities are now muzzling themselves. The anti-discrimination and anti-harassment rules being adopted will delimit what can be said and done on campus. Inevitably, this must govern what can be taught and written in lab, library, and lecture hall, as well as in the sordid antics of fraternity houses and the crude nastiness of inebriated teenagers.[4]

The question before us, then, is: How should academic communities respond to expressions of racial hatred, ethnic prejudice, and sexist or homophobic put-downs? Should university administrations attempt to prohibit the utterance of offensive epithets or the use of demeaning or insulting language on campus? Or are expressions of intolerance, and racial or ethnic hatred, protected by the right of freedom of speech? Is there some way to respond to intolerance and prejudice other than by prohibiting its expression?

I will examine two options for responding to prejudice on campus. The first reaction of most university administrations to this problem was to rely on their authority to prohibit and penalize offensive speech and behavior. This punitive, *authoritarian* approach, however, not only is likely to run afoul of First Amendment rights, but also, fails to address the root of the problem. While it may be possible to frame constitutionally sound anti-harrassment policies by examining carefully the limits of freedom of speech, it is doubtful that such an approach can ever be truly successful in altering values and attitudes. Instead, I want to argue that an *educational* response to the problem of prejudice is the most responsible policy for colleges and universities to adopt, and that such a response is also most likely to be effective in the long run. However, it is also the more difficult course to follow.

We first need to determine what forms of speech and expression are protected by the right of freedom of expression. We are also interested in the question of whether and how far we ought to tolerate the expression of certain sorts of heterodox *moral* opinions and values, and factual assumptions which are claimed to support them. The two questions are indeed closely related, but not the same, since moral opinions and values can be expressed in various ways, both through actions, and through various different kinds of speech acts. There is an important difference to be observed between toleration of heterodox moral views in what I shall call the *context of inquiry* and in the *context of action*. The context of inquiry refers to the stage of moral deliberation in which we are seeking to determine what moral beliefs and values we ought to accept, or what rules or policies we ought to enact or adopt, or in which we reexamine the grounds for having adopted those beliefs and values we have accepted.[5] The context of action refers to the stage in which we act *on our moral beliefs* against a background of accepted or socially legitimated moral values and policies by which we judge conduct. In this context we are bound to act in accordance with the justly enacted laws of civil society, the settled, and democratically arrived at policies of institutions, and in accordance with the dictates of our own consciences.

I want to use this distinction, (which roughly corresponds to the difference between trying to determine what the right thing is, and trying to do what we believe to be the right thing,) to argue that within the context of inquiry (that is, within the academy) we are justified in not only tolerating but encouraging the expression of all moral opinions, including (and especially) those that are antithetical to the core values of our prevailing moral system, even if doing so requires reading books and pamphlets, permitting statements, and tolerating forms of expression that members of particular groups may find offensive, demeaning, or insulting.[6]

However, I also wish to urge that there is no similar justification for tolerating acts, including certain types of speech acts, that proceed from heterodox moral beliefs. Society surely need not tolerate homicide, rape, robbery, nor racial, ethnic, nor sexual discrimination, because those who commit such acts may happen to believe that such conduct is morally correct. Civil society is under no requirement to tolerate actions which threaten to injure or are actually injurious to individuals, nor should we tolerate actions or patterns of conduct that, if left unchecked, would lead to the destruction of the moral order in which intellectual and social tolerance can flourish. Moral systems, in general, cannot be required to tolerate acts whose toleration would defeat the possibility of its own moral principles actually governing conduct. Moral systems, in other words, must not be self-defeating.

II.

Let me begin by addressing the arguments of the civil libertarians against restrictions on offensive or abusive speech or behavior. Those, such as Finn, who oppose such policies provide basically two arguments: First, that the right to freedom of expression encompasses the use of language or other forms of expression that other people may find to be offensive. And secondly, that socially enforced restrictions on offensive speech and behavior on the campus, will inevitably produce a narrowing of intellectual, personal, and academic freedom in other areas that would be inimical to the purposes and culture of the academy. Both of these arguments have merit, but both need to be considered carefully as to the implications they have for how institutions of higher education should respond to the problem of intolerance.

The first argument rests on the claim that the right of freedom of speech and expression that is expressed by the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution has been traditionally interpreted as encompassing forms of speech and expression that others may find to be offensive. To prohibit all offensive speech and expression would mean censoring artful satire and biting humor, as well as the cruder forms abuse. Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* would need to be suppressed as well as the speeches of Louis Farrakan; Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs censored as well as those in the latest issue of *Hustler*, and those punished who burn the flag in an act of protest as well as those who deface the washroom with racist graffiti. The flag-burning example should remind us that while as patriots we may be offended when someone burns or defaces the symbol of our nation, but we should be outraged when attempts are made to prohibit and penalize such acts. Flag-burning injures only the symbol of our freedom, while restriction of our freedom of expression injures its substance.

While this is indeed a powerful argument, it should not be assumed that the right to freedom of speech is absolute. There are, on the contrary, recognized exceptions in which speech and expression are justifiably limited, namely, in cases where physical injury to identifiable individuals may result, e.g. "fighting words," incitement to riot, or yelling "Fire!" in a crowded theatre, and in cases where a person's reputation or livlihood is harmed by the spreading of libelous falsehoods. The question we must address, then, is whether there are any particular forms of abusive or offensive language that fall within these types of recognized exceptions to freedom of expression?

The reason for approaching the problem in this way is because, as Thomas Scanlon has noted, "it is easier to say what the classic violations of freedom of expression have in common than it is to define the class of acts which is protected by the doctrine."[7] According to Scanlon, what distinguishes legitimately protected forms of expression from exempted cases is, "not the character of the acts they interfere with but rather what they hope to achieve,"

> Very crudely, the intuition seems to be something like this: those justifications [for restrictions on expression] are illegitimate which appeal to the fact that it would be a bad thing if the view communicated by certain acts of expression were to become generally believed; justifications which are legitimate, though they may be sometimes overridden, are those that appeal to features of acts of expression (time, place, loudness) other than the views they communicate.[8]

Given this general approach, Scanlon outlines what he takes to be several possible grounds for restricting forms of speech or expression. For our purposes the most relevant class of exceptions are those acts of speech and expression that are directly harmful to individuals, particularly those that fall within the common law notion of assault, wherein, "assault (as distinct from battery) is committed when one person intentionally places another in apprehension of imminent bodily harm."[9] A paradigm of this sort of speech act would be the sending of a death threat to an individual. Other forms of expression such as the burning of a cross on the lawn of a black family, or the painting of a swastika on a synagogue, because they have in the past been regularly associated with acts of physical violence, might also be legitimately be interpreted as threats of imminent harm, and hence as assaults. Hence, campus policies which seek to prohibit speech acts directed against individuals which directly threaten them with physical harm or violence, can be sustained on First Amendment grounds.

But, why should threats of harm to individuals be restricted to physical harms? What about the emotional and psychological harms that come about from being subjected to racial invective, hate literature, and sustained verbal abuse? The children's saying, "Sticks and stones may break my bones but words with never hurt me," is not, in fact, true. Cuts and bruises quickly heal, while the psychological effects of hatred and verbal abuse can produce emotional scars that last a lifetime. If we include such psychological harms within the class of exempted forms of expression, then, "assault is only one of a large class of possible crimes which consist in the production in others of harmful or unpleasant states of mind, such as fear, shock, and perhaps certain kinds of offence."[10] So, if one of the grounds for justifying restrictions on forms of speech and expression is harm to individuals, and certain forms of speech can be shown to demonstrably produce such emotional and psychological harms, then it may be legitimate to restrict and punish such forms of speech and expression as produce these kinds of harms, and one can do so without encroaching upon legitimately protected forms of speech and expression.[11]

Thus, if colleges and universities are going to adopt regulations that restrict certain forms of expression, it is important that they be written very carefully. To prohibit all forms of speech or expression that individuals might find to be offensive is clearly too broad. How can we possibly anticipate all cases in which something that is said might offend someone? Offensive to whom? The intended object of the remark, or to others who may overhear it or repeat it? But if we cannot hope to identify all speech that someone may find offensive, is it not unjust to design special rules to protect the sensibilities of members of certain minority groups that have been subject to past discrimination. People who are offended at being referred to unkindly as "WASPs" and "honkys," may I think rightly complain that such prohibitions, if they are to be fair, must cover them too. But then, shall we also craft statutes to protect people from being called "fat" or "ugly" or "stupid"? How about those who might be offended by being sneeringly called "dilettantes" or "blue-collar" or "racists"? Although it may not be nice, people cannot be prohibited from offending and insulting one another.[12]

Against this argument it may be urged that considerations of social harmony and utility suggest that society would be better served if all kinds of abusive language that aims to insult or stigmatize anyone were not employed. This is certainly correct --the use of abuse language and especially derogatory racial or ethnic epithets, even if it cannot be shown to harm individuals directly, does contribute to an atmosphere of tension and distrust. But such considerations of general social utility are not, by themselves, normally taken to be sufficient grounds for creating an exception in a fundamental right, and those who believe it is misunderstand what it means to call something a "right." To say there is a *right* to freedom of speech and expression entails, as Dworkin puts it, that one cannot override the content of the right "on the minimal grounds that would be sufficient if no such right existed, ... that its act is likely to produce, overall, a benefit to the community."[13] In order to create an exception in a fundamental right, it is necessary to show that the exercise of the right in that case violates another fundamental right, or that an exception is needed in order to prevent a catastrophe, or that it is needed to secure some important social end which cannot be secured in other ways.

In this case the only requirement for justified exception that appears to be satisfied is one arising from the right of individuals to be secure in their persons from assault. However, this limitation does not justify a blanket prohibition of all speech and expression that might contribute to an atmosphere of tension and mistrust. Moreover, there is no conflicting right not to be insulted, no catastrophe will result if society tolerates the use of this kind of language, and finally, as I shall shortly argue, there are other, and better ways, to secure the social ends that such regulations are intended to promote. So it seems that the civil libertarian's first argument is basically correct and that blanket prohibitions on the use of offensive or stigmatizing language or speech are not consistent with a careful formulation of the right of free speech.

III.

Most all of the classical and contemporary arguments that are given to justify the right of freedom or speech and expression concern themselves with an analysis of the legitimate powers of governments. However, the question that is before us is somewhat different than this since we are concerned not with the laws of civil society but with the policies of private, voluntary institutions of higher education. Surely, private voluntary institutions have the power to set policies to regulate the conduct of their own members, employees, and associates on their own premises. Moreover, what policies might be legitimate for a particular institution to adopt may differ substantially from what a government should be permitted to do. Churches, for instance, have the power to expel members who engage in blasphemy or embrace heresy, even though the expression of these same views is protected under the laws of civil society. Thus, while it may exceed the legitimate powers of government to set limits on offensive speech, it may still be within the power of private institutions to do so, particularly if such regulations are needed to promote and protect the special interests or goals of the institution itself.

While college and university administrations may have the right to enact regulations that would punish or expel individuals who transgress the limits of locally acceptable speech and expression, it does not automatically follow that it would be wise for them to adopt such policies. In addressing the question of whether such regulations are wise, one needs to consider the nature and purpose of institutions of higher education. When one does this it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the rationales given for allowing free thought and speech in civil society apply with equal or even greater force within the special ambit of the academy.

The rational justification given by the thinkers of the Enlightenment for placing such a high value on freedom of thought, speech, and rests mainly on the grounds of what they took to be its overarching utility within the context of inquiry. When a Presbyterian Parliament, in an attempt impose its discipline on England, passed an Ordinance for Printing in 1643, John Milton responded by publishing *Areopagitica*, unlicensed, in 1644. Arguing against the attempt to suppress "scandalous, seditious, and libelous books" Milton writes, "it will be primly to the discouragement of all learning, and the stop of truth, not only by disexercising and blunting our abilities in what we know already, but by hindering and cropping the discovery that might be yet further made both in religious and civil wisdom."[14] According this reasoning, the chief argument for permitting the circulation and publication of heterodoxy in the marketplace of ideas was that doing so would naturally lead men to a livelier appreciation of the truth: "all opinions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and assistance toward the speedy attainment of what is truest."[15]

The classic modern statement of the view is that by J. S. Mill, who, in the famous passage from *On Liberty*, writes that , "...the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation--those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great as benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error."[16]

It is particularly noteworthy, however, that these earlier defenders of toleration of thought, expression, and religion, made explicit exceptions for certain views which they apparently found simply too heterodox to tolerate. Milton draws the line at "popery and open superstition, which, as it extirpates all religions and civil supremacies, so itself should be extirpate,...[nor] that also which is impious or evil absolutely, either against faith or against manners, no law can possibly permit, that intends not to unlaw itself...."[17] Similarly, Locke, who argued in favor of extending religious toleration to Jews, pagans, and Muslims, nevertheless, excluded Catholics, and denied tolerance to atheists, on the grounds that since they did not believe in God, promises and oaths could not bind them and feared that tolerating atheism would undermine the basis of the social contract.

These exceptions to the rule of toleration are an embarrassment, but reveal an important sociological and historical truth: Even the great defenders of religious and intellectual toleration of the Enlightenment were willing to compromise their own principles in order to defend their doctrines against certain sorts of contrary beliefs. Whether, as some scholars think, these statements were made only on prudential grounds (for to say otherwise would have been regarded as too offensive to the powers that were) or whether they were sincerely believed by their authors, the fact remains, that the Enlightenment's doctrine of toleration was intolerant of certain views which we now can tolerate.

Just as "popery" was regarded as intolerable from the vantage point of 17th century Protestantism, and atheism was similarly exempted from most 18th century views about toleration, in the 20th century similar feelings exist about socio-political doctrines that teach racial, ethnic, or sexual supremacy or inferiority, views that argue for the segregation or separation of the races, various kinds of Social Darwinist views, and other views that challenge the fundamental belief of contemporary humanism, namely the belief that "All human beings are born equal in dignity and rights."[18] Doctrines that would call this belief into question have for most contemporary humanists the same effects that Calvinist heresies must have had on 16th century Roman Catholics or Hume's atheism must have had on 18th century Lutherans. To suggest, today, that members of one or another racial, ethnic, religious group, or gender, are inferior and that therefore they are not entitled to the same rights as others, is to utter a moral heresy too outrageous to be contemplated.

Just as the writers of the Enlightenment feared more than anything a return to the era of papal authoritarianism and religious intolerance -- another Inquisition, so we today fear more than anything a return to the era of black slavery, segregation, ethnic prejudice, and genocidal anti-semitism -- another Holocaust. No doubt this fear of the beast only recently conquered is part of the reason why colleges and universities are rushing to muzzle those who openly dare to express racist and anti-semitic beliefs. The expression of such sentiments was, in living memory, the prelude to far more serious moral wrongs, so that those who hear them today cannot but view them as portents of a possible return to an evil past.

But, there is surely an additional reason. The resurgence of racism and prejudice on campus is particularly galling to educators because it indicates our failure to lead our students successfully to the understanding of why such doctrines are false, and why the attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately, policies and actions which they supported are unethical. This failure can be attributed at least in part to our unwillingness to examine racist, supremacist, social Darwinist, eugenicist, segregationist and other heterodox views carefully within the context of inquiry. Instead of examining these doctrines and beliefs that led to the moral errors of the past, we tend to dismiss such views contemptuously with a wave of the hand as too wild to be seriously considered or carefully refuted, preferring to rely on the liberal social consensus that generally prevails on most campuses to enforce compliance with the view that such doctrines are false.

But the problem with this is the very problem that Milton, Locke, and Mill have identified: Regulations that would suppress the expression of racist, anti-semitic, supremacist, segregationist, or other views, on that grounds that members of certain minorities find them offensive, rob the intellectual community of the opportunity to examine such views carefully and objectively within the context of inquiry, and so to discover the grounds upon which they are mistaken. To quote Milton again, "Since therefore, the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with less danger, scout into the regions of sin and falsity, than by reading all manner of tractates and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read."[19]

This is still sound advice, but I believe that we can do better than the thinkers of the Enlightenment in following it. Moral toleration in the 20th century should extend to the expression of views that would challenge the idea of toleration itself, and which would confute the ethical principles based on the belief in human dignity and equality. Especially within the context of inquiry, that is, within the academy, our students need to know not just that we *do* believe in human equality, but also *why* we believe it, how we came to hold that belief, and what precisely is wrong with contrary beliefs, beliefs that support prejudice and teach human inequality. To do this, we as educators must be willing to present and discuss such views, read such books as present them, and take seriously the questions and comments of students about them. To shrink from this task does a disservice to ourselves and to our students, for by exposing our hypocrisy, only serves to breed contempt in those whose beliefs and attitudes we hold to be abhorrent.

But, even this sort of educational approach may not succeed in rooting out the causes of prejudice and intolerance in our society. Prejudice is, after all, an irrational phenomenon, and thus it is quite likely to be resistant to rational approaches to eradicate it. Just as the psycho-social causes of prejudice and intolerance cannot be removed by merely legislating against certain forms of offensive expression, so merely ideological or rational defenses of intellectual or moral toleration (like this one) are not likely to do much to alter deep-seated attitudes and values whose roots lie in complex psycho-social phenomena.

Much the same is, unfortunately, likely to be true of programs designed to teach moral toleration and cultural sensitivity through "multicultural education" or course requirements which emphasize "diversity." Unless explicit attention is given to the values and attitudes that underlie racial and ethnic prejudice, merely providing bigots with information about other cultures is unlikely to alter their attitudes to any significant degree. Writing on the subject of educational approaches to combatting prejudice thirty-five years ago, Gordon Allport noted the defect with a purely informational approach to values education: "Children may, for example, learn the facts of Negro (sic) history without learning tolerance."[20] Allport's conclusion at this time, (one that I have found no reason to question), was that, "While a child may through indirect methods learn to take cultural pluralism for granted, he may still be perplexed by the visible difference in skin color, by the recurrent Jewish holidays, by religious diversity. His education is incomplete unless he understands these matters. Some degree of directness would seem to be required."[21] The more effective programs for altering prejudiced attitudes he surveyed involve direct contact and acquaintance with members of minority groups, group therapy and retraining methods, and individual therapy. If we are really serious about tackling the problems of racial hatred, religious intolerance, and ethnic, sexual, and other forms of bigotry we need to devise programs that reach out to and involve all members of the campus community in frank small group discussions and process-oriented group therapy. But, as Finn wryly notes, "...it is easier to adopt a behavior code for students than to alter faculty-time allocations and administration priorities. Symbolic responses to problems are always quicker and less burdensome, at least in the short run, than hard work."[22]

During the first phases of the civil rights and the feminist movements the progressive social agenda quite rightly emphasized enacting federal legislation that would prohibit the most damaging and unjust forms of racial and sexual discrimination and ensure equality of access and opportunity to members of groups that had been historically subjected to invidious discrimination. While progress towards eradicating discrimination has been made by means of this legislative strategy, such authoritarian approaches cannot, by themselves, alter the beliefs, attitudes, and values that support intolerance and bigotry. In searching for ways to effectively address this deeper, more difficult problem, society should quite naturally turn to educators to suggest methods and approaches. Educators, those of us in higher education, as well as those who teach at the elementary and secondary levels, need to respond to this challenge thoughtfully and creatively. And part of our response must certainly be to devise an educational program designed to foster in our students attitudes of toleration and empathetic understanding towards people and cultures other than their own. The challenge for the progressive social agenda of the 1990s is to find a way to attack and root out these deeper causes of prejudice and intolerance by effective educational means. The second, and all later stages of this social transformation must be fought in our schools more than in our legislatures.

However, make no mistake, intellectual toleration of heterodox moral views in the context of inquiry does not entail that we ought to tolerate *acts* that proceed from such beliefs and that injure others or deny them the enjoyment of their equal rights and freedoms. The belief in human dignity and equality, and in the rule of reason and of law, have for our society the status of a hard-won, but settled, and socially legitimized fundamental ethical beliefs. While within the context of inquiry, we ought to challenge those principles in order to understand their rational basis, in the context of action we must nevertheless defend them and the moral order which they support with all of our strength and wisdom.

As moral agents we must act to defend our own rights and those of others that are built upon our belief in human dignity and equality, and we must attempt to enlarge the moral and legal order under which all people may enjoy these same rights. Threats to that order, within our society, or in other societies, should be taken seriously and effectively checked; tears in the fabric of trust speedily mended; and outbreaks of human rights abuse met with steadfast and sustained intolerance. But let us not compromise our own ethical principles and in so doing deprive our children of the opportunity to understand why the defense of human dignity and equality is ethically right.

Notes

1. See Jon Pareles. "There's a New Sound in Pop Music: Bigotry" *New York Times* September 10, 1989, Section 2, p.1.

2. Robert M. O'Neil. "Colleges Should Seek Alternatives to Rules That Override Historic Guarantees of Free Speech." *Chronicle of Higher Education.* (October 19, 1989), pp. B2-3.

3. Chester A. Finn, Jr. "The Campus: An Island of Repression in a Sea of Freedom." *Commentary*, September, 1989, pp. 17-23.

4. Ibid., p. 18.

5. The name usually given to such inquiry concerning moral beliefs, values, and principles, is ethics. Ethics is a systematic form of rational inquiry into the grounds and justifications for moral values and beliefs. It is conducted by rational discourse and critical examination of belief. In short, to *do ethics* is to engage in a form of critical thinking about moral values and beliefs. What results from this process of inquiry, what is commonly referred by the substantive "ethics" (and thus frequently confused with morals) are moral convictions grounded upon rational justifications that are revealed and critically examined in the process of "doing ethics." An individual has an "ethics" on this view, as opposed to a mere morality, only if his or her moral beliefs have been formed and critically examined through rational inquiry.

6. We need to be clear about what is meant by "tolerance." Tolerance is certainly not the same as acceptance: To say that one ought to tolerate a belief, an expression of opinion, or a form of conduct is not to condone it nor to refrain from judging or criticizing it, but rather it is to allow people who engage in it to do so without being penalized. To tolerate something is to refrain from prohibiting it, and punishing those who transgress that prohibition; it is not to endorse it.

7. Thomas Scanlon. "A Theory of Freedom of Expression." *Philosophy and Public Affairs.* vol. 1, no. 2 (winter 1972): 204-26. Reprinted in R. M. Dworkin (ed.). *The Philosophy of Law.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 157.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 158.

10. Ibid.

11. There is, however, going to be a problem in drafting such regulations because it will be necessary to show that a particular instance of verbal abuse produced a demonstrable emotional harm to an individual or group. While there is no doubt that such harms can and do often result, it is difficult to demonstrate that they do under the usual assumptions of legal evidence, which is the law tends to be wary of including emotional and psychological distress under the notion of assault.

12. As a case in point, consider the artful but bitingly satiric repartee between Oscar Wilde and James Whistler in which Whistler ridiculed Wilde's dress as, "Haphazard from the shoulders of many manners with the medly of the mummers' closet," and Wilde returned the insult mimically describing the five-foot-four Whistler as "a miniature Mephistopheles mocking the majority." I am indebted to Rick Kamber for bringing these quotes to my attention.

13. Ronald Dworkin. "Taking Human Rights Seriously." In M. E. Winston (ed.) *The Philosophy of Human Rights.* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989), P. 15.

14. John Milton. *Prose Selections.* Edited by Merrit Y. Hughes. New York: Odyssey Press, 1947, p. 206.

15. Ibid., p. 222.

16. John Stuart Mill. *On Liberty.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, p.21.

17. Milton, op. cit., p. 264.

18. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights.* Article 1, (1948).

19. Milton, op. cit., p. 225.

20. Gordon Allport. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954; 1979, p. 485.

21. Ibid., p. 487.

22. Finn op. cit., p. 22.

Morton E. Winston is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Instructional Enhancement at Trenton State College. He retains the copyrights for this paper.

In Defense of the College Taking a Leading Role in the Community in Confronting Issues of Social Reform

Critical Thinking in Institutional Ethics: A Case Study

Jerome B. Wichelns

Problem

To define for the college and for the community exactly what comprises the leadership role of an educational institution: What is our ethical stance when we choose to become an active and participating instrument for community critical thinking and social reform?

Thesis

The development of successful critical thinking among college students in issues of social reform requires the successful integration of three convergent components:

1. *skill* in reasoning critically
2. *knowledge* of the historical context within which that reasoning occurs (without which skill remains a simple academic exercise)
3. *experience* in perceiving the effects one's reasoning has upon others and, in turn, upon oneself (without which skill and knowledge remain isolated from the immediate situation).

Structure

This paper is structured into three parts.

Part I: a brief overview of the event which served as the catalyst to get us stirred into motion.
Part II: our reasoning as an academic institution about institutional ethics, which tries to articulate why we decided to do what we did.
Part III: what we did (and continue to do); the format of our community forum series; preliminary observations on what we have learned so far.

Part I: Overview: What event precipitated our involvement?

In the fall of 1984, the Pentagon announced the activation of a full, light-infantry division, a complement of nearly 10,000 soldiers, to be stationed at Fort Drum, New York. With dependents, this figure actually represented a real net increase of close to 30,000 people for this rural, upstate New York region, in effect increasing the population of the impacted area by one-third.

Reaction by the local communities at first was optimistic. Essentially, it remains so. The creation of new jobs and new business opportunities, the meeting of new people, the exposure to different cultures, were seen to be positive tonic for an economically depressed region, one which had seen a steady population decline since the 1930's, one whose number of working farms had dropped by 24% in twenty years, with a corresponding loss in heavy industry jobs.

In the fall of 1987, however, as the expansion began to take visible and concrete form, a significant minority of residents (at JCC, among students, 37%) began to express reservations about what this impact was doing to the quality of life as they perceived it. Some strong special interest groups in the area sought to minimize these concerns. What follows is a brief summary of concerns.

1. There has been an unprecedented acceleration of building construction. 1.3 billions of government monies have been invested by the Army in major capital construction. This is the largest construction project the Army has initiated since World War II. There has been a corresponding building boom in the civilian sector, and an attendant rise in the transient labor force because of this. The building boom peaked in the 1987 season, receded slightly in 1988, and will dissipate by 1990; the transient labor force is expected to move off with it.

2. The impact area has seen a significant number of new people representing various ethnic groups move into the outlying communities through a housing program unique in Army history, designed specifically to integrate military personnel directly into civilian community life. Pre-expansion (1984) non-white minority representation was less than 1% of population; as of February, 1989, this figure had risen to 16% of population.

3. There has been a real change in the economic values structure of the region. In truth, part of this has nothing to do with the military presence, but reflects national economic trends. Nonetheless, the public associated the expansion with these trends. For example, pre-expansion economic power rested in agriculture (dairy) production and in the manufacture of durable goods, both of which by nature are conservative and essentially stable. Today, retailing and tourism, which stress flexibility, high turnover and consumer orientation, dominate the economic horizon. Land values have skyrocketed; many farms are selling out.

4. The economic turnabout has, in turn, created a subtle but significant ripple effect in political power, and this power is shifting away from the diversified, local and essentially rural autonomy of the small town toward the centralization of power in county, regional and state agencies, themselves often urban centered.

This vast, sudden expansion at Fort Drum created problems for which the impacted communities were neither economically nor psychologically prepared: such problems reflected themselves in housing, crime, racial tension, sexism issues, health care, education -- in short, coming of age in America. These problems could have become volatile. They haven't, in large part because an environment of communal dialogue, which stresses critical thinking and positive community involvement, prevails.

How did this college (JCC) fit into this picture? In response to these concerns, which first surfaced in its student body, JCC initiated a continuing series of public forums. The key to this continuing series -- and its overall success in creating in this community a sense of respect for reasoned debate -- rested in the College's assertive, public position that, while change was upon us, certain constants remained stable: one of those constants being that healthy, enduring social change could not be instituted without informed public consent.

Part II: Why did we do what we did? (Critical thinking in institutional ethics)

Why did the College get involved? Even if our middle name is "Community" (and this means something to us), why *should* the College get involved. Traditionally, the role of a college has been one of "reflection." My thrust here is that, to survive critical thinking skills must be integrated as "active habit." While we can teach the theoretical framework of moral reasoning, it needs to be encouraged and it needs to be modeled so that students can see how it is done. It needs to be bold, but it needs to be responsible. Thus, the College thought to get involved so that our students might learn how to think more clearly, speak more clearly and write more clearly about issues of concern to them and to their community. To accomplish this, we needed to involve the decision-makers in the community. Student cynics have often contested, and correctly pointed out, the discrepancies between what those in power say and what they do, and these same students genuinely wonder if there is such a thing as equitable accountability, or whether "rules" are arbitrary requirements placed upon them by hypocritical elders who do not necessarily live up to their professed responsibilities.

This latter is of such importance to me that I wish to take a small side-trip here. If there is anything like an "evil presence" in the world, it is the urge to self-destruct, to give up, to relinquish oneself as subject and creator, and, instead, become someone else's creation...whether that "other" be an individual, a group or an institution. A community such as ours, undergoing such radical change as it has, felt this way. I don't know how to measure this, but there was a public sense of "It's out of control!" Thus, I begin my defense on the assumption that , in the making of values judgments, we define and create self. This is true of the individual; this is true of the community.

Ethics, for me, is the creation and recreation of self in communion with others. It involves options and choices, not always polar in extreme, but definitely it involves making statements of positive or negative self identity. It assumes responsibility for self in choice and action. In short, making values judgments reflects a continuing process of self-definition and self-recognition (or denial) of self-worth, and the mutual recognition and respect of this worth in others. Jurgen Habermas refers to this as "ego-identity"; the Hindu recognizes and salutes this creative god in you when he clasps his hands in prayerful attitude in greeting you; Aristotle talks about ethics as "self-actualization"; I discuss ethics with my classes in terms of the "capability of becoming" or, better yet, as "the courage to be who you already are."

My point here is that values judgments awaken self-awareness. Again, this is as true for the community as it is for the individual. Just as the locus of energy in an atom is not found in material stasis but in the active and complex interaction of particles, and just as the beauty of a gemstone is not found in the singular plane of each facet, but in the internal glowlight created by the refractions of many facets, so, too, *how* and *what* a community establishes as its values-base can be found in the multi-dimensional dynamic of an interaction which involves various peoples, positions and disciplines. The study of philosophy in general, and ethics in particular, as a system of highly structured thought processes, is *one* of those cultural facets which allows us a unique perspective into teaching critical thinking skills. Ethics theory indeed may be necessary to ethical growth (as Lawrence Kohlberg attempts to demonstrate), but ethics theory *alone* is not sufficient. The college must model this practice of critical thinking, in particular for its students, but also for the community at large.

How, then, do we as an academic institution respond to this challenge?

Messages bearing ethical content flash through our communities daily, perhaps even hourly. Such is the case with academic communities. And these messages must affirm, not deny, basic community values, or else the perceptive cynic will learn quickly to ignore what we preach and, instead, will model behavior by what we do.

In general, it is probably safe to say that, for most students entering college, moral development in the college years shifts from following a simple and protected ideology as structured by a closed, hopefully nurturing home, and turns from that earlier view toward an individual ethical responsibility perceived as being within the context of a protracted community. Habermas and Kohlberg are convincing in so far as they point out that stages of moral development proceed well into adulthood (unlike what classical psychoanalytic theory holds), and that these stages of moral reasoning are transcultural (in Kohlberg's words , "universal and invariant"), and that moral reasoning is not simply limited to being a series of culturally-determined, conditioned responses, as some of our behavior modification theorists would hold. In short, moral reasoning and development in the college years is more flexible, more open, more vulnerable, and more "critical" of critical thinking than perhaps at any other time in a youth's life, and if we as members of an academic institution fail to respond to this, we neglect our responsibilities..

How, then, can the college have an impact? On the theoretical level, the college can do the following:

1. It can demonstrate a greater respect for facts and the ability to reason carefully about complicated ethical problems; instructors and administrators should model the care with which they prepare responses to values questions.

2. The college is by nature a diverse community of young people and adults who work together, and this diversity requires tolerance and respect for opposing viewpoints. But it is not enough to talk about values judgments; the college must live these judgments. What students watch for is this: do we live up to our convictions and, just as important, do we demonstrate to students that those persons holding positions of power in the community also are accountable and answerable to the basic norms of a responsible community?

Traditionally, of course, colleges in this century have shied away from that sense of community responsibility. We have approached higher education, on the one hand as a vocational preparation for the professions, so preoccupied with the "hard" factual data of that profession that we have let slide the "soft" data of values implications. Yet, if professionals define themselves only in their *functional* context, for example, when scientists function as scientists and think of themselves *only* as scientists, they run the risk of deliberately setting aside questions of possible moral consequence in their pursuit of knowledge. In process, they "set aside" a significant part of self. Put another way, the more we specialize in our search for knowledge, the less capable we become in perceiving the consequences of our actions. Perhaps this is why, as scientists, as lawyers, as college teachers, we sometimes destroy that which drew us to the profession in the first place, that which we seek to create and to preserve. Examples are the lawyer who circumvents law to protect a client's interests, the college teacher who cuts in and eloquently expresses the awkward thoughts of a freshman so as to "cover the material." In doing this, we become indifferent to the consequences of our actions.

My point is, that when professionals limit their definitions of self solely to their professional functions, then they tend to render *irrelevant* what would be truly morally relevant to those people thinking of themselves as human beings. There is a seductive allure to saying: "That's not my concern; my job is to...." But, do you notice the transfer of personal identity there? The result is a two-fold tragedy: stress in the professional; imbalance in society.

To overcome this attitude in the vocational-professional classroom, many colleges look to the liberal arts as a source for considering the values implications of decision-making. But, the liberal arts have for too long approached learning from a deliberately non-vocational perspective, isolating themselves from the concrete realities of the so-called "real world out there," perhaps in a genuine attempt to examine that which is permanent and universal, as distinct from that which is temporal and fragmentary.

The net result of these two limited perspectives is that students and communities often perceive the college to be a closed system, one that sports a peculiar institutional garb and speaks a peculiar institutional language. Despite all the turmoil of the past thirty years in our post-secondary schools, the fact remains that colleges remain conservative institutions. We are slow to catch the message of this turmoil: that, for the most part, American society does not look to us to provide innovative leadership; instead, it looks to us to provide innovative rationale! Unlike other nations, it is extremely rare in this country to find a person who identifies himself or herself as an academic holding a position of political power. The reason for this, I think, is that I'm not sure American society trusts us.

This historical mistrust centers, in part, on the controversy over what ethics is and how one teaches it. I have already outlined what I think ethics is; here, I would like to comment on two ways to teach it.

1. Ethics as prescriptive formula: Essentially, this mode of teaching exhorts students to do the proper thing, and it punishes them if they fail to do so. This mode is specific, it is applied, and it is extremely satisfying to the rule-giver. The maxim here may be stated as follows: "Good (socially acceptable) behavior produces good (socially acceptable) people." In short, it produces tractable people. This isn't satisfactory as a definition of ethics, however, for its only enforcement is "reward-based." In Kantian language, this hypothetical "...if...then..." thought process is based solely on a socially acceptable (and thus socially manipulated) system of rewards and punishments. If the events of this past year in the eastern European bloc nations and in China have taught us anything at all, I hope that what they have taught us is that teaching ethics prescriptively, and mandating prescriptive formula, does not stand the test of time. Yet there is a current generation of sophists in positions of authority, especially in government and business, which extols the virtues of this very limited mode of thinking.

2. Ethics as knowledge: Essentially, this mode of teaching, to follow in a Socratic frame, exhorts the young to know the "universal good" by stimulating thought about fundamental social goals and by examining the resultant ethical dilemmas that arise from implementing those goals. The assumption here is that reasoning in the abstract about such questions gives the student a life-long skill in learning to apply these constant principles to constantly changing circumstances. The maxim here may be stated as follows: "Good reasoning (as a skill) produces good results (choosing 'the good')." In short, skilled thinkers will always choose rightly, right? Wrong. We know better than that. If all we teach is thinking skills, then this too is not enough, because everyone knows that simply knowing how to be ethical doesn't necessarily mean that a person will choose to act in an ethical way. There are many pressures upon us to choose against what we know to be a right course of action.

The truth is, we need *both* modes of teaching and, more than that, we need to demonstrate to our students how critical thinking about real issues of social reform is enacted. They need to experience that. The college needs to foster the ability to think critically about ethical problems, and it needs to show its students why acquiring the desire and the will to put this abstract reasoning to practical use is definitely in their best interests. Our colleges have been wonderful in developing the former, that is, in demonstrating abstract theoretical reasoning. They have been remiss (and mine is no exception) in developing the latter, that is, in demonstrating why one would want to use these skills, apply them to specific social issues, and place them within a historical perspective. This, I think, is why American society, while it may admire our skills, does not necessarily trust how we put those skills to use; and this, I think, is why our society does not look to us for leadership.

So, I return to my premise. We need to teach critical thinking by teaching abstract reasoning theory, yes; but we also need to teach by example to create an active habit of thinking critically *in context of community*.

It is easy, for example, to put on the board seven different ethical theories or non-theories and, in the course of a semester, pull them apart to see where they came from historically, what their a priori assumptions are, if any, and to analyze their logic. That is the easy part of teaching ethics. And, even if we succeed, and if the students succeed in grasping all this stuff, there is no guarantee that this "skill" in analyzing ethics theory will lead to ethical "knowledge," nor is there any guarantee that it will lead to ethical behavior.

The hard part of teaching critical thinking -- the necessary part, the part that creates the active habit of thinking critically and constructively using those thoughts -- is putting theory to the test of practice. Without practice, without students seeing critical thinking skills actually being applied where it counts ...in the community , in the vocational-professional matrix of the data-oriented disciplines... students will not see the value nor the need to apply theory, and their ability to think critically about the values' implications of their actions will atrophy, just as surely as their ability to write clearly and effectively will atrophy if only English teachers stress writing skills.

Thus, the college, to be effective, must consider extending its efforts beyond the classroom.

Why *should* we do this? What is there implicit in the quasi-contractural agreement that exists among the college, its instructors, its students, and the community, that *requires* us to do this?

The ability to reason is indeed essential to our finding our way through the maze of ambiguities and contradictions that characterize a modern, post-industrial society. However, the ability to reason about ethics does not necessarily guarantee that people will behave ethically. Skeptics on and off campus will argue that there is very little correlation between ethical *beliefs* and ethical *behavior,* and they may point the finger at the apparent double-standard operating among leading religious figures to demonstrate this paradox. Yet Habermas and Kohlberg hold that if we are cognitively aware of a "higher standard of ethical awareness" we will tend to choose in that direction, and our behavior will be thus modified. Yet we are all aware of the pitfalls in implementing such awareness: personal fear, whether of physical harm or social disapproval, the desire to be accepted in a valued group, hunger, fatigue, etc., all conspire against our will to actually do the thing we know should be done.

Thus, neither skill nor knowledge is enough.

The best way to acquire an ethical view is *to know and to experience* (These are not synonymous terms.) ....to know and to experience situations in which one can perceive the effects one's actions are having on other people and, thus, one can understand how one's own interests are in turn affected by others, "Skill" alone is not enough; theoretical "knowledge" alone is not enough; practical "experience" alone is not enough. What is required is a synthesis of all three. Thus the college needs to provide an arena for the thoughtful consideration of and the application of critical thinking skills to specific and immediate social problems.

The mechanism of the JCC forum series -- indeed, the presence anywhere of a college *engaged in the work of the community* -- provides just such a balance. We can observe those persons in authority who are thinking critically (or not thinking, as the case might be). We can observe challenges from the floor. And, as this dialogue unfolds, as sound judgment is articulated, we can perceive its effects upon others and upon ourselves. We can also experience the effects of unwarranted assumptions which create errors in perspective, or distortions of oversimplification or obtuse complexity. We can assess a speaker's irrational appeal to tradition or to common practice, and we may thus decide, upon recognizing these flaws in thinking, to reject his or her argument. Thus, as we assess the complex process by which a community approaches problem-solving, as critical thinking is revealed and applied to complex social issues, we can determine the relative merits of those decisions. We become an informed, participative community. Our consent to decisions affecting public policy becomes one based upon three integrated factors: skill in analysis, knowledge of choice, and experience of the effects of our choosing. And, it is all "out front," as they say. Everybody sees it unfold. The college can make this happen.

This is what we have to offer to the community. This is why the college should be and can be a leader in confronting issues of social reform. Not because we hope to instill or to indoctrinate or to impose petty doctrines of behavior, but because moral education in its broadest sense is too important to chuck out the window because of past failings. Our planet is not in danger; our ideas are! Several 200-year old economic and social assumptions are up for grabs now; such issues as solid waste, concepts of individual privacy clashing with social control through government ...these are just a few which pop to mind. These issues are being questioned now on the streets, in the courtrooms, in our classrooms. Our four-billion year old planet will survive; the question is whether we can manage ourselves! Without a concerted effort by the colleges to examine critical thinking in practical, volatile areas, we, as an important segment of the community and the nation, short-change our chances as a species of enjoying a successful and meaningful transition through our children into the future.

So, how does a college go about the business of making critical thinking in community values judgments a valuable, life-long and active habit, what I call "...a way of 'being,' involved in the work of the world...?" We dust it off, put it to the test, and we invite our students to observe and to participate as public people wrestle with real public issues. I don't know, frankly, if the results of this are measurable, but the *process* makes an impact upon the community; its value is not lost on students, nor is it lost on those public leaders who, because they take their responsibilities seriously, welcome the opportunity to articulate their thinking.

Thus, the genesis of the JCC North Country Forum Series.

Part III: What did we do, and continue to do? What are some preliminary observations?

The forum series is an on-going social experiment. As experiments go, it is different from those fields in science, such as medicine, chemistry and physics, where it is possible and sometimes desirable to manipulate data so as to control certain variables and isolate them. This kind of experiment is a " closed experience," as Stephen Gould refers to it. In other fields of science, such as astronomy and geology, the field is too big to close, or, as in paleontology or archaeology, the field is in the past and has slid by us. These latter fields cannot be controlled; our conscience keeps us from doing so. To try to "manage" such an experience would be fundamentally impossible; to try to do so would be immoral and probably illegal.

Thus it is with our "field of experience" in critical thinking and issues of social reform. Ours is not a controlled experiment. It is what Gould calls a "natural experiment," because it is too big and too diverse, and it involves too many cultural variables rising out of the past, and expectations pulling us forward into the future. It involves an entire community of diverse values systems. Yet there is one constant which all members of this community accept: that profound and meaningful social change cannot occur without informed public consent. Building upon that "given," we proceeded. Any college can proceed from that given. Take an issue of immediate, tangible concern to the community. It probably will be an emotional issue as well; it will generate heat; it will be uncomfortable; people won't always make sense when they talk about it. Every community has such an issue: abortion, the homeless, racism, sexism, solid waste, the teaching of values in the public schools, and so on. The point is, we as college people live in a community; the college itself is a community within another community, with its own ethical dilemmas.

Our issue was, and is, the Fort Drum expansion. This issue has been the catalyst to extraordinary public interest in examining issues of public concern and public policy. *How* we as community confront these issues says as much to our young people as *what* we decide to do about them. Public recognition of a just and equitable decision -- just as public recognition of an unjust one -- sends shock waves of recognition throughout a community, and has an impact of lasting consequence on the young. In our case, many decisions had to be made regarding the expansion, and few in the community knew where to look to find the reasoning that led to those decisions.

Thus, JCC conceived of the community forum series, established a format, set up a steering committee, established its objectives, and then proceeded to model, through the mechanism of the forum, how public leaders go about the process of thinking critically about issues affecting social reform. Modeled after the New England town meeting, each forum centered on a separate subject for discussion, invited knowledgeable professionals and public figures, including elected officials, to present their decision-making rationale to the public; then, questions were invited from the floor. Sometimes it got tense; but in truth, it is fair to say that most people are civilized most of the time, and the moderator really had little difficulty in calling people to the real task of the evening, which was community self-discovery. "What are our priorities?" "How best do we achieve them?" "Why did you do it that way?" These represent the essential tenor of the discussion.

Six of eight forums scheduled for this year have occurred. I wish I could report that all forums were well attended. Some were, some weren't. Especially effective, and especially well attended by the general public, were the three forums on Human Services, Housing and Health Care, Cultural, Ethnic and Religious Diversity. These were effective, I think, because they were not abstract issues and people could relate to them with an immediacy that was not apparent in some of the other issues. The Criminal Justice forum raised concerns about statistical changes in the nature of crime and the need to redress an overcrowded prison system. Surprisingly, the Education forum drew fewer than two dozen people. I'm not sure why, and this has baffled me to this day, because we thought this one would be the best attended of the lot. I even scheduled a larger auditorium! It looked very empty. The land Use Planning and Zoning Issues forum was moderately attended. This is an abstract and technical issue, but an important one; those in the audience did not necessarily represent the general public so much as they were people from county, state and local governments and agencies.

Each forum had media coverage, including radio, TV and newspaper.

Of the two remaining forums, we don't know what to expect with the Small Business one, because, except for the competition between long-established and conservative downtown businesses, and the newly-established, aggressive and highly successful mall on the outskirts of town, things are quiet. However, we do expect a large public turnout for the Solid Waste forum, as this is an emotionally charged local issue, one that clashes rural and urban interests. There is a lot at stake with this solid waste issue; recycling, for example, may serve as an issue to define exactly how the North Country perceives its economic values and structures its priorities for future development.

What have we learned so far? What follows is a preliminary assessment of the data that has been presented in the forums, as well as some of the general observations drawn concerning people's responses to the forum series. (Space precludes my doing this here, but statistical documentation, as well as a complete series format, are available, and we will forward these with pleasure.) What has emerged so far is this:

1. A perceived double-standard exists relating to property tax exemptions. According to the City Planning Department, 40% of all taxable real property in the city of Watertown is on exempt or reduced basis. As a new solid-waste treatment facility comes on line, the issue of tax exemption will become a heated issue, because residential properties are carrying the tax burden, and business properties are getting the reductions. Many see this as an unequal

distribution of the tax burden, and the city faces possible taxpayer resistance from residential property owners.

2. Apparently, zoning law is being invoked to exclude low-income housing from major portions of the city. Also, as rental and purchase costs for housing have risen so dramatically, the net combination has effectively excluded affordable housing for low-income families in Watertown. Between 1984-1989, for example, the average purchase price of an average one-family, two bedroom house rose from $32,000 to $67,000, a rise in cost of 109%; for a comparable rental unit, the rise in rent has been 117%. (Source: Fort Drum Steering Council).

3. Many people have generalized *all* local changes in this decade as being "Fort Drum related." However, as this forum series evolved, it became evident that some of those issues that surfaced and that were attributed to the military expansion actually pre-dated the expansion, but they were only now being dealt with under the pressures and climate of change. The national decline in the dairy industry is a good example of this; the national trend in the business sector toward retail sales, service and recreational facilities is another. Those who saw these only as local issues, and who blamed the military expansion for it, were neglectful of the realities of modern economic life.

4. Nonetheless, while trends in agriculture were not caused by the expansion, but reveal a national decline, this trend has been radically accelerated by the local situation. Even if the local dairy economy were to stabilize or prosper, the Jefferson County Department of Taxation points out that the economics of the "highest and best use" of local lands now favors non-agricultural development. We are seeing a land in transition from rural-agricultural to suburban.

5. In many other respects, too, the nature of North Country life has been permanently changed. We note: a) a gradual movement toward centralization as major economic and political pressures favor consolidation of resources in major urban centers. This trend is influenced, in part, by b) the fact that, as technology becomes more complex, there is a tendency by local elected officials to defer to appointed professionals in state agencies which, by design, are exempt from direct public scrutiny, and which are only indirectly accountable to the public they serve. On the other hand, the forum entitled Who's in Charge Here?, which examined and debated the tenuous balance in power between elective and appointive authority, revealed that many local elected officials clearly recognize this trend, and they see the need to be more assertive on the local municipal level. If the population figures and the economies of the small towns stay healthy, perhaps a balance between rural and urban interests will be achieved.

6. Some state agencies, whether by accident or design, discouraged attendance at important public hearings by phrasing their public notices in obscure 'technocratese'. When this was pointed out at one of the forums, they tried to rectify the wording of their notices, and were somewhat successful in raising attendance.

7. Although some isolated racial incidents among teenagers have erupted in the public schools, racism does not appear to be a major problem; however,
sexism is, as evidenced in an abrupt rise in reported incidents of domestic violence. In truth, it is difficult to assess whether this rise is due to the expansion. (Some professionals in the field feel strongly that it is directly related.) Or, whether this rise reflects an increased awareness of and reporting of an existing problem.

8. A changing demographics reflects a younger population. From 1980-1990, the local census is expected to reveal a 43% increase in people less that 25 years of age; this same decade will see an increase of 87% in the number of pre-school age children. The ratio of males to females will

increase by 45%. These changing demographics will have a profound effect upon the business community as business tries to anticipate changes in future products demands. These changing demographics will also affect the region's health-care facilities. For example, since 1985 there has been an increase in sexually transmitted diseases. In the year 1986-1987, gonorrhea rose by 73%. Among males, all forms of venereal disease increased in this same period by 38%; among females, 32%. In 1987-1988, of 404 patients seen by Jefferson County Public Health (from whom I get these statistics), 108 of those patients sought testing-counseling for AIDS. In 1987, there were no reported cases of AIDS in Jefferson County; in 1988, three confirmed cases were reported in the general population; 17 cases were reported in the prison population.

9. The overall economic picture of the region has greatly improved. Spin-off development of recreational second homes is creating a mini-boom along the rims of lakes and waterways in the region. Jobs are plentiful, although not all segments of the economy enjoy prosperity; farm employment is down; heavy industry jobs are down. However, retailing, tourism, fast foods, construction and related jobs show a great surge. While many of these jobs offer skilled-labor wages, many more remain at the minimum wage level.

Conclusion

We have been told by researchers, the military and government officials, that ours is a uniquely effective approach to community problem solving. They tell us that efforts such as this one are usually not undertaken until years *after* an expansion trauma has occurred, with the result that social recovery is sometimes bitter and often prolonged for decades. Ours is unique only because it attempts to anticipate and confront issues *before* they become major social problems. The College is taking an active, not a reactive position, because it feels that the skills of theoretical critical thinking need to be reinforced by knowledge of the historical context within which that reasoning occurs, and by the experience of developing an active habit of thinking critically. Such an approach to critical thinking in issues of social reform can best be modeled by citizens of the community as they publicly challenge or defend a public-policy decision, thus revealing the processes they use to make decisions. It appears so far that the established residents trust this approach, and that the new people respect it. They are talking to one another, and it seems to be working.

Jerome B. Wichelns is an Instructor in Philosophy at Jefferson Community College, Watertown, NY.

Social Inquiry as Critical Practice

In this section, a series of papers concerned with the inquiry process itself is presented.

Michael Steffy, in *Culture, Anthropological Perspectives, and Critical Thinking,* addresses the nature of critical thinking across the disciplines, suggesting that it be defined and understood from an anthropological, cross- cultural, multi- disciplinary perspective. The cultural understanding created by each modern discipline through its own processes of inquiry, or knowledge- production process, may itself be the subject of anthropological inquiry. Although the process of critical thinking may not differ, the disciplines provide diverse vantage points that are necessary for the process of critical thinking to take place, and challenges us to question basic assumptions and presuppositions of that thinking process.

In his paper on ethnographic inquiry, *Ethnography as a Critical Practice,* Michael Huspek responds to the need for the ethnographer to respect the norms of a host culture under study in order to avoid importing external standards and to avoid missionary proselytizing. However, he also criticizes the extreme cultural relativist position which proscribes any and all critical applications of external standards of rationality or morality. He presents an argument for the existence of universal standards of rationality common to all cultures, and for inventive approaches to cultural critique that are based both on these universal standards and on those of the host culture as well.

Bernard Davis presents a positivist argument for the application the scientific method, as a mode of critical thinking, to ethical, "life-style" issues, in *Science, Ethics, and Critical Thinking.* Scientific method is described as a "hypothetical-deductive" method in which acceptance of a truth is always held as tentative, and "if we are wrong we will find out that we are wrong." Davis suggests a pragmatic, experimental approach to social inquiry and human conduct. The usefulness of the scientific method is seen in everyday practical decision making. There is, he suggests, no need for philosophical analysis of the meaning of ethical terms; "all we need do is...apply try each change in social policy that appears promising, see if it works, keep it if it does and discard it if it doesn't." Evaluative experiments, well conducted, can best be used to provide both factual information for decision making and also the opportunity to observe the effects of evaluative experiments done by others, since we individually cannot "try everything." For that last opportunity, however, there must be freedom for "entrepreneurs of life style" to experiment, and opportunities for others to observe the outcomes of these experiments.

Rev. John Conley, in *Social Knowledge: The Critical Reception of Testimony,* addresses the critical assessment of testimony, as used in historical, religious, and legal inquiry, in which our evaluation of the credibility of the truth-claims of others is dependent, at least in part, upon the competence and reliability of witnesses. The criteria of competence and reliability are themselves subjected to critical evaluation, as both are socially constructed. "Competence is rooted in a given society's concept of authority. Reliability is embedded in the interests which motivate a particular society." Critical assessment of testimony, he concludes, "cannot banish the possibility of error in a particular judgment. It can, however, place our social knowledge in the realm of thoughtful reflection rather than in the arbitrary realm of prejudice and wish."

Culture, Anthropological Perspectives, and Critical Thinking

Michael Steffy

Culture as an anthropological concept was first defined formally for the discipline, or so the lore that is taught to undergraduates tells us, by Edward B. Tylor in 1871. His now classic text, *Primitive Culture*, opens with the statement:

> Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.

Tylor was a nineteenth century English scholar who believed that existing information on the behavioral similarities and differences of human groups around the world could be best organized, understood, and, as a result, explained within the intellectual framework of cultural evolution. The work of Tylor and his contemporaries could be called today an early paradigm in anthropology, after Kuhn's use of the term in his discussion of scientific revolutions (1970), but cultural evolutionism is traditionally considered by the discipline to be its first great theoretical "school."

As cultural evolutionists Tylor and other early anthropologists believed that human societies progress from simple to complex up a hierarchy of stages. There was, however, a tendency to trace the progression of specific cultural institutions alone through their developmental stages--institutions such as marriage and the family, belief systems, descent systems, and law and jurisprudence--rather than whole cultures as complex, integrated, functioning systems, characterizing various societies and human groups, large and small, around the world. The result of the posited cultural evolutionary sequence, the ultimate achievement in humankind's cultural development, was considered by the anthropologists of Tylor's day to be "Civilization." That which came before was judged from their perspective to be "uncivilized" or "primitive" and given classificatory labels such as "Barbarism" or "Savagery" (Morgan, 1877).

Today we can look back and marvel that these classical evolutionists achieved as many valuable insights about culture as they did. For, while establishing culture as the salient concept of anthropology, their perspective on others, that first major theoretical orientation in the discipline, stands now as a textbook example of a view that anthropologists have come to abhor in cross-cultural research -- a view we refer to today as the ethnocentric perspective. Ethnocentrism is what appears to be the natural tendency of human beings as cultural animals to view, interpret, and evaluate the socially learned behavior of others in terms of the ideas and standards acquired in their own social group. Humans everywhere seem to assume that their learned patterns of thinking, believing, and perceiving, their culture, is, in fact, in direct touch with reality and, as a result, with Truth in an absolute sense. By definition, therefore, it is believed to be correct and proper. The result of this assumption is that alien customs and culture traits that are seen as different, are also perceived as both incorrect and inferior. People everywhere believe, indeed know, that their way is the real and true way--the natural and proper human way.

Sometimes ethnocentric humans merely assume that others just need to learn or to be taught the "right way" to do things. But more often they associate what they view as incorrect or improper behavior with obvious biological differences that cannot be changed. The result of this culturally learned perception goes beyond ethnocentrism to racism and is more likely to translate into actions that result in indirect and unintentional or even direct and intentional repression and genocide. Humans in general have yet to evolve effective ways of dealing fairly and humanely with cross-group, biological and cultural, differences, because humans are cultural animals.

To their credit classical evolutionists did not invent social Darwinism, a biologically based justification for the cultural reality of poverty and the politico-economic injustice in the world that creates it. Yet when it came time to explain why some populations had obviously progressed faster than others through the discovered stages of cultural development, it was all too easy for some cultural evolutionists to join other scholars and laymen of the day and take the ever so short step from cultural ethnocentrism to biological racial determinism. Nineteenth century racial determinists made the assumption that race determined and, for "naturally inferior" races, limited human behavior and, therefore, the cultural development of whole populations. When cultural evolutionists attributed a perceived cultural inferiority of other human groups to biological differences, they went beyond ethnocentrism to pure and simple racism.

Science by its nature progresses, and regardless of those who like to think of anthropology as a humanity, there is a clear scientific tradition running through the history of the discipline. The classical evolutionism of the nineteenth century has been replaced today by other more viable paradigms for organizing, understanding, and explaining human biological and cultural, similarities and differences (Harris, 1968; Garbarino, 1977; Lett, 1987). While recognizing links between specific biological and cultural characteristics in human populations, there is in contemporary anthropology a general rejection of all forms of determinism when seeking to understand cross-population human differences. The interplay between biology and culture is now seen as very complex and subtle. Thus any simplistic and sweeping racial deterministic explanations employed in the formative years of anthropological inquiry, have long since been rejected by the discipline. In everyday life, however, ethnocentrism and racism are still alive and well. Let me give an example.

The vast majority of the world's populations do not as adults drink what we Americans like to think of as "natures most perfect food," milk. But most human populations are genetically incapable of digesting whole milk as adults. Both the cultural behavior of drinking fresh milk and the biological ability to digest it beyond childhood, seem to be adaptive specializations associated with some early cattle raising peoples and their descendants. When Americans first began trying to address the problem of world hunger by distributing surplus food, reports of widespread intestinal distress among some populations, apparently caused by drinking reconstituted powdered milk, were quickly explained away as evidence that "natives" were not competent to mix the milk properly under sanitary conditions, or to utilize it correctly as directed by relief workers in the field (Harris, 1985). Americans assumed ethnocentrically that our foods were the best foods for everyone and, also from a much more subtle racist perspective, that inherently inferior "native capabilities," rather than simple biological differences, must be the cause of the problem. The result was that many thousands who were suffering and both needed and accepted our help in good faith, were forced instead to suffer additionally until we achieved a more enlightened perspective on the problem. Anthropologists have learned to be leery of even the most well intended cross-group efforts, including their own, and it is the achievement of this anthropological perspective on the problem of understanding human similarities and differences cross-culturally, that I intend to argue bears directly on our efforts to explore the nature of critical thinking across the disciplines. But first, more on anthropological perspectives.

In order to combat the cultural problem of ethnocentrism when attempting to study other cultures, anthropologists, just after the turn of the century, especially in this country under the encouragement of Franz Boas, the "father" of American anthropology, began to argue that a doctrine of cultural relativism was a necessity. Cultural relativism holds that other cultures can only be described, understood, and explained in their own terms, from the "native" perspective. It treats human values as relative and culture specific and translates into a cross-cultural value orientation that all cultures are equally valid manifestations of human capabilities. Therefore, there can be no universal standard to measure cultures cross-culturally (Garbarino, 1977, p. 50).

This doctrine or value orientation of cultural relativism relates directly to the Boasian rejection of not only the theoretical perspective of cultural evolutionism, but theoretical perspectives in general. Theory was seen as a culture specific, biasing agent interfering with the "objectivity" required to successfully study other cultures. Boas argued, and taught the whole first generation of American anthropologists, that theory must wait until more information about cultures as specific entities could be gathered through intensive and extensive field research. Fieldwork became a rite of passage required for a doctorate, and the ethnography, a description of a specific cultural system replete with its own "world view" and unique "ethos," became a research end in itself. If the nineteenth century cultural evolutionists speculated too much and unknowingly allowed their own cultural biases to influence their theory and results, many Boasians in their efforts to produce unbiased, objective descriptions of other cultures knowingly avoided, and even disavowed, the pursuit of anthropology as a theory making and testing science. The result is that Boas has been accused of trying to turn the discipline into a humanity. In some sectors his approach to doing anthropology, the Boasian paradigm, has been dubbed, historical particularism, to suggest its ascientific orientation (Garbarino, 1977, p. 48).

In all fairness, Boas and many of his students were anxious to produce generalizations about culture from their field experiences. The trouble with many of the generalizations produced by the Boasians after they collected and analyzed their data gathered from numerous specific cultures was, that in an anti-theory environment, generalizations can take on the qualities of "discovered truths" that are accepted without question as accurate representations of reality. Granted the Boasians attempted to avoid the cultural evolutionists' problem of a biased and subjectively produced, overriding theory shaping their perception of cultural realities, but the rejection of any stated theory does not prevent ethnocentrism by liberating the mind, indeed, it can help deceive it by creating a false sense of unbiased objectivity. Let me illustrate.

In 1923 as a result of attempting to bring order to the growing anthropological collections at the American Museum of Natural History, Clark Wissler, a colleague of Boas, formally postulated the universal culture pattern. The pattern as he saw it was a list of categories, or what he called components of culture, that all cultures were necessarily assumed to have, although the specific character or expression of each component could differ from society to society. Thus all cultures have language or social organization--Wissler's original terms were speech, and family and social systems--but the form that language or social organization takes is a characteristic of each specific culture. The universal culture pattern, to the extent that it represents all cultures, is then a generalization characterizing culture itself as a phenomenon (Garbarino, 1977, pp. 51-52).

While there was some discussion and modification of Wissler's original nine categories into an eventual list of ten, the universal culture pattern was widely accepted and became a kind of outline for doing ethnographic fieldwork (Keesing, 1958, pp. 188-189). The task of describing a culture became for many Boasians, more and more a process of going down a check list and recording through observation which previously identified characteristics under each component were represented in the culture under consideration. Only later, unfortunately after many of the cultures so studied and recorded by the Boasian school had become extinct or acculturated, did a new group of scholars point out that this approach tended to impose preconceived categories of description on cultures, rather than eliciting from the representatives of the cultures themselves, the actual categories used by the "natives" to organize, describe, and define their own culture's specific view of reality (Spradley, 1972).

To some extent these ethnoscientists, as the proponents of a new approach to doing ethnography were called, seemed to be out-Boasing the Boasians, but their goal was not description as a means to generalization, but scientific explanation. While the Boasians were interested in cultures as historical entities out there, and, as a result, in "discovering" the nature of culture itself, ethnoscientists needed data on cultures as cognitive systems, socially learned and shared by communities of knowers and believers--culture as ideas in peoples heads. These cognitive anthropologists, as they eventually became known, were interested in understanding cultures as systems of knowledge for dealing with reality, and ultimately in the qualities of the human mind that make the creation, use, and transmission of culture as human knowledge possible.

I do not mean to suggest that cognitive anthropology represents the ultimate approach to studying culture. It is, as I indicated earlier, only one of several paradigms currently available to the discipline to ask and attempt to answer questions concerning the nature of humans as cultural animals. I mention it only to illustrate that the Boasians, while avoiding the ethnocentrism and racism of their larger cultural milieu, succumbed to the ethnocentrism of their own paradigm. Today many of us in anthropology realize that the doctrine of cultural relativism, as applied by the Boasians to other cultures in cross-cultural research, is simply not enough. We must apply it to ourselves as well. We cannot escape the created reality of our own acquired perspectives. Unbiased objectivity is a myth. Knowledge, cultural or scientific, is created and relative to the existing knowledge system from which it derives. And some of us have also come to know that as the basis for a human way of life encouraging cross-cultural understanding--as the primary cultural value of a culture of cross-cultural tolerance, the way cultural relativism is frequently offered in the classroom--it leaves something to be desired as well (see Bagish, 1981). More on this later.

Now in order to describe and discuss cultural and scientific perspectives, and, therefore, the kinds of results produced that a given approach to doing research in anthropology represents, the discipline has evolved two complementary concepts, the emic and the etic, as extensions of the culture concept itself. Tracing the history of the development of these two concepts would be the topic of a separate paper. It is sufficient for our purposes here to note that these terms derive from the field of linguistics (Pike, 1954); emic from phonemics, the study and establishment of the phonemes, the smallest units of contrast in a specific language; and etic from phonetics, the study of the sounds of human language in general and, therefore, of all human languages. Each language is phonetically selective. That is, of the full range of sounds employed by humans to communicate linguistically, each specific language uses only a subset. In modern anthropology emic has come to refer to descriptive results, or an approach to studying cultures and thus to producing those results, from within the culture under consideration. That is to say, it represents a culture specific point of view, or what has been called by Hunter and Whitten (1975), the "folk" culture perspective. There are as many unique emics as their are cultures out there, in the same way that there are as many specific phonemic systems as there are languages. On the other hand, etic refers to an external perspective or approach, outside any specific cultural system under consideration. Further, the etic perspective is frequently linked to cross-cultural analysis in general, and ultimately to the scientific perspective itself in anthropological research.

To return to the Boasians and the cognitive anthropologists for a moment, the Boasians were trying to do emic descriptions. But the cognitive anthropologists, interested in obtaining accurate emics for a later cross-cultural, etic analysis of human cognition, frequently found the Boasian culture descriptions to be etic, that is representative of the perspective of the researcher, not the "native." That in itself is not bad, except that by rejecting science, with its theoretical approach and adopting the doctrine of cultural relativism, the Boasians thought they could be "unbiased" and "objective" about other cultures and that their "data" would be emic. What they ended up collecting many times without realizing it, were etic observations that were accepted without question as accurate representations of the native's cultural reality. That's not nonscience, it's bad science, because it involves creating knowledge about the cultural reality of others and accepting that knowledge as "objective truth" without testing. There is nothing unbiased or objective about the emic or the etic perspective. Culture and science both represent human knowledge that is, in the final analysis, subjective and relative to the cultural system that produces it.

If all this emic and etic stuff seems confusing, imagine having this discussion without these two concepts. Anthropology today is increasingly admired by some of the other disciplines in the Western intellectual tradition, because of its willingness to undergo introspection and to share both the process and the results. I believe it is, in part, the emic/etic distinction, this extension of the original culture concept, the awareness of anthropological perspectives on others and ourselves when we study others, that encourages and supports this introspection to the extent that it occurs. And I also believe the emic/etic distinction can provide the basis for a viable cross-disciplinary approach to understanding thinking that is truly critical. After making such a claim, I must move on quickly to explain myself, but first let me make a point about culture and cultural relativism.

The Boasians got themselves into trouble, it seems to me, because they did not go far enough with the concept of culture and the doctrine of cultural relativism. They did not really admit that all human knowledge is relative, including their own. If you are going to argue for the cultural nature of humans and the relativistic nature of cultural knowledge, then you have got to accept the idea that all human knowledge is cultural and, therefore, relativistic, including any anthropological knowledge that might be created by any cross-cultural study of the cultural knowledge of others. You cannot say that the knowledge of others is subjective and relative to their culture, but that mine is somehow objective and absolute. The Boasian etic was, after all, the emic of the Boasian paradigm. The etic, anthropological point of view is the emic of anthropology. Anthropological knowledge represents created relative truth, not discovered absolute truth. There are no absolute truths out there waiting to be "objectively discovered," because there are no absolutes as far as human knowledge is concerned.

Did I just say that the etic is just another emic? No, not really, for it is a very special emic. But I did say that as far as human knowledge is concerned, the only absolute is nonabsolutism; objectivity at best is only a higher form of subjectivity. There may be absolutes out there, but that belief as well as what those absolutes might be, is a pure and simple act of faith. As humans we can only "know" absolutes through religion, not science. In the relativistic reality that we humans create, there is no foolproof way of knowing for certain when we have found an absolute. Real reality is truly elusive. Absolute truth cannot really be known. But sciencing has evolved as a way of approximating and approaching that truth.

Now people everywhere learn emic, ethnocentric perspectives from their cultures, and, as a result, they know and think in terms of absolutes. Humans seem to have trouble functioning without culturally defined absolutes. There is one perspective, however, that must admit that all knowledge is culturally relative. It is the etic perspective. The etic is the emic of emic/etic distinction awareness, and that is why it is not just another emic. We cannot stop being cultural and ethnocentric. We cannot avoid believing in culturally defined absolutes, and it would be a supremely arrogant and quite ironic form of ethnocentrism to think otherwise. We cannot really be objective about anything. But we can become aware of all this, and we can take steps to deal with it. We can work to achieve that higher form of subjectivity, a position of awareness and skepticism. And that is what I am arguing the anthropological perspective of the etic offers us for a consideration of the nature of critical thinking across the disciplines.

What have I been talking about here, really? Well, you have probably guessed by now that I am not only talking about the anthropological perspective, but also the perspective of modern science itself. The real revolution in science in general and anthropology in particular in the last few decades has been, as far as I am concerned, the realization that sciencing is not actually a process of discovering the "Universal Laws of Nature" or what was originally thought of as "God's Universal Truth." It is, instead, a process for creating and testing temporary truths or theories that are relative to the existing state of knowledge. Science creates and defines reality; it does not discover it. Absolute truth becomes the ideal toward which science works. Science is a formal, explicit, socially learned and practiced, system for doing what people have been doing informally since the origin of humans as cultural animals.

Cultures and science all create human knowledge. Culture and science both define reality for communities of knowers. Culture and science both provide models of reality that permit their communities of knowers to deal with the reality that is out there. Cultures are emic and assume ethnocentrically that their models of reality are correct, indeed, are reality and represent "absolute truth." Science must be etic and realize that with the inductive method of producing theories and the hypothetico-deductive method of testing them, it is capable of producing better and better theories, better and better models of reality, but that the precise nature of reality as such may never really be known.

With science we may be able to improve our models of reality until they are, in fact, exact representations of the reality that they are modeling, but nothing in science, or human culture for that matter, permits us to know with absolute certainty when we achieve this point. How do we know the one true reality from all the models of reality created as human knowledge when we meet it on the street? The one theory out of many that is, in fact, reality is not identifiable in any particular way. Theories are never proven, only supported or refuted through testing (Lastrucci, 1963). Competing theories can be evaluated relatively by comparing their validity in reality, but when it comes to knowing absolute reality, "close enough" or "better" has got to be the scientific, even if it is seldom the human cultural, "bottom line."

It would appear to be almost impossible for humans as cultural animals to accept a world in which there is no way of truly knowing reality, no way to really know what the absolutes are. That is why all human cultures teach ethnocentrically that they know reality, and why some scientists even today need to think they are discovering it. That is why the human mind is so good at accepting and believing the knowledge it creates. The etic cannot be the basis of a human lifeway or culture, that is what emics are for. It is the nature of humans to believe in absolutes. But the etic can and should serve as an intellectual "tool," a perspective on ourselves when we consciously attempt to create knowledge. It represents a way to think about what we are doing. It teaches us that thinking to be truly critical thinking, must include thinking about our thinking.

All human cultures are made up of people who think. In 1911 in *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Boas, after a study of the available data, concluded that the mental capabilities of all human populations were, for all intents and purposes, the same. To this day after an additional three-quarters of a century of anthropological research, there is still no reason to doubt this conclusion. Every population and culture seems to have its geniuses and its dullards. Granted in every society some people appear to do more thinking than other members of that society. In one sense the human goal is to meet basic needs with as little conscious thinking as possible, and culture as traditional patterns of knowing and believing, and the habitual behaviors that result, supports that goal. Why go to the trouble to figure out a new way to know, if the old way continues to give the appearance of working? There is, however, a kind of paradox here, because one of the human needs would also seem to be the need to think. Once basic needs are met, the mind is free to create. By this kind of "thinking" then, I mean the more or less conscious attempts at creating knowledge that are made possible by culture--what could be called "creative" thinking.

To some extent our larger culture is a specific expression of this paradox. We do not encourage widespread creative thinking, except to the extent that its results can be used in our practical efforts to make profits. By more or less isolating higher education in general and parts of the university in particular from the rest of society, however, we have permitted the creation of nonpractical knowledge to become an end in itself. The disciplines as specializations in our culture, because they are in the knowledge production business, represent a concentration of attempts at creative thinking. That is one of the reasons we, as representatives of the disciplines, are paying attention to the problem of critical thinking. We feel the need to justify by the way we do it, the results of what we are doing. We want to be better at creating knowledge in our fields, and passing that ability on to the next generation that replaces us. In one sense then, critical thinking is the kind of thinking that creates the kind of knowledge that we want to create. We prefer to call it critical thinking rather than creative thinking in the hope that our results will be more widely accepted as truth. There is no reason to believe, however, that any one culture or any one discipline, if we accept the model of the various disciplines as "interpretative communities" functioning like miniature cultures, has the inside track on thinking that is either creative or critical. If we talk to the right informants, I am sure that each culture and each discipline will be able to demonstrate for us, if not consciously define, its version of creative or critical thinking.

It may well be, however, that critical thinking within the disciplines is, after all, just thinking. Or said another way, disciplined thinking may have the potential to be critical thinking, but can only be judged as such in retrospect. What is the difference between thinking that is not critical and critical thinking that is eventually judged to be flawed or in error? Were the classical evolutionists or the Boasians not thinking critically? I suspect, but I do not know, that all descriptions of critical thinking from within cultures and the disciplines as subcultures will have to be culture specific and ethnocentric. That is to say, they will have to come from the emic perspective. They will have to be derived from the specific underlying assumptions and traditional knowledge that characterize each human knowledge system. I do not understand literary criticism, nor do I know what would be considered critical thinking in that field, because I do not know it as a human knowledge system. I have no doubt, however, as an anthropologist, that if I were to study literary criticism from the inside, I could find out. Human knowledge is after all, human knowledge, and we are all human. Further, I may already know something about the greater cultural tradition from which literary criticism derives. My larger problem, however, is this: would I thus be learning critical thinking, or would I just be learning to think correctly, even creatively, in the field of literary criticism? The issue that really concerns me here, as I have suggested previously, is what might be the nature of critical thinking across the disciplines or even across cultures. It is here, I think, that the emic/etic distinction and the etic, anthropological perspective itself can come to our rescue.

Thinking that is truly critical thinking in a cross-disciplinary sense, must, I should like to suggest, be thinking from the etic perspective. It must be thinking that is cognizant of the culture concept and the emic/etic distinction. It must be thinking that accepts the emic, relativistic nature of all human knowledge, but recognizes the value and importance of an etic awareness of and perspective on this. It must be skeptical thinking. It must be skeptical of all truths, but especially those that are treated as if they were absolute. It must be thinking about thinking. It must include thinking about the thinking process itself. It must go beyond the internal problem of logical consistency, to the external problem of the presuppositions and assumptions upon which the thinking process is based. It must be thinking that considers the context of thinking. It must take into consideration the emic environment from which all thinking comes. It must be public thinking, open to review and criticism. It must be thinking that seeks to build bridges of communication, tolerance, and understanding, not walls of arrogance, privilege, and elitism. In that sense it must be thinking that is both humble and humane. And lastly, it must be thinking in and about a real world that also includes thinking about ways to test itself in that world, rather than ways to validate itself in imaginary worlds of self-justification. In the final analysis critical thinking, whether it be thinking from the emic or the etic perspective, can only be judged as such by thinking critically about it from the etic perspective. Etic critical thinking must include a constant effort to show that the original attempt at critical thinking, was not really critical thinking in the first place.

At the end of the decade of the 60's, Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, two educators, produced *Teaching as a Subversive Activity* (1969). Books can have a profound impact on individual lives, and this book had no small influence on me. Looking back I can see that it finalized a shift in my intellectual focus from anthropological archeology to what was then a relatively new area of interest in anthropology, a field called anthropology and education. Today this specialization tends to be given the rubric, educational anthropology, and largely involves culture studies in educational settings. Back in 1969, however, after completing a field season on a Ford Foundation archeology fellowship at the highland Maya site of Kaminaljuyu in Guatemala, and also reading Postman and Weingartner's book, I knew that what I really wanted to do more than anything else with my life was to become an educator by studying anthropology. It was my positive response to a powerful idea presented in the first chapter of that subversive little book, and certainly not any negative reaction to my field experience in Guatemala, that caused me to choose that new direction in my intellectual and professional life.

Without benefit of the emic/etic distinction labels, Postman and Weingartner--by the way, Weingartner was then on leave from Queens College where I now teach--argued for schools cultivating what they called the most "subversive intellectual instrument" of all--the anthropological perspective. Let me give you their words:

> This perspective allows one to be part of his own culture and, at the same time, to be out of it. One views the activities of his own group as would an anthropologist, observing its tribal rituals, its fears, its conceits, its ethnocentrism. In this way, one is able to recognize when reality begins to drift too far away from the grasp of the tribe (1969, p. 4).

Need I point out that what Postman and Weingartner were offering as the anthropological perspective, is the perspective of the emic/etic distinction awareness--what I have been discussing here as the etic perspective itself? They were arguing for this perspective as the learning outcome necessary to cultivate the ability to, as they put it borrowing from Hemingway, detect crap in one's own society and culture. Elsewhere I have referred to this learning outcome as the ability to conduct autoethnography (1979, p. 17), but we could also use here the concept that is the central theme of the conference that generated this collection of papers, critical thinking. I heartily recommend to you the entirety of that first chapter on the concept of "crap detecting," especially to those of you who think of yourselves as educators, for it is the best practical discussion of what seems to me to be the essence of critical thinking as a desirable, general learning outcome that I have ever heard.

Critical thinking must be the ability to detect the crap, both intellectual and cultural, that accumulates around us at what would seem to be a geometric rate. Clearly Postman and Weingartner were concerned about the application of this ability within our larger society and culture, rather than from the cross-cultural perspective of anthropological inquiry or the cross-disciplinary focus of the conference noted above. But as they indicate, the anthropological perspective of the etic can, indeed must, be called upon in any and all situations to detect the crap that can result from thinking that is emic, ethnocentric, and absolutist. Critical thinking, like crap detecting, is not a process that leads inevitably to truth, either absolute or relative, but it is a process by which the lack of truth, i.e. crap, can and must be detected.

Perhaps I should end on this admission that the major point of my paper is not really my own, but I cannot. Another significant event in my intellectual and professional life bears some consideration. Just a little over a year and a half ago at the University of Chicago's Twelfth National Institute on Issues in Teaching and Learning entitled, Teaching Critical Thinking: Campus Practice, Emerging Connections, I was introduced, I am ashamed to admit for the first time, to the work of William G. Perry, Jr. Perhaps some of you reading this paper have also attended a Chicago institute, and I am sure that many of you have been familiar with Perry's pioneering and significant work much longer than I. His empirically derived scheme for the intellectual and ethical development of college students was first published in book form in 1968, then again in 1970, but has gotten considerably wider distribution since 1981 in a shorter version in the influential collection of articles, *The Modern American College* (Chickering, et al.). Much research has been generated in developmental and educational psychology based on this scheme. A more recent work of equal importance, *Women's Ways of Knowing* (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule, 1986), has attempted to compare the Perry scheme, which apparently is based on a male biased sample, with a similar empirically based developmental sequence generated for women.

I mention all this because, after declaring my personal area of intellectual interest to be pedagogical anthropology, my own term for an applied educational anthropology of the teaching/learning process (1979). I have been working to formulate a pedagogy that uses anthropological content to bring elective undergraduate students to a position of emic/etic distinction awareness and etic intellectual empowerment, without requiring them to become emicly enculturated into the discipline of anthropology. Imagine my surprise, therefore, when I discovered the parallels between my evolved instructional goals and the later positions of cognitive and ethical development in college students from Perry's scheme. As an educator of undergraduates, I had been attempting to accomplish through explicit instruction, what Perry has shown to be the implicit intellectual and ethical product of a successful college experience.

Over my years in the classroom working with students, I have come to realize, and so explicitly teach, that an understanding of anthropology's emic/etic distinction offers not only an awareness of the emic, relativistic nature of human knowledge, but also an etic, intellectual awareness of and, commitment to the human process of expanding and improving that knowledge, no matter what the field or discipline in which one chooses to specialize or focus. This is similar to the last position in Perry's developmental scheme, that of relativism with commitment (1981, pp. 92-97). When teaching, however, I use anthropological content to emphasize the larger social, cross-cultural, and pan-specie dimensions of commitment, rather than the more personal and self-oriented ones, that necessarily emerge from Perry's empirical, personal development orientation.

The world desperately needs critical thinking crap detectors with a commitment beyond just using their intellectual abilities to make the best possible living they can for themselves. Just in case you haven't looked out of the "ivory tower" lately, we are engaged in a worldwide human struggle that requires, indeed demands, the cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural application of the critical thinking perspective. It is the thesis of this paper then, that the anthropological perspective of the emic/etic distinction awareness, the anthropological etic, offers anyone who is willing to accept it, an explicit path to cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural critical thinking empowerment, and to the personal cognitive and ethical development that it can represent. I do not claim that anthropological knowledge is the only path to this destination. But having traveled this particular route extensively with my students over the years and become quite familiar with it, I can only do what any teacher in a similar position would do, I offer it to you in the fervent hope that, for the greater good of all humankind, it can help guide others in their personal efforts to achieve a position of critical intellectual development and ethical commitment in the world we humans continue to create.

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Michael Steffy is the Social Sciences Instructional Development, Pedagogy, and Media Officer and an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Queens College of the City University of New York.

Ethnography as a Critical Practice

Michael Huspek

When doing ethnography, one is inevitably confronted with the temptation to critique aspects of the host culture's way of life. This temptation to criticize is understandable. Over a period of time the ethnographer inevitably gets involved with the people he or she is studying (e.g., Crick, 1982) and there arises the felt need to point out what appear to be cases of ignorance, logical inconsistency, or moral failure. At the same time, however, the sensitive ethnographer must scrutinize the rationale that warrants the critique; for he or she surely does not want to partake in the kinds of proselytizing efforts that all too often in the past have disrupted communities in ways bordering on cultural murder (Marcus and Fisher, 1986; Clifford and Marcus, 1986). A question that the sensitive ethnographer must always ask, then, is: Are there adequate moral or epistemological grounds to warrant criticism of another culture?

Those who have explicitly addressed the moral or epistemological question at a theoretical level (e.g., Winch, 1958, 1972a, 1972b; Walzer, 1983, 1987) have claimed that while there are grounds for critique, the grounds are limited in important respects. The claim is commonly predicated on a relativist view that acknowledges a diversity of culturally autonomous rational systems and moral codes which, by virtue of their relative autonomy, are exempted from external moral or epistemological critique. The role of critique available to the ethnographer, on this view, is limited to matters *internal* to the rational systems or moral codes under consideration. The ethnographer, in other words, possesses no warrant for importing external standards against which to criticize the host culture, but may legitimately criticize provided only that he or she adopts the host culture's own standards.

The cultural relativist position has displeased many on account of the extreme limitations to which it seems to subject the potential critic (e.g., Gellner, 1974; Jarvie, 1970). At face value, the position seems so intent on honoring the principle of cultural relativism that it proscribes any and all critical applications of Western standards of rationality or morality (excepting perhaps those standards that may overlap those of the host culture). At face value, then, the position seems to deny the ethnographer-as-critic the warrant to criticize an extraordinarily large array of systems, standards, codes, beliefs and practices which by Western standards would be judged morally repugnant or completely illogical. Jarvie (1970), for example, notes just how extreme the position seems, for even the introduction of life-saving medical technology to a foreign culture that does not value Western technology might well be considered to stand in violation of the principle of cultural relativism.

My aim in this essay is two-pronged. First, I argue that those who are critical of the cultural relativist position have been too quick to judge the position as limited and that, contrary to what these critics charge, the relativist position can actually be shown to provide a good deal more leeway for engaging in cultural critique than would at first appear. Second, however, I argue also that the cultural relativists' definition of internal critique is unnecessarily too restrictive; that cultural critique can (and should) be made without violating either the ethnographer's respect for cultural diversity or his or her reliance on (a redefined) internal critique. Success of my argument should point us in a direction of giving clearer definition to the moral and epistemological grounds upon which to justify cultural critique.

The essay proceeds as follows: First, I introduce the epistemological claims that form the basis of Peter Winch's (1958) classical conception of cultural relativism, point to some poignant criticisms of the position, and then entertain Kai Nielsen's (1974) partially successful efforts to salvage the position (in modified form) in light of such criticisms. Second, I introduce Michael Walzer's (1987) moral claims (which, in many interesting ways, parallel Winch's relativist epistemological claims), and critically assess their particular strengths and weaknesses. Third, in light of the strengths and weaknesses of Winch's and Walzer's respective claims, I show how the cultural relativist position must be rethought in ways that provide the ethnographer with a warrant for deployment of minimal standards of universal rationality and morality when engaging in cultural critique.

The cultural relativist position has had no more thoughtful and eloquent defender than Peter Winch (1958, 1972a, 1972b). Drawing from the later Wittgenstein (1963), Winch argues that our view of reality depends upon the concepts we use which get their sense in the language games that make up our cultural way of life. Essential to this argument is the idea that our understanding of the world is linguistically mediated, dependent on the concepts we use: when our concepts change, our view of the world has changed also. Our concepts should not be defined as having any intrinsic, context-independent meaning, for their meanings are contingent on the ways in which they are deployed in various language games (e.g., describing, predicting, arguing). We know that a concept has this or that sense insofar as we understand how to play the game. Games are always rule-governed, and to use such and such a word counts as meaning such and such depending on the particular game and its game-specific rules. Following the rules, using concepts in ways that are consistent with the rules of the game, counts as a meaningful act within the game; or, stated slightly differently, knowing the meaning of a concept is akin to knowing how to go on in the game in which it is being used.

According to Winch, insofar as cultures constitute different forms of life, so they are made up of culture-specific language games each of which having a distinctive set of rules for its members to make sense with as they play the game. Intimately tied to this idea is the proposition that truth and logic are culturally specific: what counts as a truth in one game may count as a falsehood or nonsense in another game; what counts as rational in one may count as irrational in another. Winch's most telling empirical demonstration is to point to how the Azande arrange significant aspects of their lives according to a logic of magic that undergirds the practice of witchcraft. To us, drawing upon Western conceptions of truth and logic, the Azande practice appears counter-intuitive, i.e., false and illogical. But Winch argues persuasively that learning the game -- in the Azande's own terms -- is sufficient to learn and appreciate its intrinsic truth and logic. For Winch, what is "real" or "rational" is meaningful only in the sense that language gives to these terms; the criteria of truth or logic are embedded in distinctive life forms marked by culture-specific language games; such criteria are apt to be quite different from the ethnographer's purported "general" criteria acquired in his or her home culture. Thus, for the ethnographer to impose his or her imported "general" criteria is to engage in a basic category mistake.

Although Winch is espousing a cultural relativist position, it is not so evidently relativist as to preclude cross-cultural communication (cf. Dixon's (1972) discussion of strong versus weak versions of relativism). Indeed, he stresses that cultural difference provides the occasion for the ethnographer to draw from the host culture's practices and beliefs so as to both deepen and broaden our understanding of what it means to be human; and he goes on to maintain that his position does not exempt the ethnographer from comparing and contrasting other cultures. Surprisingly, it would seem, he even goes so far as to maintain that the ethnographer may criticize in some or another fashion another culture's practices and beliefs. In response to a number of unfriendly readings of his 1958 work, Winch (1972a) states:

> In view of various criticisms which have been made ... I ought perhaps to emphasize that its argument is not, absurdly, that ways in which men live together can never be criticized, nor even that a way of living can never be characterized as in any sense 'irrational'; still less do I argue ... that men who belong to one culture can 'never understand' lives led in another culture. The

> argument is rather against certain kinds of account of the criticisms which are possible and of what is involved in such 'cross-cultural' attempts at understanding.

Winch's position is not as contradictory as it apparently seems at this point. Appreciating the internal consistency of his position, however, requires that we examine the extent to which he would place constraining parameters on the ethnographer's practice of critique. For Winch, it would seem that the cultural critic need not contradict the cultural relativist position if he or she respects the limits of localized critique. On this view, critique may be directed at another culture only to the extent that members of that culture fail to measure up in action or word to their own culturally held standards of truth or logic. If, for example, an Azande elder abuses the witchcraft ceremony, whereby his abuse counts as a rule violation of the game, he is therefore deserving of criticism; but it is only because the elder's violations deserve criticism from his fellow Azande that the ethnographer is justified in criticizing the violation. At no point does Winch's position seem to entitle the ethnographer to criticize the witchcraft ceremony itself, when correctly performed, as being irrational.

Winch's position, as noted above, has met with a good deal of criticism. Two particularly critical attacks have been directed by Lukes (1973) and Hollis (1972) (in slightly different ways) at the epistemological foundations of Winch's position. Lukes' argument begins by first accepting Winch's contention that there exist different criteria of rationality inasmuch as different cultures have their own distinctive practices, game-like in nature, having game-specific rules for going on, making sense, and the like. Over and above Winch's claim, however, Lukes argues that a more general rationality, premissed on the existence of a common reality, is available to members of all cultures. Without either a common agreement as to the identification of public, spatio-temporally located objects or shared beliefs in laws of identity and non-contradiction, argues Lukes, intercultural communication would not be possible.

This idea is developed even more fully by Hollis, whose argument runs as follows: First, to understand another culture we must learn its language; we do this by ostensive pointing to things which "commits us to assuming that we and [they] at least sometimes perceive the same things"(99); this suggests a common, shared reality that exists as a precondition of intercultural understanding. Second, to understand another culture's standards of rationality we, again, must find out how to reason correctly in their language; and if rationality is a matter of following rules of inference (e.g., the inference of "q" from "p" and "if p then q"), a failure to make inferences would mean an absence of rationality: "their logic is either a version of our logic, or it is untranslatable"(100).

Drawing on arguments such as these, both Hollis and Lukes point to the existence of universal criteria of truth and logic. Lukes, for example, admits the existence of culturally distinctive criteria which may be at variance with universal criteria, but he believes that such criteria are in fact parasitic upon universal criteria; that when "second-order" beliefs run up against universal criteria, they must (logically) give way to that which is genuinely truthful, genuinely logical. Lukes' argument here is similar to Hollis's in that the communicative bases of understanding are emphasized. In brief, Lukes contends that 'second-order' beliefs are parasitic upon universal criteria because they can be rendered fully intelligible *only insofar as they are seen to operate against the background of universal criteria.*

If we accept Hollis's and Lukes' criticisms of the epistemological bases of Winch's relativist position as well as their arguments concerning universal rationality, then it would seem that the restrictions on cultural critique that follow from Winch's position are too severe. Against Winch, we could argue that the ethnographer is entitled to overstep the bounds of local cultural systems and to critique practices and beliefs against a background of universal criteria of truth and rationality. However, resort to such a move at this point would seem premature in light of Nielsen's (1974) defense of Winch against the likes of Hollis and Lukes.

Nielsen is impressed by the types of argument advanced by Lukes and Hollis, yet he does not believe they warrant an abandonment of Winch's relativist claims. Nielsen concedes the point that there may well exist general standards of rationality, premissed on a shared view of reality, that can be found in all cultures; but he then expresses skepticism as to those standards *necessarily* having first-order force within each and every culture. We should not neglect, says Nielsen, the distinctive cultural roles of those standards which seem to be at variance with general standards; for although *we* may think of them as second-order and parasitical, they may in fact be valued more highly than general, universal standards, and thus take precedence over them. Even though we are able as both Lukes and Hollis suggest to communicate cross-culturally on common grounds of rationality, such does not afford any guarantee that alternative standards of rationality may not be guiding a range of significant practices and beliefs within different cultures.

The Azande practice of witchcraft supports Nielsen's argument. As Winch has noted from his reading of Evans-Pritchard's (1937) work, the Azande do in fact operate with standards that closely approximate those of Western (scientific) rationality when they plant and harvest crops. But even though such standards appear to contradict those alternative (what Lukes would term 'parasitical') standards that guide the Azande witchcraft practices and beliefs, the Azande appear not to consider the contradiction to be of any real importance. Thus, although the Azande can be said to rely on universal standards of rationality in some instances (such as planting and harvesting of crops), when it comes to witchcraft, they value no less highly an alternative set of culture-specific standards.

On the strength of Nielsen's defense of Winch's ideas against the objections of Hollis and Lukes, we are in many ways left where we started regarding the prospects of critique of cultural forms and practices. Because of a multiplicity of standards that guide what people in different cultures consider to be truthful or rational, the ethnographer's primary task is to sort out their varied forms with the intent of deepening our understanding and appreciation of the human condition. If compelled to engage in critique, the ethnographer should be ever vigilant lest he or she lapse into ethnocentric proselytizing. This is best done by restricting one's critique in ways consistent with Winch's cultural relativist position: the games themselves should not be criticized, but only the practices that violate rules of the game; the forms of rationality that prevail in a culture should not be criticized, but only the misapplication or abuse of the culture's rational principles.

However, Nielsen's concession to critics of Winch's position has much significance. In an important sense, the concession would seem to entitle the ethnographer to be more critical than the relativist position, a la Winch, initially seemed to allow. For in addition to engaging in the critique of practices internal to culture-specific games, the ethnographer may *also* appeal to those universal standards of rationality that do currently exist in *all* cultures. The Nielsen-amended principle of cultural relativism does not necessarily rule out, say, importing of Western life-saving medical technology as Jarvie would have us believe it does. For to the extent that a common (scientific) rationality *does* inform some of the host culture's medical beliefs and practices, so the critic can point to limitations of such beliefs and practices by appealing to the very rationality that guides them. There is, of course, no guarantee that the host culture will not rebuff the critic's efforts on the strength of an appeal to more highly valued, alternative standards of rationality. But in principle at least, the critic may point to limitations of practice or belief based upon commonly shared, universal standards of rationality. This is a critical point to which I shall return in a later section.

II.

At this point I want to put some of the moral claims of the cultural relativist position to a critical test by asking: Given the cultural relativist position, just how limited is the ethnographer as moral critic? This involves shifting the discussion from the explicitly epistemological claims being advanced by Winch to the moral claims put forward by Michael Walzer (1983, 1987).

Although Walzer's (1987) recent work on moral philosophy and social criticism does not directly address itself to the practice of ethnography or the role of ethnographic critique, the work has a good deal of relevance to this inquiry; for Walzer, like Winch and Nielsen, is especially sensitive to cultural variability and the perils of external critique. Walzer distinguishes among three ways of doing moral philosophy in a socially critical manner: discovery, invention, and interpretation. The path of discovery is characterized as waiting upon revelation -- either religious (from the God-who-reveals) or natural (objectively deduced natural laws or natural rights). That which is discovered, according to Walzer, most often has a prescriptive force, emanating either from God or an objective nature, which takes an imperative form: "Do this!" or "Don't do that!" Says Walzer, "Discovery waits upon revelation; but someone must climb the mountain, go into the desert, seek out the God-who-reveals, and bring back his word"(4). So too with discovery of a natural sort: natural laws or rights are divined from a source beyond the confines of society proper. For the religious seer or secular philosopher who is located within a social setting, discovery entails that he "steps back in his mind from his social position"(5); and, in so doing, he or she acquires divine or objective insight that is typically brought back from the desert, the mountains, or the realm of pure thought and introduced to those who had remained behind in the earthly social realm.

Walzer expresses little confidence in the path of discovery as a mode of social criticism. In the event that the divine or objective prescription takes hold within a society, Walzer maintains that it usually takes the form of the owl of Minerva: it is usually at dusk that it arrives and, as such, it merely reaffirms that which has already been accepted as having moral force within the society. At the same time, however, its godly or objective imperative force may tend to stand over and above the community. Walzer also notes that there are other times in which the divine or natural prescription takes the form of an eagle at daybreak. Here we are immediately reminded of the millenarian movements spawned in the later middle ages which frequently were instigated and led by mystics and madmen alike who, after spending time in forests or deserts outside the community, would reveal their spiritual encounters with God and then utter his divine pronouncements (Cohn, 1961). But we might also think here of ethnographers who entered societies as eschatologically lathered, missionary zealots. In either event, Walzer is suspicious of the path of discovery whereby moral claims and social criticisms that emanate from sources outside the community take on an imperative force over and above the community.

A second path discussed by Walzer is that of invention whereby the moral philosopher as social critic, in light of the perceived inadequacy of actually existing moral worlds, designs a method by which to liberate us from the bonds of particularism. Usually the method invites us to suspend participation in the moral corruptions and deprivations of existing society and to partake of hypothetical, idealized states in which the universal presence of reason is brought into view. With such reason at our command, we are then able to legislate a morality, fitting for all, which can guide us in our efforts to transform the actually existing society to which we belong into a world less beset by moral chaos. Two of the better known exemplars of the path of invention are Rawls (1971) and Habermas (1979). Whether we step behind a veil of ignorance, as Rawls asks of us, or we entertain an ideal speech situation freed from communicative distortion, as Habermas suggests, the inventive technique aims to demonstrate how reason, unfettered by social bias, is capable of realizing a moral universe that binds together all rational beings.

Walzer's criticism of the path of invention is somewhat akin to his criticism of the path of discovery. Generally speaking, he is troubled by the prospect of having to leave this world and to partake of the hypothetical; for doing so most surely invites us to adopt moral standards, founded on the hypothetical, that are bound to seem alien, unworldly to us. He cites the invented morality as being akin to a new hotel for strangers; shortly after unpacking their bags, they'd want to go home. How strange it would seem to us, Walzer suggests, were we to adopt Rawls's bid to counter-factually relinguish our age or color or sexuality; for we are aged creatures living in a particular society where color and sexuality are intrinsic to our specific moral beingness in the world. So, too, with Habermas's ideal speech situation. Walzer asks us to consider what things we could not say as a requirement of being a rational, moral participant: would not our choices about what opinions we can express be limited? Assuming an affirmative response, Walzer concludes with the question: "Why should newly invented principles govern the lives of people who already share a moral culture and speak a moral language?"(14)

Walzer's question points to interpretation, his third and clearly preferred path. The interpretive path requires no uncomfortable visits to strange hotels, but instead enables the social critic to stay at home. Says Walzer: "We do not have to discover the moral world because we have always lived there. We do not have to invent it because it has already been invented"(20). Interpretation grows out of and points to who we are. Interpretation does not lead to executive pronouncements having a divinely imperative force; nor does it lead to a universal morality that appears to be legislated by aliens. Rather, it is more judicial than executive or legislative, as it assumes that we already possess a moral code that is merely to be interpreted like a common text. Says Walzer: "Morality ... is something we have to argue about. The argument implies common possession, but common possession does not imply agreement"(32); and so in the event that conflicting moral claims do arise, and that interpretations do clash, then we must resolve the issue by going back to our commonly held text -- i.e., the values, principles, codes and conventions that already constitute our moral world.

The kind of critique applied by those traveling the interpretive path "does not wait upon philosophical discovery or invention"(35). Such critique is "more a matter of (workmanlike) social criticism and political struggle than of (paradigm-shattering) philosophical speculation"(27). To the extent that all societies have prohibitions against acts of murder, deception, extraordinary cruelty, and the like, and that "these prohibitions constitute a kind of minimal and universal moral code"(24), Walzer claims the social critic need look no farther than the culture's own moral code to find and establish sufficient grounds upon which to proceed. Because "morality is always potentially subversive of class and power"(22), "[c]riticism does not require us to step away from society as a whole but only to step away from certain sorts of power relationships within society. It is not connection but authority and domination from which we must distance ourselves"(60).

Walzer's principle of moral critique is consistent with Winch's epistemological claims insofar as it underscores the virtue of internal critique and the perils of external critique. Moreover, Walzer's principle gives support to Winch against those who contend that his position seriously constricts the boundaries of critique. Walzer, against such criticism, reveals that the cultural critic has a good deal of leeway available to himself or herself. It would seem to follow from Walzer's view that once the ethnographer-as-critic learns the practices of the host culture, being able to partake of the language games through which the culture constitutes itself as a distinct form of life, he or she is then provided license to draw from the host culture's moral code so as to critically point out how the rules of a game are being violated. Since, on Walzer's view, all cultures' moral codes have a universal substratum of prohibitions against many various practices the ethnographer or presumably anyone else would find morally reprehensible, the ethnographer has a considerable stock of moral precepts and principles from which to draw.

All this to the good, I am not convinced that Walzer's path of interpretation is broad enough to satisfy the rigorous critic. While I sympathize with Walzer's effort to elaborate the extent to which the critic can breathe while remaining consistent with the principle of internal critique, it can be shown that Walzer's position ultimately invites claustrophobia. Walzer's error, I believe, is in his unwarranted dismissal of those who travel the path of invention, i.e., those critics who use techniques to bring about a universal, rational consensus by which we can critique existing cultural beliefs and practices. In short enough order I shall argue why Walzer's path of interpretation needs to be complemented with invention. But first I want to emphasize two significant shortcomings of Walzer's preferred path.

Although Walzer's position is consistent with that of Winch's regarding a preference for internal over external critique, it differs from Winch's in its implied acceptance of a bedrock layer of rationality that enables participants of any culture to draw upon an actually existing moral code so as to challenge prevailing practices and beliefs (cf. DiQuattro (1987) on this point). Walzer's position founders in this regard; for even though it may well be that every culture has a minimal moral code that limits a range of (universally agreed upon) reprehensible acts, following my earlier discussion of Nielsen's (1974) argument, we cannot be at all sure that each and every culture executes, legislates or adjudicates its moral code with *identical* standards of rationality. We need look no further than the halls of Western academe to point out how culturally distinctive practices may be relatively immune from critique as those who possess power or knowledge, or power in the form of knowledge, are able either to regularly deny the legitimacy of critique or to deflect the directive thrust of critique by establishing it as irrational or nonsensical.

Extending the language game metaphor, Walzer does not seem sufficiently appreciative of the ways in which games are frequently distributed and regulated whereby some potential participants are either denied entry or admitted only to find that the real game is being played across town. MacIntyre (1981) so puts it: "Not one game is being played, but several, and, if the game metaphor may be stretched further, the problem about real life is that moving one's knight to QB3 may always be replied to with a lob across the net"(99). It is simply not clear that those following the interpretive path of critique are going to have the moral leverage Walzer would wish them to have. Given what we know of power, it is not at all clear that critique which restricts itself to the interpretive path may encounter anything but systematic dismissal (wrong game) or deflection (wrong move) that renders oftentimes the critical enterprise ineffective.

Walzer's second failing is his willingness to place too much confidence in the critic's ability to cleanly delineate the differences between morality and power. He seems to overlook how it is that sometimes the participants themselves, by virtue of their involvement in the game, may be unable to recognize internal contradictions that they *would* be critical of were they so recognized. Walzer underestimates how existent moral codes may be maintained and stabilized through ideological legitimation as systematic production and reproduction of distorted communicative practices (e.g., repressed speech) (Habermas, 1984). It is not clear that Walzer's critic, faithfully sticking to the interpretive path, is capable of penetrating dominant ideology by liberating himself or herself from socially repressed ways of speaking. In Evans-Pritchard's (1937) account of the Azande, for example, though it appeared that the practice of witchcraft induced a good deal of social strife and personal anxiety, there was no clear evidence that the moral foundations of the practice were ever verbally critiqued either by the powerful or, more interesting still, by those who always stood to lose much in adhering to the practice (McLeod, 1972). Walzer does little to convince us that the critic who follows diligently the path of interpretation is capable of exposing Azande witchcraft practices as repressive or non-liberating.

Now against this objection it might be argued that, even if the Azande were to have pointed out to them certain repressive or non-liberating aspects of their witchcraft practices, they still might choose not to critique those aspects as such. They might counter, for instance, that there is plenty of liberation in other of their culture-constituting games; that they partake of witchcraft less for liberation than for other reasons. Such a response misses the point of the objection, however, which is that Walzer's preferred type of criticism does not seem to allow for any such discussion to eventuate. For Walzer, the very act of critically pointing out game inconsistencies that are not already the topics of cultural dialogue is to go beyond interpretive critique. Such an act, rather, would belong to the inventive approach and thus be subject to the same charge of failure.

These objections I've raised are not meant to suggest that we reject Walzer's stress on the importance of interpretive critique; but they are meant to suggest that his interpretive critique, by itself, is limited in ways that unnecessarily restrict the potential critic. In what follows, I want to argue that Walzer's interpretive critique can be broadened with a more sympathetic reading of what Walzer has termed the path of invention.

III.

Those who follow the inventive path of critique, unlike those following the path of interpretation, are unwilling to restrict themselves to the strict (literal) terms of actually existing rational-moral systems. Although sensitive to the need to understand cultural life forms in the participants' own terms, the inventive critic points to how existent power relations are intimately bound up with local moral codes in ways that may at times render the interpretive critic ineffective. While it certainly is beneficial to critically point out the ways in which the rules of a game are being violated by its players, the inventive critic is sensitive to the ways in which an interpretive critique may either be deflected, in that the power holders can charge that the critical move is a wrong move to make, or dismissed, in that it can be said that the move belongs to a different game. All too often, that is, the interpretive critic runs up against defenders of the faith with the upshot being that rational discourse finds itself subordinated to partisan interests. So, too, the inventive critic is sensitive to the way in which the interpretive critic may be so attached to the strict terms of the game that he or she, like all the other participants, is unable to recognize contradictions either within the game or between different games.

So as to avoid limitations of the interpretive path of critique, the inventive critic devises means by which to develop idealized principles against which to critically assess actually existing moral codes and practices. The inventive critic's means are usually designs which invite game participants to suspend their play and to partake of hypothetical situations -- e.g., Rawls's veil of ignorance; Habermas's ideal speech situation. Depending on the ingenuity of the hypothetical design, participants arrive more or less at a rational consensus as to what constitutes a genuinely moral code or set of practices. With this new understanding of what is genuinely moral, the participants are then able to gain a clearer view of the limitations of their current beliefs and practices. Along with the inventive critic, they too engage in critique of actually existing moral codes.

We can recall that Walzer objected to inventive critique in that it departs from a cultural underlay that, Walzer maintains, is sufficient enough for the critic to work from. "Why," asks Walzer, "should newly invented principles govern the lives of people who already share a moral culture and speak a natural language?"(14). And, responding to his own question, he concludes: "we have to start from where we are. Where we are, however, is always someplace of value, else we would never have settled there."(17).

But I'm not at all convinced that Walzer's response is adequate; for he assumes too much when he appeals seemingly unreflectively to an inclusive "we" without taking into account its exclusive form. As noted above, some games, developed and organized by dominant, controlling groups, may in fact be exclusive in ways that are gravely disadvantageous to some, while others may be designed to the systematic disadvantage of some of the game's participants. Moreover, and this really is the point Walzer seems to miss, participants in the culture may be seriously confused about the nature of the game; or they may not realize the ways in which the rules are in need either of repair or replacement; or they may systematically repress such concerns as a survival strategem in the face of power constraints.

Walzer also charges that the inventive critic engages in an enterprise destined from the start to fail; for we cannot expect participants of a culture to reside in a strange hotel without acknowledging that at some point they shall desire to return home. But Walzer's objection here is without merit as it is based on a misreading of the inventive critics he cites. While the inventive critic's design is meant to alienate or distance members from their actually existing moral code, it is done so as to give members a clearer picture of where they presently live and how they might improve the quality of their neighborhood.

Rawls's veil of ignorance or Habermas's ideal speech situation are ingenious designs intended to uncover principles that are immanently present within virtually all cultural moral systems and practices. Not unlike the interpretive critic, the inventive critic is telling members of a culture who they are, only at a more abstract level than usual. The inventive critic does not foist upon members of a culture foreign principles to live by, but rather points to what immanent principles are consistent with and potentially realizable in light of the moral code and practices that currently reflect and constitute their culture. For one reason or another, such potentially realizable principles have not been explicitly recognized by members of the culture. But the value of the design is that it invites members of a culture, within an intellectually refreshing atmosphere of abstract thought, to suspend momentarily their fears or prejudices and so to exercise their basic, commonly shared critical-rational faculties.

There is another possible objection to the inventive critic's immanentist approach that is, I think, stronger than the objections raised by Walzer. Such an objection would stress the point made earlier in our reference to Winch -- that some cultures may value different modes of rationality -- and then go on to point out how the immanentist approach relies on a Western conception of rationality that may not be valued highly by a particular culture. The inventive critic may in fact be introducing something alien to the culture, in which case his practice would be not unlike that of the proselytizing misionary.

This objection, however, like those raised by Walzer, does not hold. We might recall how one of Winch's staunchest allies, Kai Nielsen, defended the cultural relativist position by, first, conceding that there must be a mode of rationality common to all cultures and, second, then stressing how some cultures may not value that (common) mode of rationality as highly as other modes. (A representative case was that of the Azande in that they used "Western, scientific" rationality when planting and harvesting crops but did not pay heed to the ways in which such rationality seemed to stand in a contradictory relation to the logic of witchcraft.) Nielsen's concession is critical here, for it would seem to entitle any inventive critic to appeal, however minimally, to the host culture's reliance on the common rationality that binds communicatively all cultures together. The appeal is to show that which is immanent within that culture, insofar as its members, however minimally, rely on a global rationality; the appeal, thus, does not emanate from an external source.

The most important point to stress here, is that the inventive critic, who at once seeks to draw upon and more fully explicate the universal rational foundations of moral codes and behaviors, is distinct from the proselytizing missionary. The missionary adopts standards of rationality and morality that are alien to the host culture. And insofar as the standards pushed by the missionary are not universal but rather parasitical upon those that are universally shared, they always threaten to become encysted within a culture, in the manner of a foreign, cancerous growth. The inventive critic, in contrast, draws upon and appeals to universal standards of rationality and morality, and does so by pointing to that which is immanent within all cultures.

Conclusion

The cultural relativist position of the sort advanced by Winch, Nielsen or Walzer provides significant theoretical guidance for those who practice ethnography in a critical vein. Especially significant is the position's theoretically based injunction against forms of external critique marked by ethnographers bringing to bear standards of rationality or morality that are not acknowledged or valued by the host culture. Such an injunction forcefully legislates against ethnographic practices that fail to distinguish themselves from missionary proselytizing.

The cultural relativist position, however, has been too severe in its inuunction against certain kinds of cultural critique. Although the emphasis on internal critique is sound and consistent with the epistemological and moral moorings of the position, its conceptualization of what constitutes "internal" is unnecessarily restrictive. At the epistemological level, for example, I discussed how the position has tended to overlook the universal standards of rationality that are valued by all cultures and how, consequently, the position has not sufficiently examined the potential for cultural critique that draws from (universal) standards that may have first-order force over alternative, parasitical standards. And at the moral level, I argued how the cultural relativist position, in its tendency to adamantly acknowledge only standards that are explicitly accepted by the host culture, has unnecessarily dismissed inventive approaches to cultural critique which expose and draw upon culturally immanent, universal standards.

If my argument has been at all successful, ethnographers now have a sound moral-epistemological basis for engaging in cultural critique that is at once sensitive to explicit *and* implicit-immanent standards of rationality and morality but which, at the same time, legislates against proselytization based upon and motivated by external, imported standards. What my argument also suggests, but which can not be sufficiently developed here, is that the ethnographer is morally compelled to criticize cultural codes, systems, and practices that violate universal standards of rational-moral action.[1]

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Michael Huspek is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at Rutgers University, and Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at the State University of New York at Albany. His doctorate in political science is from the University of Washington.

Science, Ethics and Critical Thinking: Primitives Playing With Fire, Primitives With No Fire, or No Longer Primitive?

Bernard Davis

Available scientific knowledge exceeds the imaginative speculations of classical antiquity. We live in a world transformed by science and technologies based on science. But we are told that, while critical thinking and the scientific method are wholly appropriate in determining matters of fact, their role cannot be extended to decide the questions most important to us, questions of what it is best to do.

This is a severe limitation. Were we able to make gains of the same magnitude in the area of evaluation as we have made in the areas of description and explanation we could hope for progress in the achievement of human happiness as profound as the progress we have made in science and technology. On the other hand, if beliefs and committtments not subject to scientific scrutiny must provide the basis for our decisions in areas of life where evaluation is required, we may have in prospect a dark age of conflicting committtments.

In fact we are entering a period in which champions of various causes, most of them poorly educated or totally uneducated in the sciences, are seeking to limit, on ethical grounds, medical practice, medical and biological research, the use of chemical and nuclear technologies and even civil engineering. Laws and regulations multiply and NIMBY stalks the land.

Yet, many of our students don't see any point in applying critical thinking to ethical questions. Such questions they tell us have no objective answer. Discussions can come to no conclusion. Ethics is a matter of selecting rules of conduct and modes of life on the basis of tradition or an ultimately irrational act of committtment. We can discuss within the limits set by those committtments we happen to share, but finally it's all arbitrary, just a matter of personal taste.

And this is true no matter how much we know about the facts of any case. The facts won't allow us to decide. To decide ethical matters we always need something more, and this something more cannot be established by any rational means.

Our students' views may seem paradoxical, how can anything so important be arbitrary, yet our students have a long and very respectable philosophic tradition behind their view. Their view is a statement that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy, a view they share with most contemporary analytic philosophers.

That evaluative statements cannot be derived from descriptive statements was noted by David Hume in 1739, in his *Treatise of Human Nature* . Hume introduces the argument in book 2, part 3, section 3. He points out that while reason can direct our evaluative impulses it cannot be the source of them.

> It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us. Where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never give them any influence; and 'tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connextion, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us.
> (Hume, 1888, p. 414)

G.E. Moore in *Principia Ethica* named the attempt to derive evaluative conclusions from factual premises "the naturalistic fallacy."

> The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it may be always asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good.
>
> (Moore, 1903, p. 15)

There have been attempts to deny or evade the naturalistic fallacy, but for the most part philosophers have accepted that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy and attempted to provide an account of the nature of evaluative language consistent with its radical separation from descriptive language. The logical positivists simply ruled evaluative language out of the domain of significant language. Denying that evaluative language is meaningful simplifies the logical positivists' agenda of providing an analysis of all meaningful language, but it reduces ethical debate to meaningless posturing and provides no account of the effectiveness of evaluative language in guiding conduct.

R. M. Hare in *The Language of Morals* produced an account which explains the conduct guiding role of evaluative sentences while preserving their radical separation from statements of fact. Hare identifies evaluative language as a kind of prescriptive language. Prescriptive language differs from descriptive language in that its function is to guide conduct. Should we learn that a descriptive sentence we accept (e.g. 'swans are white') does not agree with the observed state of the world, this is grounds for rejecting the sentence, for ceasing to believe it. If, on the other hand, we learn that a prescriptive sentence we accept (e.g., 'examination questions are answered without reference to written notes') does not agree with the observed state of the world, this is grounds for doing something to change the world.

Hare's account succeeds in explaining the conduct guiding role of evaluative sentences while recognizing their referential and logical similarities to descriptive sentences, and it returns ethical debate to the domain of meaningful discourse. But a consequence of Hare's account is that to validly draw a prescriptive conclusion from a set of premises requires that the set include at least one prescription. How, in addition to all the description science can provide can we get that additional prescriptive premise?

We can't see values, as J. L. Mackie points out,

> If there were objective values, then they would be entitites or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.
>
> Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty . . . utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else.
>
> (Mackie, 1977, P. 38)

What can we do then? We can seek such premises through irrational non-scientific means and accept them for irrational reasons. Or we can conclude that this account of ethical language, like that of the logical positivists, leaves us with nothing further to discuss once basic ethical principles have been reached. Our students are right, The Naturalistic Fallacy is a fallacy. Every argument with an evaluative conclusion must have at least one evaluative premise. An evaluative premise can be derived from, or shown to be incompatible with, some other evaluative premises, and we can critically examine the efficacy of different means to achieve pre-chosen ends. Finally, however, we are left with some irreducable evaluative premises that must be accepted by non-rational decision.

But do we need to arrive at prescriptive or evaluative knowledge by deriving it from premises either descriptive or prescriptive?

We might be led to question this assumption by the realization that advance in science itself was once crippled by a similar requirement. Aristotle believed that scientific truths were necessary and had to be established by derivation from postulates that were obviously and certainly true. Aristotle was not quite clear as to how such postulates might be found, through he had hopes for various forms of induction, but he and his followers, both ancient and medieval, were quite clear that derivation from true and certain postulates was needed.

This method sought to emulate, in the areas of empirical inquiry, the success the method of derivation from postulates had achieved in arithmetic and geometry, which were seen as providing certain knowledge about the world.

This method of constructing science by starting with obviously true postulates was tried by the Ancient Greeks and attempted again by the Cartesians. But in neither case did it succeed. With the acceptance of Einstein's theory of relativity even one of its original successes has been challenged - one of Euclid's postulates is not true of actual space.

A correct account of scientific knowledge and a basis for scientific progress was attained only when Aristotle's requirement that scientific theses are necessary was given up. In 1634, 70 years old, forbidden to do any further research on celestial matters, his *Dialogue Concerning Two World Systems* and all his other writings condemned, Galileo Galilei began working on a new book treating of applied mechanics, the motion of terrestial bodies, and the principles of scientific reasoning. The manuscript was smuggled from Italy to Holland, and in 1638 his *Discourse Concerning Two New Sciences* was published.

Galileo suggested that a scientific hypothesis is to be tentatively accepted while we deduce its consequences and test them by experiment. Acceptance of the hypothesis is to be based on its correctly predicting the resulting observations. This suggestion by Galileo has become the basis of the modern scientific method.

While the scientific knowledge we have accumulated is overwhelmingly impressive, it is not certain knowledge based on derivation from indubitable postulates. Rather it is hypothetical knowledge based on hypotheses which are designed to be falsifiable.

Central to this method is the construction of a hypothesis from which deductions can be made which explain the phenomena being considered. If it explains the phenomena this hypothesis is tentatively accepted and predictions derived from it are tested. If these predictions are correct, and if no better hypothesis is available, the hypothesis continues to be tentatively accepted. But, if a better hypothesis is constructed, or if the hypothesis leads to false predictions, this tentative acceptance is withdrawn and the hypothesis is rejected.

While the true postulate method of the ancient Greeks and the hypothetical deductive method both use deduction from general principles, the purpose of doing so is exactly opposite. The purpose of deduction in the true postulate method is to extend the truth of the postulates to their consequences. In the hypothetical deductive method the purpose of deduction is to extend the testability of their consequences to the hypotheses.

At no point in the deducing and testing process is the hypothesis accepted as something that has to be believed. We accept hypotheses that have been tested and not proved false, but we know that the hypotheses we accept now may prove false in the face of some later test. For as long as a hypothesis is accepted, acceptance is always tentative.

All scientific knowledge is of this sort. As science advances hypothesis after hypothesis is discarded and replaced. Once Europeans got to Australia, "all swans are white" was discarded. Our present belief that all penguins are flightless only requires the discovery or creation of a penguin capable of flight to share the fate of "all swans are white". Even one of Euclid's axioms has been rejected as a hypothesis about actual space. Since the acceptance of Einstein's theory of relativity we have believed that space is non-Euclidian.

Today, advance in the various branches of science comes so quickly that we expect pieces of the science we learned a few years ago to be challenged and discarded a few years hence. The tentative nature of such knowledge is constantly being brought to our attention, but we do not find this strange or threatening. If it turns out that some dinosaurs were warm blooded or that chimpanzees are more closely related to humans than to orangutans or gorillas, to cite two recent examples, we don't throw up our hands in despair. We have become accustomed to this sort of knowledge. We expect that at least some of it will be replaced each year or decade, and yet we have not trouble using it. Quite the contrary, the technology we use everyday, everything that makes our existence different from the existence of those who lived a century or two centuries ago, depends on knowledge of this sort.

Just as in science we have had to abandon deduction from true postulates in favour of a method which only guarantees that if we are wrong we will find out that we are wrong, so, perhaps, in ethics we should give up the attempt to justify evaluative principles by deriving them from postulates which we then in turn must somehow justify and instead apply the hypothetical deductive method to evaluation directly.

This can be done. To apply the hypothetical deductive method in the moral areas of life we tentatively adopt those social institutions, customs or modes of behavior which we believe on the basis of the best information we can gather to be promising alternatives for solving the social problems we face, and test these in use, retaining those that are preferred by people who have tried both the new institution or custom and the alternative, and rejecting those that are not preferred. Actually, we can count on the subjects of the experiment to do the retaining and rejecting, for what else is preference but to keep one thing and reject an alternative. As Dewey phrased it,

> The test of the existence of a valuation and the nature of the latter is actual behavior. . . Is the existing field of activities *accepted*, where "acceptance" consists in effort to maintain it against adverse conditions? Or is it *rejected*, where "rejection" consists of effort to get rid of it. . .
>
> (Dewey, 1939 p 54)

What people prefer is simply what they choose. So, while we must ensure that the subjects of moral experiments are capable of making an informed choice, that they have sufficient exposure to both patterns of behavior, have no significant false beliefs as to the nature or effects of either custom, have not been denied relevant information, etc., we do not have to define "prefers". Nor need we define "good", "should", "ought", "happiness" or any of the other bugaboos of analytic philosophers. We can get right on with the work of improving human society and leave defining the words to the lexicographers.

Nor need we fear committing the naturalistic fallacy. While in the hypothetical deductive method we have a method for making rational choices in the moral areas of life, we have not defined "good" or derived any moral or ethical statements from statements of fact. This method does not fall afoul of G. E. Moore's objection because we are not defining any evaluative term. It is safe from Humes' objection, and, indeed, follows a methodology which conforms with the restriction he suggests, in that it is not testing that, "such objects be causes and such others effects", but exactly whether, "the causes and effects be indifferent to us."

That moral terms and statements are persuasive or prescriptive and cannot be derived from descriptive or empirical statements affects how we use and interpret moral terms and statements. It does not affect our ability to make choices in moral areas. Avoiding the naturalistic fallacy is a matter of words not of things, a constraint on logical argumentation not on practical decision making. There are no philosophical or lexicographical problems we need to solve, nor need we become skeptics in ethical matters. All we need do to apply the hypothetical deductive method in morals is to try each change in social policy that appears promising, see if it works, keep it if it does and discard it if it doesn't.

We have been using the hypothetical deductive method for evaluative decisions all our lives. We've evaluated cuisine, clothing styles, products of technology, occupations and ways of life. We talk to each other about the things we have tried and the outcomes of these informal experiments. Such talk makes up much of our daily conversation. Unlike talk of the weather, which it is said everyone talks about but no one can do anything about, we can do something about these topics of conversation. We try things or do not, urge others to try or not, all on the basis of this naively empirical experimentation.

In our private lives most of us recognize the hypothetical deductive method as the rational way to make major decisions. We investigate new projects carefully and then try them at least briefly before making a major committment. We vacation in cities before deciding to move there, do some work in career areas before committing years to specialized training, we may even be so cautious as to rent our skis the first time we go skiing. We are willing, even eager, to try new things, for if we don't try new things we will never improve our situation, but we realize that some of our choices will fail and have to be undone. However, whether the experimental activity is retained or rejected, we increase our store of evaluative knowledge with each experiment.

To the extent we live in a free market economy we make such decisions every day. As we are doing this the manufacturers and advertisers do more formal research in order to determine what we will choose. On the basis of of such research products are designed or altered so that we will prefer them to others. And, on the basis of such research, descriptions of products are designed or altered so as to artifically mimic what those whose judgment we trust would say or do if they really had tried the product and preferred it.

We all use the hypothetical deductive method in our private lives for many important practical decisions. Nations also use the method. In the United States a number of experiments have been tried and we know the outcomes of some of the major ones. So I would like to mention a few that have already appeared and you can decide how well the method has worked. One experiment was the New Deal--social security, unemployment insurance, workman's compensation. These seem to have been preferred by most people to life without them, and they are still with us. Interestingly enough, these improvements were piloted before the New Deal by the rich, personal insurance before this time was an option invented for and used by the well to do.

Another experiment is the marital or quasimarital customs we have today. These were pioneered in New York City and Los Angeles in the 1910's, 20's and 30's, and now are pretty well ubiquitous, at least among the educated and the urban. This marital institution hasn't a name as yet so I will give it one. I call it 'seriogamy.' It's not polygamy--it does not include harems, either male or female. And it's not monogamy--people are not limited to one spouse for life. The custom allows as many husbands or wives as one can attract, one at a time. I would not suggest that this is a perfect arrangement--many of us are all too familiar with its pains, frustrations and insecurities. However, the alternative it replaced -- forced monogamy--was worse. The world was filled with married couples who thoroughly disliked each other but could not get out of marriage. If you want to explore the human tragedies our change of custom has ameliorated, read Judge Lindsay's *Companionate Marriage*, published in 1923 before divorce laws were liberalized.

Another experiment of which the results are well known is the experiment in changing lifestyles brought about by technological advances. Advances in transportation in the last century have totally changed the way we live. Exploitation of the myriad possible uses of small electric motors has created a revolution in household management. An even more recent advance is such a notable boon that, if there could be such a thing as a moral absolute, I would nominate the principle that permanent press is better than ironing. On the other hand, some 'advances' have been rejected--does your attic have a *vegomatic*?

More seriously, several experiments have been tried for a period of time and then rejected as worse than the situation that preceeded them. The most famous in recent American history is the 'great' experiment--prohibition. Proposed from lofty motives of social improvement, imposed by decision of a majority of the Nation, it was tried, its effects were seen, and it was rejected as decisively as it had been chosen. And there have been a myriad of other experiments, from the popularity of routine tonsillectomy to the rise and fall of phoney sidings to cover frame buildings, from 'insulbrick,' to asbestos shingle, to vinyl.

Besides these experiments, that were not designed as experiments, there have been some formal studies that attempted to determine which of two choices those who had tried both preferred. Some classic studies of special interest to educators are: *The Dewey School, the Laboratory School of the University of Chicago 1896-1903* by Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards, a case study of John Dewey's school which examined what actually occurred at his school and collected anecdotal evidence from former students; the Eight Year Study reported in *The Story of the Eight Year Study* by Wilford Aiken which, while it formally investigates how the graduates of progressive and traditional schools did in university, in fact is trying to establish (at least for university bound students) which education is to be preferred, and *Mixed or Single Sex School?* by Reginald Dale, who surveyed those who had been students or teachers in both single sex and coeducational British secondary schools to establish which those who had tried both considered preferrable.

If morals are dealt with by the hypothetical deductive method, society moves in the direction of greater satisfaction for its members, as experiments that prove preferable are retained and extended and experiments that do not are rejected and forgotten. The hypothetical deductive method has the same advantage in morals as it does in science. We are not restricted by any postulates that cannot be justified and dare not be questioned. There are no moral dogmas to which we must adhere regardless of contrary evidence.

The hypothetical deductive method is not moral relativism. It does not say any society's practice is as good as any other's. Which is not to say relativism is always wrong. In some cases, given a real choice, people may split in their preference 50/50 or 40/60 or 30/70. But in many cases almost all will go for one choice and the 0-5% that doesn't will simply be seeking variety or some personal distinction from the mass--like those who spin, weave and wear homespun, choose celibacy in a sexually open society, or refuse to purchase any insurance regardless of the moderateness of the price or the enormity of the risk.

The moral message of the hypothetical deductive method is not relativistic but utopian, not a laissez-faire attitude--let every society do its own thing--, but an experimental attitude--try new systems, see if they work, attempt to improve social arrangements. When moral experiments succeed we all benefit.

The enemies of the application of the hypothetical deductive method in morals are the self-interest of entrenched power groups, established moral systems based on faith, and prejudice (which is just faith itself identified by a less honorific name).

> . . . the difficulties that stand in the way. . . are supplied by traditions, customs, and institutions which persist without being subjected to a systematic empirical investigation. . . Hence it is worth while to note that the same obstacles once existed in the subject matters now ruled by scientific methods. Take, as an outstanding example, the difficulties experienced in getting a hearing for the Copernican astronomy a few centuries ago. Traditional and customary beliefs which were sanctioned and maintained by powerful institutions regarded the new scientific ideas as a menace. Nevertheless, the methods which yielded propositions verifiable in terms of actual observations and experimental evidence maintained themselves, widened their range, and gained continually in influence.
>
> (Dewey, 1929, p. 273)

Since Dewey wrote this in 1929, the hypothetical deductive method has already greatly increased its scope in moral decision making. Social science, a handful of struggling researchers in 1929, is now a major component of our universities and a significant force in our society. Business corporations and government agencies now make many of their decisions after extensive formal research, feasibility studies and perhaps pilot projects. We worry today that changes in social policy may be based on research that is faulty or inadequate. This is a much more subtle worry than people had in the 1910's, 20's or 30's when changes in social policy were more often based on no research at all.

As individuals and as societies we have been applying the hypothetical deductive method for centuries. The major barriers to successful application have been the insistence of supporters of dogmatic systems of morality that only they could determine, by some special method, or by referring to some special beliefs about the world, what was right and what was wrong. The recognition of the naturalistic fallacy, rather than subverting these vulgar systems of morality as Hume expected, has been taken as separating evaluative language from descriptive language in such a way as to exclude science and the scientific method from evaluative decision making.

Realizing that there is no such barrier to the application of the scientific method in evaluative matters will allow us to counter the dogmatists and irrationalists and make a serious attempt to improve our lives through a scientific approach to questions of human conduct. Evaluative experimentation has been effective in many areas despite being informal, naive and uncontrolled. If such experimentation is recognized as the proper procedure in evaluative decision making, experimentation can be conducted which is more wide ranging and more valid.

In doing evaluative experiments or reasoning on the basis of evaluative experiments we can recognize, and attempt to avoid, some of the problems which have long been recognized in scientific research. These include the lack of clear hypotheses, extraneous variables and variable connected confounds, the Hawthorne effect and other novelty effects, and conclusions that go beyond the evidence. By careful, well conducted, evaluative experiments we can hope to test alternative norms for the conduct of human affairs, eliminate non-productive and counterproductive modes of conduct, and begin to change society in ways that will make our lives happier and more satisfying. All that is needed is the realization that it can be done, a concerted effort to remove the barriers that stand in the way of doing it, and, most important, doing it.

There is not one but rather three ways in which the scientific method can be applied in evaluative decision making. It can be used to provide factual information to guide the selection of means for ends already agreed upon. We want a food that helps reduce the incidence of bowel cancer, the only question is whether high fiber cereal has this effect. In this case science establishes a matter of fact which is then used, together with a prescriptive premise, to produce a prescriptive conclusion. This is the only use which dogmatic moralists wish to allow science and the scientific method.

But the scientific method can also be used to directly test evaluative premises through experiment. We want to know whether nuclear or extended families are better, or we want to know which is preferable, monogamy, polygamy or seriogamy. In these cases there is no agreed upon prescription we can use as a premise. The only realistic candidate is 'increase human happiness' but this is too vague. We don't know how to measure happiness in the required sense. In these cases the test is truly a test of the 'sentiments'. No other experiment will finally do except an experiment in lifestyles and the only measure is which course of action the subjects of the experiment choose after experiencing both alternatives.

This requires that those who do the experimenting be given the freedom to choose. It is choice that provides the results of the experiment, this choice cannot be replaced with some less 'real' measure without destroying the result. Since the subjects of the experiment are necessarily those who decide the results, we can draw from the scientific account of ethical choice the conclusion that each person or group must ultimately be responsible for itself. Others can predict their response, but only they can have it, and it is their choice that is the ultimate test. Peanuts may be delightful to 99.9% of the population, but you may despise them. You may find sex a bore. Owing property may give you a feeling of anxiety rather than of security.

This use of the scientific method is the ultimate test of evaluative questions. It does have disadvantages, however. It can be costly and risky. As Benjamin Franklin wrote, "Experience keeps a dear school". Also, since the subjects of the experiment must decide the outcome, it is extremely vulnerable to problems of subject bias and to Hawthorne or novelty effects. For clear results to be obtained from evaluative experiments these effects must be controlled.

To use this method exclusively, moreover, would impose an impossible burden on each of us - we can't try everything. And it would impose a severe limitation on evaluative experimentation by societies and a brake on evaluative progress. Fortunately, however, there is a third application of the scientific method. One can apply the method by observing evaluative experiments done by others. Such observation does not provide an evaluative result. The results of such observation is factual information about the behavior of people. But this factual result allows one to predict the likely outcome of an equivalent evaluative experiment were it to be performed by oneself or one's own society.

This third use of the scientific method is only possible because the second use exists, because we can use it as a substitute for the actual experiments which make up the second use. Otherwise these observations would be useless to us. To again quote David Hume

> It can never in the least concern us to know that such objects are causes, and other effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us.
> (Hume,1888, P. 414)

Analogously, it could never concern us that others had been involved in such experiments with such outcomes if we could not imagine ourselves being subjects in the same experiments with the same outcomes. The outcome of such an experiment is prescriptive only for those who are the subjects in the experiment. To learn from what they decide we must believe a comparable prescriptive outcome would ensue were we to be the subjects in such an experiment. Except for the second use of the hypothetical deductive method in evaluative decision making the outcome of experiments involving others would be irrelevant to us.

Of the three ways of using science in ethics, scientists can do the first, provide the 'facts', and scientists can do the third, investigate alternative ways of life and determine for each, how many, and who, are happy to remain, how many, and who, are eager to leave. But the third is crippled if it must seek alternatives far away or in the distant past - additional confounding variables are introduced with each remove. Therefore, there is a need for the second to be done, for entrepreneurs of lifestyle like those who experimented in the 1920's and those who experimented in the 1960's. They need not be young. Ursula Andruss, founder of the AARP, began her experimenting at 60. Over 15 million senior Americans have chosen the alternatives she explored.

By using all three applications of science to ethics, not limiting ourselves the first, we can make evaluative decisions without committing ourselves to irrationally. By exploring the hypothetical deductive approach to evaluative decision making with our students we can move their view of ethics from that of an arena for 'taste' and irrationality to that of a scientific and rational exercise in practical decision making.

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Bernard Davis is an Associate Professor of Education at Saint Mary's University, Nova Scotia, Canada.

Social Knowledge: The Critical Reception of Testimony

Rev. John J. Conley, S. J.

I know that Napoleon married Josephine, although I did not attend the wedding. I know that my Redeemer liveth, but the mystery of Easter cannot be reenacted under laboratory conditions. I know that Leona Helmsley is guilty of tax evasion, although I have never met the woman nor even checked into the Helmsley Palace.

I.

In at least three key areas of social life--history, religion, law--our knowledge is rooted primarily in the testimony of others. In most cases, our judgement of truth or falsehood leans neither upon direct perception of an event nor upon recall of that event through personal memory. The event in question usually cannot be repeated under the controlled conditions mandated by the scientific principle of verification.[1] In many historical, religious and legal judgments, one must critically evaluate testimony, i.e., the claim to truth offered by the putative witness(es) to a particular event.

The critical reception of testimony involves two distinct moments. First, one must establish the credibility of a given witness by using the criteria of competence and reliability.[2] Although fallible, this criticism of witness distinguishes reasonable from incredible or nonsensical testimony. It places the truth-claims of testimony upon firmer foundations than those of authority, tradition, emotion or sheer faith. Second, one must critically evaluate the critical criteria themselves. The categories of competence and reliability are not neutral. Competence is rooted in a given society's concept of authority. Reliability is embedded in the interests which motivate a particular society.

II.

At the first level of initial evaluation, one must assess the competence and reliability of the witness making a particular truth-claim. In short, one systematically scrutinizes the intellectual and moral character of the witness in order to determine the credibility of his or her testimony.

In everyday social interaction, we implicitly apply these criteria to separate the noetic wheat from the chaff. My color-blind aunt's description of the annual flower show is not the most accurate. The neighborhood gossip's account of who's currently sleeping with whom is rarely dependable.

In the areas of history, religion and law, the use of the criteria of competence and reliability becomes more systematic. Competence in these areas of sophisticated social knowledge denotes not only the physical and mental soundness of the witness(es). It often involves the expertise of a witness concerning a particular domain or event.

The legal determination of guilt or innocence, for example, derives in great part from the evaluation of the testimony, often contradictory, offered during a trial. The competence of the witness becomes crucial for assessing the credibility of the claim. Does the putative eyewitness to a crime have good eyesight, sound hearing, reliable memory, healthy mental constitution? If the witness offers a technical judgment, such as the worth of a stolen painting or the psychological state of the defendant at a given moment, is the witness qualified to make such a judgment? In resolving the issue of witness or defendant competence, the courts increasingly turn toward the "expert," the person deemed prominent in a particular area of knowledge and, hence, a privileged authority on how credible a questionable piece of testimony is.[3]

Of course, as the recent explosion of "expert" testimony in civil and criminal court attests, experts in a given field may conflict over a particular judgment. Nonetheless, the judge and jury, who by principle may not themselves be witnesses to the alleged crime, have no alternative to weigh the veridic quality of testimony other than through the critical assessment of the witness' competence and the broader judgments of competence delivered by the qualified expert.

In the area of history, judgments of truth rely heavily upon the critical assessment of the testimony of witnesses, especially through written documents. The historian must reconstitute the past through an evaluation, even a gradation, of the competence of those who claim to have witnessed a given event. This critical assessment of competence is crucial in the adjudication of conflicting testimony concerning a distant event. There are sound reasons to prefer Thucydides' account of a particular battle in the Penelopenesian War to that provided by a faltering general in a letter to his impatient town assembly. The historian's representation of the past is not a collation of indiscriminate claims by all the putative witnesses to a particular person or event. Rather, it is a critical construction of historical verisimilitude, rooted in the careful discernment of a witness' competence, according to the canons of historical research.

The religious domain presents comparable problems in the critical reception of testimony. One of the distinctive traits of the world's great monotheistic religions lies in the claim of their respective witnesses to have received a particular divine revelation. There is little left to Judaism, if one excludes the claim to divine initiative in the exodus of Israel from Egypt to the Promised Land or in the words given to the Biblical prophet. Saint Paul warns that Christianity is in vain, unless the claim by apostolic witnesses to the resurrection of Jesus is true. Since its inception, Islam's claim to truth has been closely tied to Mohammed's contention that he received the Koran from God through angelic intervention.

Although credibility of religious belief cannot be reduced to a question of historical verification, the monotheistic religions rest their claim to truth upon the testimony of key witnesses, whose competence demands evaluation. For example, many Christians, while sincerely admiring the moral virtues fostered by Mormonism, do not accept the religious claims of the Mormon Church. They consider Joseph Smith's solitary witness to the divine origin of the Book of Mormon and to supernatural assistance in his interpretation of a hieroglyphic text as unconvincing. Even in the realm of mystery and grace, the issue of a witness' competence repeatedly asserts itself and demands a critical response.

The criterion of reliability must accompany that of competence in the critical evaluation of testimony. Reliability concerns the moral character rather than the knowledge or expertise of a witness. It involves primarily those motives which might taint the witness' disinterestedness and, thus, weaken the credibility of the witness' claim to truth.

In the legal arena, an otherwise competent witness may compromise his or her testimony by too obvious interest in the outcome of the trial. Motives of love, hatred, revenge, financial gain, or prejudice can easily impugn the credibility of witness. Evidence provided by a relative, friend or enemy of a defendant is inevitably suspect. The judge and the jury must scrutinize not only *whether* a witness is competent to offer a particular judgment, but *why* this witness is providing such a judgment. The presence of motives other than the disinterested desire to serve justice easily corrodes the witness' trustworthiness.

In historical documents, witnesses are rarely neutral. The desire to praise or blame usually informs the chronicle of a given event. A history of World War I based exclusively upon German newspaper clippings would be a hazardous enterprise indeed. Even when faced with the claims of well-documented observers from an earlier period, the historian can determine the veridical value of the account only by critically examining the motives, intentions and loyalties of those who produced it.

In religious experience, the issue of motive inevitably conditions the claim to truth. The TV evangelist who expertly explains the Bible may destroy his claim if the viewer is convinced that her wallet, rather than her salvation, is the primary goal of the operation. On the other hand, the generous service of the poor or the sacrifice of one's life may strengthen the credibility of religious testimony. As Pascal remarked, "I listen to witnesses who let themselves be killed for their beliefs."

The critical examination of testimony under the rubric of reliability underscores the importance of the will in the claim to truth and in the evaluation of that claim. In examining the motives of a witness, one attempts to determine the posture of the will, which conditions the credibility of the witness's testimony.

III.

The critical assessment of testimony is not limited to the application of the criteria of competence and reliability to determine the credibility of a given witness. These formal criteria themselves must be critically evaluated. The contours of competence and reliability vary according to the distinctive structure of the society where the testimony occurs. The decisions, often implicit, concerning who is competent and reliable are inevitably rooted in the configuration of power and interests which characterize a given culture.

The concept of competence often varies according to a community's patterns of power. In the practice of law, the growing authority of the medical doctor in determining damage to the plaintiff or the responsibility of the defendant is hardly accidental. It reflects the preeminence accorded the medical practitioner, especially the psychiatrist, in an increasingly therapeutic society.[4] Concommitantly, the earlier legal prestige of the clergyman, once considered an expert of moral character and the supernatural interferences in criminal acts, has faded in a laicized society.[5]

In the writing of history, the designation of competence also shifts according to the configurations of power. In the early nineteenth century, when politics and economics revolved around the heroic individual, historians such as Carlyle[6] naturally designated the isolated "great man" as the key witness to the historical significance of a given age. History became the biography of prince and general. In the mid-twentieth century, where large collectivities participate in economic and political power, leading historians, such as those associated with the *Annales* school,[7] stress the masses and their popular culture as prime witnesses to the meaning of an age. The stables of Versailles displace the palace as the *locus* of history.

In the religious domain, the competence of witness has varied according to the structures of religious power. In the New Testament, the resurrection of Jesus is first announced by women. As contemporary exegetes underline, this preeminence of women as primary witnesses to the central event of the Christian faith is striking, given the incapacity of women to serve as religious witnesses in the Judaism of the period or as political witnesses in Roman jurisprudence.[8] This foundational claim of women to religious truth reflects the considerable empowerment of women in the primitive Christian communities which shaped, and were shaped by, the scriptural account.

As with competence, the criterion of reliability must itself be critically assessed. What one declares to be a trustworthy witness is embedded in the structure of a particular culture. In assessing the integrity of a witness, one must not only analyze the motives, such as greed or revenge, which might distort testimony. One must also attend to the social interests which, often implicitly, mold the claim to truth in one direction rather than the other.

In the course of a trial, a witness may sincerely offer testimony untainted by conscious deception or prejudice. Nonetheless, this claim to truth emerges in the framework of a particular society whose values temper the "objectivity" of the testimony offered by that society's members. It is patent, for example, that American racial values and interests shaped the judicial process of even the most painstakingly fair courts in the nineteenth century. The most disinterested witness cannot perfectly abstract his or her testimony from the hierarchy of interests which implicitly structure his or her community.

In the realm of historic and religious testimony, the need to critically assess the overachieving purposes and creeds of the society in which a witness operates is just as compelling. Scrutiny of the moral integrity of the witness does not suffice. One must explore the religious and political beliefs which the witness, often dimly, serves in a given claim to truth. Bossuet's testimony concerning the virtue of the royal family members,[9] for example, must be carefully interpreted in light of the wide-spread Gallican belief in the divine origin of the French monarchy.

In critically evaluating the criterion of reliability itself, one focuses upon the social matrix of beliefs within which the process of perceiving and testifying to truth occurs. This collective framework, often obscured from the individual witness, diminishes or enhances the credibility of testimony as surely as does the witness' personal moral character.

IV.

The complexity of the critical assessment of testimony need not foster skepticism concerning legal, historical or religious truth. As in other areas of knowledge, one seeks the most reasonable or the most probable explanation when absolute certitude proves elusive. Furthermore, it is impossible to simply suspend our judgment in these key areas of social knowledge, because this knowledge is tied to necessary practical action. No society can exist which does not represent its past through history. No individual or society can avoid a choice of religious truth, even when that choice is agnosticism. No society can maintain its coherence, let alone an order of justice, without some determination of legal and criminal, innocence and guilt.

The key issue in the inevitable development of knowledge rooted in testimony is how critically this testimony is received in our society. The critical approach has long nurtured our right to question the competence and integrity of the individual witness with a claim to truth. Currently, it must intensify our duty to question the cultural determinants of what counts as competence and who counts as reliable. Obviously, the critical assessment of testimony cannot banish the possibility of error in a particular judgment. It can, however, place our social knowledge in the realm of thoughtful reflection rather than in the arbitrary realm of prejudice and wish.

Notes

1. For a classic presentation of the theory of verification cfr. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, (London: Gollencz, 1952) 102-113.

2. This paper's theory of the criteria of credibility is indebted to the treatment of testimony presented in Vincent G. Potter, *Philosophy of Knowledge*, revised ed. (New York: Fordham, 1986) 180ff.

3. For a discussion of the problem of the legal expert, cfr. John P. Hittinger, "The moral Status of the Expert in contemporary Society," *The World and I*, (A 1989) 560-585.

4. For an analysis of the "therapeutic society," cfr. Robert Bellah, *Habits of the Heart*, (Berkeley: U. Cal. Press, 1985).

5. For a discussion of the problems raised by laicization of American society, cfr. Richard John Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square*, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984).
6. Cfr. Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History*, (London: Dent, 1967) for the classic presentation of the "great man" theory.

7. Cfr. R. Foster and O. Renum, *Deviants and the Abandoned in French Society: Selections from the Annales*, (Baltimore: Hopkins, 1978) for a presentation of the methods of *Annales* historians.

8. For a feminist interpretation of the New Testament, cfr. Elisabeth Schussler-Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: a feminist theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins*, (New York: Crossroads, 1983).

9. Cfr. Jacques Benigne Bossuet, *Oeuvres oratoires*, ed. by J. Lebarq, 7 vol. (Paris, 1922-1927) for Bossuet's eloges of the Bourbons.

Rev. John J. Conley, S.J. is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, Bronx, New York.

Critical Thinking, Social Issues and Communication

The presenters represented in this section address the issue of critical thinking as related to social issues that involve communication of various kinds.

James Schneider, in *Subjectivity and Critical Thinking* links the presentations by the plenary speakers and other presenters to the conference theme, and raises many of the issues addressed by the conference presenters. These issues include concerns about language and culture, power and authority, voice and identity, public participation and critical distance, education and media. In his paper, he notes that "all language is culturally conditioned, as is all knowledge, all vision, all reason. A language unconditioned by culture is like money unconditioned by the economic system in which it is exchanged, since language is the currency of any cultural system, along with its meanings, its values, and its ways of thinking and feeling."

Schneider discusses two conceptions of "subjectivity;" subjectivity as a condition of subordinacy, and subjectivity as the assumption of a critical identity. He presents an analysis of a documentary film which is often used in classrooms, toward an understanding of the process of subjectivity involved in such media and as an example of the cultural context within which knowledge and skills are acquired. In this, as in many such documentaries, the rhetorical use of the "collective we" by an unidentified but authoritative narrator, diffuses historical and social responsibility for the social problem described, and assigns vague powers and responsibilities for correcting the problem to the viewer. Moreover, the perspective represented by the narrator is that of a benevolent leader, implying the membership of the viewer in community with others, actively assuming a critical stance toward the problem, while simultaneously exercising power and control over the text and images of the film.

Sue Curry Jansen, in*"Collapse of the Public Sphere and Information Capitalism,"* relates the global expansion of corporate power to both the decline of the international influence of the United States government and the centralization and control by corporate powers of cultural institutions in other nations. Despite the social value placed on a "free and diverse press...as a necessary constituent of democratic pluralism, the concentration of ownership and control of the 'information industries," including both print and broadcast media, has resulted in monopolization, centralization, and privatization." Jansen claims that information media are instrumental and even essential in the internationalization of business. Moreover, although the United States government has lost influence globally, its corporations have expanded in extent and in terms of their capacities to influence the political, economic, and social structures of the nations in which they operate.

Jansen claims that where the contemporary resources for public expression and creativity are "captured by corporatism," cultural institutions, including mass media and higher education, become themselves basic industries like oil and steel. These resources, in turn, become inaccessible for the purpose of participatory democracy and peaceful social change. Ironically, Jansen asserts, post-modern challenges to the foundations of Western cultural traditions have weakened social institutions and thus rational argument for public life and critical resistance of market forces. Jansen recommends the development of models for critical discourse about information industries in the context of structures of power and privilege. She raises a series of issues to consider and strategies for popular resistance to the privatization of knowledge which are rich with promise for furthering critical dialogue.

In *"The Impact of Pictographic Reasoning on Contemporary Pedagogy,"* by George Teschner and Frank McClusky, conflicting modes of communication of print media and electronic imagery are contrasted. Television, they suggest, has rendered many established communication modes obsolete. On the other hand, what we call intelligence and knowledge, reasoning and logic—"to go by words"— is defined in terms of the verbal practices and criteria of literate societies. In contemporary educational settings in Western society, these practices have become rooted in the formal syntactic structures of propositional text. The oral and pictographic language of the culture outside the classroom, however, is contextual, visual and/or "performatory," rather than formal. Teschner and McCluskey recommend changes in educational practices to develop reasoning skills that are semantically rather than syntactically based, and thus more closely related to the contexts within which reasoning occurs.

Michael Kagan, in *"Listening to English from Speakers of English,"* also addresses conflicting modes of expression—that of the popular culture from which students have come, and that of literate society. He expresses dismay about instructors' tendency to expect that students be able to do what they have come to college to learn. As examples, he contrasts such terms as *argument, prove, valid,* which are in common usage in both popular language and in academic communities, but which carry different meanings in each domain. Kagan suggests that "when communication seems to be suffering, we might try to listen carefully to our students... We might usefully think of ourselves as teachers of what, even if it is not a foreign language, is at any rate language which is foreign...We can be more willing to distinguish the language we are teaching them from the language they have been taught..."

Will Kollock, in *"Television and Critical Thinking: Is It Possible?"* recommends the educational application of critical thinking skills to television programming and its consequences, to counteract students' tendencies, based on years of television viewing, "to learn without thinking, to accept without judging." For many people, characters on TV are more realistic than their own acquaintances. Expectations, desires, and fears are formed by television viewing; materials goods and pat solutions typify the values and that influence us through television. Through education, knowledge of the criteria upon which the information and entertainment provided by television are based will help students think critically about the role that television plays in their lives.

Schools and colleges, as we know, are not our only educational institutions. In *"The Cognitive Management of Cultural Institutions: Museum and Library Heuristics,"* David Carr provides us with an analysis of museums and other cultural institutions as environments with special potential for critical thought; as "institutions for the mindful life." Cultural institutions, he notes,

> "are the places we create and sustain in order to bring new information to our lives, to consider and integrate the information we require, and where we hold the texts, artifacts, and experiences that we wish to keep as a culture, or that we need in order to have a home in time and space. They are places for learners, for lives of self-invention and pursuit — not for credentials, job training, tests, or grades. They are environments, and at their best they are forums, for critical thinking, for communication, for independent learning, for self-presentation, which is to say: for living on one's own horizon."

Cultural institutions are public spaces that make possible private transformation through discovery, exploration and reflection beyond information. They represent organized knowledge structures created for both cultural continuity and "acts of mind" in which personal visions can emerge. They represent the possibility of watershed experiences, of significant problem solving events, of situations for the construction of personal meanings. However, "cultural institutions have barely begun to define themselves as educative institutions," Carr notes. His essay presents and analysis of the potential for critical thinking involved in cultural institutions, including emphasis on connections, contexts and experiences, alternative perspectives, exploration, and structure. How a cultural institution fulfills its role as an agency of "mindfulness" depends on how well it "interprets itself as an informing environment, how it nurtures its learners and informs their reflections...how it thinks of itself, and embedded in that is how it thinks of me." Those who try to promote critical thinking in schools and colleges, as institutions of culture themselves, would do well to review their own goals in the light of David Carr's broader perspective. Do we prepare students to take advantage — to want to take advantage — of these cultural opportunities available for lifelong learning?

The Subjectivity of Critical Thinking

James Schneider

As numerous partipants in the Critical Thinking Conference reminded us, critical thinking is not primarily a skill to be acquired, but an ongoing process of engagement with the (social and cultural) world, with other critical thinkers (such as conference participants) and with one's own thinking processes (self-criticism being perhaps the most difficult criticism of all). This paper is being re-written after the conference in order to take advantage of some self-critical reflection on my own presentation at the conference, as well as react to two of the major conference presentations. My purpose is not primarily to engage in a critique of these presentation, but to use them as a foil for my own critical reflections on one of the difficult questions in the formation of critical thinking, the question of subjectivity.

We might begin by asking what makes thinking "critical?" For conference keynoter Richard Paul, critical thinking is the "individuated, disciplined, reflective thinking" which transcends the conditioning we have all undergone as members of a culture. In this view, some people are able to extricate themselves from the fetters of their own socialization processes and get in touch with reality by an "intelligent use of language" and by reflecting on the "empirical" rather than the texts by which it has been interpreted. If this vision of cultural transcendence rings a bell with us, it may be because it has a certain resonance with the Enlightenment project of Western bourgeois civilization, a civilization which has always been tempted to see its culture as universal, its vision as empirical and objective, its logic as irreproachable, and its language as untainted by the "cultural conditioning" which afflicts those lost in the morass of unenlightened (unintelligent, inferior, other) civilizations. The concluding summary of Paul's presentation, provided by the December issue of *Inquiry* (Vol. 4, No. 4) report on conference proceedings, could easily be referring to the Enlightenment, where "ideas are central, and the intelligent use of language the necessary skill for understanding."

Whatever role these values still have to play in contemporary society, the view expressed by Paul tends to underestimate the challenge posed by modern linguistics, to say nothing of such heavy-duty theories as psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, by seriously *over*estimating language's ability to transcend cultural conditioning. Compared to unthinking cultural conformity, of course, we can all applaud intelligence, rational self-criticism, and reflectiveness. What is not generally acknowledged in this "intelligent use of language," however, are the social and cultural conditions which enable the possibility of such reflexivity and the implicit elitism which often accompanies it. It is precisely at these points where Paul's view is not critical enough, especially of his own theory.

One of the basic contentions of most contemporary cultural and linguistic theory is that *all* language is culturally conditioned, as is all knowledge, all vision, all reason. A language unconditioned by culture is like money unconditioned by the economic system in which it is exchanged, since language is the currency of any cultural system, along with its meanings, its values, and its ways of thinking and feeling. To suppose, therefore, that an "intelligent use of language" could completely liberate itself from cultural conditioning is, at best, naive.

Furthermore, the view that I can lift myself by my own intellectual bootstraps above the unthinking gullibility of the masses reflects an intellectual arrogance which, far from transcending the dominant culture, is all too recognizable as a common feature of that culture. As our culture has always deemed its own standards of rationality inherently superior to all others, so our elite have been encouraged to consider their own intelligence an emblem of their superiority and the justification for the social rewards which it receives in the form of status or income. The disquieting fact that these rewards are generally reserved for the individual thinker who is in a position to learn (afford) the requisite skills, and does not address the social conditions which either foster or inhibit the formation of "intelligent" uses of language, also makes this view fully complicit with the individualism of the dominant culture's presumed meritocracy.

Giroux's understanding, in my opinion, offers a greater hope for promoting a critical consciousness within our academic institutions by turning attention to the social and political barriers to the development of that consciousness. His neo-populist concern for empowering alternative voices rather than imposing the prescribed (cultural) standards of elite Western (white, male) intelligence, is refreshing and salutory. None of these alternative voices need (will) be completely authoritative, objective, true, good, or beautiful by any of the standards of contemporary society; they all will be culturally conditioned in their own way. Some may even be unintelligent by present criteria, and some undisciplined or illogical. The critical edge in this cacophony of voices will be generated not by imposing elite classical standards, but by encouraging and empowering the clash of disparate voices, all articulating their own experiences and perspectives, and the result will not be an integrated and harmonious symphony, but the ideological and cultural ferment which any true democratic public sphere demands.

Yet this admirable vision of ideological and cultural democracy is not without its problems when it comes to the question of subjectivity. In his presentation, Giroux recognizes that schools teach "not only subjects but also subjectivities", that the stories they tell "offer subject positions that shape identities for better or for worse...." Later in his presentation, he introduces another form of subjectivity when he contends that, when students "come to voice", they move "from object to subject". In each of these references, the concept of subjectivity is markedly different. The first reference speaks of subjectivity as a *dominated* identity, formed by the concepts and narratives of dominant institutions and apparatuses. The second reference suggests that becoming a subject is assuming a *dominant* identity, one now in a position to criticize her/his world. The question arises, then, as to how these two understandings of subjectivity can be reconciled; or, more crucially, how the critical subject can be formed within dominant discourses, especially when these discourses are themselves shaped by interests which enjoy the privileges of domination.

For Giroux, it seems that the pivot point between these two subjectivities lies in his concept of "lived experience". Although I'm not sure he would put it this way, everyday life apparently provides subjects with a more authentic identity from which to become agents of their own destiny than that granted by the stories (ideas, sensibilities, histories, ideologies) of the dominant culture. If this is so, however, we need to know more about the nature of this lived experience. How does it retain any authenticity in a world shaped from cradle to grave by dominant (mass cultural) forms? And if authentic experiences, whatever that might entail, still exist, how might they be communicated in languages which are constructed by and for dominant social institutions and interests? Before we are able to fashion pedagogical strategies and practices which encourage and provoke a critical consciousness within and among students, we need to understand more about the processes in which it is formed and the ways it can resist containment within dominant discourses.

The contemporary debate on subjectivity can be traced to a number of fairly recent developments in linguistics, psychoanalysis, and political and social theory, all of which rejected the idealist notion of a sovereign consciousness (still assumed, I would argue, within Paul's perspective). The Cartesian view inherited by Western culture is that subjectivity is innate, a "given," with the ego being the autonomous and transcendent agent of consciousness. In coming to consciousness, the subject exerts mastery over the object world, using language as a tool of such mastery. Reference to the "intelligent use of language", then, assumes this notion of the transcendent subject who stands outside of the realm of language and uses it for its own purposes. Language is not a "world" one inhabits, but merely an instrument of the sovereign ego.

It is just this view of the ego which has been challenged by contemporary theory. Not only does this definition ignore the contradictory desires of the unconscious which continually undermine the ego's mastery, but it also ignores the ego's own material conditions of production within a socially constructed world. Principal among those conditions of production are the language practices and structures in which one becomes conscious of one's world. Language may be a tool, but along with the tool comes a world which is constructed for the tool-user and a "subject position" he or she is invited to occupy (alluded to by Giroux). The sovereignty the ego assumes for itself is imaginary, based on a repression of its source and conditions of possibility, and at the same time, a lure which attracts individuals to the subjectivities which the dominant social insitutions construct for them in and through the languages of a culture.

Subjectivity is therefore formed in response to the interpellations or hailings in which he/she recognizes (or misrecognizes) his or her self. (Louis Althusser, French theorist, explains interpellation as a kind of policeman yelling, "Hey, you!) These interpellations promise us a stable and unified identity amidst the experience of loss and contradiction which accompany our fragile historical existence. Hence the paradox: the mastery we seek may be purchased at the price of conformity to the images provided by the dominant (linguistic and political) institutions.

Now it should be noted that most subjectivity theorists have backed away from a hard, deterministic version of this theory in favor of a more dialectical process of intersubjectivity, whereby the subject participates in his/her own subjective formation. They also resist any suggestion that such subject formation is not itself frought with contradictions which make it extremely unstable and capable of being mobilized for purposes of social change. Subjectivity, after all, has within its very definition a contradictory dynamic, as we have witnessed already in Giroux's references. Not only is the term capable of being employed to denote almost diametrically opposite senses, at once being subject to another's authority (as in "British subject") and, on the other hand, subjecting another to one's own consciousness (as in the traditional subject/object duality), but in any particular example of subjectivity we are likely to find both of these senses present to some degree.

Other qualifications, elaborations, and challenges to this concept of subjectivity could well be made at this point. As a theory, it is by no means unproblematic. But to avoid theorization which heaps abstraction on abstraction, I will instead look briefly at one particular example of subject "positioning" to analyze how subjectivity is shaped by a type of educational film commonly used in the classroom. This analysis is prompted by the conviction that educators who are concerned to revitalize the democratic public sphere need to study the process of subjectivity involved in dominant modes of educational media.

The film I am analyzing here, like many educational films, is in the classical "direct address" mode (the usual designation, although not entirely appropriate), with a narrator guiding the viewer through a montage of images organized around an argument (rhetorical) or a topic (expository). These films invite the viewer in specific ways, both overt and covert, to assume particular subjectivities in the world, and their effectiveness as films will depend as much on the power of those interpellations as it will on the validity of the film's arguments. What kind of subjectivity is implied by this form of address and how does it relate to the processes of critical thinking which we seek to promote? To answer this question, we need to look at the historical context of our example.

The River, a 1937 film directed by Pare Lorentz and sponsored by the New Deal's Farm Security Administration, was probably the most famous documentary (Lorentz preferred to call it "educational") film in a documentary age. The Depression era was known for the prominance of the documentary form in photography, magazines, film, novels, dance, theater, and other cultural modes of expression.

The relevance of this film for our discussion is based not only on its educational purpose, however; it also is a film which shares a kind of neo-populist vision of sorts. Like the administration which produced it, *The River* is often interpreted as encouraging citizen empowerment by warning us about the environmental deterioration of the Mississippi River Valley caused by agricultural and industrial development and promoting the Tennessee Valley Authority as a model response to this problem. Through a problem/solution rhetorical mode, the film attempts to persuade us that we have power to effect social (environmental) change.

Questions of subjectivity enter the analysis of this film at three sites:

1) *Diegetic subjectivity* (the diegesis, for our purposes here, may be defined as the depicted world) refers to the subject of history: Who was responsible for these historical developments and who will be the agent of the Valley's revitalization?

2) *Viewer subjectivity* invites a particular viewer consciousness, from which the viewer can act in relation to the depicted world: Who are you, the ones being addressed by the film in relationship to the depicted world?

3) *Textual subjectivity* refers to the subject relations of the film itself as representation/performance/argument: Who is "speaking" by and in this film? Whose subjectivity, if anyone's, is responsible for the representations of the film?

In the overall working of the film, textual subjectivity mediates the diegetic subjectivity for the viewer, with the viewer being invited to see her/himself as subject of history in and through the subjectivity of the film.

In *The River*, there are no characters, as in narrative films, to guide the viewer through the action. With the exception of the flooding victims and migrants, the people depicted in the film are shown in a way which de-emphasizes their personal characteristics. The active human agents such as agricultural workers, lumberjacks, factory works, dam builders, for example, are not shot in close-ups or from angles which would easily identify their facial features. Nor are there any diegetic sounds of these people which would distinguish them as persons. While the lack of personal characteristics does serve to generalize the historical references, it also removes from the film a common vehicle of viewer involvement.

Yet, despite this absence of characters with which an audience might identify, we are still invited to see ourselves as historical agents through the narrator's use of the collective "we": "We built a dike..." "We made cotton king." "We fought a war," "We built a hundered cities and a thousand towns." The use of an impersonal and indefinite "we" with which any potential audience member may identify is a common feature of documentaries, especially those which attempt to rally the nation in a time of crisis. Most wartime documentaries, for instance, invite audiences to see themselves as part of a national "we" against a demonized "they" who threaten us.

Besides compensating the audience for the lack of identifiable characters, the use of the collective plural pronoun also attempts to avoid the divisive recriminations which often arise in a period of crisis by assigning responsibility to the nation as a whole. Instead of engaging in historical analysis which would attempt to designate the social dynamics or degrees of responsibility for the problems, the film claims, "We are all responsible", which means in effect, "nobody in particular, or everybody in general." Today, this strategy is sometimes called Pogo-ism, after cartoon character Pogo's famous declaration, "We have met the enemy and they are us."

But there is another side to the appeal to a national identity, a more positive side, in which the "we" is central to the logic of the film's argument about power and control. The rhetorical fulcrum of the film is the phrase, "We had the power to take the river apart; we have the power to put it back together again." Like the New Deal as a whole, *The River* tries to combat the widespread feeling of impotence and hopelessness which afflicted the nation by encouraging us to tap into the very power which got us into the mess, this time with the wisdom which comes from experience. If the problems were caused by a misuse of our power, then a proper use can remedy it.

The byproduct of this strategy is that the government, which was itself suspected of being either impotent or uncaring in the face of a human catastrophe (at least under the previous Hoover administration), would be affirmed as the catalyst for the transformation. The program of flood control, reforestation, and economic revitalization known as the Tennessee Valley Authority, sponsored by the Roosevelt administration, was an important step in restoring the government's credibility as an institution looking out for "the people's" interests. Thus, the point within the film when "we began" to resolve the problem is the point at which the government is introduced into the film as our representative, thereby establishing its democratic or populist credentials. With proper planning ("planning" being the key programmatic concept of the film's sponsoring agency and its boss, Rexford Tugwell), "we" could reverse the fortunes of the river and recover our control over the threatening forces of nature and, by implication, over the depressing economic forces as well.

We can therefore detect within the collective "we" two distinct diegetic subjectivities which are collapsed into one national identity. The first refers to (identifies) past responsibility for the problem; the second refers to the power to resolve the problem in the future. And the film raises two distinct, but related questions about the exercise of that power. One has to do with the adequacy and integrity of its representation of history; the other with its potential to stimulate change through identification with a powerful national voice.

If this rhetorical strategy deflects any impulse toward finger-pointing, it also avoids further analysis of the historical dynamics which led us to this state of affairs and hence to the kind of changes which might be made to reverse the damage. Power, as used here, is abstracted into a vague and indeterminate agency which lacks practical specificity. We might ask, "Whose power to do what under what conditions?" Were we all equally responsible for the rape of the land? Was this historical development simply an unthinking and irresponsible binge (a suggestion made in the film by accompanying the logging scenes with the tune, "Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight")? Or was this development a calculated exploitation of resources, including human resources, for benefits which accrued to some groups at the expense of others?

The national identity which is constructed by this film is forged at the price of a repression of differences, such as those of class, race, and gender, and the experiences and histories which contribute to those differences. Workers are equally responsible with the captains of industry for abusing the land (indeed, all representations of owners and questions of ownership are absent from the film), black slaves with their white slave owners, female tenant homemakers with their male landlords. The existence of a native people who were here before "we found the land"--"we" being the white European race, it is assumed--and who could, ironically, provide an alternative to the disrespect for nature which led to the problem in the first place, is also missing from the film. Before "we" arrived, the film implies, the country was a dark, uninhabited wilderness.

We are all responsible, and no matter what our status, race, or gender, we are all invited to identify with the self-evidently white, male voice which narrates the film and its hypnotic classical intonations and rhythms. While the "we" casts its net out to all citizen/viewers, the formal characteristics of that net are not entirely culturally unconditioned. The standard around which this national identity is to be forged, the film assumes, will be that of the elite white male culture.

The music track is constructed with the same cultural bias in that it takes white spirituals and folk songs (already a limited sampling of cultural expression) and transposes them into a classical symphony (by composer Virgil Thomson, performed by members of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra). Thus, while appearing to give voice to "the people", the music strips away the more authentic aspects of that voice in order to make it conform to the classically-appropriate standards of the dominant culture.

We have seen, then, that the viewer is invited to identify with a national "subject" by repressing differences and avoiding divisive historical analysis, but the "we" also represses specific identification of its textual subjectivity. Because the narrator's (or author's) image does not appear on the screen and is not identified as belonging to the diegetic world, it is labelled, in Bill Nichols' typology, a "Voice of God" narration. The narrator's voice has the ubiquitous authority of a presence which cannot be located in space or time and hence is not subject to the critical gaze of the viewer; it comes from nowhere...or everywhere. In this voice, the Nation speaks, not Lorentz, not the New Deal, not white culture, not capitalist acumulation, not any of these human persons or institutions or ideologies whose authority is permeable and readily available for testing. Instead, The Nation speaks with the Voice of God. Hence, the film does address us (how "directly" is another matter), but it is an address which attempts to efface its own conditions of production in order to secure its authority as an unimpeachable national identity, available to all.

The lure of this voice, besides being tied to the utopian desire to belong to a community which transcends differences, is also related to its power over the image and, by implication, over the unruly historical conditions which threaten us. The narrator guides and directs the montage of images, which , in the ideology of representation, have a closer relationship to reality than other kinds of representation. By asserting control over these "natural" representations, the narrator also assumes some control over the "natural" forces represented in the image, not as a ruthless and insensitive master (the consciousness which produced the problem), but as an expressive presence, integrated into and respectful of the rhythms which are already there. Thus, the power and authority of the narrator becomes an emblem and mediator of the power of the viewer as historical subject.

In this case, however, the power the film attributes to the viewer/subject is more emotional than real, in that the film gives him or her little to do except endorse the New Deal program already underway. Rather than mobilize the viewer for real power in her or his historical situation by providing specific analyses, or offering a platform for alternative practices or disparate voices, all of which could derail the drive toward conformity, the film works to integrate the viewer into a homogenous national identity around a benevolent government who is "doing it all for you."

My argument is not that viewers are unable to resist this homogenizing integration and adopt a more critical attitude toward the historical process and its possible alteration, but rather that we need to retain a certain wariness about populist visions which claim to give voice to the voiceless, but may instead be inviting the repression of alternative and oppositional voices (which are bound to be disparate and grating to the dominant ear) in favor of an undifferentiated identity. An emotional catharsis is no substitute for historical empowerment.

Critical thinking depends upon being able to distance ourselves from any subjectivity, including any collective identity, which supplies us only with the power to endorse or consent to that which is already occurring in our name and not to construct our own histories and identities out of the differentiating experiences of our past. We need to be concerned not only about becoming subjects rather than objects, but with what kind of subjects in what kind of world.

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Collapse of the Public Sphere and Information Capitalism

Sue Curry Jansen

For nearly two decades, critical theorists have been documenting the collapse of "the public sphere" in liberal societies (Elliott 1983). Privatization of public resources -- knowledge, information, media of communication, lands, space, and rights -- appears to be a global trend. It is not only the terms of power in Western nations, it is also radically altering the structure of the state and economy in Eastern bloc nations, re: perestroika (Edsall 1984, Hall 1988, Jansen 1988).

"Collapse of the public sphere" in the United States

The corporation is increasingly replacing the state and the citizen as the essential unit of analysis in post-Liberal logics of power. As a result, the term, the "corporate-state" -- once confined to the vocabularies of radical political economists -- has migrated into mainstream media and discourses of established power-structures. This migration has, in turn, rendered the concept of the "nation-state" increasingly irrelevant. Recent assessments of U. S. global power indicate that the U. S. government has lost influence in the global arena but U. S. corporations have expanded both the range and depth of their global penetration, assets, and capacities to influence the political, economic, and social structures of the nations in which they operate. (Lipsey and Kravas 1987).

Expansion and internationalization of the influence of global corporate power has been accompanied by acceleration of economic trends which emerged in the United States during the early decades of the twentieth century: trends toward concentration of ownership and/or privatization of the control of means of public expression, newspapers, book publishing, broadcasting, telecommunications, publicity, advertising, museums, the arts, etc. For example, in the United States freedom of the press has historically been conceived as a public good. Sharing the Enlightenment's valorization of human reason, the framers of the American covenant believed that informed citizens are democracy's first line of defense against tyranny. Jefferson, of course, conceived of newspapers as playing a special role in informing citizens, and in a much quoted statement claimed that if he were forced to choose between preserving "government without newspapers or newspapers without government," he would cast his vote for newspapers. The first Amendment of the U.S. Constitution formalized the Jeffersonian principle; it privileged the status of free speech and the free press in U.S. law and ideology. In sum, a free and diverse press have been regarded as a necessary constituent of democratic pluralism. However, as a result of twentieth century trends toward greater concentration, monopolization, and centralization of ownership, 98% of U.S. cities now have only one newspaper, fewer than twenty companies conduct most of magazine business, and eleven companies account for most of the sales in the book industry (Bagdikian 1984.) In broadcasting industries, which have never been as diverse in ownership or editorial orientation as newspapers, the deregulation movement of the 1980's has removed most of the legal barriers to further concentration of ownership. Some diversity continues to survive in the low or non-profit margins of media industries such as citizen access cable television, public radio and television, newsletters, academic journals, etc.; but, the major channels of communication --- the channels most of the people access most of the time for most of their information about public affairs in the U.S.--- have been subject to concentration, monopolization, centralization, and privatization of ownership and control.

These trends appear to global trends. Indeed, information industries have been in the vanguard of moves to internationalize business. Moreover, these industries produce and often control the communication infrastructures which make globalization of the economy feasible (Freiberg ,1981; Schiller ,1989,; Dean and Shayon ,1989).

The new enclosure movement

The processes whereby the sites of public expression and creativity -- the open political spaces of democratic liberalism -- are captured by corporatism have been characterized as part of a new "enclosure" movement (Jansen, 1988; Schiller, 1989). Where these vital resources are appropriated for private ends, Schiller maintains, "human health and consciousness itself are held hostage" (1989, p. 89). This enclosure movement expresses and reflects a profound structural change in the basis of contemporary capitalism. Under this rearrangement of the resources and relations of production, culture --- mass media, periodicals, books, advertising, public relations, museums, research and development, higher education, etc. --- become basic industries like oil, coal, and steel. Access to control over the production and distribution of knowledge becomes potential sites for social conflict under what Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1986) calls "information-capitalism."

Under the assumptions of Liberal democracy, citizens, or more specifically groups of citizens organizing themselves into "publics", were empowered to act as agents of peaceful social conflict. Under information-capitalism, however, citizens lose this franchise. Privatization of public expression increasingly excludes citizens from the sites of social conflict. Instead the drama is played out in an escalating series of mergers and "hostile" takeovers while citizens are diverted by the bread and circuses of consumerism. Stuart Ewen (1988) has described this structural change in the terms of participatory democracy as the "bribe" of contemporary capitalism.

The new enclosure movement is still gaining momentum, solidifying and entrenching the transformations from public to private definitions and control of information, cultural industries, and their infrastructures (Schiller, 1989, c.f. also Peters, 1988). This momentum cannot be sustained indefinitely, however, because as Schiller (1989, p. 174) points out, "the world, in corporate terms, is a finite market". Nevertheless, as Schiller also acknowledges, the counterforces to the new enclosure movement "are yet to be revealed" (p.174).

This paper examines: (a) the structural and communicative constituents of this new enclosure movement; (b) current controversies and impasses in critical social theory which may be inhibiting articulation of democratic strategies for resisting the new enclosure movement; (c) the constituents of information-capitalism; and (d) some non-academic platforms which serve as sites for articulations of counterforces to the new enclosure movement.

The postmodern impasse in critical thought about the constituents of democratic discourse

It has been argued that we are at a critical point of rupture or breach in history: that discourses of modernism--- including discourses of resistance--- have been exhausted. Much current social theory tells us that we are standing at, or already have one foot into, a new, "postmodern", age (see for example Lyotard, 1984; Jameson, 1984; Huyssen, 1986). To date, the concrete, or more accurately, the plastic, celluloid or silicon, manifestations of post-modernism have been largely aesthetic; they have expressed a new sensibility, a new aesthetic, based upon surface appearances, decontextualizations, fragmentation, irony and puns.

Advocates of this new sensibility acknowledge that the terms of power governing the postmodern age have not been fully revealed. However, they are unequivocal in their rejection of the discourses of modern power. They maintain that the cosmological bargains and political covenants of modernism---liberalism, humanism, Marxism-- have been depleted. According to the new critical sensibility, these covenants have been exposed as corrupt to the core. The patriarchal, Eurocentric, and hierarchical values that secure modernism have been extensively (and in my judgment, correctly) dissected and catalogued by feminists, critical theorists, and postmodernists. As a result, the familiar Western bulwarks against complete colonization of public life by market forces --- God, family, nation, and the eternal verities of reason and beauty --- have lost their persuasiveness.

In spite of its aesthetic appeal and critical sophistication, postmodernism is a philosophy and aesthetic of endings. So far, it has provided no tools for empowering resistance to the new enclosure movement. Indeed when postmodernists do attempt to articulate philosophies of value and praxis, the praxis appears to presuppose the primacy of market values (c.f. Smith 1987). Almost against its will, postmodernism seems to have become an ideological consort of information-capitalism; it disables existing paradigms of critical resistance, vacates the spaces occupied by modern social critique, valorizes difference and individualism, and by default cultivates upscale markets for designer breads and intellectual circuses.

The wide appeal of postmodernism sensibilities in influential left intellectual circles has had the effect of marginalizing or muting critical analysis of the new enclosure movement. Its laudable but interminable search for epistemological purity tends to immobilize practice; as a result would- be defenders of pluralism and difference are left on the sidelines while the spaces formerly occupied by the flawed and incomplete discourses of Liberal democracy are subdivided and enclosed by the architects of information-capitalism.

The purpose of my critique of this critical impasse is to sound an alarm. Information-capitalism is changing the terms of global power now. Corporate interests which do not, for the most part, problematize principles of eurocentricity, androcentricity, or hierarchy are currently securing the terms of power-knowledge and the technological designs under which all of us --- the epistemologically pure as well as the epistemologically flawed --- will enter the twenty-first century.

Technological designs are also social designs. They carry social values, establish limits, facilitate some forms of action and inhibit others. The designs of the technologies and infrastructures of information-capitalism reproduce in abstract and reified forms the eurocentric, androcentric, and imperial practices of the corporate-state. Feminist, critical, and postmodernist theories need to continue to engage in epistemological critiques of the templates that secure these designs; the search for purity may be a necessary prerequisite to discovery of more environmentally and species friendly models for living. If, however, the search for purity postpones confrontation with the current crises, it may be a futile journey. The light may not come on until after the critical assets of democracy have been turned over to private interests.

In sum, "modern" critical tools are flawed. We need to recognize those flaws, but we cannot afford to leave the land untended while we design new tools.

*Critical Theory, Information, and the New Enclosure Movement**

Oscar Wilde pointed out that when the pike are set free, the minnows die. In the U.S. today, major information industries are pike claiming protections initially intended to preserve the minnows. Deregulation and privatization are the lures these industries are using to attract and devour the minnows. We need to develop critical models for thinking and talking about information industries which permit us to distinguish the pike from the minnows. These models must be able to identify, explain, and critique the following: the mechanisms whereby public knowledge is privatized; the new structures of inequality produced by stratification of the global economy into information-rich and information-poor countries, regions, classes, genders, or races; the implications of the strategic placement of knowledge workers in information-capitalism; the structural position of communications as an arena of ideological and social conflict; and the epistemological foundations of the system of power-knowledge created by information-capitalism including the gender, race, and class-based communicative structures that secure it (and are secured by it).

New information technologies reproduce and entrench old structures of power and privilege. It is therefore unlikely that centralized systems for the control of capital, images, and people will be voluntarily dismantled. The "global shopping center" and the "corporate village" are not merely hyperbole. (Barnet and Muller 1975; Hamelink 1977) They are blueprints for the new world-system of information-capitalism. Those who would support design of alternative blueprints might want to consider the following ideas.

First, it is necessary to recognize the centrality of mass media to the control systems of information-capitalism. Reports of the impending demise of mass media are not only premature, they are smokescreens for new forms of cultural control. Mass media are not independent or ancillary to the agenda of information-capitalism. The Fourth Estate was a useful fiction of Liberalism. However, information-capitalism's deregulation, privatization, and commodification of information in the U.S. are rendering Liberal concepts of "fairness" and "the public interest" obsolete. As a result, more than at any other time in history, mass media are acting as agents of established powers. Therefore, any movement which seeks to challenge the totalitarian structures of information-capitalism needs to develop systematic communication strategies.

Second, it is necessary to recognize that new information technologies (including both producer information products like design and software, and consumer information commodities such as videos, personal computers, etc.) enter the marketplace "already constituted as expressions of capital and its needs." (Robins and Webster, 1983). They are not wired to facilitate democratic agendas. As a result, democratic activists must develop communication strategies which consciously seek to counter the programming hardwired into these technologies. In sum, they not only require democratic commitments, they also need adequate theories of mass communication as well as technological expertise and production skills. What is at stake in the new ideological warfare is nothing less than the power to define reality.

Third, it is not enough for opponents of information-capitalism to produce alternative constructions of reality. They must also articulate epistemologies which legitimize these constructions because established powers establish the rules of evidence which prevail within their provinces.

Fourth, in addition to producing alternative interpretations of reality, opponents of information-capitalism must also create innovative networks of communication for distributing their messages. Video co-ops may become the electronic culture's equivalent of the medieval print shop. Deep-Dish Satellite, a New York-based video production organization, is an example of an alternative television production system which has established a national network using citizen access cable channels.

Fifth, lessons can be learned from the history of recent democratic social movements. Veterans of failed movements frequently attribute their defeat to "the media": to mass media's abilities to co-opt, trivialize, reframe, undermine, and distort movement agendas. The war wounds of these veterans can suggest some defensive strategies that democratic activists could adopt. In Movements and Messages: Media and Radical Politics in Quebec (1983), Marc Raboy identifies some of the lessons learned the hard way by democratic forces in Quebec and elsewhere. Raboy concludes that democratic communicative strategies should (a) create feelings of solidarity, feelings of belonging to a common culture; (b) challenge mainstream media by offering audiences alternative interpretations of reality; (c) embody democratic principles in their own organizational structures; (d) be independent of both business interests and the state; and (e) have links with popular, political and union movements without being organically tied to them. However, not all opponents of information-capitalism have been crushed. Revolutionaries and terrorists are not the only activists who understand the power of the media. Lessons can also be learned from democratic movements which have successfully used the media. Greenpeace, for example, has been very effective on staging dramatic media events by providing their own film crews and producing high quality footage which appeals to large audiences. This strategy was also adopted by the United Mine Workers when they occupied Pittston's Moss 3 plant in Carbo, Virginia, although the mine workers have not been as successful as Greenpeace in getting by the gateskeepers of major U. S. media.

Advocates of democratic resistance should not ignore the fact that the power-knowledge of information-capitalism has given birth to new categories of workers as well as new categories of outlaws. Knowledge-workers are strategically positioned in the new information order. Alvin Gouldner (1982) thought they represented a new revolutionary class. To date there is little to support Gouldner's claim. Unionism is in decline among information workers. The conditions of work in most segments of the information industry do not promote development of a collective consciousness. New job titles proliferate, old print-related crafts disappear, and "interfacing" with a video display screen supplants interaction with co-workers. Nevertheless, the effects of deregulation, privatization, concentration, and internationalization of information industries as well as "de-skilling" of the labor of knowledge workers could combine to radicalize some segments of this group. Their expertise could make them particularly dangerous opponents of information-capitalism and very useful allies in democratic movements against the totalitarian structures of information-capitalism. Moreover some political activism fueled by criticism of information-capitalism's code of technical efficiency has sporadically occurred among such unlikely cadres of knowledge workers as computer scientists and engineers.

Information-capitalism's commodification of time and knowledge have transformed these once priceless entities into liquid assets. The outlaws of the information age steal them. In America, time and information pirates have become modern folk-heroes, especially among the young who regard computer hackers and the HBO Bandit as new-age Robin Hoods. However, the habitual criminals of information-capitalism usually engage in less dramatic exploits. They frequently carry briefcases and commit their crimes at the Xerox machine, the Facsimile machine or at the meetings of the IBM users' club. The use of Fax machines during the Chinese student movement marked the beginning of a new chapter in revolutionary politics; today Fax machines are being used to circumvent official censorship in Latin American countries. Thus, for example, a newspaper edited by a Central American emigre is written in Pennsylvania and faxed to his homeland where it is reproduced by xerox and circulated to the interior.

Although largely unorganized, popular resistance to the privatization of knowledge indicates that the triumph of information-capitalism is not yet assured. It also suggests some amendments to Raboy's list: (a) capture the public imagination by rewiring or reprogramming new technologies so that they can serve as tools of popular resistance; (b) cultivate alliances with information workers but be wary of signs of incipient vanguardism; (c) create outreach projects to bring technological expertise and equipment to groups denied access to these resources.

Sixth, the histories of Liberal and Marxist societies have demonstrated that intellectual elites or vanguards cannot be trusted to rebuild the world to democratic specifications. Philosopher-kings tend to behave as kings not philosophers. Nevertheless as citizens with useful skills they may have a role to play in developing strategies for resisting information-capitalism.

Intellectuals may not be able to rebuild the world, but they can rebuild their theories about the world. Nether classic Liberalism nor classic Marxism can provide theories which adequately explain an economy in which information produces surplus value. As a result, neither of these worldviews can provide satisfactory tools for resisting the censorship of information-capitalism. Lessons can be learned from our ancestors, but citing prescient passages from Areopagitica or Grudrisse is no substitute for developing media-critical theories which directly address the problems posed by information-capitalism.

In my judgment, media-critical theories should: (a) reject mechanical models which see media contents as simple "reflections" or "superstructures" of corporate or state control systems; (b) recognize that the intertextuality and ambiguity of mediated messages cannot be captured by linear causal models; (c) acknowledge that the message sent is not always the message received; (d) examine the class functions of mass media; (e) analyze the new international system of social stratification created by information-capitalism; (f) consider the strategic positioning of knowledge-workers in the new order; (g) expose the power-knowledge wired into the circuitry of new information technologies; (h) explore the gendered assumptions that secure modern concepts of information; (i) develop rigorous models for criticizing media which are as accessible to civilians as they are to specialists so that all citizens can engage in what Umberto Eco has described as "semiotic guerilla warfare;" (j) articulate epistemological groundings for cultures of critical discourse; and (k) police vanguardism in theory and society by keeping theory and theorists responsive to rules of reflexive power-talk. (Ackerman 1980; Jansen 1983). This proposal does not fully outline the work of a new media-critical theory; it only marks some openings for dialogue.

Emerging platforms for developing resistance to information-capitalism

The first enclosure movement transformed wilderness into property and thereby made capitalism and nationalism possible. Concepts of "public" spaces and goods are artifacts of pre-modern and modern systems of power-knowledge. This paper should not be read as a brief for unreconstructed restoration of the nation-state; imperialism and colonialism are articulations of nationalism. My paper should be construed as an argument against all forms of power which do not routinely and insistently hold the powerful accountable to the will of their constituents.

It is not yet clear what kinds of platforms can be crafted for creating such accountability under conditions of global-information capitalism. Revolutionary forms of resistance to the global hegemony of information-capitalism have assumed several forms: Islamic fundamentalism, the Chinese reversion to pre-market based militarism, state or other forms of "terrorism," etc. Some revolutionary resistance has, however, been fairly effective in exploiting the contradictions in information-capitalism in non-violent ways. Currently in South Africa large Western capitalist interests fund both sides of the conflict as a means of courting favor with whatever side eventually triumphs. Thus, for example, the African National Congress receives substantial amounts of funding from the European Economic Community (Tomaselli, 1989). Plumbing the possibilities of such contradictions is, of course, a useful strategy for local activists, but, in my judgment, this strategy is not likely to give birth to new platforms for systematically organizing and expressing global opinion. It involves a trade-off whereby activists use but are also used by the interests of information-capitalism.

To date environmental crises and human rights violations have been the most effective vehicles for organizing world public opinion. Thus, for example, the Green movement, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and Article 19 have experienced some success in expanding the claims of their constituencies. The successor to the public sphere of capitalism may emerge from these foundations. Such neo-modern efforts, which attempt to fulfill the unkept promises of the Enlightenment could conceivably articulate "rational" (re: systematic, predictable, and accountable) grounds and structures for resisting the hegemony on information-capitalism.

Bhopal, Chernobyl, and global-warming are artifacts of the new global economy. They are also compelling arguments for development of global alliances among organizations committed to the preservation of the planet, its species, and its human cultural heritages.

Like our adversaries, those of us who would support critical alternatives to a hegemonic global economy, also need to hedge our bets. The postmodern critique may produce new tools for thinking critically about community and democracy: tools that render obsolete the "neo-modern" possibilities considered in this paper. On the other hand, however, Beirut may have been the first postmodern city.

Notes

*The approach to critical theory articulated in this section is an extension and elaboration of ideas originally developed in *Censorship: The Knot That Binds Power and Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

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Sue Curry Jansen is Associate Professor of Communication Studies at Muhlenberg and Cedar Crest Colleges, Allentown, PA.

The Impact of Pictographic Reasoning on Contemporary Pedagogy

George Teschner
Frank McClusky

The use of the cathode ray tube as a primary mode of delivering information is bringing about fundamental changes in linguistic and cognitive habits. As a result, contemporary society is witnessing a collision between an older literate culture founded upon phonetic script and a new culture rooted in modes of communication that are pictographic.[1] The newer technology, that has the capacity of instantaneously transmitting visual and audio images, renders obsolete many of the established structures of the older forms of communication.

Printed Words and Electronic Pictures

Pictures that are formed on a television screen are significantly different from other imaging technologies. Television images are in motion and transmit non-verbal signs that are lost in still pictures. Television images are accompanied by speech which, unlike the printed word, contains a full range of vocal and visual inflection capable of distinguishing nuances in meaning. Visual forms accompany the spoken word with images of the actions and contexts which fix the meaning of words. The events are pictured instantaneously so that the picture comes near as possible to resembling the actual experience.[2] By contrast the printed word loses almost all of the cues provided by inflection, live action, and context. The fixing of meaning in the case of written language is done instead by surrounding the written signs with a system of signs to form texts. In societies with fully formed phonetic languages, textuality substitutes for the fullness of oral communication. The economy of natural language requires that a single linguistic sign serves a variety of functions. Words such as 'fire', 'fine', and 'frame' each have at least four distinct meanings. The sentence "It is too hot to eat", or "He saw the man in the park with the telescope" are familiar examples of strings of written signs with multiple meanings. The discipline of hermeneutics systematizes methods and criteria for disambiguating texts. Hermeneutics exists because of the inherent ambiguity in the written sign.

Oral Cultures

There are striking resemblances between pictographic and oral cultures. In an oral culture the word is a specific occurrence in the context of action. Language is a mode of behavior rather than an expression of thought. Wittgenstein's example of a builder and his assistant serves as an illustration. The words 'block' and 'slab' function to distinguish not the thing block and the thing slab but instead to differentiate two different behaviors, namely, passing a brick in contrast to passing a block.[3] The function of language is to create differences. What it is that is divided and distinguished is not the world but human action. The meaning of a word is the behavior that it elicits in a social context. This is intuitively obvious in an oral society where the relationship is not between word, meaning, and truth, but between word and action, and power.

In an oral culture, the word always occurs as part of a lived world. It is transient in contrast to the written word which remains in existence when the action context which gave it meaning has disappeared. When words are spoken, the context itself changes. The environment responds to and redirects the course of speech which reciprocally modifies the environment. Oral cultures must verbalize and conceptualize in close proximity with the lifeworld that is filled with gesture, intonations and inflection. Writing, by contrast, relies for clarity of meaning not upon action which would be contemporaneous with its utterance, but upon other strings of visual signs which make up the body of a written work. Action and situation are replaced by script and text. In an oral society, the spoken word is part of an actual interpersonal present. Writing, however, is a solitary activity, conducive to introspection in which the presence of audience and author are existentially absent. The written word cannot be directly interrogated. It is unresponsive to the reader and detached from the author. In writing, extra-textual context is missing. Punctuation in written language is a scant substitute for the richness of meaning that can be achieved by inflection. The veracity and reliability of writing cannot be determined by the manner of its delivery and the tone and mood of the speaker. Nor can it be directly contested in the manner of oral speech. The determination of truth in the case of written language and especially textuality is dependent not upon a living context but instead upon textual cohesion and consistency.

Oral and literate cultures cultivate different linguistic abilities.[4] It is not possible to look up a word in an oral culture. Its linguistic signs have no visual presence; they leave no trace. The only access that exists to the linguistic practices of an oral culture is through recall by mnemonic aids, rhythmic oral patterns and repetition. The meanings of words and the accumulated knowledge of the oral culture is contained in such formulae as "a stitch in time saves nine" or "there is many a slip betwixt the cup and the lip." Learning is through apprenticeship in which listening, repeating and mastering proverbs are the valued abilities. In oral cultures there are no neutral lists, itemizations and manuals. Instructions on how to do things are always conveyed through concrete narratives that surround instructions with a story line. Language practices in oral cultures are taught the way something such as swimming is taught - not through reading a book, but through practice and repetition.

Oral Reasoning

Our concept of reason and logic is essentially textual in nature. In an oral culture what is generally associated with critical thought is absent. For a nonliterate individual the connection between things is not seen according to abstract general categories but instead according to utility. The abstract categories necessary for syllogistic reasoning are absent. Ong in *Orality and Literacy* describes Alexsandr Luriia's work in which nonliterate persons were asked to identify geometrical figures.[5] The words that they used were names of concrete objects. A circle was called a plate, a sieve, and the moon. A square was a door, a mirror and a house. In another instance subjects were presented with groups of four objects: a hammer, saw, log, hatchet. The non-literate subjects were asked to group together the objects that were similar. The literate answer is that the hammer, saw, and hatchet are tools, the log is not. But for the non-literate subjects, saws, hammers, and hatchets are used to cut and shape logs, and it makes no sense to separate them from one another according to the rules of what sounds like a verbal game. In the same work Luriia describes giving non-literates the following syllogism, "In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white. Novaya Zembla is in the far North and there is always snow there. What color are the bears?". A typical response to the question was "I don't know. I've seen a black bear. I've never seen any others... Each locality has it own animals." In another case the same syllogism was given to a man that was barely literate. His response was that "To go by your words, the bear is white." The phrase, "to go by your words" indicates that there was a recognition of formal relations, yet there was no feeling of being compelled to assent to the conclusion beyond the restrictions imposed by the words. The perception of such responses from the point of view of literacy is that there is a deficiency in the ability to reason. An alternative hypothesis is that what we have called reasoning is the peculiarity of the verbal practices of a literate society.

Pictographic Reasoning

The language of ancient China, although it has a written form, is not phonetic. It is a pictographic language with signs that are closely connected to the objects they are said to name. Consequently, there is not the disposition toward the formation of abstract nouns as there is in alphabetic languages. Nouns in ancient Chinese functioned like the mass nouns, 'rice', 'water', 'paper', etc. do in English. Mass nouns contrast with count nouns such as 'table', 'house', 'lamp', etc., which can be preceded by the definite articles 'a' or 'an', can take pluralization, and be modified numerically. In contrast to the Greek idea that there are universal essences that a word names, the substance that mass nouns name is a total quantity of stuff. Here the relationship of one to many is a relation of whole to part. In a language that has names that do not function as abstract nouns, it is not possible to have categorical reasoning based upon class relations.

In ancient China there was a paradox which resulted in much debate over the validity of formal inference.[6] It can be agreed, for example, that since a white horse is a horse, riding a white horse is riding a horse. The rule is that what is true of the genus is true of the species. However, applying the principle to the following inferences creates a problem.

> Since her brother is a handsome man, and she loves her brother, then she loves a handsome man.
>
> Since his parents are human beings, and he serves his parents, therefore he serves human beings.
>
> Since murderers are men, abounding in murderers is abounding in men.
>
> If it is good to kill murderers, and murderers are men, then it is good to kill men.

Our natural response is to rescue the formal algebraic inference and say the intention of the term 'love' in the proposition "She loves her brother." is different from the intention of the word 'love' in the proposition, "She loves a handsome man." However, the reason why this remained a persistent problem for thinkers in ancient China and not for the philosophers of ancient Greece was that the Chinese language being pictographic resisted the kind of abstraction that was necessary for a purely formal manipulation of signs. A distinction could not clearly be made between the intention and the extension of a term. It would be comparable to trying to define the syntax of a painting.

Chinese philosophy in fact had no theory of mental entities. In place of a knowledge of classes where what is known is *that* something is of a certain kind, there was knowledge of *how* to use particular words for discriminating different attitudes and behaviors. The Chinese term 'chih' , usually translated by the word 'know', does not mean the propositional knowledge of "knowing that". Rather it is to be understood as "knowing how", namely, as a skill. Knowledge is the skill at using the system of signs according to the linguistic conventions of society. Instead of speaking of the truth of a statement, the emphasis is placed upon the appropriateness or acceptability of its utterance. The criteria employed is that applied to any human action. In place of rules of evidence there are rules of conduct. The theory of language and mind that Plato made natural to the West never occurred to the ancient Chinese.

Contemporary Culture and Critical Thinking

Contemporary culture is moving in two different directions linguistically. On the one hand, the mechanization of language, which began with the alphabet and was industrialized by the invention of the printing press, is now being automated by the computer. On the other hand, because of television, communication is becoming more pictographic and less textual. The disambiguation of the signifier is achieved through vocal inflection, gesture and action. Subtleties of meaning which before relied upon text now can be conveyed instantaneously through audio-visual media. The formal syntactic structures of sequential reasoning can be maintained only insofar as the signification of a sign can remain stable from one context to another. But it is this stability that is dissolved by electronic communication. It is impossible, for example, to capture the subtleties of street slang in a dictionary. Such signifiers are incomplete without the behaviors that accompany them. And since they are tied to human action their meaning is continually changing. This is equally true of signifiers that are learned through audio-visual media.

Critical thinking is a movement away from the syntactic and symbolic focus of formal logic. It is a return to doing logic and philosophy in natural language. However, contemporary natural language practices are resembling language practices in oral societies where the meaning of a word is the action with which it associated. Sentences are performative. Value is decided by whether or not an utterance is appropriate in a given context. Propositional truth can only occur in writing and in the presence of texts. A sentence such as "I hereby promise..." can be heard as an autobiographical description of the speaker or as performative utterance that is judged by the same criteria by which any action is judged. We ask "Is it effective?", "Is it appropriate under the circumstances". Hearing the sentence performatively we do not ask whether it is true or false. Since performative utterances do not have truth value, they cannot be the elements of argumentation. Critical thinking and educational theory have diagnosed the failure of contemporary pedagogy as a deficiency in reasoning and thinking skills. Here, however, we can repeat the words of McLuhan that, "We have confused reason with literacy and rationalism with a single technology."[7] It is not that there is a loss of reasoning but that there is a different kind of reasoning.

The bulwark of argumentation theory and informal logic rests on the relationship between reason and conclusion that is described in the literature by the metaphor of support. Reasons are said to "support" conclusions. But the feeling of support requires that syntactic structures can be abstracted from a stable semantic base. Indeed informal logic chooses not to symbolize these structures. Nevertheless, it does require that these formal relations be felt. In an oral or pictographic culture where the meanings of words is their associated actions, the feeling of support is absent. The utterance of one sentence can compel the utterances of another, but there is no force requiring assent that results strictly from formal inference.

The critical thinking movement inherits a prejudice from the history of Western philosophy that is likely to arise in literate cultures and is totally absent from oral and pictographic cultures. It originates from what Rorty called, "...Plato's muddled attempt to talk about adjectives as if they were nouns."[8] Although beautiful things can be felt by the senses, beauty cannot. For Plato beauty as such was an immaterial entity experienced by the equally immaterial mind. By treating meaning as immaterial, removed from the realm of the bodily senses, the significance and power of words was divorced from action. Thinking, instead of being the manipulation of the tokens of social exchange, was experienced as the working of an inner reality of which language was merely the outward expression. Consequently, critical thinking, in imagining that it is developing and promoting mental skills, has disregarded the enunciative context in which sentences are uttered. It too, like formal logic, considers syntax apart from semantics and pragmatics. It would be comparable to teaching swimming without water, and mountain climbing without cliffs. It has only been by separating syntax from semantics and thereby presupposing a detachable form that critical thinking has maintained that the skills which it teaches are significantly transferrable.

Some Suggestions

A number of recommendations follows as consequences. First, if critical thinking skills are to be transferrable, then they must be practiced in the vocabulary of the field to which they are applied. Semantic practices are as important as formal syntactic structures. In order, for instance, to think critically in the sciences we must speak the language of science.

Secondly, what has been diagnosed as a lack of skill is instead the presence of a skill of a different order. Contemporary students hear sentences performatively. They feel less the force of purely algebraic inference. The critical thinking literature is heavily dependent upon writing, primarily developing analytical skills through the analysis of written exercises. In order to incorporate more the performative aspects of language critical thinking needs to become more forensic and rhetorical.

Thirdly, the skills that the contemporary student has acquired from the richness of audio visual communication is the ability to distinguish subtle differences in meaning. Because less attention has been payed to the semantic aspects of analytical thinking, the critical thinking literature has been untroubled by the use of metaphor in describing reasoning skills. We can understand the word `clarity' when it is applied to visual phenomena and the word `support' when it describes a distribution of physical forces. But what is meant by the words `clarity' and `support' when they are used in the context of thinking? Paraphrase, on the other hand, is a method which is able to explore the properties of what has been termed `clarity' and `support' as characteristics of critical discourse. Paraphrase is an analytic technique that is semantic rather than syntactic. It develops an adeptness in being able to move between different vocabularies and discursive fields and achieve many of the analytic skills that have been sought through more syntactic approaches.

Endnotes

1. Postman, Neil, *Teaching as a Conserving Activity* (New York: Dell) 1979, p. 33-48.
2. Greenfield, Patricia, *Mind and Media* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard) 1984, p. 25ff.
3. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillian) 1952, p. 6ff.
4. Ong, Walter, *Orality and Literacy* (London: Methuen) 1983, p.22.
5. *Ibid*,. p. 49.
6. Hansen, Chad, *Language and Logic in Ancient China* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press) 1983, p. 100ff.
7. McLuhan, Marshall, *Understanding Media* (New York: McGraw Hill) 1964, p. 30.
8. Rorty, Richard, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 1979, p. 33.

George Teschner is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Christopher Newport College. Frank McClusky is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Mercy College.

Listening to English from Speakers of English

Michael Kagan

It has been suggested that even the creator of the universe could find no better way to keep people from completing a project than by making them unable to understand each other's language.[1] According to Jewish legend:

> God . . . spake " . . . let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech." Thus it happened. Thenceforth none knew what the other spoke. One would ask for the mortar, and the other handed him a brick; in a rage, he would throw the brick at this partner and kill him. Many perished in this manner. . . . .[2]

The problem with Babel was not only that the people could not understand each other's language--they thought they should be able to without any extra effort. They probably believed they were still speaking the same language. After all, they had been all speaking one language just shortly before.

The classroom can introduce its own similar confusions. We walk into class talking with our students, discussing politics or the weather, sports, a movie or a recent episode of some TV series. Shortly after we take attendance (sooner if we don't take attendance), something happens. Communication becomes more difficult.

While in graduate school, I once asked a friend of mine (called Kevin here) to come along to a course in philosophical logic. The issues were exciting and the treatment often hilarious. We were then studying theories that had all names refer to their objects, views which seemed to guarantee the existence of the specific archangels, Santa Claus, and Yorick the king's jester. We were reading Kripke and Dummett under the tutelage of a down-to-earth pragmatist whose expression and delivery are akin to Jack Benny's. Kevin is bright, well-read, and articulate. "A splendid time," I thought, "is guaranteed to all." Kevin came to the session, and afterwards explained that it was impenetrable. Kevin is not a professional philosopher. He doesn't speak the language.

* * *

Consider the following truism and one of its implications:

Truism: Words vary in meaning according to context.

Implication: The word "English" may vary in meaning according to context.

Casual observation seems to reveal a variety of specialized languages and vocabularies associated with each special enterprise. These terms often overlap general terms. Some are the same. Some of these that are the same seem to mean the same thing (by "mean" here I mean something like "get the same job done"). Some do not. There are wrenches and Allen Wrenches. There are programs and programs. There are synthetic statements and synthetic fabrics. There are philosophical arguments and there are marital arguments. Some of these vocabularies appear to develop into their own languages, as does Yiddish from German and Hebrew. Whether a different way of talking is a dialect, a sublanguage or a language in its own right is a decision I leave to others. In this paper the idea of students coming from a different English speaking culture is being used heuristically for pragmatic reasons; It is not being offered as a descriptive sociological or anthropological claim. Bearing this in mind, one thing fairly obvious to many of us as teachers is that although our students also qualify as English speakers, the English they speak and (occasionally) write is not always the same as ours. Their language seems to have a different history, reflecting different ways of doing things, ways of seeing things. They have not inherited the same literature that we have, whether our inheritance be the old standards ("Great Books") or the newest trend in literary criticism.

Whether our inheritance be analytic methods applied to texts or tissues, the legacy is not theirs, at least not yet. Lately, with all the discussion about the aims of education, we have been reminded that students, especially at earlier levels, may be coming to claim their birthright--an inheritance that includes an expansion of language, and processes and methods including techniques of critical thinking, as well as mastery of content (e.g., useful or interesting information about the futures they face and the worlds they may inhabit).

It is easy to forget the obvious. It is easy to forget that, to an important extent, they come to us without the inheritance they seek to acquire from us. It is as if--you'll have to ask the professional anthropologists here at this conference just how iffy this "as if" is--it is as if they have come to us from a different English speaking culture.

One of the hardest things about interacting in a different English speaking culture is the generally strong feeling that since all parties concerned consider themselves English speakers, we speak the same language. This is not the case; just ask a Texan visiting England.

That two languages seem to exhibit a general syntactic and semantic isomorphism is no guarantee that they will continue to do so in all cases. One case where I have suddenly discovered myself to be in foreign territory has to do with the language of students in my philosophy classes.

Today, I defend the thesis that it is often necessary to retranslate the language of popular student culture in order to understand, evaluate, and respond to student claims and questions. This retranslation can help us as teachers:

1) to avoid committing the fallacy of "straw-person" argumentation; and
2) to communicate more effectively with our students.

To show how this works, I will consider the unusual (and illegitimate according to most academic canons) student use of expressions such as "prove," "thus," "therefore," "argue," "show," "imply," and "infer." I will also discuss some background considerations that can interfere with or help students and teachers in our communications with each other. I continue by giving an example of how we can apply our awareness of our differences to the task of communicating in a teaching situation. As the paper concludes I consider some lessons we can learn from foreign language instructors and speech and language pathologists. Though the examples given will be most familiar to teachers of philosophy, I trust that anyone who has been on the giving or receiving end of classroom transactions will find something familiar here.

Since many students systematically use (many of us might say abuse) terms like "prove," "infer," and "imply," it is, I argue, a useful idea to make sense of this kind of speech, above and beyond the standard procedure of attempting to correct students' non-academic dialects piecemeal.

It is hard for a philosopher trained as many of us are, to listen patiently while students abuse words like "prove" and "therefore." Many students do not seem to know the difference between an "argument" and an "opinion," an "inference" and an "implication," a "necessary" and a "sufficient" condition. . . We can correct them piecemeal. We can sometimes even forget that they don't use these words the way we do and correct what we think they are saying. We can fail their papers until they get it right; we can give up and never assign another paper.

A bleakly comic scene that used to show up in the movies from time to time was that of the Ugly American in another country shouting at its residents because they failed to speak English. The scene grows funnier, if not more tragic, if we replace the Ugly Americans with instructors who berate their students since they do not yet know the ins and outs of the language they have come to learn.

Consider the word "prove." Many, perhaps most of the students I've come across, use the word "prove" to mean "argue" or "try to convince" or "give or attempt to give evidence for a position." Most of the professionals in my philosophical tradition use the word "prove" to mean "give a sound deductive argument for."[3]

Most professionals in philosophy take the verb "argue" to mean something like, "to offer reasons for a claim." Most students take this word to mean "fight." The pragmatics of "student culture" has taught them that it is a bad idea indeed to *fight* with an instructor. Long ingrained and useful patterns of student culture and language concerning manners, agreement and credibility may interfere with their acquiring a non-combative concept of argument, and may actually interfere with their offering arguments. Similarly, phrases like "what do you think about X" (e.g., what point do you think Socrates is making here in the Apology?") may be difficult for a student to translate, given classroom dynamics. Language and context may mix badly, creating a double bind. Experience with previous instructors may lead the student to understand this question *pragmatically* as "what point do you think I think Socrates is making here in the Apology?" Occasionally a student may crack or rebel under the pressure of this kind of ambiguity and ask, "What do you *want*?"

According to one school of interpretation, when RAMBAM (Maimonides, 1135-1204) wrote and taught his philosophy in the *Guide of the Perplexed*, he protected the secrecy of his teaching by first explaining technical uses for ordinary vocabulary and then using his vocabulary technically. The less astute among the student readers would stumble in the ways of their old habits, hear the old words with their old meanings, and misunderstand the whole business.

What is said to have occurred to RAMBAM's readers as a result of deliberation may happen to our students by accident. Ask a formal logic instructor what happens when students are confronted with the formal definition of a truth-functional conditional or "if-then" connective, or a new definition of "valid." Ask English teachers about "imply" and "infer" . . . But, rather than wear us out reviewing the range of common student abuse/use of terms like these, I would prefer to spend the rest of this paper considering how we might avoid what could be called (after that famous Jewish medieval philosopher) RAMBAMMING students when they ask questions.

Let's consider the word "prove." As mentioned above, in professional philosophical discourse "prove X" means something like "argue soundly for some claim X." Yet students use the word differently. Consider the context of arguments for God's existence. One such argument, namely argument from Biblical authority, is taken to be so flawed that about the only time we see it written in a philosophy text is as an example of a bad argument. For example, last year at the first annual conference on critical thinking here at Montclair, it was used as a paradigm case of Begging the Question. Now, many students will read such treatment of the argument, accept this, and have no problem with it. However, other students will either continue to take Scripture seriously, or realize that many apparently rational people take it seriously and still will ask, e.g., "Doesn't the Bible prove there is a God?"[4] Similarly we will see questions like "doesn't science prove our minds are our brains?" and "doesn't my seeing you prove you are here?" In all these cases these questions may be veiled arguments along the lines of:

1. Everything science (or the Bible or vision) attests to affirmatively is the case;
2. science (or the Bible or vision) attests affirmatively to the claim under dispute;
3. Therefore the disputed claim is the case.

Even if the conclusion to the example argument were true, in all these cases the dreaded question "why does this authority say so?" could arise. If the answer is different from the cited authority, the authority is in some sense unnecessary;[5] if the answer is just another name for the authority, then the argument has begged the question. The dilemma concerning authoritarian argumentation is a version of the famous paradox of the *Euthyphro* where Socrates asks if the Pious is loved by the gods because it is pious or if it is Pious because the gods love it.[6]

Sometimes our students may be offering question-begging argumentation by asking questions of the form, "doesn't N prove that P?"; sometimes they may be raising legitimate non-question begging concerns. At other times, when they are asking such questions, they may not be arguing at all. Sometimes the student questioners are using the word "prove" in the way the students use it before they learn the academic vocabulary (where "prove P" may mean something like "present or attempt to present evidence for P"). Before we answer or criticize the student's point, we need to investigate the language in its context. Otherwise we will argue at cross-purposes or commit the fallacy of "straw person" against the student's point. Furthermore, if we assume that the student is using the language our way, or infer such use from the fact that we defined the term "prove" earlier in the semester, we may be RAMBAMMING them or committing the fallacy of misplaced accuracy,[7] a dictionary version of the is/ought fallacy in which we assume that people *actually do use* the language the way the lexicon and grammar books say they *ought to use it*.

When students say "prove," they may mean what I do when I say "attempt to give evidence for"; just as when they say "valid" they often mean what I do when I say "sound." To find out what students are getting at, I recommend we ask them.[8] We may, e.g., ask a leading question: "Do you mean by 'prove that God exists' that the Bible offers airtight arguments from self-evident truths the way Euclid proves truths in geometry?" Or we can ask the less leading question, "What do you mean by 'prove'?" This may save all of us (students and teachers alike) trouble and embarrassment. The instructor does not spend valuable time answering a question the student did not ask; neither do students get criticized for offering a bad argument when they may not have been arguing at all.

Given these considerations, when a student says something that sounds odd, it may be a good time to double-check the vocabulary. Double-checking can provide us with opportunities to learn how students use the words we may be using differently. Then we can explain to them the technical use of the relevant term.

When communication seems to be suffering (e.g, students seem peculiarly dense, we have just repeated the same thing four times in different ways) we might try to listen carefully to our students, acting as if we are in a different English speaking culture when we deal with students (as we might feel if we were, say, Texans in Britain). Doing this we could assume that some of our vocabulary would be the same ("chair," "haircut," "final exam") due to historical confluence, that some vocabulary would be isomorphic but equivocal ("prove," "valid," "argue") while some terms or expressions might be found only in one group's language (e.g., "ontological," "heterological," "operant conditioning").

When the speaker of student English confronts us with a question (or when we attempt to confront them with a question), we might try to determine which of these three kinds of language overlap apply. When we explain it would seem to be optimal to use language we believe them to have acquired previously.[9] When we answer questions and respond to students' critical efforts, we may need to question questions more often before we reply. Getting clear on the issue is part of the methodology of many of the arts and sciences and can be part of what we teach.

* * *

Given this view of Academic English(es) as different from student English(es), we as instructors might usefully think of ourselves as teachers of what, even if it is not a foreign language, is at any rate language which is foreign. Then we can learn from foreign language teachers and speech and language pathologists to be sensitive to the distinctions between active and passive language--to be well aware that it can be harder to get students to speak our language than to get them to understand it when they hear or read it. We can also learn that language teaching that is not pragmatically relevant to the student rarely sticks--that the learning has to be important not only in the context of the learning exercise, but to the student's future experience.[10]

A sensitivity to special as well as general background issues may be crucial. It seems that languages and dialects contain certain paradigm cases (e.g., in some groups the Bible is a paradigm example of an authority) that embody what are taken to be central truths and standards by the community. Certain subgroups like students may have sub-languages which share these features. Students whose religious orientation is central to their survival are going to have different responses to religious terms. Understanding religious background may be crucial to understanding a question. For example, Islamic students might mean something a little different by "prove" if they ask, "Doesn't the Koran prove there is a God?"[11]

Some people listen better. Some talk so it is easier to listen. We probably all know someone who speaks English as a foreign language, slowly and carefully, with a controlled vocabulary, so that it is easier to follow. Once aware that students may come from backgrounds more different than previously suspected, we may listen and speak more carefully. We can be more willing to distinguish the language we are teaching from the language they have been taught. After we teach them (and they us), then we can be together with them doing philosophy or biology, or mathematics or literary criticism, whatever our disciplines may be . . . . The times do come when there is dialogue, when we say "brick" and they hand us a brick. Some students will end up speaking our language so well that *they* may forget that it's different. Clues that this is happening are the sophomores who raise their hands, and begin their questions with something like, "I have *always* thought that the ontological argument was a question-begging reductio . . . "

Notes

1. The story of the tower of Babel is found in Genesis 11:1-9.

2. From "The Tower of Babel," in Louis Ginzberg's *Legends of the Bible* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1975), pp. 84-85. This interpretation of the lack of communication can be found in Rashi's commentary on the words, "they may not understand" in vs. 7. For an interesting parallel, see Wittgenstein's discussion of a "complete primitive language" between a builder and an assistant in Part I of the *Philosophical Investigations*, third edition (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 3e.

3. I.e., to give a formally valid argument with true premises.

4. For a lively discussion of how this question may arise and compact response to it if it is being offered as argument from biblical authority when "prove" is used "correctly," see Peter Hutcheson, "The argument from Biblical authority" in *Teaching Philosophy*, 9:2 (June 1986), pp. 147-150, p. 147.

5. See Hutcheson.

6. Plato, *Euthyphro* 10a, ff.

7. A rather uncharitable application of a principle of charity where we assume proponents of a position know what they ought to know, but where such assumption works against their position or against their credibility or ability to mount a defense.

8. The possibility of sensibly asking such questions seems to require the (perhaps optimistic) assumption that a common vocabulary exists at another level, that terms for which we have not yet developed technical academic uses remain the same in the student cultures as among professional academics. Depending on subsequent questions, we may assume the legitimacy of taking advantage of students' previous studies (e.g., some may assume students to know the difference between even and odd numbers, or that they have studied and remembered some algebra or geometry if the college or university required these for admission).

9. See Richard Kretschmer and Laura Kretschmer, "Communication Competence and Assessment" in *Communication Assessment of Hearing Impaired Children: From Conversation to Classroom*, Monograph Supplement to *The Journal of the Academy of Rehabilitative Audiology*, Vol. XXI (1988), p. 7.

10. For one kind of philosophical defense of this point, see John Dewey's contribution to The Kappa Delta Pi Lecture Series, *Experience & Education* (New York: Macmillan Collier Books edition, 1963). Mere imitation, for example, does not make for language learning. In one study in language development a child became unable to repeat one of her own utterances when it lost direct pragmatic relevance. For this example, which shows how a language performance disintegrates in the absence of pragmatic utility, see the discussion in Herbert H. Clark and Eve V. Clark's *Psychology and Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.,), p. 335. Clark and Clark cite D. I. Slobin and C. A. Welsh's research ("Elicited Imitation as a Research Tool in Developmental Psycholinguistics" in C. A. Ferguson & D. I. Slobin's *Studies of Child Language Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 485-497.

11. The Islamic religious community sees the Koran itself as a miracle.

Michael Kagan is a member of the Department of Philosophy at Le Moyne College, Syracuse, NY.

Television and Critical Thinking: Is It Possible?

Will Kollock

Television is the antithesis of critical thinking. Television not only doesn't encourage critical analysis of its content, it makes it practically impossible. The constant blur of rapid images through time and space greatly inhibits inner-reconstruction: stop to think and you miss what follows. When television is watched for entertainment or relaxation, as it usually is, no one wants to interrupt the flow with analysis, particularly when effective analysis requires thinking about each image and its relationship to those images around it, then to the whole of the program and, next to other programs and finally to historical, psychological, sociological, etc., factors that interrelate in a complex and often confusing way. Hardly sounds relaxing, does it?

The difficulty of applying critical thinking to the analysis of television is further compounded by our bi-cameral brains. We are trained from babyhood to dominantly use the left-half of the brain, to deal with the world in a propositional, analytical, sequential and linear fashion. Television's technology, as well as production techniques, deny us the use of such skills. Images flash by faster than we can consciously comprehend them, let alone analyze them. We learn from television, but we learn without analysis. About the only thing viewers apply any critical judgment to is which show to watch. Students enter our schools and our colleges expecting to learn without thinking, to accept without judging. They want answers, not questions. They want speed and constant variety in the learning.

What to do? Students can learn to apply critical thinking skills to television programming and thus to its consequences. They already know the *content* of television even though they don't *understand* it in terms of critical thought. Unfortunately there are few answers regarding the possible effects of television. For every study proving the disastrous effects of TV's steady diet of sex and violence, there is a study demonstrating TV's innocence. Research using traditional scientific methodology yields conflicting results, in part because of the difficulty in controlling so many variables, and because of the artificiality of the research setting. Traditional criticism fares no better — most TV productions have multiple, unknown authors; they inhibit or prohibit intellectual analysis by their very structure; continuing series and soap operas offer temporary conclusions but no real end. There are few answers but many questions. Asking these questions has proven to offer an effective path to understanding. So, ask questions. As you explore these questions with your students, new questions will arise. First question yourself, and only afterward question your students. Are we arrogant as educators, denying we watch much TV or that we ourselves are influenced by it? Do we refuse to think critically about TV because we refuse to recognize, let alone admit, our own involvement with it? I tell my wife I *must* watch TV because I teach it.

The average American watches TV in excess of 6 hours a day. If you don't watch that long, there are poor souls somewhere enslaved to the set to keep up the average. Is it safe to make the assumption that anything we do for that long will have some effect? Even staring at a blank wall for 6 hours daily should yield at least some effect. And TV is certainly not a blank wall. It is filled with messages which are consistent and unrelenting. Six and one-half hours is more time than children spend daily with any single influence: teachers, parents, siblings or peers. Every poll confirms that young children and often babies in the crib watch a large amount of TV.

You have read many times that TV is commonly used as a babysitter. It doesn't help to say it shouldn't be. It is and will continue to be a handy respite from the exhaustion of child-tending in a harried schedule.

What is the result of this constant early exposure to TV's repetitious messages? What if TV is actually helping to mold the nuclear personalities of children? Psychologists generally agree that the nuclear personality is formed in inverse proportion to age; the earliest impressions exert the strongest influence. Significant others are largely responsible for the formation of the child's self-concept, values and attitudes. Is it possible that TV itself has become a significant other, disproportionately sharing its values with the child? Many critics feel that TV is absorbed directly into the unconscious mind via the right hemisphere of the brain, thus by-passing the left hemisphere's ability to analyze, judge and categorize. Is this dramatic possibility even more insidious since we know that young minds have less developed left brain abilities to begin with?

Do TV images pour into essentially passive minds, inducing a hypnotic-like state? TV requires little or no intellectual effort. The ability to think critically about TV is hampered by the speed with which images flash by. Images replace one another before they can be thought about. TV provides no opportunity to talk back, to ask questions or to review scenes in order to compare or contrast. It allows only emotional participation.

Is it possible that Jerzy Kosinski's satirical novel, *Being There*, is becoming reality? The mind of the main character, Chance, has been molded almost entirely by watching TV. A retarded and illegitimate child, he has been shut away all of his life by his wealthy and politically powerful father. TV is his sole companion and his only teacher. When his father becomes severely ill, Chance is catapulted into national politics. He has become TV. His values, his manner of speaking, the way he dresses are all a result of TV. He is so good at being TV that he easily impresses a public who find in Chance a comfortable and reassuring TV image.

How real are TV's characters and messages to us? Children imitate the behavior they experience. TV is no exception. Take as an example a five-year-old brother of one of my students who hit his two-year-old sister on the head with a frying pan after seeing a "Three Stooges" film on TV. When Moe was hit with the pan, he wasn't injured; his eyes bulged, his head shook rapidly, his throat emitted a funny sound, and the action continued. The blow to the two-year-old sister resulted in a concussion and a gash requiring twelve stitches to close. The parents took their son to a psychiatrist who said the boy was perfectly normal. He just didn't understand the consequences of imitating what he had seen on TV. But are children the only ones who find TV's output surprisingly real? Raymond Burr of "Perry Mason" fame received thousands of letters asking for legal advice. The American Bar Association invited him to speak at a national convention. Alan Alda of "M*A*S*H" received frequent requests for medical advice and spoke at an American Medical Association convention. Children and teenagers aren't the only ones who adopt a TV character's hair style or who buy clothes similar to those sported by a TV character. National and international fads are commonly sparked by TV. Ask students to discuss this phenomenon and they will provide dozens of examples.

Does TV hinder the development of the characteristics of a mature adult? For example, what effect does TV have on our tolerance of frustration? Students typically respond that TV presents the expectation that even the most complex problems can be solved in twenty-six minutes (because they always are on TV), that the world is just and fair, that good always triumphs over evil, that the boy always gets the girl if he's supposed to, etc. Do these and other expectations lead to exaggerated disappointment in dealing with the real world? Similarly, does TV affect our tolerance of ambiguity? TV has pat answers to everything; life does not.

Does TV, therefore, teach us to settle for an easy answer before we have to suffer the pain of cognitive dissonance? Are we able to accept that at times we don't have sufficient information to make an accurate judgement, let alone a mature decision, and to live with that ambiguity while searching for more information?

Ask your students to discuss the messages of several TV series with which they are familiar. For example, what does "M*A*S*H" teach us about the following:

1. Authority? Students usually say that characters in authority on "M*A*S*H" are egotistical, prejudiced, and just plain stupid. Only by subverting authority can the doctors go about the business of saving lives.

2. Women? Students say women on "M*A*S*H" are bundles of sexual desire. Even "Hotlips," the most professional of all the nurses, constantly needs sex. She has slept with many colonels and generals in Tokyo and carries on an open and adulterous affair at the camp.

3. Alcohol? Students say that alcohol is what keeps the "M*A*S*H" unit going. It reduces the tremendous stress the doctors feel. Trying to get nurses drunk in order to have sex with them is acceptable behavior.

4. Government? Students say government is pictured as a bureaucratic morass, run by incompetents and crooks.

5. War? Students say war is shown as a ridiculous and horrible tragedy. At the same time it is fun. The characters seem to laugh and enjoy themselves more than is usual in real life.

6. Discipline? Students say the series depicts discipline as an impediment to effective performance. Only Colonel Potter can discipline and he is more a father figure than an authority figure.

Discussion of the messages of this and other series demonstrates that students can, indeed, think critically about the content of TV when they become involved with analysis. At this point they are ready to discuss the broader messages of TV; messages that are fairly consistent in most programming. Students, with a bit of prodding, present a lengthy list of such messages, which typically include the following:

1. TV negatively affects our self-esteem. It teaches what kind of bodies and faces we should have. Comparing ourselves to these sprayed, painted actors, shot from the perfect angle in the perfect light is certain to lead to disappointment with ourselves.

2. Doctors become emotionally involved with their patients' care. They're available whenever we need them. They aren't concerned with money, just with saving lives. Ask your students to compare this with their own family experiences with doctors.

3. Lawyers always get their client off. The client is always innocent and the lawyer has to play detective to find out who really committed the crime. Justice is swift and fair. Being a lawyer is exciting. Ask your students if they know a lawyer. What is his/her career like?

4. Blacks are funny people. They make silly faces and use their bodies more than whites do to express their feelings. They usually live in pretty nice places and dress well.

5. Women are hot. Even when they say "no," they mean "yes." When the hero kisses a woman, at first she pulls away, but then she kisses back passionately. Often the implication is that this leads to sex. Discuss if this portrayal might have any influence on the increase of date rape.

6. Men are macho and powerful. They frequently use violence to get a just result. Discuss if this makes male students feel they too should be strong and aggressive. Do female students have this expectation of males?

7. Violence is an effective problem-solver. If someone gets in your way or causes trouble, violence is the best way to get results. Ask your students if the constant bombardment of violence on TV — even on the news — might serve to desensitize people to real-life violence. We know that frequent exposure to real-

life violence desensitizes, as a means of emotional survival. Is it also possible that overexposure to TV violence condones violence as an acceptable behavior?

There are numerous other questions that encourage students to think critically about TV. Here are just a few:

1. To what extent has TV affected our social patterns? Ask your students to interview parents or grandparents who can contrast family life prior to TV with their current lives. This usually leads to the realization that TV is allowed to restrict socialization. There is less conversation, less reading, less playing together and less activity outside the home.

2. Has TV created a demand that all learning must be enjoyable? For example, are children likely to be more resistant to standard classroom fare after being entertained by "Sesame Street"? We know that TV lures children away from homework and reading. Has its fast pace also reduced their attention span? Since TV leaves no room for the use of imagination, could this inhibit the development of imagination?

3. Is TV a salvation for the lonely or does it serve as an escape from their insecurities in seeking companionship? Many divorced individuals have told me they have their TV sets hooked up to turn on with the entrance light. Some even have their TV on a timer to turn off after they fall asleep. Many elderly have TV on during nearly all their waking hours. Some develop an exaggerated sense of danger in the outside world. Does TV's steady stream of violence on both news and entertainment programs create or, at least, reinforce this fear?

4. Does TV help to make us global villagers? Certainly most people obtain their picture of the world from TV, but the picture is filled with assassinations, wars, drug cartels, famine, suicides, robberies and murder. Does the sheer magnitude and complexity of these horrors lead to action, or does it lead to psychological overload and withdrawal? Do we say to ourselves, "What can I do? I feel helpless." Does TV distract us from seeking solutions to our individual problems? Worldwide hunger is difficult to deal with, psychologically or practically. Hungry families on the other side of town can be helped.

5. What effects might flow from national dependency on TV news? Polls show that over 80% of the population use TV news as their primary news source and about the same number find it the most credible news source. Do we read various news magazines and newspapers to compare the treatment of a given story? I make this a written assignment.

If people are dependent solely on TV for news, what information are they getting? Are most news shows packaged as entertainment — sensational stories, trivia and laughter with good-looking news readers who are presented as personalities, not as journalists? How much time is devoted to a typical story? Do these brief snippets of information provide enough information to form the basis of an informed judgement? Is TV news, therefore, anything more than a headline service? Conversely, doesn't live coverage of events such as President Kennedy's assassination or the recent San Francisco earthquake serve to reassure us, to prevent panic?

If film or tape is unavailable is the coverage especially brief? TV abhors a vacuum. Complex stories that don't lend themselves to interesting images tend to be short and simplistic. Such stories are usually sandwiched between taped footage of a suicidal leap and live coverage of a downtown fire. If no downtown buildings are burning, we are shown a burning building in some other city. I suggest that you tape local news programs on two different stations and analyze them in the classroom. How similar are they? Is the lead story about the same event? Is the lead story also the featured story in the newspaper? What does a TV story tell you compared with a newspaper story? Does the story on TV seem more real and interesting than the newspaper story?

What is the result of the omission of a news event on TV if we depend on TV to keep us informed? If the event was not covered on TV, it didn't happen as far as we are concerned. It isn't on our agenda to think about or to talk about. What is TV's power to legitimize people? If someone appears on TV as an expert, do we assume he or she must be the leading authority on the topic under discussion? Sometimes only third-rate experts are willing to discuss a controversial topic in front of the cameras.

Might the mere presence of TV cameras influence the events being covered? If your students have attended a football game being broadcast on TV, they might have noticed that the fans scream, wave and hold banners aloft only when they see a camera pointed at them. Protests and demonstrations often occur only if the events will be taped. The presence of TV cameras attracts curiosity seekers who appear on the evening news as part of the protest. They wave and scream along with the committed protesters. How might this affect our perceptions of such events?

> 6. Do commercials create insecurities and needs that might not have otherwise existed? Do we really need four different kinds of perfumed sprays for various parts of our bodies? Do we need cars that will go faster than 110 miles per hour? Does the creation of need prompt us to buy more than we should? Personal debt is extremely high in the United States, and we tolerate the largest national debt of any country. Have we grown to believe we are what we have, that the acquisition of products can make us happier? Have commercials escalated the roles of women in our society to perfect mother, fastidious housekeeper, sex goddess and successful executive? Is it possible for any woman to fill these many roles successfully? If not, could the failure to live up to these demanding images result in women feeling as if they are failures?

It helps to look at and discuss magazine advertising before analyzing TV commercials. Magazine ads have the same themes but are fixed on the page and are, therefore, easier to critique. When you show tapes of commercials, ask your students about the set or settings. Do they provide romance or prestige to the product? Ask why the actors might have been selected. What power do they lend to the product? Do the actors' body language and clothing contribute to the message? Do the words used have strong connotative power? Keep in mind that the verb "come" is one of the most frequently used words in advertising, for obvious reasons.

> 7. What role do sound effects, music, dialogue and images play in producing responses in viewers? Ask your students to watch TV with the sound turned off. Does some of the action seem confusing? Next, ask them to listen to TV without looking at the screen. Can they follow the action from the dialogue alone? Do sound effects and music provide much of the total message, leading us, for example, to experience tension during an otherwise dull scene.
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> 8. What can be done to improve TV? What problems arise from any form of censorship? If special interest groups, such as the one supported by Jesse Helms, boycott products advertised on disfavored shows, is this a problem for our form of democracy? How could consumer groups with a more broadly based philosophy make successful demands for the improvement of TV?
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> 9. What is the bottom line of the networks and companies who produce TV programs? Of course, it's to produce profits, and the way to assure profits is to provide large audiences to advertisers. Series with millions of viewers are dropped or, at least, shifted to another time if ratings are perceived as reducing the size of the audience fof the show that follows.
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> 10. Is it possible that, although many critics and parents decry TV's content, we are really getting what we want? We have strong violent and sexual urges. Most of us keep these urges in check, maintaining the veneer of civilization. But

producers of TV programs — entertainment, news and commercials — spend many millions of dollars to discover our inner urges. What if the seemingly real images on the screen reinforce our inner desires and somehow legitimize or reinforce them?

11. Ask your students, what is good about TV? You may not agree with the responses, but they serve as points of discussion. When asked the question, my students typically respond:

1. It stresses family relationships.
2. It teaches how to handle death.
3. It shows how to resist peer pressure.
4. It teaches how to deal with intercultural relationships.
5. Game shows teach facts.

Each of these responses can readily lead to critical thinking about TV's content and possible effects. For example, are family relationships presented on TV in a manner that can be instructive to members of your students' families?

Family relationships on TV sitcoms are idyllic. Every problem will be worked out by the end of the show with gentleness and maturity. Bill Cosby, who plays a doctor on the "Bill Cosby Show," is always at home to deal with crises. He never gets emergency calls that distract him from dealing with his son's first date or his daughter's first prom. He not only resolves the problem but maintains a hilarious sense of humor while doing so. Family shows over the years have followed the same approach. How does this make your students feel about their own family life?

In sum, applying critical analysis to TV is important because TV lives in our homes. It is a companion and a babysitter. It provides us with some kind of answer to our social and sexual concerns. For many it even provides religious experiences.

We know TV has effects, but we're unsure what these effects are or what they mean to our lives or to our society. Why do many people give more generously to TV evangelists than to their local church or trust Ted Koppel more than a New York Times' journalist? Maybe it's because TV's images seem more personal, more reassuring, more real, more easily absorbed. Maybe it's because the production qualities of TV make its messages more exciting than real life.

Whatever it is, we need to discuss TV with our students, to help them think critically about it, and to discover the role it plays in their lives. Over the years many of my students have said to me, "I don't enjoy TV as much as I used to. Now, when I watch it, I'm thinking all the time." That's a beginning.

Will Kollock is Chair of Communication Arts at Ramapo College of New Jersey. He received a New Jersey Fellowship on the Academic Profession for 1989.

The Cognitive Management of Cultural Institutions: Museum and Library Heuristics

David Carr

At the American Museum of the Moving Image in Astoria, New York, a museum user can observe and play forty-seven different video arcade games, assembled in chronological order from Computer Space (1971) and Pong (1972), through Space Invaders (1978) and Asteroids (1979) to Out Run (1986) and Narc (1988). As the user moves through the gallery, these objects come to capture a history of popular technology, and redefine the concept of play in twentieth century America.

At the Webber Resource Center in Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History, the inquirer -- just having emerged from the museum's extensive collections of Native American objects -- stands before a desk and asks a question about Southwest Native American song. After consulting with a museum anthropologist on duty, the inquirer selects a videotape of original dancing; it is shown for him in one of four small video rooms. Afterward, he examines the instruments he has heard, looks up books and newspapers about contemporary tribal music, and attends a concert of Chilean musicians playing informally in an adjacent gallery.

At the Indianapolis Children's Museum, a museum user enters a gallery titled "Teens Speak Out On Issues," and sees exhibitry devoted to teenage pregnancy, child abuse, alcohol and drug addiction, AIDS, world peace, and school. He photographs these and copies portions of the wall texts into a small notebook. The words on the walls, as well as the issues, the displays, the construction, the presentation -- all were carried out by students invited by the museum, first, to identify the matters at the heart of adolescence, then trained by museum specialists in design and installation techniques. The Indianapolis Children's Museum refers to itself not as a museum *for* children, but a museum *with* children.

At a space simply called The Sixth Floor, located in the Texas School Book Depository Building in Dallas, a museum user, listening intently to sounds he first heard a quarter century ago, reconstructs the life, death, and memory of John Kennedy. He observes, hears, and reads about the legal, social, local, global, political, and personal contexts that permanently surround November 22-25, 1963. He records his impressions in a large public memory book, his comments adjacent to the rantings of a conspiracy theorist and an expression of sorrow from a citizen of Dallas. Later, the user writes privately about the feeling of deep, generational disappointment he discovered in himself, mixed with astonishment at having been there, having seen what the assassin saw through the window over Dealey Plaza, having felt again what he thought he had forgotten.

A tension of consciousness

This essay is devoted to redefinitions, and it has several purposes. First, it is an opportunity for me to extend the scope of my own thinking, by reconsidering the ideas I have pursued for the past decade in a form of discourse that is somewhat new and daunting, but increasingly important to me. Second, I hope to move toward a theory of cultural institutions as situations for critical thinking. Third, and most important, I want to suggest the value of museums and libraries for the application and exploration of critical thought. This last goal includes the suggestion of a heuristic stance that seems to me to epitomize critical thought processes in cultural institutions. These three goals are sequential: scope, theory, application. In case I should fail to master this sequence for you -- and so this talk should not be a total loss -- I will include at its close, as a fourth intention, a short list of recommendations: several museum experiences that seem to me to be created in order to induce critical thinking.

To begin, I want you to place yourself at the main entrance of the New York Public Library or the Metropolitan Museum of Art about to enter for the first time. I want to suspend you there during my talk, because during this half hour I want you to dwell in the tension that envelops us when we are given an immense array of choices, all enticing, all suggestive of human expression, of something new. Such tension is acute, but exquisite. We feel, in the presence of more than one masterpiece, or more than one exhilarating text, or in the midst of a reconstructed moment, that there is a transforming experience at hand, if we can find it, feel it, attend to it adequately. This may be what Berger and Luckmann (1966, p.21) refer to as a "tension of consciousness:" an awareness of a world unfolding at this moment for us alone, comprising multiple realities, each requiring its own transitions, each implying its own contextual complexities, and each available under limited conditions in time and space. The learner's problem is to live up to this moment, this tension of consciousness, to think about it, and to capture it within the continuing passage that is one life.

After hearing me speak about this problem recently, a colleague suggested that I should describe this uneasiness as "bewilderness." I like that. Bewilderness in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, for example, could be described as a tension of consciousness including an awareness of the extension and scope of this encyclopedic place, its infinite combination of paths, and its particular richness among museums. To cite Berger and Luckmann again (1966, p.25f.), it is a realm we know to be filled with "finite provinces of meaning," collections and arrays that, row after row, evince a taxonomy of masterworks. We sense an organizing genius, a sensibility, a shaping intellect that tells us that nothing is here by accident. And you, standing on the edge of this realm, carry tacit structures of your own: past feelings you have had in museums or libraries, memories recollected from Art 101, or back farther, thoughts of childhood games soon to be evoked by Winslow Homer's "Crack the Whip." Perhaps fusing all of these are the feelings, the needs, or questions that have brought you to the edge of the institution today; these unresolved issues -- perhaps they are emptinesses -- make you realize that you are not here by accident either. So, there you stand: about to step into this immensity of objects and texts held steady in time and space, as your mind enfolds possibility, promise, and memory. This is exactly where I want you to be as I speak to you.

But hold that first step, please; some definitions are in order.

Cultural institutions and the critically mindful life

My concern, as clearly as I can articulate it, lies in the relationship between cultural institutions and the critically mindful life, a life that stands fully in the flow of information, and sometimes allows itself to be carried forward over rocks, into eddies and pools. Critical thinkers live for this flow, its tensions, its risks of mind. And cultural institutions exist because, as John Gardner (1968) says, "We are problem-solvers by nature -- problem-seekers, problem-requirers " (p.32) . Cultural institutions are the places we create and sustain in order to bring new information to our lives, to consider and integrate the information we require, and where we hold the texts, artifacts, and experiences that we wish to keep as a culture, or that we need in order to have a home in time and space. They are places for learners, for lives of self-invention and pursuit -- not for credentials, job training, tests, or grades. They are environments, and at their best they are forums, for critical thinking, for communication, for independent learning, for self-presentation, which is to say: for living on one's own horizon.

These are institutions for the mindful life. Ellen J. Langer (1989a, 1989b) has described the qualities of mindfulness as

> A state of alertness and lively awareness, which is specifically manifested in typical ways. Generally, mindfulness is expressed in active information processing, characterized by cognitive differentiation: the creation of categories and distinctions. The act of creating distinctions tacitly creates new categories and vice versa.... Mindfulness may be seen as creating (noticing) multiple perspectives, or being aware of context. When in this state, the person is becoming more and more differentiated while differentiating the external world (1989a, pp.138-139).

Langer describes mindfulness as a capacity-expanding, entropy-reducing state of engagement with the environment and its constant flow of information. We might say that libraries and museums hold the changing world constant, so we can reflect on it and move ourselves forward in it, perhaps even master a portion of it.

Mindlessness, Langer says, is "entropy-constant" (1989a, p.139), a "state of reduced attention ... expressed in behavior that is rigid and rule-governed rather than rule-guided. The individual becomes mindlessly trapped by categories that were previously created when in a mindful mode. This entrapment limits people both physiologically and behaviorally." (1989a, p.139) Even though I feel that I am far from mindless, I know the mindless parts of my own intellectual past. Again and again, I am mindful that the importance of cultural institutions lies in the probability that much teaching and schooling as it is experienced in America misses the *lifespan message*, telling us nothing about how to respond to our own emptinesses.

For example, I think of the unusefulness of my own schooling -- its deadness and routines -- and realize that it does not apply to most of my life-tasks today, nor has it contributed much to the learning that has moved me most. I am every day reminded of the unfinished learning and unresolved intellectual issues, some begun years ago, that stay with me now. Every day I find numberless parts of the world that I don't understand on the front page of *The New York Times*. And, even overeducated as I am, I am especially mindful of a deep personal illiteracy that I can best describe as an inability to read my life, articulate its distinctions, clarify its challenges and uncertainties. Critical thinking begins here, under the skin, behind the eyes, maybe in the fingerprints. Perhaps these parts of my life suggest some resonances; perhaps I am not alone as an adult when I feel an undertow of mindlessness, a routine powerlessness in the waves of life, a restive compliance with routines. But then, through afternoons in libraries and museums, I am awakened by the possibilities of inquiry, continuity, and innovation in my life.

Cultural institutions as instruments of mindfulness

Museums and libraries will serve as the exemplary instruments, but this category of institution also includes historic houses, zoological and botanical gardens, science centers, living history settings, national parks, archives -- the list is incomplete. Approximately 6,000 of these places appear in the ***Official Museum Directory***, and approximately one-half billion visits to them occur each year. For purposes of definition, though it falls outside my scope here, perhaps the truest example of a cultural institution is public broadcasting: it is multicultural, configurated by information and communication, broadly and freely accessible, uniform in its distribution, inviting and attentive to its users, and an agency of mindful constructions of the contemporary world. Like all cultural institutions at their best, public broadcasting offers an empirical record of achievements and acts. It also creates a situation that induces discourse, adaptation, and change.

Cultural institutions are common knowledge structures used daily and freely by diverse public learners seeking authentic information, intellectual experiences, or practical guidance. Adapting Ezra Pound's definition of literature, cultural institutions contain news that stays news. Cultural institutions are formative, because they make possible private transformations through discovery, exploration, and reflection *beyond* the information. Cultural institutions stand against fragmentation. They give us opportunities to see entire collections of objects or ideas, narratives of events nearby and distant, and in them we are able to find themes, patterns, whole new pieces of knowledge. They translate concepts, eras, scientific revolutions into specific objects. Cultural institutions are settings for dialogues, transactions among companions, verifications of evidence, speculations about documentation, uninterrupted reflections, expressions of inquiry, and, in a phrase borrowed from Maxine Greene, "intergenerational continuity" (Greene, 1986, p.438).

Professor Greene's phrase, "public spaces" (1982, 1988), used to describe settings where people can come together to share their stories and lived realities, has been especially important to me in thinking of how cultural institutions have meanings in human lives. As public spaces, museums and libraries are environments where human beings can come to understand the fresh and unroutinized parts of themselves: their curiosities, their continuing, unfinished issues, and unarticulated needs to learn. When cultural institutions understand themselves and their users, they provide structures and opportunities for the exposition of cultural differences within a community. They invite alternative stances toward experience. And they provide access to multiple forms of information and the diverse cultural texts and contexts that confer meaning on them.

As I think of them, I find museums and libraries to invite critical thinking because they are *knowledge structures*, constructed around taxonomies or systems of organization having permanence and an open public order. Unlocking these abstract systems may require probative thinking, toward the construction of usable keys or cognitive maps of the territory. Such settings clearly depend on someone gathering, juxtaposing and ordering an array of objects or texts whose relationships and connections can compose a continuous fabric. The logics of cultural institutions are based on selection and concentration within a determined scope; on comprehensiveness and connoisseurship; on differentiation and comparison; and on the quality of language used to communicate these meanings.

Connoisseurship or mastery in the cultural institution is not based merely on an expanding catalog in the mind, but on sensitized knowing, critically developed when an intelligence works within a knowledge structure of this kind, using its information to expand perceptions. Intimacy with a collection of books or objects constructs the foundation for what Bruner calls going beyond the information given. (1973) That is, apart from the discovery of specific content or intellectual knowledge, the mindful probing of knowledge structures can give form to personal styles or patterns of critical thought -- particularly qualities of thought in the presence of first-hand experiences. The mindful learner may observe patterns in these thoughts; these observations may suggest passages, changes, and development over time. Cultural institutions invite acts of mind, and so they become environments for the critical thinker to expose the processes of critical thought.

In his essay, "Art as a Mode of Knowing" (1962), Jerome Bruner alludes to "the self-rewarding experience of connection," (p.68) often accomplished through the use of metaphors as bridges between private and public thinking. Bruner says that, apart from the direct, object-centered approach to art works, there is a second, more intuitive approach to the experience of art

> At the fringes of awareness, a flow of rich and surprising fantasy, a tangled reticle of associations that gives fleeting glimpses of past occasions, of disappointments and triumphs, of pleasures and unpleasures. (p.70)

This is where the intellect leaps, where mindful risks are taken, and where one's personal vision can be illuminated. Engaging in thought that is "more symphonic than logical, one theme suggesting the next," the user brings to experience "a matrix of life that is uniquely his own" (p.72-73). These pursuits configurate a mindful life.

I use the term *cognitive management* to suggest a way of handling an intellectual process or situation of complexity and depth. Learners about to enter the Metropolitan Museum or New York Public Library should expect a rapid change of stimuli, various degrees of confusion, anonymity among unknown companions, ambiguity of meanings, and uncertain closure. Admittedly, it sounds a bit like air travel, but these are the elements of intellectual risk that surround the learner. Against this potential for chaos in cultural institutions, the idea of cognitive management captures the qualities of reflection and design I want to evoke. Cognitive management might be characterized by the steady presence of a thoughtful, persistent question as the learner enters the cultural institution; by the construction of an inquiry that leads the learner on, organizing experiences in private patterns; by the use of a system of documentation: a notebook, a camera, a tape recorder; by regular pauses to reflect and plan. However private, these experiences evince logic and process; they follow the learner beyond the museum, and are used to make sense of the lived world. To be a learner in this setting is to reflect on the known and the unknown, and to manage the interaction between the two.

Cultural institutions, critical thinking, and the conduct of life

How does critical thinking in cultural institutions affect the conduct of life? First, it alters the proximity between the learner and the evidence, and it reduces the influence of habit. Whatever image or text we find before us, our presence permits us to find and ask the best questions we can, allows immediate feelings to flow over us, observe new information, and explore Bruner's "tangled reticle of associations." These evidences appear before us directly, authentically, and wholly. They carry the authority of presence. As Maxine Greene writes in an essay titled "The Art of Being Present,"

> There is no such phenomenon as a second-hand experience with a Cezanne landscape or a Stevens poem or a Woody Allen film. We can never send someone else to see it for us and come back and report. Not only are we required to be there; we are required to be there as active and conscious beings, allowing the energies of perceiving and imagining and feeling to move out to the works at hand, to bring them into life (1984, pp.133-134).

Second, critical thinking in cultural institutions, by the very separate nature and character of these settings, permits reflection as a basis for decisions and beliefs. Here attention is under individual control, it cannot be seized by a teacher, and our awareness of complexity is not diluted by the decontextualized, formal, reductive discourse of the classroom. These are opportunities for "situated cognition" (Brown et al, 1989). Cultural institutions are knowledge structures; therefore, cognitive acts within them constitute by definition direct participation in knowledge itself, in a situation where such knowledge matters deeply. John Seely Brown and his associates, in a recent article titled "Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning," borrowing from D. N. Perkins's book, *Knowledge as Design* (1986), assume that conceptual knowledge can be thought of as tools that "can only be fully understood through use, and using them entails both changing the user's view of the world and adopting the belief system of the culture in which they are used" (p.33).

> People who use tools actively rather than just acquire them ... build an increasingly rich implicit understanding of the world in which they use the tools and of the tools themselves. The understanding, both of the world and of the tool, continually changes as a result of their interaction. Learning and acting are interestingly indistinct, learning being a continuous, life-long process resulting from acting in situations (1989, p.33).

Such activities, Brown and his associates go on to say, are *authentic*, in contrast to activities transferred and "hermetically sealed within the self-confirming culture of the school" (p.34), where they are encoded with a formal syntax and diction that surgically separates original experiences from vividly supportive contexts. And so it goes that artworks are discussed in the medium of Ektachrome color slides and literature in the medium of An-Du-Septic dustless chalk.

Third, critical thinking in the presence of objects and texts deeply expands the flow of information through a life. As I have said to my students for years, if you wish to be informed it is useful to spend as much time as possible where the information is. We are all aware of serendipitous discoveries in libraries -- the perfect citation lying adjacent to some dead end. I, however, believe that these are not simply happy accidents but recognitions from the gods, rewards for being present, being mindful, and being good. The presence of information confers a textural change on one's life, slows it down, speeds it up, slams it into the wall, aims it into the past and future while anchoring it more firmly in the here and now. Ellen Langer says that, unlike the pupil in Gary Larson's cartoon who raises his hand and asks, "Mr. Osborn, may I be excused? My brain is full," mindfulness expands capacities, increases thirsts, makes it more difficult to be bored, and leads the learner toward increasingly complex forms of attention.

"When people look for something," Langer writes, "they are surely more likely to find it than if they do not even think to question whether or not it is possible" (1989a, pp.150-151).

Fourth, critical cognitive experiences in cultural institutions create landmarks, reference points, watershed experiences that become permanent parts of an individual's repertoire of performing data. They permit the learner to take a vivid experience into the future, and use its meanings there, like tools. Wolfgang Iser (1978) writes about literary texts that they "initiate 'performances' of meaning rather than actually formulating meanings themselves" (p.27). It seems clear to me that the same concept of performance might apply to all cultural knowledge: "without the participation of the individual ... there can be no performance." Critical thought, when seen as a performance of clarification, verification, or interpretation, underscores not only the immediate relevance of a powerful experience, but it also offers more permanent constructs for use beyond the moment. Bruner (1986) cites Iser's remarks in *The Act of Reading* that "readers have both a *strategy* and a *repertoire* that they bring to bear on a text" (p.34); these, it seems to me, characterize critical cognitive acts as well. As one encounters powerful texts in libraries, in museums it is through encounters with powerful objects or insightful conversations with companions that we are enabled to open parts of ourselves and create (or construct, or perform) new meanings for our futures. What makes cultural institutions extraordinary among the educative structures in society is the limitless range of contexts they permit us to bring to bear on our thoughts: cognitive, emotional, personal, reflective, action-inducing. I have had my permanent questions about technology altered by the basketry of ancient North American Indians; I have found myself overwhelmed by memories of my father, while in the Henry Ford Museum in Dearborn. One way to estimate the relative power of a cultural institution is to consider if, when we are in it, we feel driven toward feeling, thinking, forward motion, sometimes into the past.

The fifth effect of critical thinking in the cultural setting on the conduct of one life is the awareness of continuity and connection it suggests. The individual inquirer in the library or museum stands in the shadows and on the shoulders of others. In this way, critical thinking is not the isolated act of an individual communicant, but a form of participation in the construction of a community of knowledge and experience. Bruner writes that "a culture itself comprises an ambiguous text that is constantly in need of interpretation by those who participate in it" (1986, p.122). Meaning comes from negotiation and discourse within the cultural institution. From the moment of entrance, the user of a cultural institution is negotiating: a stance toward the information array, the means selected to construct it, the paths to be taken through it. It is in the negotiation of this critical passage that the reality of culture is to be found: not in the arrival, not wholly in the objects or texts at hand, but in the thought and language we use to understand their meanings. For the learner, the art of performing one's own meanings in cultural institutions lies in combining and balancing the contexts we carry with us, the richness in the texts we find, and the discovery of our own authentic voice.

The situation of the critical thinker in the cultural institution

None of this is easy. These acts of cognitive management and personal construction in cultural institutions constitute significant problem solving events. The "tensions of consciousness" in Berger and Luckmann's phrase do not go away, but change form. Despite the vivid power of cultural settings to create situations for the construction of personal meanings, suggested strategies for their use are generally missing in museums, steps toward related concepts and contexts are often obscure, and opportunities for self-definition as a learner are unusual. Even when -- perhaps *especially* when -- librarians, docents and other professionals are present, independent learners in libraries and museums are rarely offered useful models, illuminated paths, or nurturant counselors. In settings so devoted to objects and texts, the articulation of usable processes becomes submerged, and the fate of the individual mind is barely illuminated. In some cultural institutions, every thought that survives its instant lives against the odds, in defiance of routine, anonymity, ambiguity, and -- not incidentally -- technology. Cultural institutions have barely begun to define themselves as educative institutions.

The use of cultural institutions involves critical thinking under the following eight circumstances, maybe more:

1. The learner has chosen the problem.
2. Old ideas and assumptions are at risk; new frames for thought are possible.
3. A question has been articulated, or a constellation of related questions has been articulated.
4. The question involves a specific situation, captured in an object or text, but understood as an intellectual problem, with strands and contexts leading to other problems.
5. Expanded contexts may include related problems, cultural differences, and sensitivities to language.
6. Documentation of the process occurs: writing, photography, tape recording, sketching are all possibilities. (These steps create useful texts, and, as they construct a documentary record of the inquiry, they confer a narrative quality on the process)
7. An awareness of design or pattern emerges in the problem.
8. An awareness of one's own practice as a thinker emerges in the learner.

Critical thinking in cultural institutions stands against entropy because it is constructive in two ways. First, it leads to authentic new images of the world, expanding repertoires and strategies for controlling and understanding information first-hand. Second, because the knowledge structures in libraries and museums are always linked to other structures, acts of critical thought lead to further venues for inquiry. The process of museum or library use is adaptive and progressive. Our exploratory journeys across disciplines, leave trails we can retrace. When faced with uncertainty in the future, the learner understands the contributions of the places where the most informing options can be found (Langer, 1989b, p.143).

Cultural institutions as instruments for adult transformation.

One definition of "critical" cited by Raymond Williams (1983) comes from medical usage, "to refer to a turning point; hence decisive." (p.85) Williams also notes the use of "crisis" as a referent to a turning point, and it is in this context that I want to offer the metaphor of the watershed to emphasize museums and libraries as agencies for critical thought, turning points for learners. Literally, a watershed is a divide, a high area of land that separates river systems from one another; on each side of the watershed, headwaters and rivers flow in opposite directions. (Wilson, 1978) From this, the metaphoric watershed is a dividing line in a landscape of time, from which point things flow differently. Critical thought contributes to the construction of a watershed in adult life when its effects can be seen as sources of transition for adult experience, that is, when it assists us to cross the divide. Jack Mezirow (1985) describes these effects as *perspective transformation*,

> The process of becoming critically aware of how and why the structure of our psychocultural assumptions has come to constrain the way in which we perceive our world, of reconstituting that structure in a way that allows us to be more inclusive and discriminating in our integration of experience and to act on these new understandings (p.22).

Jerrold Apps (1985) describes a similar form of watershed experience as *emancipatory learning*, based on multiple assumptions, among them,

> That human beings are free to act on their world; that human beings, differing from other living creatures, have the alternative of being able to create and modify their world; that they have the ability to reflect on their past, to be conscious of the present, and to make plans for the future; and that as persons work toward changing social structures and social situations, they themselves change (p.153).

My description of cultural institutions as watershed institutions -- settings for adult transformation and, in Apps's sense, emancipation from the structures of others -- has ten elements.

1. Cultural institutions emphasize connections among disparate experiences and otherwise fragmented information.
2. They offer arrays of data and alternative paths toward that data.
3. Contextual information abounds.
4. The learner constructs order, structure, or pattern without interference; judgments are emergent, "provisional, relative, and contextual" (Brookfield, 1987, p.17), never predetermined.
5. Cultural institutions offer grounded, empirical, direct experiences of artifacts and texts; each experience acts upon expectations and changes them. In this way, as the psychologist George Kelly suggests, behavior itself becomes a question (1970, pp.260-261).
6. They nurture nonroutine, exploratory thoughts.
7. Because they concentrate stimuli and make them immediately available, museums and libraries are conducive to peak experiences.
8. Because they stimulate language, they are conducive to clarity and accuracy in perceptions; language makes classifications, questions, and judgments possible.
9. Cultural institutions have a particularly adult character: they match the reflective modes of age; they assist in distinctions between ideals and realities; they lead to renewal, or suggest the possibility of renewal; and they permit us to compare the past with the new.
10. They are conducive to self-directed change, movement not only beyond the information given, but movement beyond the self as given. We learn in them that we are more capable, more perceptive than we think.

Heuristic questions for the use of cultural institutions

I have not forgotten you. You are, as I recall, poised at the brink of the Metropolitan Museum of Art or the New York Public Library, and now I want to invite you to enter. As you do, permit me to hand you the following list of questions. A heuristic is a procedure for solving problems, a way of looking at the known and the unknown, and finding ways to use the former to reduce the latter. The word "heuristic" comes from the Greek word meaning "to find." It is an adjective meaning "serving to find out or discover" and a noun meaning a method or process of discovery. We use a heuristic in most of the logical problem-solving we do.

-- We look at the problem in order to understand it.
-- We develop an approach to the problem, based on what we know and what we have done with similar problems in the past.
-- We carry out the approach as well as we can, according to the unknown we are after, as well as we can understand it.
-- We look back and evaluate.

Critical thinkers in cultural institutions can approach the challenging tasks of use by considering the following questions, addressing the need to understand the problem at hand, the need to devise and carry out a plan, and the need to look backward.

What has been brought here?
What is here for me?
How do I get to it?
How do I make use of it?
What do I think of it?
What is the situation for learning?
What do I want from it?

Can I change it?
What is expected of me here?

What paths are open to me?
What is familiar to me?
How is this available knowledge useful?
How have I behaved usefully in similar situations in the past?
What are the most difficult parts of my plan?
What is the most fitting language to describe my experience?

Where do I begin?
What follows from this beginning?
What conditions are present?
What obstacles must I overcome?
What other constraints are here?
What is the range of responses open to me?

Have I found something useful?
Have I found something new?
Is this what I wanted to occur?
Do I want it to happen again?

I have tried to suggest in this particular constellation of questions that a heuristic process does not do away with uncertainty, complexity, or challenge, nor does it reduce the need for tentative, improvisational, or experimental behavior. The heuristic attends to the unknown and the mix of remembering and risking that causes learners to construct experiences in ways that have meaning -- and to go beyond the information given.

Polya (1957) says that "The aim of heuristic is to study the methods and rules of discovery and invention." My own rules are to use naive questions whenever possible, and to keep them simple.

What is going on here?
Why have these things been brought here in this way?
What is expected of me here as a learner?

These questions are "naive" because they are low in knowledge and high in ignorance. They turn me into a stranger, even in familiar situations; they take away my cultural knowledge, and the easy assumptions we all share about museums and libraries; and they subtract the element that obscures much of our lived reality, the taken-for-granted. Their intention is to introduce a distance between me and my knowledge. In doing so they have led me to continuously more interesting observations. The first of them, "What is going on here?," is my broad, framing question. It causes me to look for processes and behaviors, and patterns of communication in the cultural institution. The second question, "Why have these things been brought here in this way?," is not always naive, since I have encountered some truly bewildering institutions. Typically, it leads me to look closely at the situation, its messages, connections, and patterns, and to think of how well it has been designed to assist the learner. The third of these naive questions, "What is expected of me here?" may be the most generally useful of all, because it leads me to a critical stance and a number of ancillary questions.

What does the institution empower me to do?
Does it offer me many choices as I pursue my inquiry?
Does it provide me with information or guidance to sharpen my perceptions?
Does it provide me with a human being to answer my questions?
Does it assist me to discover my own procedures, find my own way?
Does it inquire about my expectations?
Am I required to know something before I can find my own way?
How am I to think of this?

Over time, the reality of learning in a cultural institution has been illuminated by my experiences and naive questions. My attention to details leads me to grounded observations. I document these and reflect on them as scrupulously as I can. They have led me to some useful information about what cultural institutions are, how they address learners, and how they succeed or fail to live up to their needs.

My naive questions can be described by a phrase from the critic I. A. Richards (1955): they are "speculative instruments." Like all questions, they are engines of language that move and direct attention in probing ways. Because they are simple, they start me off at the surface of things, but they yield rapidly to other more complex, deeper questions connected (as in a hall of mirrors, or an echo chamber) to other resonant questions. My questions address how the cultural institution interprets itself as an informing environment, how it nurtures its learners and informs their reflections -- how it thinks of itself, and embedded in that is how it thinks of me.

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David Carr is Associate Professor in the School of Communication, Information and Library Studies at Rutgers University.

Critical Thinking in Instructional Contexts: Within and Across the Disciplines

The papers is this large section reflect a wide range of concerns related to instructional contexts. In them one finds the interplay of theory and practice that has characterized the critical thinking movement throughout its history. The papers reflect a range of instructional contexts including the humanities, mathematics and professional studies (papers related to social science and social studies are included in the preceding section), but as importantly they offer a wealth of theoretic and practical perspectives that enrich the notion of critical thinking across the disciplines.

We begin the section with a general critical thinking course. *Critical Thinking in Critical Discourse,* by William A. Yaremchuk, describes a college course entitled "Critical Discourse," designed to "develop critical thinking and problem solving skills within a small group context." He describes a course that is typical of many courses offered to students early in the college studies, a course focused on recognizing the structure of arguments and, identifying the main thrust of an argument, distinguishing facts, opinions and assumptions from conclusions and identifying fallacies. In addition, Critical Discourse includes such typical critical thinking skills as becoming aware of value judgments, weighing evidence and decisions, analyzing problems , enhancing oral communication and strengthening inquiry skills.

Students also learn discourse skills, including group dynamics and process, presenting positions and debate. Pair problem solving is extended to group problem solving as is the "observation, analysis, assessment and evaluation of oral and written messages presented in both classroom and out-of-class situations."

Peter F. Macaluso, in *Strategies for Developing Critical Thinking Skills in Value-Oriented Humanities,* presents another common strategy, integrating critical thinking within a course that has a discipline-based objective, preparing "students more successfully for the study of value-oriented humanities texts." Using traditional texts from Greece and Rome, Macaluso introduces students to such concepts as"freedom and authority, liberty and fraternity, the private person and the public person in history and our own society."

The paper includes questions that extend the discussion of such issues into modern times using thinkers as diverse as Reinhold Niebuhr, John F. Kennedy and Toynbee.

Critical thinking within a particular discipline is also the focus of *Schema Rubs and Schema Blanks: Forcing Attention Upon Semantic/Interpretive Trouble Spots to Improve Poetry Explication* by Paul Ady. Based on schema theory, Ady's course helps students to "*run to, not* away from schema blanks and schema rubs." These aspects of schema, missing elements and anomalies, respectively, enables students to appreciate the "linguistic complexity of the text."

Utilizing strategies of literary analysis in conjunction with critical thinking, interpretation of a poem involves such skills as discussing tentative hypotheses and resolving anomalies and developing "intellectual courage and honesty." Ady cautions against the instructor "playing the role of the omniscient guru." and instead recommends "modeling the questioning process" and "admitting to their own difficulties with the text,"

The next two papers extend the theoretic basis for integrating critical thinking into particular disciplines in response to the difficulties that face teachers of the deaf.

Anne E. Kingston, in her, *An Inquiry into English Language Instruction with Deaf Students:A Tool or an End?*, reflects both theoretic and cultural issues in her discussion of English instruction at a technical school focusing upon the education of deaf students. In such a context "English becomes language imposed by the hearing world, taught through courses aimed to promote functional or cultural literacy. Inherent in this definition of English is the shared cultural framework of the hearing world, to which a deaf student has limited access."

Kingston's discussion explores visual metaphors, writing, testing, the grammar English in relation to verbal signs and the problem of seeing deaf students through a "deficiency model." She sees the issues from a Freirian perspective in which "language instruction can be an imposition or it can be a tool with which the individual names and acts upon the world." Her broadly ranging piece, drawing form both theory and practice presents an image that provides " possible ways through which student and teacher can negotiate the learning process."

Joan B. Stone's *Exploring Representational Intersections in Mathematics Teaching* offers a complementary piece using her experience teaching mathematics to students who are deaf to accentuate "the role that different representational systems play in our communication with all students." Working from the notion of mathematics as a language. Stone shows how "English language, words with specific mathematical interpretations, and mathematical symbols all coincide to create meaning for a student."

Citing the work of Freire, Stone claims that " mathematical literacy requires an understanding of the social and cultural aspects of mathematical expressions." Working with deaf students affords a clear view of the linguistic character of mathematics, leading us to a better awareness of "social and cultural contexts within which (mathematical) systems have evolved." Her paper explores "the intersections of the representational systems used in teaching mathematics and suggest that what we have learned from working with students with explicit language difficulties may be applicable to other students."

Gail Kaplan, in her paper, *Critical Thinking in the College Classroom: A Workshop on Developing Critical Thinkers*, continues the discussion of critical thinking through mathematics. Seeing critical thinking as a "crucial determinant of success in the academic setting, as well as the world beyond," She offers a variety of techniques to foster critical thinking.

Kaplan's paper includes a variety of "games, puzzles, and brain teasers" that can be used as to promote active participation rather than passive behavior. Although her examples are drawn from mathematics and logic, she claims that"the thought processes involved have applications in every discipline."

James G. S. Yang and Diane K. Schulz continue the discussion of critical thinking in quantitative contexts in their paper, *The Importance of Teaching Critical Thinking in Accounting Through the Integration of Other Disciplines.* They see accounting is inviting a wide range of approaches, since "accountants are required to present a single and unique annual report from a host of financial elements with divergent characteristics." The divergence grows form the complex perspectives that constitute key notions drawn from philosophy, economics, sociology, behavioral science, decision and communication sciences.

Yang and Schulz offer examples that demonstrate how characteristic accounting problems demand critical thinking for assessments in typical situations. "Without critical thinking into its purposes and problems, the measurement of an asset is nothing more than an exercise in addition, and the measurement of profit, an exercise in subtraction.

Gloria Pierce continues the discussion of critical thinking in business related education in her,*Critical Thinking and the Emergent Paradigm: The Role of Management Education.* Her discussion is based on the view that we are living in a period of " turbulence and that a major transformative change in our society (on institutional, organizational and individual levels) from the now predominant but eroding paradigm to a new emergent paradigm is necessary for the survival and growth of the global community." The emerging paradigm is "characterized by the expanded awareness that humankind inhabits an interdependent world in which cultural institutions and organizations are open systems with permeable boundaries, that is, they affect and are affected by their environment."

Given this she explores "the relationship between the development of critical thinking in adults, especially decision-makers at the workplace, and cultural transformation to an emergent paradigm" Her paper identifies "some significant areas of inquiry for critical thinking in the context of management (goal-setting, strategic planning, leadership and human resource management) and examine various methods for developing critical thinking in adult decision-makers (films, humor, experiential learning)."

Critical Thinking in Instructional Contexts: Some General Considerations

The remaining five papers return to general characterization of aspects of the critical thinking process, each author presenting an aspect of critical thinking that can be applied in various instructional contexts.

Robert Zweig's concern in *Critical Thinking and Moral Dilemmas*, is with "that a discussion of moral issues might play in a critical thinking course." Zweig contrasts "the greater objectivity " towards which critical thinking is directed" with the "subjective inclination" that he sees as essential in moral reasoning. Beginning with hypothetical questions that expose preference such as "What kind of a car should I buy?" Zweig engages students in discussions of such issues as the legalization of drugs, and abortion.

He accounts for why "students are not moved by reason when it is applied to moral issues" by an account of the nature of moral judgment. But even here critical thinking is invaluable for "understanding the issues involved in moral problems, in deciding what the nature of a disagreement might be in moral argument, in making clear distinctions between those issues that are moral as opposed to those which are practical, for instance." Zweig concludes, "I see no reason why (critical thinking) may not help to unravel our multifaceted and complex relationship with matters of right and wrong."

John Morreal, highlights another general aspect of critical thinking. In his *Humor and Critical Thinking* he explores the value of humor for "fostering of critical thinking, especially critical thinking about social practices and values." Morreal first offers "the most widely accepted theory of humor, the incongruity theory," this enables " students to think critically about the culture they live in."

Humor in the classroom has other advantages as well. Since humor is enjoyable "students pay attention to the teacher that uses it. They also also remember humorous examples better than dull, prosaic ones." Seeing critical thinking as fostering a "questioning, experimental eye," humor is invaluable since it its spirit involves the search for "discrepancies, contradictions, inconsistencies, and other kinds of incongruity."

Vivian M. Rosenberg offers a paper, *Empathy: A Neglected Critical Thinking Skill*, that argues that "empathy is a facet of intelligence that is essential for critical thinking; it is a necessary component of both interpersonal communication within a given culture and cross-cultural understanding." She bases her work on recent research that indicates that "as students reach higher levels of cognitive maturity, their ability to see the world from someone else's point of view improves and they show a greater capacity for empathy."

Given her arguments for "connected knowing," her addresses the question if whether and how it can be taught. She offers pedagogical strategies for improving empathy skills and examples of materials constructed for that purpose. Such materials, she cautions, "work best with people who share a common culture and world-view." She then considers "ways of reaching across class and cultural boundaries to facilitate understanding among people with very different backgrounds."

Judith B. MacDonald's paper, *Analysis of Communication Patterns in Social Studies Discussions: Strategies to Promote Discourse*, employs an adapted version of the Bellack system for analyzing discussions in a classroom of sixth/seventh grade students. MacDonald points out that although "group discussion has been touted as an optimal setting for the exploration and articulation of ideas," discussions are "a scarce commodity in classrooms."

Her analysis supports a number of suggestions, for example: "fewer direct questions generate student participation." Her paper is an instance of the policy she recommends: "If as teachers we want to promote discourse and develop students' abilities to participate in discussions, we may need to examine our discussion-leading behavior."

Our final paper in this section, *Assessing the Potential of Underachieving College Students: Feuerstein's Learning Potential Assessment Device*, by Judi Hirsch offers a theoretic model of broad application. Hirsch's concern is to include "all economic classes and cultural groups" in education. In order to accomplish this she recommends the perspective of Reuven Feuerstein whose success in educating youths from North Africa and Europe who "scored so poorly on standardized intelligence tests that they were that to require custodial care," led to the concept of the "mediated learning experience" which directly involves the learner in the learning process.

Hirsch presents Feuerstein's Learning Potential Assessment Device (LPAD) as a tool for assessing "cognitive functions" at various phases of the learning process. She shows how the LPAD can serve to identify "recommendations for intervention" so that "children increase their ability to benefit from encounters with all kinds of stimuli and experiences."

Critical Thinking in Critical Discourse

William A. Yaremchuk

As the critical thinking movement began its spread across the nation in the 1980's, educators began to ponder as to how to cope with this phenomenon. While everyone will agree in principle that critical thinking is probably the most significant skill that a person can develop, there is widespread confusion as to what was is meant by critical thinking and how to implement it into the educational process.

Numerous definitions, interpretations, and operational explanations of critical thinking began to emerge without universal agreement.[1] Each user of the term has chosen to conceptualize critical thinking within the context of a specific philosophy or discipline. The problem for the educator is at least threefold. First, what should be included in the concept of critical thinking? Second, how can one instruct another in developing critical thinking? And finally, what educational activities promote critical thinking in the classroom as well as in other noneducational settings?

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the role of critical thinking within a recently developed college course titled "Critical Discourse."[2] The new course of study was designed to develop critical thinking and problem solving skills within a small group context.[3] Three questions are posed for consideration: (l) what is critical discourse, (2) what critical thinking skills are developed in the course, and (3) what types of activities promote the critical thinking process?

Critical Discourse Defined

The term "critical" is described as a systematic attempt to analyze and assess objectively. This concept of analysis and objective judgement seeks to weigh and consider the advantages/disadvantages, strengths/weaknesses, and validity/soundness of a selected message. The term "discourse" was defined as oral and written communications. Any attempt on the part of a communicator to present a message, an argument, or statement would be included. Specific types of discourse to be considered within the context of critical discourse would include such items as public speeches, arguments, public discussion panels, advertisements, editorials, print and broadcast news, and any interpersonal or persuasive message that sought to gain acceptance from the receiver of the message.[4] "Critical Discourse," then, can be defined as the method by which an individual logically, systematically, and objectively analyzes and assesses oral and/or written communications.

Critical Thinking Skills Developed

Ten major critical thinking skills are developed in the course: (l) recognize the structure of an argument (premises and conclusion), (2) clarify the main point, issue, or argument in a message presentation, (3) distinguish facts, opinions, and assumptions from the conclusion of an argument, (4) identify the fallacious reasoning that may be operating within the message, (5) assess the validity and soundness of an argument, (6) develop awareness of how value judgments, assumptions, semantic usage, and personal motivations affect reasoning, (7) weigh and consider evidence in order to formulate rational decisions, (8) systematically analyze a problem and propose alternatives, (9) enhance listening skills and recording methods to promote critical inquiry when oral communication systems operate (speech, discussion, debate, radio, television),and (10) strengthen inquiry skills by developing the use of questions and cross examination techniques.

Critical Discourse Instruction

Before specific critical thinking skills and activities could be introduced, it was important that students be provided a substantial background in the various concepts to be developed.

Instruction was given in the understanding of argumentative and nonargumentative expression as well as the structure of an argument.[5] Considerable class time is given to recognizing the elements of an argument (premises and conclusions) in both written and oral communications. Emphasis is placed on the recognition of premise and conclusion indicators to assist in the identification of argument.

Extensive attention is given to clarifying the role and use of evidence in the substantiation of claims. The types of evidence and the applicability of evidence to arguments are presented. A major concern is the identification of fallacies in any oral or written message. The types of fallacies are examined in detail.[6] Discussion of propaganda techniques are included as a means of exploring nonrational decision making. The study of language usage assists in the understanding of how claims are supported in rational and nonrational ways.

Students also are engaged in learning about the dynamics of group behavior, i.e., how groups process ideas, deliberate, formulate decisions, and solve problems. An understanding of information exchange, information processing, analysis of data, and the problem solving sequence is stressed. Students present informative and problem-oriented panel discussions. Moreover, they work on group problem solving situations and engage in a major collaborative group project on major contemporary problems.

In addition, instruction also is given in presentational and debating skills. Students learn the basic rhetorical principles governing a short presentation (two minute arguments, reports, and speeches) and the guidelines for conducting a public debate. Rebuttal, refutational, and cross examination techniques are explored. Significant emphasis is placed on the testing and evaluation of ideas. Listening carefully and recording accurately the claims made by others is an important consideration.

In summary, students are expected to have developed broad understanding about the following areas: structure of argument, evidence, fallacies, propaganda techniques, language usage, group process, decision making, information processing, collaborative problem solving methods, debating tactics, cross examination techniques, and listening skills.

Critical Discourse Tools

Students are taught how to organize and process facts, opinions, problems, and alternatives. Various tools include the use of frequency charts, a spreadsheet approach, checklists, a double summary, a semantic differential device, thesis identification, problem solving sequence guides, and outlining. These tools are used to analyze arguments presented from speeches, essays, editorials, advertisements, and other periodical literature.[7] Students are instructed in the use of these devices to assist them in the decision making, problem solving, and critical thinking process.

Critical Thinking Activities

Two major activities of the course highlight the critical thinking process in the course: (l) pair problem solving and (2) group problem solving. These activities, in addition to the analysis of oral and written arguments, fallacy identification, conducting public debates and discussions, exemplify the application of critical thinking concepts to the course.

Pair problem solving is a method by which two students working together deliberate on a designated problem. Two specific roles are assigned: (l) the problem solver and (2) the listener/respondent. Person One works on the problem mentally and verbalizes as Person Two listens and responds to the process of reasoning and the outcome.

Person One reads the problem, engages in reasoning, and verbalizes the steps to be followed to reach the solution. Person Two listens attentively to the problem solver with the option of asking questions for clarification of directions and anticipated outcome. Person Two monitors the problem solving process and interrupts only with general feedback and questions to clarify the method of reaching a solution. After the deliberations, Person Two will be able to review the steps to reach the decision or solution expressed by Person One. Both will be in agreement about the method and the outcome before proceeding to the next exercise or problems to be analyzed.[8]

After the first problem has been completed, the team will reverse roles and another situation will be examined. After a series of exercises (four to six in a thirty minute segment), the students will discuss the concepts, methods, and principles derived from the pair process. After an evaluation of the pair problem solving process, the students discuss with the other class pairs the applicability of these techniques and methods to the small group context.

Group problem solving involves four to six students deliberating on a given problem. The purpose is to assess all the available data and to explore all the possible alternatives. Problems similar to those used in pair problem solving are assigned to work teams. The problems explored may include verbal reasoning, decision making, a survival situation (raft, moon, atomic bomb, kidney machine), an ethical dilemma, hypothetical situations,or the assessment of a contemporary issue.

Problems are to be analyzed using all the skills of logical reasoning developed throughout the course. Moreover, the students use any of the tools (spread sheet, lists, summary, etc.) necessary to complete the assigned task. Collaborative problem solving teams are expected to employ a five step procedure when investigating and deliberating on major contemporary issues. The problem solving sequence involves five steps: (1) problem definition, (2) problem analysis, (3) solution generation, (4) solution analysis, and (5) solution selection. After the completion of the group problem solving exercises, the students are asked to assess the reasoning process employed, methods utilized, and the soundness of the proposed solutions or alternatives.

Critical discourse seeks to develop the critical thinking skills through three principal activities: (1) knowledge and understanding of logical reasoning, group process, problem solving techniques, and analytical skills, (2) the systematic practice of the ten critical thinking skills through the presentation of arguments, discussions, debates, pair/group exercises, and collaborative group projects, and (3) the observation, analysis, assessment, and evaluation of oral and written messages presented in the both classroom and out-of-class situations.

Endnotes

1. Stephen D. Brookfield, *Developing Critical Thinkers* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987), p.11.

2. "Critical Discourse" was first proposed as a concept and general education (core) requirement by Dr. Eugene Rosi, Provost at Monmouth College, West Long Branch, NJ in 1983. A faculty committee composed of Dr. Mark Rodgers and Dr. Dennis Darnoi gathered background data in 1983-1984. Dr. William A. Yaremchuk joined the committee in 1985 and outlined the course and its activities. In the Fall semester of 1985, the first pilot courses were operational. By the Summer of 1987, "Critical Discourse" was adopted as a core requirement for graduation.

3. William A. Yaremchuk, "Introduction to Critical Discourse," *Critical Thinking: Language and Inquiry Across the Disciplines, Conference 1988 Proceedings* edited by Mark Weinstein and Wendy Oxman-Michelli, (Upper Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for Critical Thinking, 1989) pp. 479-482.

4. See previous article for complete discussion of the definition of "Critical Discourse," Yaremchuk, pp. 479-480.

5. Brooke Noel Moore and Richard Parker, *Critical Thinking*, (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 181-189.

6. Howard Kahane, *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric*, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 21-109.

7. Similar tools (spreadsheet, summary, journal entry, quiz items, and exercises) are cited in Vincent Ryan Ruggerio, *Critical Thinking*, (Rapid City, SD: College Survival, Inc., 1989), pp. 83-84 and 94-95.

8. Problems for use in pair and group problem solving can be found in Arthur Whimbey and Jack Lochhead's, *Problem Solving and Comprehension*, 4th ed. (Hillside, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publisher, 1986), pp. 41-128.

William A. Yaremchuk is Professor of Communication and Director of Critical Discourse, Department of Speech, Communication & Theatre, Monmouth College, West Long Branch, NJ.

Strategies for Developing Critical Thinking Skills in Value-Oriented Humanities

Augustus' Imperial Policy: The Individual vis-a vis' The State

Peter F. Macaluso

Critical Inquiry

What are the values and issues raised in Caesar Augustus' (63 - 27 B.C. - 14 A. D.) policy to transform the allegiance within the individual aristocratic family to the state-family? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this new focus? What questions are to be considered as we examine the state-directed use of Virgil's *Aeneid* and of art and architecture to destroy one culture and replace it with a state oriented one? What are the vital issues here, as we examine the claims of freedom and authority, liberty and fraternity, the private person and the public person in history and our own society?

Augustus' Ideological Policy and Virgil's Aeneid

Virgil (70 - 19 B. C.) died before he could complete the *Aeneid*, the masterpiece he spent fourteen years writing. Augustus had the poem completed and put it to use to demonstrate that the qualities of the Republican family cult were to be put to the service of the Imperial State-Family.

Augustus shrewdly saw the *Aeneid* as the literary justification and explanation of the Roman Empire to the entire world. In this complex poem Virgil viewed Rome as majestic and sacred, ordained by destiny and Providence to rule the world. He saw a new Golden Age of human life emerging during the reign of Augustus. Rome is exalted and its virtues glorified.

Books 5 through 8 of the poem was not only a reflection of the new cultural syntheses, but also the most profound expression of the ethical issues implied in the new system. Aeneas' movement in the *Aeneid* is from the family-centered world of Troy to the state-centered world of Rome, the poetic counterpart of the historical reality. There is an element of majestic patriotism in it as Rome is linked to the heroic past. Virgil suggests, however, that in the Homeric past, the epics are works in praise of greatness and nobility of rugged individualism, whereas in the *Aeneid* he preaches the precedence that organized society and the state must have in order for men to achieve happiness and the good life.

Augustus saw the need for order after a century of tumult. He sought centralization of power and the possibility of a Julian Dynasty. He gradually transformed, finally ransacked the locus of authority from the family as it was in the Republic to the ideological system of the state-family of Rome by changing funeral practices and rituals.

In the Roman funeral each member of the living family both sees the place of the immortal family in history and learns his place in and obligation to the eternal procession. This is the right of passage for the son who praises his father and vows his energies to the glory of the family. Responsibility was reciprocal between the living and the dead and the living and not yet born. The rituals of the family cult were a form of ancestor worship.

The funeral was central in the formation of the Republican Roman's conception of authority. The primary place of authority was the family. Only by achievements which met public needs and received public approbation could a Roman *nobilis* justify himself to his family and assume his rightful position in the unbroken chain of the living and the dead and thereby live up to his office derived from his parents.

In the Roman house the Atrium was a mini-cathedral in which images in their individual shrines provided the salvation history of the family. This was a visual textbook that was a mini-epic and moral training ground as each child was guided through the Atrium to view the death masks and hear of the lives they represented.

Caesar Augustus transformed and codified the funeral practices that changed the structure of authority in the first century. By limiting the power of the father of the family as the center of aristocratic family power and by identifying his own Julian clan with the entire state-family he increased his control of the state and established a state religion.

Citizens were to be child-dependents of the Julian *pater*. To be a citizen of the Roman state-family was to owe obedience to its male leader - the *priceps* and *pater*. This was the new *pietas* of the empire. The State-family ideology implied sanctification of government through divinization of its living leaders.

The quote attributed to Augustus, "I found Rome a city of brick and left it a city of marble," does not suggest the remarkable town planning and temple building by Augustus for political purposes. Besides the various rituals he shaped and titles he assumed, Augustus used art and architecture to shape his plan.

The Pantheon, the Forum Augusti with the Temple of Mars Ultor (Mars the Vindicator), and the Ara Pacis, (Altar of Peace), were used to address primitive and psychological forces which were capable of inspiring reverence and mobilizing commitment. This new cultural system was capable of shaping with its structures and rituals the man suitable for participation in the Imperial System.

We can begin to observe the Augustan Plan unfolding itself concerning the dedication of the Pantheon in 25 B. C. Agrippa, Augustus' first assistant and heir apparent, had built the Pantheon with the original intention to make Augustus the deity of the shrine. However, dissuaded by Augustus, he ultimately consecrated it to the three family gods - Venus, Mars, and Julius. Yet Augustus and Agrippa received honors within the same monument. There were statues to both of them in the forecourt. The total effect of this assemblage was thus in line with a visual representation of the lineage of the state family. The parent gods, the recently deceased *paterfamilias*, now one of the family gods, the reigning *paterfamilias*, and the heir apparent.

The Forum of Augustus and the Temple of Mars Ultor were built over a period of many years. At the side of the Temple was the Hall of the Colossus (Giant Statue of Augustus). The Forum underscored the universal authority of the living Julian patriarchy. It had a significant functional value as a tool of the Imperial pedagogy of power.

The Forum contained at least 100 statues and the historical procession was a complete chronicle in stone, bronze, and gold, of the state-family, its divine progenitors, and its great leaders sown through history ending with Augustus himself, the reigning *paterfamilias*. It was a statement in stone of Imperial ideology intended to educate Romans in the manner a man of the Empire was supposed to view the state and its history.

The Imperial man was to experience the Forum of the Emperor with its *Exempla* in stone and their accompanying *Elogia* as Republican man experienced the display of *imagines* with their *tituli* in the Atrium of his private home.

It was in the Temple of Mars that Augustus had a passage rite for Imperial youth. Here in the Temple of Mars Augustus had all young men of military age enrolled in the *iuventus* after donning the *toga virilis* on the capitol. It was also here that the *ludi martiales* were celebrated in which recently enrolled sons of the nobility had the most prominent part.

In both cases the intention was to have a young man associate his military eligibility, his availability as a man now prepared to serve the Roman state, with the *imagines* of the new state family and its newly created tradition. The Temple was a shrine of patriarchy, a legal center of the city, where the Senate met to discuss triumphs, where generals dedicated sceptres and crowns, and where captured standards were stored. Law, war and the concept of public duty were focal themes.

The Ara Pacis is an example of a politically powerful concept wedded to historically convincing symbols. The general themes were probably chosen by Augustus: Peace, state-family, the nurturant and protective capacities of the State. It is the matriarchal counterpart of the patriarchal Forum.

The benefits of Augustus's new order was that the matriarchal conscience of the State could guard against hubris and overbearing qualities of the individual. The matriarchal conscience was not only a peace saving force but one of maternal protection, military energy, and as an inspiration and motivational influence surpassing the paternal.

Augustus spoke for both the patriarchal and monarchal principles of the state-family. He capitalized on the motivational resources inherent in both symbolic constructions. Joined together in common cause they had remarkable power.

Critical Inquiry: Strengths and Weaknesses of Augustan State

The transformation of society and culture by Augustus touches many vital questions and values that relate to the individual and society. A critical inquiry should be made of the strengths and weaknesses of the Imperial system. An inquiry should also be made of the legitimacy of the state-directed use of Virgil's *Aeneid* and of the arts and architecture. On a higher plane we should discuss our conception of the rights and duties of the person, the family and society and the relationship of one to the other.

The strength of the old *pietas* in the Republic was that relationships were concrete, and authority was personal. Its world was filled with the certainty of the past. One knew that one's actions were in behalf of one's very kin, family.

The weakness of the new *pietas* was that relationships were abstract and authority was impersonal. It's world was filled with the uncertainty of the future. There was the uncertainty of acting for the wrong person or of violating the spirit or feeling of old *pietas*.

The strength of the old *pietas* in Republican Rome was the hallowed images of the family's great leaders. Human action was governed by the tribunal of the past, whose authority was given living voice by the *paterfamilias*. The weakness of the new *pietas* was that the *patres* of this new ancestorhood were a melange of mythical legendary, and historical figures for whom one could have little feeling. Authority in this context was more remote and impersonal. National history replaces the familial past. The state geneology of Book 6 of the *Aeneid* and the Forum Augusti replaced the family.

In the Republic, a time of danger and chaos, men of power and singular oratorical talents emerged. In the Empire, a time of safety and order, there was less challenge or opportunity to develop one's highest personal capacities. Bureaucracy and a stultification of talent developed in the Empire.

In the Republican system of education there was a sense of competence and an experience that led to power and autonomy. The aristocratic family inculcated a sense of pride and public identity through the public funeral demonstration. An educational form of deep significance was eliminated.

In the Imperial practice the public arena is no longer separate from the family, but is the new family of the state. The hollow ritual of passage into manhood in the Forum lacked practical immediacy and a sense of potency communicated through the Republican practice. The young were reminded of their total dependency and impotence than any new privilege and responsibility. There is an acknowledgement of dependence and political acquiescence.

Augustus dramatically welded the power of Rome and exalted the city of Rome to the capital of the world. His extraordinary use of power and remarkable reign gave way to disorder within the family and turmoil in the years after his death. Despite the structure, the system focused sharply upon the *princeps*.

The historical relationship to the *Aeneid* seems clear. Just as Aeneas in the *Aeneid* frequently faltered as he entered the universe of Imperial Rome, feeling uncertainty and the loss of immediacy of his earlier life, so, too, did many a Roman before the brilliant but hollow vision of the state-family.

Critical Issues and Questions

1. What were the strengths and weaknesses of Augustus's policy?
2. What is the proper role of the state in relation to the arts?
3. Give examples of crucial questions related to the claims if the individual vis-a-vis' the state in the past, present, and future.
4. Demonstrate where the rights of the natural person and/or natural family have a prior or higher claim than the rights of the state. General examples. Specific examples.
5. Demonstrate that conscience, moral law, or holy prophet can claim or witness to a higher law than the law of the state.
6. What films or stories depict excessive individualism or state power? What depict a proper balance between the two?
7. What do we mean by collective conscience and social responsibility?
8. In what ways does the public person within the community fulfill the human potential and/or goal better than that of the private person?
9. Cite some Supreme Court cases related to these issues.
10. The extent and limits of a state's authority has been one of the greatest problems or challenges in history. Comment.

11. What are the rights and duties of the individual in relation to the state in the political, economic, social, and cultural areas?

12. What are the rights and duties of the family or community in relation to the state in the political, economic, social, and cultural areas?

13. What are the rights and duties of the state in relation to the community or individual in the political, economic, social, and cultural areas?

14. Discuss the following:

A. The tragedy of the human spirit lies in its inability to conform its collective life to its individual needs.

Reinhold Niebuhr

B. Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country.

John F. Kennedy

C. Above all, we must at all times remember what intellectuals habitually forget: that people matter more than concepts and must come first. The worst of all despotisms is the heartless tyranny of Ideas.

Intellectuals Paul Johnson

D. My country right or wrong.

Henry Clay

E. Throughout these years, the power of the State to do evil expanded with awesome speed, its power to do good grew slowly and ambiguously.

Modern Times Paul Johnson

F. The State ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper or coffee, calico or tobacco, or some such other law concern to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved, looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient, only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are dead, and those who are to be born.

Edmund Burke

G. The challenge of the Parlements could not be ignored. With a determination he had never before shown, Louis XV suspended the Parlement of Rennes, and in a *lit de justice* in the Paris Parlement in 1776, declared:

> What has occurred in my Parlement of Rennes does not concern my other Parlements. I have dealt with this court in this affair as my authority requires, and I am answerable to no one. In my person alone resides the sovereign power; from me alone my courts take their existence and their authority; to me alone belongs the legislative power, without dependence and without division; public order emanates entirely from me, and the rights and interests of the nation, which some have dared to separate from those of the monarch are necessarily united in my hands and rest only in my hands.

Louis XV

H. The Levée en Masse 23 August, 1792

Article I. From this moment until that is which our enemies shall be driven from the territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned for service in the armies.

Young men will go forth to battle; married men will forge weapons and transport munitions; women will make tents and clothing, and serve in hospitals; children will make lint from old linen; and old men will be brought to the public squares to arouse the courage of the soldiers, while preaching the unity of the Republic and hatred against kings.

Article II. Public buildings shall be converted into barracks.

> I. The child, the citizen, belong to the Fatherland. Common instruction is necessary. Children belong to their mother until the age of five. If she has nursed them, and to the Republic afterwards. . . until death.

Committee of Public Safety Notes in French Revolution
Saint Just

J. As Churchill correctly noted, the horrors he listed (of World War I) were perpetuated by the "mighty educated states." Indeed, they were quite beyond the power of individuals, however evil. It is commonplace that men are excessively mindless and cruel not as a rule out of avowed malice but from outraged righteousness. How much more is this time of legally constituted states, invested with all the seeming moral authority of parliaments and congresses and courts of justice! The destructive capacity of the individual, however vicious is small; of the state, however well-intentioned, almost limitless.

Modern Times Paul Johnson

K. According to the late historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationalism, like the atomic weapon, is today the archenemy of humanity.

> If the human race is to survive we shall have to make a revolutionary break with the traditional order of priorities in our loyalties. We shall have to transfer our paramount loyalty from our respective national fragments of the human race to the human race itself.
>
> . . . If we, in our time do succeed in subordinating our national loyalties to a loyalty to the human race, we can turn nationalism from the curse that it now is into the blessing that it might come to be.

New York Times, November 3, 1963
Arnold J. Toynbee

Peter F. Macaluso is Associate Professor of History, Montclair State College.

Schema Rubs and Schema Blanks: Forcing Attention upon Semantic/Interpretive Trouble Spots to Improve Poetry Explication

Paul Ady

Often in the introduction to literature course the instructor rewards attempts to explain and interpret works primarily in terms of how well the student can produce a coherent reading, even when that discovered coherence ignores the linguistic complexity of the text. The superficial reading that too often results is shaped well, but at the expense of anomalies or semantic trouble spots in the work. Like the disreputable uncle at the dinner table, these areas are often politely ignored. Our students will produce more insightful explications about poems when they are rewarded for focussing on all spots in those texts that evoke a question. Furthermore, students should be encouraged to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own interpretations.

Drawing upon my attempts to include schema theory in an introductory literature class, I have developed a procedure for encouraging students to seek out and investigate "schema blanks" and "schema rubs" in their reading of relatively difficult poetry. A schema blank occurs when the student has no match in his semantic repertoire for some element in the work. Schema rubs come in two sizes. Small ones happen when there is some knowledge in a reader's repertoire but it "rubs" against something in the text. Large ones happen when the student spots a falsifying anomaly in his or her interpretation of the work as a whole.

Running to such blanks and rubs means practicing intellectual courage, as well as intellectual honesty, two virtues necessary when experts think -- really think -- about literature.

Schema Theory

Schema (plural: schemata): Any mental representation. Schemata (sometimes called frames, though schema as a term has a longer history, dating to Kant) can be learned, invented, adjusted. In his application of schema theory to the reading process Rumelhart (1981) calls them the "building blocks of cognition," enabling us to understand phenomena within a prior context of learned information (repertoire of schemata).

Just as there are many types of knowledge there are many types of schemata:

1. *Conceptual schemata*: conceptual is a tricky term. Though useful pedagogically (students get the meaning) it really is redundant. If schemata are mental representations, then they are all conceptual. I prefer nominative schemata, suggesting that this is the type of schemata that nouns fall under: apple, Jesse Jackson, feminists, Baltimore, and so on.

Reader response theorists might point out that these schemata often vary from reader to reader, depending upon varied experiences. The point is that readers come to texts equipped with a vast number of conceptual (nominative) schemata: concepts that bear with them a cluster of associated and denoted and even private meanings. A given text may support or rub against these reader-based schemata.

2. *Procedural schemata*: if nominative schemata are like nouns, procedural schemata are like active verbs. This is "knowing how" knowledge, as opposed to "knowing that" knowledge. Take, for example, your procedural understanding about how to order a meal in a restaurant. Those of us with relevant background experience in this area follow procedural scripts to

perform this activity with ease. If we possess no script ("How much do I tip for indifferent service?") we are momentarily at a loss. Scripts like these develop out of all sorts of activities we have engaged in, whether it be waiting at a doctor's office, working a personal computer, tying shoes, reading a poem or a story, and so on.

Psychological studies in memory have revealed how powerful these scripts can be. In one case, subjects first read about an activity like a visit to a doctor. Later, they were asked to repeat what they had read. Frequently subjects misreported the event, adding information derived from their expectations about how such events take place. This suggests that procedural and nominative schemata can be the source of both blindness and insight. They enable us to function in the world by matching or adjusting new experiences to previously learned procedures. Unfortunately, in guiding our expectations they can also blind us to what is actually there--in the world or in the text. Such is the paradoxical nature of these "building blocks of cognition."

3. *Interpretive schema*: This is an explanatory hypothesis one forms in dealing with complex or ambiguous phenomena (or texts). When we try to "read" a person's behavior, or account for economic decline in a period, or explain why a moth died in an experiment, or interpret any ambiguous or complex text, we produce interpretive schemata.

Interpretations are rule governed, meaning that procedural schemata guide their formation. When we (most of us, anyway) try to produce an interpretation for a text we follow one of the key procedural rules of the game: we make certain the explanation displays the relationship between significant parts and the whole (We also have a rule governed procedure for identifying "significant parts"). Once again, a reader response theorist would point out that since interpretive schemata depend upon one's understanding of basic content knowledge (nominative schemata) and appropriate skills (procedural schemata) and because these often vary from individual to individual, interpretive schema will often vary. One could argue, however, that those more familiar with the nominative schemata evoked by the poem or text, and those more familiar with the rhetorical conventions and reading practices implied by the text will likely generate more appropriate and more persuasive interpretive schemata.

3A. *Schema blank*: in the process of formulating an interpretation this presents itself whenever we read a word or a phrase and draw a blank. We simply do not know what the word means; we need a dictionary or some other source of information.

3B. *Schema rub*: a falsifying anomaly. There are little rubs and big rubs. A little rub happens when a student's understanding of a word or phrase "rubs" against the way the word or phrase is being used. The cognitive dissonance that results may be minimal, particularly when students are accustomed to suppress such mismatches, or significant, as is the case with more rigorous readers. A big rub happens when the student has formulated an interpretive schemata for a text as a whole which ignores or suppresses a falsifying anomaly.

General Rule: Successful readers *run to*, not away from, schema blanks and schema rubs, for these hold the keys to a successful interpretation.

In class, students are introduced to the concepts of schema rubs and blanks when they practice a sequence of tactics for reading and explicating poetry. On the first day of a session on poetry, students received the following procedure:

On Reading and Interpreting Poetry

1. Let the poem be.
   (Write the poem out, read the poem slowly several times, try to meet it on its own terms, defer judgment)

2. Let the poem speak.
   (Perform the poem out loud, to yourself, to others in a small group. Don't rush the performance)

3. Activate the literal level as fully as possible.
   (Don't rush to a symbolic or otherwise figurative level. Very often that tactic is completely inappropriate.)

4. Attempt an interpretive schema
   (Write an explication for the poem that tries to fit all the parts of the poem into some understandable whole without ignoring anomalies).

5. Seek out all schema blanks and schema rubs.
   (Note down in your inquiry log all spots in the poem that raise a question in your mind at the word, phrase, clause, stanza levels. Note also any parts of the poem that your interpretive schema does not account for. Then get in a small group and let others show you things you may not have noticed. Add these ideas to your list.)

6. Seek answers to these blanks and anomalies.
   (For blanks: consult a dictionary. For rubs: consult a dictionary if you think a troublesome word means something other than you thought; try a different interpretive schema. Perhaps your problem is that of the prisoners in Plato's cave: you are resisting alternate views.)

7. Do another explication that has fewer, if any, anomalies.

8. Let the poem speak again.
   (Perform the poem orally, or coach another in your group to express the poem in a manner that coheres with your interpretation)

During a workshop of this year's conference at Montclair State the leaders of the session went through the procedure with the audience. We concentrated upon the following poem by Emily Dickinson:

> I'm "wife"--I've finished that--
> That other state--
> I'm Czar--I'm "Woman" now--
> It's safer so--

How odd the Girl's life looks
Behind this soft Eclipse--
I think that Earth feels so
To folks in Heaven--now--

This being comfort--then
That other kind--was pain--
But why compare?
I'm "Wife"! Stop there!

-- Emily Dickinson

In small groups of 3-4 people the workshop participants first read the poem silently, then read the poem out loud to each other very slowly. Continuing with the procedure, they discussed a tentative hypothesis to explain the text. With steps four and five the session as a whole identified as many schema blanks and rubs as they could. Schema blanks were few and consisted mainly of identifying such references as "that other state" or "this being comfort" or "that other kind --was pain--" One participant asked why "wife" and "Woman" are in quotations. Stanza two with its use of analogy puzzled several for a while. I mentioned to this adept group that in an introduction to literature class "Czar" would function as a schema blank for some students.

Schema rubs were more plentiful. Some typical questions: "How can a wife be a czar?" "Does this text really suggest that becoming a wife means becoming a woman?" Both of those last responses betrayed a resistance in this audience to the valorization of the role of being a wife. Since this "rubbed against" their perception of how a woman *should* view being a wife, or their perception of how women in late 20th century America typically view their roles, many resisted what the poem was actually saying. This resistance also influenced the way several of the participants filled in the "blanks" in the first two lines of the poem ("I'm "wife" I've finished that --/ That other state), choosing to read "That other state" as the state of being a wife. In fact, this interpretation works well until the last line of the poem ("I'm 'Wife'--Stop there!"). No interpretive contortions were able to resolve this "big rub" (falsifying anomaly).

Hearing the participants argue over their interpretations for these blanks and rubs reminded me how intellectually exciting and revealing such an exercise can be. Listening to someone's interpretive choices at these very specific levels often reveals preferences, mental mind sets. When these mind sets rub up against a poem that will not comfortably match them, a poem in class can arouse much useful argument, particularly about the nature of interpretation.

As I have suggested, steps four and five are crucial in sequence of interpretive tactics. Performing them requires of students an intellectual courage and honesty that they do not often practice. I can not think of a student who likes to admit his or her ignorance with respect to what he or she has read, most especially out loud in class. And yet we acknowledge that expert readers gain their expertise in large part by facing up to what they do not know. How can we get students to admit their ignorance?

Terms like "schema blank" and "schema rub" help matters. "I have a schema blank on that word" is a statement far less mortifying than "I don't know what it means." "I have a schema rub on that line" encourages inquiry in ways that "It makes no sense" does not. We often talk about reading as a dialogic process between text and reader. A term like "schema rub" isolates a particular moment in that dialogue that too often gets muted.

None of this works, however, if the instructor insists on playing the role of the omniscient guru. If students are convinced that their job is to discover the answer that the professor has in mind, then the inquiry is bogus. Modeling the questioning process, admitting to their own difficulties with the text, rewarding students for identifying the specific places where the poem raises a question in their minds all prove more effective.

Evaluation

Usual practice in evaluating student proficiency in reading and explicating poetry too often inhibits, rather than rewards, in-depth analyses. Replicating an instructor-derived exegesis for an exam, or writing a well shaped explication that suppresses much of the linguistic complexity in the poem yields minimal gains. Such activities do not encourage students to think very deeply about the poems.

In order to encourage more genuine inquiry, I had students take quizzes that assessed the degree to which they posed questions about a given text. In such a quiz they were given a poem, asked to identify as many blanks and rubs as they could, then asked to explicate the poem, and finally had to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses in their interpretations. They were told that they would be graded *only on the strength of their initial questioning of the text and the final self critique.*

For the final exam, naturally, they knew that the quality of the explication *would* matter. Just as important, however, was the process they employed to reach an explication. Consequently, they had to question, analyze, and interpret a difficult poem they had never seen before; and then critically evaluate their own efforts. They were told before hand that it was quite possible to do very well without performing an excellent interpretation -- so long as their questioning and evaluating were rigorous.

Conclusion

For me and my students all of this works exceptionally well. They appreciate that someone has given them specific tactics to test and assimilate. For my part, I appreciate having a class where inquiry matters. Teaching specific tactics, including those which entail the concepts of the schema rub and schema blank, particularly facilitate this.

Paul Ady is Professor of English at Assumption College.

An Inquiry Into English Language Instruction with Deaf Students: A Tool or an End?

Anne E. Kingston

Introduction

The presentation was introduced with the story of *The Five Chinese Brothers.*

Once upon a time there were Five Chinese Brothers and they all looked exactly alike.

They lived with their mother in a little house not far from the sea.

The First Chinese Brother could swallow the sea.
The Second Chinese Brother had an iron neck.
The Third Chinese Brother could stretch and stretch and stretch his legs.
The Fourth Chinese Brother could not be burned. And
The Fifth Chinese Brother could hold his breath indefinitely.

Every morning the First Chinese Brother would go fishing, and whatever the weather, he would come back to the village with beautiful and rare fish which he had caught and could sell at the market for a very good price.

One day, as he was leaving the market, a little boy stopped him and asked him if he could go fishing with him.

"No, it could not be done," said the First Chinese Brother.

But the little boy begged and begged and finally the First Chinese Brother consented. "under one condition, " said he," and that is that you shall obey me promptly."

"Yes, yes," the little boy promised.

Early the next morning, the First Chinese Brother and the little boy went down to the beach.

"Remember," said the First Chinese Brother, "you must obey me promptly. When I make a sign for you to come back, you must come at once."

"Yes, yes," the little boy promised.

Then the First Chinese Brother swallowed the sea.

And all the fish were left high and dry at the bottom of the sea. And all the treasures of the sea lay uncovered. The little boy was delighted. He ran here and there stuffing his pockets with strange pebbles, extraordinary shells and fantastic algae.

Near the shore the First Chinese Brother gathered some fish while he kept holding the sea in his mouth. Presently he grew tired. It is very hard to hold the sea. So he made a sign with his had for the little boy to come back. The little boy saw him but paid no attention.

The First Chinese Brother made great movements with his arms and that meant "Come back!" But did the little boy care? Not a bit, and he ran further away.

Then the First Chinese Brother felt the sea swelling inside him and he made desperate gestures to call the little boy back. But the little boy made faces at him and fled as fast as he could.

The First Chinese Brother held the sea until he thought he was going to burst. All of a sudden the sea forced its way out of his mouth, went back to its bed . . . and the little boy disappeared.

Those of you who have read the story recently or remember it from the past may know that the brother who had swallowed the sea was held responsible for the disappearance of the little boy and condemned to death. As the sentence was announced the brother begged to go home to say goodbye to his mother, to be replaced in the morning by a brother whose particular gift would render him indestructible to the punishment enacted. At the pronouncement of each punishment the brother would beg to postpone until morning whereupon another brother whose particular skill would render the punishment void, would replace him. The story ends with the five brothers happily living with their mother for many years.

I am not sure if I ever really knew what this story was supposed to tell me. Most children's stories appearing on Captain Kangaroo or in a parent's hands at bedtime always seemed to have an underlying message which the child might ferret out; albeit often the "answer" was coaxed and preened to the adult's interpretation. I don't really remember my summary then, although I do remember wondering what happened to the little boy. While the story had elements about interdependence, the importance of family bonding, the danger of greediness and a mixed message about defiance of authority, I was always stuck at the lack of resolution offered for the little boy enticed with an artificially contrived world . The little boy, perhaps, like me, was lured to the sea-treasures, caught in their magical otherworldliness yet wholly earthiness. The little boy, desiring and finding a way to enter this strange world, one that led him to disobey the frantic motions of the sea-swollen brother who, fully knowing the sea's potential to swallow and consume the boy, was on the edge of releasing the terrible force. After all, the boy was only exploring, and the older "authority figure" had said he could . . . I suppose this begins to sound like an exploration of childhood, and what does it have to do with teaching English and deaf students at a technical school?

The story and its images appeared one morning as I was trying to put academic language around a sometimes inexplicable sense of "knowing" as related to teaching. The pictures were first to appear from childhood, the swollen jowls and the contorted face, desperate and angry at the same time, the child running and stuffing pockets with stinky, wet, oozing sea treasures, of the type that rarely washed up even after high tide. I suddenly could feel the pressure of the Chinese brother, pressured to an irrepressible degree before spewing forth the ocean, knowing that the child was still out there some place.

Who has not felt this as a teacher? Or as a student? Who has not pondered whether your own methods, while designed to reveal treasures and the inner complexities of the language has instead served to overwhelm the student, to the degree that she drowns in the realities, never really understanding how all the treasures are intertwined and co-dependent upon each other?

And most of all, have any of us entered teaching and remained in it and not seen a student, armed with only curiosity and a demanding need to achieve, defiantly face the onslaught of the overwhelming reality of school and community pressures? How often, when confronted with the realities of presenting fragments of knowledge have we been tempted to throw away heedence to the "curriculum" ?

And sometimes I could see how I too would be the child, lured by the inexplicable and the miraculous, entranced and greedy to the point of not wanting to leave a seemingly safe haven, not knowing that the haven is artificial and momentary.

But there is a connection in my mind where the visual metaphors meet solidly with the experience and struggle of deaf students learning English.

Teaching English: A Tool or an End?

Deaf students enter higher education with a wide range of education and language backgrounds. Their educational histories reflect an emerging social/cultural identity influencing the sense of self as communicator. The oral student may consider herself as part of the hearing community and the manual student might strongly associate with the traditional "deaf culture" as defined by the traditions of the deaf residential schools and deaf communities scattered across the country. In the NTID and RIT community a student might encounter a language reality so opposed to self-definition as deaf or hearing-impaired that the student may define self as what she is not, when compared to the hearing or the deaf community. This too sets up a deficit perspective as to communication skills and identity. To reject, either the deaf or the hearing community's main language form is to define self as communicator as what one does or does not have; skill, hearing, spoken language, sign language or a "sense of culture". This dilemma is embedded in the developing sense of identity.

In 1982, Bonnie Meath-Lang, Frank Caccamise and John Albertini reviewed writing samples collected from interviews with incoming NTID students. This study observed that students reported learning "about" English but demonstrated little flexibility in the manipulation of the language. The sense of learning about a language does not correspond with learning the language or feeling comfortable with its use. This implies a very prescribed and contained definition of English. The language is viewed as a structure which must be mastered, learned and memorized. There is a sense of English as an imposed ought; and perhaps an elitist one at that. Almost like Latin was held out as the language to be learned by the educated in past years, although it was never used in a social context.

To this extent many students see the learning of English as an end; a fixed goal which once achieved and passed will grant them access to the hearing world. Not all students perceive that this is possible for a deaf person, especially if their first language is American Sign Language. There is a sense that the transformation will not occur, that the language will always be difficult because they are deaf and not hearing.

When asked to relate the relevance of English to their future not all students perceive it as a means of access to the job, community or academic environment. The students who do respond in the positive, often see English helping them in a job which will require some kind of writing. Rarely do they cite the need for communicating with superiors or the need for communicating with supervisees. Few deaf students in my classes envision themselves in a position requiring giving directions and feedback to co-workers or supervisees. How much this is due to the isolating deficit-perspective of deafness and how much this has to do with the very technical focus of their education and future jobs, I cannot surmise. In either case, the students seem to see English as a language of power and control, demanding a controlled approach, yet do not see themselves as holders and manipulators of that power or control over both their own lives and the English language. And yet, education always presupposes a vision of the future (Simon, 1987, p. 371). It seems that the vision that these students have of their future, is therefore one without the control over the English language, but rather one of being controlled by it, due to their own sense of deficiency in "English perfectness."

There is often a real struggle as to the definition of what "English" means. The answers which surface demonstrate confusion as to the interconnectedness of reading, writing, grammar and vocabulary . . . . Students often separate out the various aspects of using English into categories and evidence mixed understandings as to how to utilize this segmented "knowledge" which has been acquired through the process Meath-Lang describes as "academic shopping crammed with 45 minute learning packages" (Meath-Lang, Caccamise, Albertini, 1982, p. 304).

The nature of deafness may isolate the individual from the hearing community. A deaf child growing up may experience a "mainstreamed" environment where he or she is one of several deaf individuals within a school system with the benefits of support services, or a self-contained classroom, or he or she may be the only deaf person in the community. The student may have been educated in the oral, manual or total communication style, depending upon the educational institution and the predominate services available, as well as parents' beliefs and preferences. Other deaf students may graduate from a deaf school background, or have a deaf family environment. These students may be educated in total communication, manual sign language (of which there are several, including American Sign Language and its many dialects), oral speech skills etc., and experience a different communication system in the home outside of the educational experience.

In this manner deaf students are similar to other language minority groups for whom the language of the education system and the dominant culture is different from the home language. However, there are important differences in these populations which also must be taken into consideration before such comparisons can be maintained. The communication barrier that deafness can impose in a world dominated by hearing people with whom communication may or may not be achieved easily, includes inconveniences, frustrations and cultural differences which pose a barrier for functioning with the same fluency as that of a hearing person in a second-language base environment. Many students at NTID have learned how to address these communication barriers. Still, it is the fact that English, and *standard English* is held out as the key to maneuvering within the job or community environment that may reinforce or even may be at the root of a deaf individual's sense of self-as communicator as less-than-proficient.

Deaf students have little trouble identifying their English weaknesses. For many, education seems to have reinforced the notion that English is a language system that is unconnected to their personal life. When asked why they want to take a course in English or what does writing mean, the responses predominantly focus upon the reiteration of an ingrained "purpose of good English." You can almost hear the teacher's or parents' admonishments to the frustrated young child threatening to ignore this complex system often inaccessible in an environment where others are speaking without sign. Wrote one student during the first week of a course when asked to define the meaning of "writing:"

> Writing mean to communicated with someone in letter, memo, message or others. Writing is very important part of your life to get the information, to improve your writing with grammar and vocabulary and to show or prove to someone that something that someone said so from the long distance.

Other students chose to avoid the definition all together and make a list of why writing is important. Chief among these was communication on the job and the "writing" of letters to your family. One again gets the feeling of the home and past teachers or guidance counselors participating in the present. One older, non-traditional student admitted:

> "I looked that word up from the dictionary to understand me whats writing mean.".

He then proceeded to write out the four or five definitions listed under the word "writing" in the dictionary. This admittance undoubtedly took courage and bespoke of a different sense of self-knowledge. Here too we sense the student for whom the "authorities" or the "experts" hold the "right answers. A younger student for whom education and its connection to life relied upon quoting past directives or disguising dictionary definitions within a paragraph starting :

> Writing means to write the record and to produce a paragraph that to organizing the sentence. It mean write with a pen or pencil on the paper which we using human hand for hold a pen and write it down on the paper.

Finally there is another confession, a combination of pleasing the teacher and admitting confusion on the question.

> "Writing is also like communication" he started, only to finish with the disclaimer "I don't know what writing is, I guess on this paragraph."

Here we can clearly see not only an unmatured definition of English, but also a diffused definition based upon not "getting it right," of the inability to find the key into the complex puzzle labeled "English." Too, English is predominantly taught by hearing people with a variety of sign language skill. This makes English all the more a game to be played, and winning relies upon ferreting out the teacher's demands, and at the same time answering the haunting deficiencies so clearly detailed from a life of placement through standardized tests.

Students are well aware of their English deficiencies, and some will cite you what has been "diagnosed" as their problem. Often the student's assumptions of the teacher is that the teacher has and will give the correct answers, that the red pencilled lines will provide the corrections and the student will therefore only need to make the mistakes once and then the teacher will do the correcting . . . or the writing, from my perspective.

This sense of diagnosed deficiencies emerges in the following student's self analysis. (These samples are drawn from two very different courses: one which focuses upon idea organization and the analysis of ideas within a variety of written pieces, and an upper level course advertised as an "integrative course" with work utilizing reading, writing, and grammar skills).

> I need to practice more on language structure, need to stop using too many verbs in sentence, need to learn about essays, more outlines.

This student never did demonstrate the verb and language structure difficulties to the degree that was identified in the self-report. However, it is clear that for him, the foremost concern is grammar. Essays seem to have been an afterthought given reflection upon the course description. When asked what they do "right," students usually have minimal or no response.

The students' division of English into grammar, reading and writing and diagnosed deficiencies is not surprising. During the 1960's many deaf schools hired reading specialists and separated English language instruction into reading and "English." Students would attend reading classes and then report to "English" which was predominantly grammatical in focus. This promoted the sense that English encompassed precise grammar and the structuring of sentences on a page.

If English proficiency in a functional sense is held as the measure for the deaf student's fluency and functioning in college coursework, then the student is immediately being assessed as deficient and "lacking" the language and communication skills which a hearing counterpart may have developed. Language, in whatever mode is utilized, if not "Standard English" often serves as a reminder of the powerlessness of the deaf individual in a hearing world.

The use of a functional definition of literacy may promote a formulaic or a prescribed English language system to a deaf student whose deficiencies have become the focus of his or her educational experience. This in turn may promote the understanding of English as an "end" or an goal which may be achieved through logical and precise understanding of the intricacies of the English grammar structure and the seemingly arbitrary spelling patterns inherent in the English language. English becomes a skill or something to be "gotten" in order to achieve or make progress within the educational and later career spheres. It is not surprising, then, that students may enter a classroom with a predetermined sense of what an English class should be and what they "need to get out of it" or, rather, get out of the teacher.

Cultural literacy is also a predominantly "deficit" perspective in which the student is measured in terms of what he or she does not know in order to function within the dominant cultural society. The definition of "cultural prerequisites" and identification of gap filling priorities bespeaks of decisions that must be made by a majority group in response to instilling the values and beliefs inherent in the current system. This is not to condemn or to negate such subjects as irrelevant, just the opposite. It is to emphasize the importance of understanding the aspects of the culture which make up the fabric of our society, but in allowing the student to develop a sense of self in relation to these tenets, and a critical understanding of how these ideas and values impact his or her own perspective on the culture.

A deaf student may perceive these deficiencies on yet another level, given this type of framework and assessment of educational needs. The student may perceive the majority culture as possessing a common identity or a shared framework of communication and thought process inherent in a audio-oral community which often discludes the association of others for whom communication is not aural/oral.

In response to an assessment based upon perceived "deficiencies," the student may demand an objectified, formulaic approach to the frustration, looking for a harness or a structure into which to place the missing components, to make the whole system of knowledge more fluent or more cohesive. Memorization of vast amounts of vocabulary words, grammatical structures, or facts within a book, may allow the student a sense of achievement; however, if these have not been hinged into the individual's cognitive and socio-emotional life, the details and memorized material may not transfer to other applications. This could be true of technical courses in which the vocabulary and terminology may be situation specific. If the vocabulary is taught in such a way that the student is not placed in an interactive problem solving operation, the student simply memorizes the correct "solution" to the problem, and the language connected with it.

In return, the teacher tends to fragmentalize language instruction, again in reaction to a sense of language deficits. English may be objectified in the process of breaking the language into pieces. This method does have a place in the curriculum, but only as a way to provide additional information to support the student's cognitive understanding and ability to express what has already been integrated on a higher conceptual level.

A formulaic approach to English-through-grammar does foster the ability to write a "perfect" sentence if judged by the form, tense and management of controlled vocabulary words. Many students hold tightly to a memorized concept and become very frustrated upon the discovery of a printed word which may be a noun, a verb and an adjective depending upon the context.

For example: the word "light" to light, a light, a light brown dog.

The signs for these meanings would be different, yet they are represented by a single spelling of the English word. This can be further complicated by the fact that one sign may cover several English words: a circle drawn around the face with a forefinger could mean "looks" as in appearance or features and "face". Some verb/noun signs are distinguished by the fact that the verb includes motion and direction. For example seat or chair as compared to "sit" or sitting." The one verb sign may represent several different verb forms in English. This contextuality in translation is confusing to many for whom sign language is their "first language" as well as to newcomers to sign language be they deaf or hearing.

Other words have become glued to one inflexible meaning to which the student clings. In one of the entry level "integrative classes" I asked for the meaning of the word, "conflict," hoping to include this in our analysis of the characters in the book. A hand shot up in the front row, "Two appointments at the same time" was the explanation offered. True, that was a beginning, but as the rest of the class began to flush out the other meanings of conflict in the story, such as problem, confrontation, frustration, etc, I could see that the early respondent was becoming quite perplexed.

"You seemed concerned about this word," I said to him after class. He smiled and shook his head and said he would understand it after he had read more of the book. OK. I refrained from pushing. The story we were reading involved the personal and social problems of a young boxer growing up in an urban environment and faced with the tempting easiness of a life of crime or the hard and physically punishing challenge of boxing, with only a hope of being qualified as a "contender," not even a champion.

The next day we again discussed the word conflict and its relevance to the story on a variety of levels. All faces appeared calm so that I felt assured that each person was finding ways to make sense of the seeming myriad of conflicts surrounding this story's character. It wasn't until the next test that the fragmentation and need to hold onto a previous definition of the word surfaced for the student. On the test, I asked for a definition of the meaning of conflict and an example from the book to support their definition. "Two appointments at the same time" appeared on one paper with the added support that the main character had to go to the gym to work out and to work at the grocery store at the same time. Although this never happened in the story, the student had created a way to fit in his strict definition, clinging to the old definition which did not seem open for elaboration.

A formulaic approach often strands a student whose vocabulary is limited. Sentences are analyzed according to parts and words are interpreted as to the position of the word in the sentence, regardless of its spelling. Meaning is therefore derived from the position of the word in the basic sentence pattern of subject verb object. Most English users vary their sentence pattern to show emphasis or to elaborate upon meaning. But for the student who has memorized Subject Verb Object as the key to understanding English, this provides confusion. One example of this is a student who wrote an entire essay about "Hence Curtis" as a character in the plot. The main character's name was Ponyboy Curtis, and he had two brothers, Daryl and Sodapop Curtis, but where did the student come up with this fourth character? I re-read the first few chapters and discovered that in the second chapter a sentence started with the word "hence" followed by the surname Curtis. Aha, Hence Curtis was born.

This indicates dependence upon the word position in the sentence. He was unable to pull information out of a sentence which deviated from the strict Subject Verb Object pattern. In the next weeks I realized the degree to which this student was text and sentence-structure dependent. I was left to wonder how the student had made sense of the classroom discussions about the family and the fact that the name "hence" had never shown up. I also was able to observe that this student's reading skill was dependent upon a very rigid, simple sentence pattern from which he did not deviate in writing, and which it seems, he could not deviate in reading. The basic pattern of Subject Verb Object was ingrained as "English" and held tightly as the formula which unlocked the intermingled mass of words on the page. Another example of this tight hold upon a rigid S -V -O order is the understanding of embedded clauses. For example a sentence such as:

The man, who tripped over the dog, was hurt.

When asked who was hurt, the answer is often "the dog" was hurt.

I found corresponding issues in the writing classes; short choppy sentences which demonstrated near-perfect grammar but had no real meaning beyond a very broad, sweeping generalization. Everything in these essays is "very nice" or to be emphatic "so very nice." Essays were not only shallow in meaning, but also tended to cling to one or two verb forms. Nouns and adjective forms were treated as interchangeable. The sentences which appeared on the paper, devoid of meaning,had little resemblance to the communication with each other or with me through voicing or in sign language. Here, students demonstrated varied and complex thought development, using sentence structures that never appeared on the paper. I began to see more clearly that that "writing" class meant achieving near-perfect grammar regardless of meaning. The perfection of the structure was the goal rather than the expression of an idea.

"Language is a grammar to communicate" one student wrote which could mean that writing is grammar, and of course grammar needs to be perfect. Not only did the students expect that a writing course titled "Organizing Paragraphs" would focus on grammar, but they had an expectation of me to "correct" their grammar. For many this meant that I should use the red pen and write over their own writing so that their words could be modified into standard English.

(I will explain later how I addressed some of these issues, however I did want to include that regardless of how much I felt had been understood and achieved as to the direction of the course and the student's maturation of analyzing and organizing ideas on the page, the demand for me to correct the grammar still appeared.)

The message was clear, this was a writing course!

At mid-quarter I asked students in the basic writing course "Organizing Paragraphs" what they had learned from the first half and what areas they would like to focus on during the second half of the course. I listed the possible topics that we might cover and asked them to add to the list. Wrote one student:

> I learn how to put the separate ideas in the story or paragraphs. I understand what you teach us about that. I like you to check my grammar that is right way.

The long training in "English is grammar" was still surfacing, along with the student's own experience with the deficiency model. There is a perception among some deaf students that deaf students need to obtain this skill from the hearing person a sad comment on the lack of deaf role models and teachers in the area of English, and a reinforcement of the perspective that deaf students "can't" learn English or only learn it under special circumstances. One student insisted on grammar-only in his course citing grammar as the main ingredient missing in his skill development. He knew that I would not red-pencil his grammar but would provide feedback for him to do it himself and yet kept showing up in my courses every quarter repeating the same request. This student wrote of his experience in learning English:

> The language between deaf and hearing are conflict because they does not fix in same proper language situation . . . We both, hearing and deaf, have same English concept the idea of communication. Fortunately, some deaf people were taught better education in right proper hearing language.

This division in the schools between Reading and "English" enforced a compartmentalization of the student's knowledge about the English language. Many students did not see that grammar, reading, vocabulary and thought-development are required for reading and writing fluency. Learning, broken into "subject" areas compartmentalizes knowledge and students view English and reading as two separate spheres of knowledge.

This in effect promotes a sense of isolation on the part of the student. The isolation is engendered first by the language deficiency diagnosis, labeling the student's inabilities rather than abilities, in comparison to hearing counterparts. For an individual already steeped in the awareness of their difference between themselves and the hearing majority, this also sets up a negative spiral of self-confidence on the part of the student.

Secondly, the isolation is one from teachers and the adult role models as the possessors of information that the student is "lacking." The student's dependency upon the teacher to provide the "right" key or to "correct" the papers bespeaks of the philosophy that patronizes the deaf student's ability to explore and develop a manipulation of the language through means other than fill in the blank exercises and grammar and vocabulary drills. The student has learned that the objective of a classroom might be to get, store and recite on cue rather than to assimilate and contrast ideas.

In this way words, concepts, phrases are memorized devoid of context and life-meaning. Such information is later channelled back to the world in an effort to apply these fragments, even to situations seemly inappropriate to the teacher, but triggered and connected by the student due to the similarity of one word or the spelling of the word. Gates open and whole diversions of information pour out and are applied to the topic at hand, often based upon the memorized form which has resurfaced from years ago but was never assimilated and developed onto the larger framework of conceptual knowledge. It is almost as if the students attempt to design and maintain a net into which these unrelated fragments are stored, but not understood "in situ" and therefore appear as collected fragments of unconnected knowledge.

Why is this approach to English continued? The task throughout time has been to make sense of the world; to find a way to control and harness the overwhelming images and contradictions that are present in conscious living and at the same time co-exist with these contradictions. It is in this interwoven and fluctuating manipulation of knowledge that we design our reality, or accept another person's design.

In psychological and cognitive developmental spheres in the sense of Piaget, the child goes through phases of development which culminates in adulthood. In an Eriksonian perspective the child encounters developmental challenges which present a problem solving opportunity to the individual. The decisions or course of action taken impacts progressive identity development of the individual. This process continues throughout adulthood. Freud spelled out the trauma in terms of the struggle of the individual with sex drive, the ego, the id and the super ego. Social theorists have proposed that the reality of the individual is an agreed reality or a type of social contract constructed through the process of interaction (Berger and Lucyk, 1966).

Throughout all theories is the struggle to define and analyze, to order, categorize knowledge and "create" new knowledge which can be fit into the matrix fabric. If structure is in question, one must find new ways to force the structure to engulf or at least tangentially touch and hold the information in place. Then we go on with the packaging.

This approach also centers upon the testing and retesting of students' knowledge. Knowledge that is testable is therefore recognized as more important in the eyes of the students. No wonder grammar takes a precedence over conceptual and exploratory thinking when it is a test score, with an emphasis on grammar, that is keeping the student from getting into the higher level courses desired for the major. Teaching to the tests, however, is almost impossible, as the current tests used are normed on hearing students. The contradictions begin to emerge, for student and teacher. Improvement on the test scores is not attainable without the ability to manipulate and interact with the language, an expanded experiential base upon which to hinge meaning and concepts, and a conceptual flexibility.

It is this test, measure and evaluate process which Eisner (1979) labeled "Curriculum as Technology" in his book *The Educational Imagination*. Curriculum as Technology stems from the works and theories of such theorists as Benjamin Bloom, Franklin Bobbit, and Ralph Tyler. This embraces a style that is very sequential and normative with a focus upon the ends, or the instructional objectives with means or process dictated by the end goal. (Eisner, 1979, p. 67). It is thus how students learn to view English as grammar, with its separate and memorizable formulas which function to make meaning on paper. Questioning the "ends" is never pondered, the goal is to use the learned sequences in appropriate order, the meaning, it is assumed, will follow. Meaning for the student or meaning of the teacher? I am never sure.

Contrast this approach with a model in which the student moves away from a hierarchical and structured relationship with the language to questioning and exploring it. In one of my classes during the last year we would utilize interactional computers to discuss questions related to the reading. Usually these questions involved a controversial topic that students had extracted from the readings. Together we analyzed the transcripts by coding various aspects of the discussion. The students developed the codes as well as decided upon what should be labeled and coded.

One important and particularly meaningful labelling process entailed identifying and coding various types of questions and their structures. The questions were coded as to their expected response and the actual response that was received. Students began exploring the interactional nature of written language and how the simple phrasing and rephrasing of information elicited widely different responses. Better than a grammar lesson, the students began to evolve an understanding of the placement and emphasis of the words in each response. They analyzed why some questions and responses were ignored as misunderstood or perhaps phrased in such a way that the information received in response seemed irrelevant to the intended inquiry.

We moved from this exercise to utilizing and developing "questions only" about the texts. No answers were given. Only questions were moving around the room, often seeming to hang unanswered until someone else volunteered an alternate question which actually took the question deeper and implied that an answer had indeed been grounded before the question was offered. The level of meaning and the level upon which the students interacted with each other and the text quickly expanded. Gone were the restrictions of getting the right answer, now they were free to question only, and in their questions find resolutions to issues which would have been frustrating had it required a response; if only because of the fear of getting it "wrong."

Through these classes it has become evident that given the chance to use and manipulate the language, especially in the area of inquiry, students' expanded their concept of English language and use of it. Essays appeared guided by questions. Sometimes more than one question following a logical, sequential mode of anticipating the reader's thoughts. Other essays offered questions and discussion as contradictory explanations of comparison and contrast and cause and effect.

The other remarkable aspect of this process was that the students, in their immediate question and response mode, both on computer and in their questioning essays tended to demonstrate better grammar. Again, the knowledge of evaluation and the residue of the deficiency diagnosis remains for many students in a formal, structured assignment.

This method reinforced the notion of allowing the students to view and manipulate English as a tool, as a means of controlling and obtaining meaning. The approach also removed the teacher as the isolated and isolating "expert" whose sole role was to infuse students with grammatical oughts. Several students in the course decided to apply for early decision in taking the Liberal Arts Placement Test which allows students to place into the entry level writing courses required of all Rochester Institute of Technology Students, deaf or hearing, before they are granted entry into the liberal arts courses required for the Associate's or Bachelor's programs.

This too, is a method of empowering students. The interactional and student-initiated analysis removes some of the barriers instilled by a deficit - model and the strict identity of the English language as owned and operated by the hearing culture. In the realm of possible cultural invasion with its inherent oughts for the subcultures and prescribed definitions as to language, it is not surprising that the individual grasps onto whatever formula is offered to make sense out of the probable chaos, or whatever avenue is encouraged in order to join the dominant culture.

In a paper on Patriarchy in Higher Education, Roger Simon and Magda Lewis (1988 p. 468) address the problems of discourse in the classroom, and the issue of dominant and subordinate groups based upon traditional hierarchies of power. Their discussion on discourse between men and women in the classroom also has relevance to this topic. Writes Simon and Lewis:

> Teacher and student must find forms within which a single discourse does not become the locus of certainty and certification. In particular, teachers must ask how they can help create a space for the mutual engagement of lived differences that is not framed in oppositional terms requiring the silencing of a multiplicity of voices by a single dominant discourse.

Empowerment means to give ability to, to permit or enable (Simon, 1987, p. 374). Instruction in which a student can direct and manipulate the English language with support and structured reinforcement will allow the student to utilize the language as a tool, rather than as a solid, formulaic incantation. To empower students in the area of language requires a curriculum and instructional approach that allows the student to engage their own cultural resources in the process of integrating new concepts and making meaning of existing knowledge.

Giroux and Aronowitz in their book *Education Under Siege* (1985) remark that "knowledge is not reactive but a creative and meaningful relationship between the individual and her historical and contemporary situation where changed circumstances produce new and transformed knowledges" (p.12) This also reinforces Dewey's belief that the aim of education is to help the student gain a conscious direction and control of the learning process. Struggle makes new knowledge possible (Simon and Lewis, p. 469) and empowered students do develop the ability, confidence and motivation to succeed academically as compared to students who are disempowered and do not develop this " type of cognitive/academic and social/emotional foundation. (Cummins, 1986 p. 23)

Language learning could be seen as that facet which allows admittance into an institutional hierarchy. Hierarchies and institutions are created in order to establish control and to wrest some predictability out of the unpredictable, even though this may result in restriction to the point that the individual loses control in the process of being protected from the unknown.

Deeper cultural questioning might ask if, indeed, this need to instill proper English language order, a sense of controlled exact language usage is not answering a need to maintain the "purity" of the communication, and of the understanding of the word language. After all, it was only twenty years ago that linguists began to explore and recognize sign language as a formal language. Before that time, sign language was seen as a system of gestures without true linguistic elements. This too, helps us to see why the approach to language teaching was perhaps to "give real language" to the deaf. And then we must ask of these methods, have they entailed a certain amount of "doing for" or "helping" as the inverse sign portrays?

I would like to go back to the drowning of the little boy. It occurred to me upon the recent reading of this story that this is a tale of both teacher and student. The student we have already explored. Mesmerized by the fragments of the sea, by the lure of finding piecemeal objects that make up the whole, he frolics in celebration, in belief that he has found the secrets of the ocean. Secrets that he can readily transport back to the land. But the collection of them, and their scattered and intermingled confusion pulls him only deeper, forgetting the depths within which these pieces function. Depths that are never still, rarely clear and always shifting.

Here too, we recognize the student who has come to understand English as an "end" a goal to be learned. A sedimentary and controllable language which, once harnessed and placed in proper formulaic sequence, will allow the student to carry the fragments and reconstruct them at will, almost like carrying the ocean with them. This is the student who may not see that the concepts have context, that the formulas often must be torn apart and redrawn, and that this mastery of formulas and fragments does not constitute the language itself. For as one corner is mastered, or one part of the ocean bed explored, the tide will rush in with new meaning, new words and varied structure.

Here too, could be the teacher, swollen with the responsibility of transmitting knowledge that the child does not have, holding back the force of the unknown, controlling the perspective in which the child is putting together these fragments of the sea. The teacher, both demonstrating kindness and restraint, is fearful lest the onrush of information overwhelm. The teacher is forced to question actions and monitor student progress within the exposed and dissected array of knowledge.

But, the child runs away. He does not understand the context of the danger, he does not heed the teacher who he believes ultimately controls and protect the child from his own deficiencies, or at least from struggling with them. But is this the very aspect from which the child is running? For perhaps the oughts are too great, and the hoarding of individual treasures too secure, to heed and return. Surely that would mean forfeit. The child runs further. And the water gushes outward and pours back over the treasures, over the rough barnacles, the rippled sand and layers of life and death sea rituals.

And the boy? Perhaps he already knows how to swim, or perhaps he doesn't. Nonetheless, I always wished that he did and wondered why he didn't. I guess that's why I am a teacher. I am still seeking the question.

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Anne E. Kingston teaches English at the National Technical Institute for the Deaf.

Exploring Representational Intersections in Mathematics Teaching

Joan B. Stone

Few mathematicians would argue that mathematics is purely language. However, the complexity of the possible meanings in a mathematical expression is often insufficiently understood by the student who has not yet grasped the linguistic character of mathematics. In such instances, the familiar retreat to rote, mechanical processes is inevitable. Just as Freire has suggested that literacy requires understanding the web of meaning around a single word, so mathematical literacy requires an understanding of the social and cultural aspects of mathematical expressions. For those of us who believe that mathematics is handed down from on high, understanding the social and cultural meaning of mathematics is a bit like getting religion, something that frequently happens to the young graduate student in a Ph.D. program. On the other hand, for those of us who see mathematics as a consensual activity, constructed by men and women in interaction with the theoretical and empirical worlds, understanding the social and cultural meaning of mathematics is similar to understanding the human conditions under which mathematics evolved.

For years, researchers have been studying the ways in which mathematical symbolism interacts with diagrams, gestures, and spoken and written language (Janvier, Kaput, von Glaserfeld, Pimm). English language, words with specific mathematical interpretations, and mathematical symbols all coincide to create meaning for a student. For many of us, our students speak a language different from our own, a situation which makes the interaction of symbolic representation systems even more apparent. In my own case, my students are deaf. They are studying mathematics in the context of technical programs in engineering, business, and visual communications. In general, we take it for granted that our students hear what we say, whether or not they actually do. If we know, however, that our students are deaf, then we do not expect them to hear, even though we may speak, but we do expect them to understand our sign language. That they frequently do not forces us to explore the intersections of our different representational systems and to become aware of the social and cultural contexts within which those systems have evolved.

In order to communicate with one another about the concept of *perpendicular*, for example, we would have a number of different forms of representation interacting at any given time. First of all, we would have the printed word, *perpendicular*, a word which seems entirely arbitrary having no obvious derivation for people unfamiliar with French. Even for the French speakers among us, the root *pendere*, meaning to hang, may be not lead immediately to lines which intersect at right angles. In the physical world, an object which hangs will only do so at right angles with an imaginary horizontal line and then only if it can hang freely. Most of our encounters with perpendicular lines have nothing to do with hanging freely but with very rigid structures such as walls and floors or ceilings. For my students, the word *perpendicular* is simply an exercise in memorized spelling which usually starts to fade after the second "e".

For reasons which would be interesting to investigate, many mathematical words like *perpendicular* have graphic representations which are essentially iconic. The ordinary graphic representation for perpendicular is a horizontal line with a vertical line above it intersecting it at right angles. Why, given the French derivation of the word, the vertical line is not shown hanging from the horizontal line is unclear, but one could speculate. Buildings are built from the ground up, so our concrete experience with the concept of perpendicularity has to do with going up rather than hanging down. It is interesting to think that we created the graphic symbol as we did based on our actions in the physical world and not our observation of it. Another way to think about the graphic symbol is to think about what we do when we make it. Most people draw the vertical line first, starting at the top and drawing down. The horizontal line is drawn in later. When we think about how we make the symbol, it does coincide with the original derivation of the word. However, this way of thinking about the graphic representation is less visually iconic and more physically imitative. That both may be operating simultaneously within a single graphic representation is an indication of how complex the communication may be.

In my classroom, there is a third form of representation and that is sign language. The sign language of a mathematics class is a curious mix of signed English, American Sign Language, and the technical signs needed for precise communication in science and engineering areas. Information is communicated through position in space, through movement, and through handshape. Each of these holds the possibility for conveying the subtle complexities of mathematical concepts that could require many words in English alone. For example, the sign for *perpendicular* looks very much like the graphic representation with index fingers placed at right angles to one another. We could have as easily established a sign which showed an line hanging freely and perpendicular to the horizon. The horizontal line is an important part of ASL. The left hand is frequently used as a "base" hand, above and below which information is communicated by the right hand. That the sign did not develop in a way that might have taken advantage of characteristics of ASL is perhaps an indication of the dominance of graphic forms of representation in mathematics. In other instances, such as the sign for *parallel*, there is more of a coincidence of the information conveyed through the conventions of sign language and the graphic representation.

Finally, in any mathematics classroom we have the interaction of written or spoken language and the specific mathematical use of that language. Lemke (1988) has shown how the same words in a physics classroom can belong to different genres. Words like *heat* and *light* may belong to a quasi technical genre for students and have very specific technical meaning for teachers. For the physics teacher, *heat* and *light* are adjectives for the word *energy*. In a similar way, *perpendicular* is used only as an adjective for the word *lines* by mathematics teachers while the significance of this linguistic usage may often be obscure to students. Mathematics educators have struggled for years to find the correct balance between intuitive understanding and linguistic precision. For many students, the words *perpendicular* and *right angles* are interchangeable, although linguistically they function differently.

> "Perpendicular lines are two lines which intersect to form right angles."

This is a common definition, at least spoken frequently by teachers if not written in textbooks. Textbooks often need to be more inclusive and at the same time be consistent about distinctions between geometric objects. So somewhat more complicated definitions might be given.

> "Perpendicular lines are two rays, or straight lines, or straight line segments that form a right angle." or
>
> "Two lines are perpendicular if their union contains a right angle." or
>
> "Two lines are perpendicular if they meet or intersect to form equal adjacent angles."

With a more or less complex linguistic structure we can communicate rather accurately our intuitive understanding of perpendicular lines. What is interesting to think about is that perpendicular lines are not as common in our experience as perpendicular planes. The walls, floors, ceilings of our houses are examples of perpendicular planes, yet the linguistic expression that describes this phenomenon is considerably more complex and dependent on the description of perpendicular lines. This is an example of the often wide discrepancy between what we know on some level about mathematics and what we can say mathematically.

If mathematics is about ideal forms, about truth that is inherent in the relationships among objects in the physical world separate from our experience and interaction with those objects, then learning mathematics is similar to learning the codes of a secret society. Unhappily, our mathematics curriculum, including our interactions in classrooms with students, seems to reinforce this view of mathematics. Those who learn mathematics are individuals who seem to have a certain talent for it. I used to read to my twin sons when they were very young. They would sit on either side of me looking at the book I was reading from. One day, when they were about 3 years old, I noticed one of them following the printed words as I spoke them. Like many early readers, he had made the link between the sounds and the print, a link I'm sure he made by chance. Lucky boy that he was, he went off to school testing out as a very talented fellow. I suspect the same is true of those who appear talented in mathematics. They perhaps got lucky and tuned in before the rest of us.

Lemke (1988) suggests a way of understanding why it is that people have different capacities to deal with subjects such as mathematics without appealing to the hypothetical processes of cognitive science, i.e. schemas, scripts, heuristics, etc. which exist in the mind of the student or to innate forms of intellectual superiority. He draws on the notion of social semiotics as interpreted within the functional linguistics of Michael Halliday. "Social semiotics begins from a very simple principle: that all meaning is *made* by specific human social practices' (p. 82). Lemke suggests that "Social semiotics posits [an] ... economical theoretical framework. The patterns of relations of meanings made with language are describable in terms of *linguistic* semantics and grammar and their [contextual] dependence on the social activity structures in which they are embedded. There is no need for a separate 'cognitive semantics or 'grammar of thought' other than what linguistics (and for nonlanguage meanings, semiotics, generally) already provides" (p. 83). The linguistics to which Lemke refers is not the formalism of Chomsky's "innate ideas." Instead he claims, "The older, European (and non-Chomskyan American) traditions of functional linguistics, allied to anthropology, folklore studies, and literary analysis, have produced an alternative basis for studies of language in education, and in social institutions generally. It is this linguistics from which social semiotics takes its cue..." (p. 84).

To suggest that mathematical knowledge is socially constructed is controversial to say the least. However, there probably has been no historical period when there is more evidence of the social nature of mathematics. Rapid changes in technology have changed the ways in which people use mathematics and challenge the ways in which we teach it. Small, hand held calculators are capable of approximating the roots of a polynomial equation through successive iterations that are graphically represented on a screen. The capacity of the calculator to literally focus in on the root and allow the user to visually approximate it is a far cry from the ordinary but obscure paper and pencil methods of the past. It might be argued that a root of a polynomial equation is the same entity it always was. What has changed through technology is the method we use to find it. I would like to suggest that this is not what knowledge is for most of us. The concept of the root of a polynomial equation cannot be separated easily from the process through which we discover it. If knowledge develops through action and reflection on action, then the only action we have available to us initially is the process of finding roots and it is only reflection on that process that allows us to develop a concept of root. Although this sense of knowledge developing in different ways because of different experiences is especially salient in periods of rapid technological change, David Bloor (1976) suggests that this may have always been true. Today, we think of the square root of two as an irrational number distinct from those numbers we would call rational. For Aristotle, while the square root of two was clearly a magnitude, it was not a number. There was no need for a distinction between rational and irrational numbers.

A century ago, J.S. Mill claimed for mathematical truths the same empirical status as that of other sciences.

> "In resolving an algebraic equation, by what rules do we proceed? By applying at each step...the proposition that equals added to equals make equals; that equals taken from equals leave equals; and other propositions founded on these two. These are not properties of language, or of signs as such, but of magnitudes, which is to say, of all things (II, VI,2)" (Bloor, p. 78).

According to Bloor, "Mill treats mathematics as a set of beliefs which are about the physical world and which arise out of experience of that world"(p.82). However, what Mill neglected to attend to and what made his work vulnerable to the criticism of Frege and others was the social aspect of experience. Years later, Piaget would also underestimate the significance of the social. Not all of the physical world and not all experience with that world results in mathematical knowledge. According to Bloor, "Only certain socially fixated or ritualised patterns (provide models for mathematical thinking)" (p.89). These socially ritualised patterns are in fact expressed through symbolic forms of communication which are not merely linguistic manipulations. "If equals are added to equals, the sums are equal" has been repeated in so many mathematics classrooms that it has a quality of an incantation which, if uttered appropriately, will summon a resolution of some sort. If the statement was simply an English sentence, then it probably would qualify as an incantation. And for many of us, it probably does. The fact is that "If equals are added to equals..." is not an English sentence that stands alone, out of the context of other symbol systems. And it is in the intersection of those systems that the statement acquires meaning. In the 1960's, mathematics educators attempted to fix up the language of the sentence so that it could stand alone and be meaningful. The complex language that resulted from their effort soon reverted back to the abbreviated form above. This happened because the complexity was unnecessary. All of the information was present in the combination of the mathematical symbols of a particular equation and the simple statement "If equals are added to equals...."

An example from a recent class may clarify some of the ideas above. The students I am working with are not exactly mathematical success stories, a fact that they readily admit. The facile manipulative skills of those who caught on much earlier are not shared by my students. However, I am not convinced that they are necessarily at a disadvantage because of this. We have been working with problems that are somewhat linguistically complex and that require real mathematical understanding, but which do not depend on advanced algebraic tools. The following problem is a good example of what has happened in the group:

> A boy finished 1/3 of his homework before dinner. After dinner he finished 3/4 of the remainder and then went to a basketball game. How much of his homework was uncompleted?

Manipulations with fractions written only as numerical symbols tend to be obscure, although a person entirely comfortable with mathematics might solve the problem rather easily.

$1 - [1/3 + 3/4(2/3)] = 1/6$ "One-sixth of the boy's homework was left unfinished."

Such a presentation of the solution to the problem would simply re-emphasize for my students that this stuff really is a mystery and maybe I know the secret code necessary to decipher such a statement, but they surely do not. Instead, we can almost always correctly answer questions such as these through a combination of drawings, sign language, English language, and mathematical symbols.

In our culture, the basic fraction symbol 1/3 or 1/2 is sufficiently common that even those people with little formal experience with mathematics have a sense of its meaning. Although the problem above is contrived and I have been asked why would I want to bother with such a problem when there are so many other interesting things to do in mathematics, I continue to use it and others like it because such problems do seem to lead to a rather deep understanding of the concept of a fractional part, an idea that seems fundamental to the ways in which we deal with the physical world.

In order to solve the problem, one has to understand that there is an entity called "homework" which can be separated into parts but which must also be thought of as a whole. Starting with a rectangular box, not with a circle because dividing circles up into equal parts is tricky business. As long as we cut up sectors we would probably do all right, but if we started cutting up segments of a circle we would not be so good at comparing their areas with the areas of sectors. Anyway, starting with a rectangular box is relatively simple.

The first problem is how to divide up that box initially. One way to begin is to look for the temporal beginning. In this case, that is the amount of homework done *before* dinner. One-third of the homework is done before dinner. Marking that off on the picture, we can forget about it. Now what about what is left? Three-fourths of the remainder is finished *after* dinner, but what is the *remainder*? Common wisdom has told us to be careful about looking for "key words" in mathematics problems. Words which are located through a relatively mindless word search process often do result in limited mathematical understanding. However, this is not to say that certain nouns, adjectives, verbs do not carry the conceptual content of the message when they are placed in a larger context. In that sense, there are "key" words to be noticed in a sentence. The task is to determine which ones they are.

In the problem above, *remainder* is a key word, but it needs to be understood in the context of an entity which is not explicitly stated; that is, the total amount of homework. My students convey the meaning of *remainder* to one another through sign language. Holding two open hands in front of their bodies, they move them forward and down to indicate something that has been left over. Unlike the pure result of a subtraction process, this sign gives them another entity to work with; namely, something to find three-fourths of. Together with the following diagram, the sign allows them to see that the *remainder* is two-thirds of the homework.

The intersection of sign language, English language, mathematical language and diagrams contains the potential for meaning that exceeds what may exist in any one of these. What we need to do is focus much more explicitly on these intersections and not just treat each symbolic system as a separate entity which could be directly translated into another symbolic system. Whether or not such translation is possible is really not the issue. The important thing is that mathematical meaning is negotiated among people in the intersections of a variety of symbolic representational systems. And it is particularly important that we acknowledge how extensive that variety may be, especially for students whose spoken and written language may be different from ours, whose social experience may be different from ours.

I have tried to show a way in which mathematical meaning derives from the common intersection of several symbol systems. These symbol systems are not isomorphic to one another, and movement from one to the other requires more than a simple "linguistic" translation. The question now is how do we negotiate these intersections with our students. We are not simply crossing guards, stopping traffic in one direction while our students move in another. Perhaps we are more like the driver education teacher, moving through the intersection with our students, eyes alert to moving traffic in all directions, feet poised over the brake pedal ready to stop if our student doesn't see a particular obstacle.

Morson suggests that "Spoken words are the 'islands' that emerge from [an] inner stream of dialogues conducted with imagined addressees who may be more or less fully defined, but who are always drawn from voices one has already heard" (p. 8). I would add that so too are signed words, graphic representations, and mathematical symbols. If we accept the idea that mathematical knowledge grows out of human interactions in specific historical contexts, then we need to provide possibilities for such interactions in our classrooms. Our voices, as teachers, cannot be the only ones heard. If our mathematical thoughts are really dialogues with imagined addressees, then we need to extend that imaginary audience as far as possible to include the student's own voice as well as those of his teachers and friends.

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Joan B. Stone is Professor of Mathematics at Rochester Institute of Technology/National Technical Institute for the Deaf.

Critical Thinking Mathematics, A Key To Development

Gail Kaplan

What is critical thinking and how do we teach it? There are a multitude of books and articles that try to respond to this question. In this paper, I offer a short description of my concept of critical thinking followed by a practical hands on exploration of the topic. After a few introductory remarks, a series of activities are proposed for careful exploration. Use all of the tools available to you - your logical and creative abilities, a pencil and paper, a colleague, etc. If you are unable to discover the solution, read the suggestions in the section of helpful hints. After analyzing the hint, try the problem again. Only if the level of frustration reaches beyond acceptable bounds, resort to the solution section.

Imagine for a moment that you win a door prize; it is a subscription to the ballet. You religiously attend each performance and adore the experience. You enjoy the series so much that you decide you would like to be a professional ballerina. Since you are the type of individual who acts on your ideas, you contact the director of the ballet and explain that you want to join. When asked for your qualifications, you reply that although you have had no formal training, you have faithfully attended each performance during the past season. It takes little imagination to guess the reaction of the director. This situation is too nonsensical to consider seriously, but as college professors we are all guilty of acting out the same type of scenario. Even when we deliver brilliant and entertaining lectures that mesmerize our students, we often discover that our students are not able to actually use the information we supposedly have supplied. Why?

Just as it takes endless hours of practice to become a ballerina, it takes active participation to learn in an academic setting. We can't expect our students to learn by watching. The primary objective in any classroom should be the replacement of passive behavior with active participation. LEARNING IS NOT A SPECTATOR SPORT!

What are the consequences of such an atmosphere in the classroom? The answer is two fold, both positive and negative. On the positive side, active participation generates a tremendous level of enthusiasm. The subject becomes alive. It's just a lot more fun to do than to watch. The thrill of discovery and mastery is extraordinary. Students become intimately involved in the learning and creating process. However, there are also sacrifices made in this type of classroom. Smoothness and neatness of instruction quickly depart. The content, considered in terms of actual discipline specific material, will often be less than that covered in a more traditional classroom. These are small concessions compared to the benefits.

The active learning process is a combination of several types of thinking, both creative and critical. The first stage, what I call the creative stage, is a combination of idea production and persistence. Think of your fellow graduate students who didn't finish their degrees. Many of the ones in my doctoral program were probably far more brilliant than I, but they lacked the persistence to keep on going until they finished. We need to train our students to persevere. Often students feel that the solution to any problem, whether it be the causes of a particular battle or the solution to a mathematics problem, can be found quite quickly. Alan Schoenfeld, a mathematician at Berkeley, found that students who can't solve a math problem in a matter of moments give up. Imagine the consequences of such an attitude in our work force. We must make our students realize that it takes significant effort to produce ideas. As Edison said "Genius is 99% perspiration and 1% inspiration." We must encourage our students to perspire!

Our students need to learn to believe in their own ideas. When they have an idea that they think is a good one, they should be willing and able to defend it. We can help teach them this lesson by sharing the stories of many brilliant and wonderful ideas that took years to be accepted. Consider the sad story of Georg Cantor, a very famous mathematician. Cantor was so creative and his work so different from all of the accepted knowledge at the time that none of his contemporaries acknowledged the validity of a significant number of his discoveries. Unfortunately, Cantor died in a mental institution after many years of ostracism from the mathematical community. It was only many years after his death that his results became an accepted, standard part of every mathematician's repertoire.

The second stage of the active learning process is what I call the critical thinking stage. It consists of the evaluation and refinement of ideas. When we are trying to find the solution to a particular problem and we have thought of an idea, we must then test out the idea. It is quite likely that the idea won't work in its initial form. But that doesn't mean we should throw it away. We must evaluate the idea to see what parts of it are potentially part of the solution. The idea then needs refinement. And the process goes on in a circular motion, moving from the evaluation of the idea to the refinement of the idea, and back again. This strategy ends in discovery of a solution or disposal of the idea.

During the creative and critical thinking process we need to keep certain guidelines in mind. It is crucial to beware of self imposed restrictions. We must be certain not to make problems harder than they are by adding constraints that are not there. We want to let our imaginations soar. We must also, after the evaluation and refinement process recognize the time to give up. But giving up should mean working on an easier, related problem. When a technique fails, try to find an alternative approach.

Now let's try the hands on approach. On the following pages are a series of problems. Carefully read the statement of the problem. Try to find the solution. Play with the problem. Make it a hands on situation. Take out some toothpicks, make a checkerboard. If you are unable to brain storm your way to a solution, don't give up. Move on to the helpful hints that follow that statement of the problems. After reading the hints, try again. If you solve the problem, congratulations. If not, when you reach the bounds of your frustration level, allow yourself to read the solution section. HAVE A GOOD TIME!

Toothpick Challenges

Definition: An equilateral triangle is a triangle with three equal sides.

Each design you create must consist only of equilateral triangles. The entire toothpick must be the side of the triangle.

Design Problems

Design 1: Use five toothpicks to make two equilateral triangles.

Design 2: Use six toothpicks to make two equilateral triangles.

Design 3: Use six toothpicks to make four equilateral triangles.

Star Counter

Take seven counters. Place a counter on an empty circle and immediately slide it along one straight line to an empty circle. Continue in this manner until you place all seven counters on circles. Note: Each circle can be occupied by only one counter.



Another Counter Problem



The Checkerboard

Two squares are removed from opposite corners of a checkerboard leaving 62 squares. Can the checkerboard be filled with 31 dominos, each domino covering two adjacent squares?

Game of Pegs

Place thirteen pegs on the pegboard.

I I I I I I I I I I I I I

Player 1: Pick up one, two, or three pegs.

Player 2: Pick up one, two, or three pegs.

Repeat.

The winner is the player who does not pick up the last peg.

Problems

Problem 1: Player 2 should always be able to win. Can you find a method to make this work?

Problem 2: Consider another game where each player picks up one, two, three, or four pegs on his turn. How many pegs could you start with so that player 2 can always win? There are infinitely many correct answers! Can you describe all of them?

Problem 3: Can you make up still more games played in the same manner? For each game, you must decide on the total number of pegs to be used and the highest number of pegs each player can pick up on his turn. Once you discover the pattern, there are infinitely many possibilities.

Problem 4: Consider a game where each player can pick up 1, 2, 3, . . . or n pegs on his turn. How many pegs could you start with so that player 2 can always win? Again, there are infinitely many correct answers. Can you describe all of them?

Helpful Hints

Toothpick Designs:

The first two designs can be found by moving the toothpicks around on a sheet of paper. To solve the third design, try working in 3 space. Flatland won't work.

Star Counter:

Follow the same instructions, but instead of using the star design, use the design labeled "Another Counter Problem" on the page following the star counter. After you have solved the problem with the new design, label each circle in the following manner. Let the top circle on the page be circle number 1, the next circle number 2, etc. We now need to translate the solution from the linear design to the star design. Label any circle on the star as circle number 1. The only condition for circle number 2 is that you can slide to circle 2 from circle 1. Label circle 2. The only condition for circle 3 is that you can slide to circle 3 from circle 2. Label circle 3. Keep on in this manner until all of the circles are numbered. Now try to interpret the solution on the linear design to obtain the solution for the star design.

Checkerboard Problem:

Think about the colors of the squares that are removed. Are adjacent squares the same or different colors?

Game of Pegs:

Problem #1: Arrange the 13 pegs in three groups of four pegs and one group of one peg. Play again. What strategy will work when you think of the pegs as part of this design?

Problem #2: Arrange the pegs in groups of five to discover the key to this problem.

Problems #3 and #4: Think in terms of groups of pegs with one peg left over to find the key to this problem.

Solutions

Toothpick Designs:

Design #1: Make a triangle out of three toothpicks. Choose one of the sides of that triangle and let it be one of the sides of the second triangle made by adding two more toothpicks.

Design #2: Make two triangles. Rearrange them so that they touch at one vertex (corner).

Design #3: Make a pyramid. This problem is impossible if you try to solve it in 2-space, flat on the table top.

Star Counter:

Step 1: Label one of the circles #1. Move along a straight line from circle #1 to another circle and label that circle #2. Note that you will have two possible choices for circle #2. Move along a straight line from circle #2 to another circle and label that circle #3. Continue in this manner until you have labeled all eight circles.

Step 2: Place a counter on circle #7 and move it to circle #8. Place a counter on circle #6 and move it to circle #7. Place a counter on circle #5 and move it to circle #6. Place a counter on circle #4 and move it to circle #5. Place a counter on circle #3 and move it to circle #4. Place a counter on circle #2 and move it to circle #3. Place a counter on circle #1 and move it to circle #2.

Checkerboard Problem:

The opposite corners of the checkerboard are the same color, say red. This means that after removing the opposite corners, there will be 30 red squares and 32 black squares to be covered by the dominos. Since every domino covers two adjacent squares and adjacent squares are the same color, there will be two black squares left over that cannot be covered by a single domino.

Game of Pegs:

Problem #1: The second player should always choose the number of pegs that will make the total of pegs chosen on the first players turn and the second players turn combine to equal 4. Specifically, if the first player chooses 1 peg, then the second player chooses 3 pegs, if the first player chooses 2 pegs, then the second player chooses 2 pegs, and if the first player chooses 3 pegs, then the second player chooses 1 peg.

Problem #2: The total number of pegs must be a multiple of 5 plus 1. For instance, 21 pegs or 26 pegs or 31 pegs would be appropriate choices. The total number of pegs chosen on each pair of turns must be 5 for this problem.

Problems #3 and #4: In a game where each player can pick up 1, 2, 3, . . . or n pegs on his turn, the total number of pegs should be a multiple of $(n + 1)$ plus 1. The total number of pegs chosen on each pair of turns must combine to total $n + 1$ pegs for the second player to win. For example, if we let $n = 7$, the total number of pegs must be a multiple of 8 plus 1. The numbers 25, 33, and 41 would all be appropriate. On each pair of turns the total number of pegs picked must be 8.

Gail Kaplan is a member of the Department of Mathematics at Washington College, Chestertown, MD.

The Importance of Teaching Critical Thinking in Accounting Through the Integration of Other Disciplines

James G.S. Yang
and
Diane K. Schulz

The subject of accounting teaches the measurement of the value of an asset and the profit of an operation for a business entity. Without critical thinking into its purposes and problems, the measurement of an asset is nothing more than an exercise of addition, and the measurement of profit, an exercise of subtraction. As a result, accounting becomes mere bookkeeping, and accountants are reduced to bookkeepers. Consequently, the measurements of value and profit are distorted, and no purpose is served.

Accounting professors are accused of training students, not educating them. As observed by McCollum in 1988, "The biggest stumbling block to education today is the MBA mentality: go to college, get a job, make money. Money's the great goal. And that is no education; that's training. And I think training and education ought to be separated" (9, p. 50). If accounting is taught by taking the face value of a transaction alone, the result may well be the training of bookkeepers rather than the education of accountants, and the above cynicism may indeed be true.

This paper describes the dilemma in the teaching of accounting. It points out the need for applying the concepts from other disciplines to the accounting subject as a teaching strategy. It further demonstrates (with examples) this proposed strategy.

1. The Dilemma in the Teaching of Accounting

There is consistently a conceptual deadlock in the teaching of accounting: Is there any truth in accounting? The answer in turn lies in the question as to whether the accounting measurement process is a form of art or a system of science. If it is the former, the process is subjective and dependent on human behavior. Different versions of a transaction and different desires of a manager can lead to different results of accounting measurement. As such, there is no truth in accounting. However, the accountants present one single annual report with one amount for total assets, for total liabilities, one equity, revenue, expense and profit. This accounting output is direct evidence contrary to the conclusion that accounting is in practice, considered an art.

On the other hand, if accounting is considered a system of science, there is only one objective and one phenomenon in the economic environment. However, this system fails to envision the fact that a transaction is made by a manager whose objectives may be various and elusive. It further ignores the fact that financial statements are the result of a composite measurement consisting of many different components with divergent purposes. If there is only one truth then, it is contrary to the human behavior and management practices.

In short, accountants undertake an extremely difficult task of presenting a single unified amount and a single annual report, from a host of components with different objectives. If there is no truth to pursue, what is the subject to teach? If there is any truth, there must be more than one single truth. And then which is the truth to teach? This is the dilemma in the teaching of accounting.

Actually, accounting itself does not create problems. It is the problems of other human activities, and yet the accountants must tackle them. For example, with respect to the measurement of assets, those who purchase an asset are willing to pay for only the service they can expect to derive from it. This is the philosophical aspect of the value of an asset. However, according to the economic aspect of the value of an asset, no asset can exist unless it can be sold for a certain price. These two aspects can be completely divergent in concept and in amount.

How can the accountants present a single value of an asset? And how should the accounting professor teach the valuation of an asset?

In regard to the measurement of profit, it is clear that a wage is a reward for labor, interest is a compensation for a loan at no risk, and profit is a growth of wealth on investment at risk. As a corporation becomes publicly owned, and is held socially responsible, the concept of profit is expanded from the narrow sense of investors to include creditors and employees. This is the sociological aspect of corporate profit. How should accountants present a single amount of profit for a wide-rage of audience? And how should the accounting professor teach the concept of profit?

With reference to budgeting, it is true that, in order to avoid penalties, the sales budgets are always understated, while the production requirement budgets are overstated. This is natural human psychology and behavior. Should the accountant take the face value of a budget? If not, what should he do? How should the accounting professor teach the principle of budgeting?

In terms of accounting procedure, financial elements contain assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, expense and profit or loss. Should they be measured randomly and independently of one another? Or should there be a certain order? If yes, what is the first element to be determined? And what is the last? Without clear answers to these questions, accounting procedure becomes aimless. How should the accounting professor teach the principles of formulating an accounting procedure?

These are only some of the examples to show that accounting components are quite heterogeneous. Some are conceived in the form of art, while others are measured as a system of science. The former includes such items as the value of an asset, the profit of an operation, budgeting of sales and production costs, etc. On the other hand, the latter may encompass such examples as the cost of merchandise, the liability of debt, the equity of an investment, the rate of return on an investment, etc. As such, the answer to the question as to whether accounting is a form of art or a system of science is that neither is right, and neither is wrong. It depends on the nature of each individual accounting item. As to the nature of overall measurement in a single annual report, this is almost an impossible question to answer. If this is the case, what is the objective of teaching the accounting subject? This is the accounting professor's real quandary.

The fact is that the accounting subject can no longer be taught without drawing an integration of other disciplines. The teaching of asset value requires the concepts of philosophy and economics. In order to teach the contemporary concept of profit, aspects of sociology must be incorporated. How to teach budgeting necessitates the insight of psychology and behavioral science. The formulation of accounting procedure can be better taught by applying aspects of decision and communication sciences. The list can go. In short, the teaching of the accounting subject requires proper applications of other disciplines. The following explains how this may be accomplished.

2. *Teaching Asset Valuation in Accounting by Means of Philosophy and Economics*

The primary accounting function is to measure the value of an asset. This value can be completely different in nature and in amount from the buyer's viewpoint and from the seller's standpoint. From the buyer's point of view, value depends on the service, productivity, usefulness and fulfillment one can expect to derive from that asset. Two aspects stand out immediately. The first concerns the nature of value. Value is the user's subjective assessment on the satisfaction of the asset. It must be created before the asset can exist. Observed Brightman that "root-value... of which all the higher moral values are compounded, is the fulfillment or satisfaction of the particular interest"(2, p. 82). This indicates that value depends on fulfillment and satisfaction. Hocking further stated that "value is thus a specific relation into which things possessing any ontological status whatsoever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested subjects"(7, p. 116). This further shows that value from a philosophical point of view can be very subjective.

The second aspect deals with the measurement of the amount of value. No one buys an asset unless there is a value in it. Conversely, one has to own an asset only if he cannot do without it. This implies that the amount of value one attaches to an asset must be the magnitude of sacrifice he has to undertake if he does not own that asset. In fact, this is the aspect of the so-called "opportunity cost." Furthermore, in accounting sense this amount of value must have already been determined when the product is produced regardless of the amount of cost incurred to produce it. In other words, production cost does not determine the amount of value of an asset; similarly, value is not the function of cost. It is not for the producer to determine the amount of value of his product; instead, it is for the user to measure the amount of value according to his subjective assessment on the level of satisfaction of that product, as mentioned above. Backhouse stated that "Say argued that value depends not on cost, but on utility and scarcity. Cost influenced value only through imposing a lower limit to price, and through affecting supply"(1, p. 34). This shows that value and cost have little or no relationship.

As a result of these two aspects, asset must be defined as the benefits and satisfaction one must forgo and sacrifice if he has no opportunity to enjoy that asset. This leads to the conclusion that sunshine must be treated as an asset because it is useful, but diamond to a man is not because it is not indispensable in life. Further, the asset value of a piano should depend on the owner's degree of sophistication in the enjoyment of music. This is the basic concept of value from the discipline of philosophy. It can be termed the "value basis" of asset.

On the other hand, from the seller's point of view, value of an asset depends on the selling price it can command. The price of an asset is determined by the law of supply and demand in the market place regardless of the usefulness of the product from the buyer's point of view or the cost incurred to produce it from seller's standpoint. This is the concept of "value in exchange" in Adam Smith's writing in the *Wealth of Nations*. Smith defined the value of a commodity to its owner as "the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command"(13, p. 34). Apparently, no asset can exist unless it can be sold for a price. Price is a prerequisite of an asset. As a result, asset should be defined as the current market price of a property. This leads to the conclusion that sunshine should not be treated as an asset because it cannot be sold for a price, but that a diamond is an asset because it can command a great price. Further, the asset value of a piano should depend on its market price regardless of whether the owner enjoys the music or not. This is the basic concept of value from the discipline of economics. It can be called the "price basis" of asset.

The above two concepts of value are evidently incompatible. As pointed out by Reck, "One point should be clear: the definition of value tells what value is, not what things are valuable"(11, p. 22). Some assets are useful but cannot be sold for a price, such as sunshine; conversely, some can command a great price but may not be useful, such as a diamond. Smith pointed out that "The things which have the greatest value in use frequently have little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use"(13, p. 32-33). Should both the sunshine and diamond be recorded as assets? Should the "value basis" or the "price basis" be serving as a guiding principle in the accounting measurement of assets? Furthermore, some assets are intended for sales to the customers, while some are for internal use. Should the value of a loaf of bread on the dinner table be the same as a loaf of bread on the shelf of a supermarket? What is the value of an asset for these two different-intended loaves of bread? Is the "value basis" or the "price basis" applicable?

The teaching of asset valuation in accounting requires a thorough understanding and proper application of both concepts. In order to measure a specific amount of asset value, one cannot be completely ignorant of the usefulness of an asset, nor can one be totally indifferent to the market price paid. An asset is purchased by incurring a given amount of cost for an intended service. Only the kind of cost that can create this service can be treated as the value of an asset. Any cost that does not enhance the usefulness or productivity of an asset does not constitute any value at all. The buyer is willing to pay only this service-creating cost, and the seller can only charge this "efficient cost" as a price against his customer. As such, asset can be defined as the minimum unavoidable cost at the most advanced engineering technology to create utility in the future. This means that, in order to constitute the value of an asset, it must be the least necessary cost. The cost must be incurred by using the most efficient production technology. And, the asset must meet the buyer's intended service. Any cost beyond these requirements shall not be treated as an asset; instead, it must be charged as a loss to the owner.

This concept of value takes into account both the "value basis" and the "price basis." The cost incurred or the price paid does not necessarily constitute the value of an asset - price basis. It must further meet the requirement of the buyer's intended usefulness - value basis. On the other hand, the value of an asset does not merely depend on the buyer's subjective view of its usefulness - value basis, but also on the minimum unavoidable cost paid - price basis. This leads to the conclusion that sunshine should not be recorded on the accounting books as an asset because no price is paid although it is useful. Whereas, a diamond should be recorded as an asset only if it is useful to the owner. Further, the loaf of bread on the dinner table and the one on the supermarket shelf must have an equal amount of asset value because both were paid at a minimum cost and useful to the owner. And the asset value of the piano should depend on the cost of the necessary parts of the piano until it is worn out.

This concept can be termed the "cost basis" because it is neither based on the strictly immeasurable concept of the "value basis," nor on the too market-oriented "price basis." In fact, this is the actual approach of measuring the asset value practiced by accountants today. But without critical thinking into the discipline of philosophy on one hand and the discipline of economics on the other, the teaching of the "cost basis" can easily become nothing more than just adding the numbers together(i.e., bookkeeping).

The following examples demonstrate how to teach this "cost basis" for measuring the asset value by using philosophy and economics. A machine was purchased for an invoice price of $10,000. However, due to carelessness, it was dropped on the floor, and some parts were broken. As a result, it costs an additional $500 to repair the broken parts. What is the asset value of this machine? By bookkeeping, one may just add all the numbers together to arrive at $10,500. However, by considering the "value basis," the productivity of this machine remains the same before and after. The $500 repair expense does not enhance the usefulness of this machine. As a result, its asset value remains as $10,000. The concept of "value basis" justifies the treatment of the $500 as a loss rather than an asset.

Table A was produced for a regular cost of $100. However, table B was finished after 5:00PM for an additional overtime labor cost of $10. What are the asset values of table A and table B? Should they be $100 and $110, respectively? According to the "price basis," the prices remain the same between these two tables. The fact that table B was produced by using overtime labor does not increase its price. By the "value basis," table B is no more useful than table A. As a result, the $10 overtime labor premium should be borne by A and B. Therefore, the asset value is $105 for A and B, respectively. The concept of "price basis" justifies the refusal of the $10 overtime labor premium as the asset value of table B. On the other hand, the concept of the "value basis" provides no room for table A to accept this $10 as its asset value either. It immediately becomes clear that there is a need for the concept of "cost basis" to justify the treatment of this $10 overtime premium as a joint cost between A and B. This demonstrates that the accounting subject of asset can indeed be taught better by applying these concepts from philosophy and economics.

Two identical houses were for sales for $50,000 each. For the first one, the investor had enough cash on hand; so he paid $50,000. However, the investor had no cash for the second house, so he borrowed $50,000 from the bank and paid an additional $10,000 in interest. What is the asset value for these two houses? Without critical thinking into the philosophy of value, the answer is $50,000 for the first, and $60,000 for the second. This is the bookkeeper's answer, not the accountant's. This is bookkeeping, not accounting. In accordance with the concept of "value basis" as long as these two houses are identical, their values must be the same. Further, by considering the concept of "cost basis," only the minimum unavoidable cost can constitute the value of an asset. The application of these two concepts leads to the conclusion that the minimum unavoidable cost for these two houses is $50,000, not $60,000. The $10,000 interest is avoidable. The interest does not necessarily make the second house more comfortable than the first one. Therefore, the answer is $50,000 for both houses. This is another example to illustrate that the teaching of assets in accounting requires the disciplines of philosophy and economics

Another example: a locksmith usually duplicates a key by using a motorized machine, and charges $1 a key. Unfortunately, today the machine breaks down. So he duplicates the key by hand incurring a labor cost of $20. What should he charge for the hand-made key? A layman may say $20, but at that price the locksmith could go out of business. The concept of "cost basis" guides him to decide that only the minimum cost at the most advanced engineering technology can constitute the value of an asset. Any cost above that is a loss to him. That is $1 as an asset, and the remaining $19 as a loss. And the concept of "price basis" serves to indicate that the price of a key was already determined by the law of supply and demand at $1 each regardless of the cost incurred. In other words, cost does not determine the price. Instead, it is the price that serves as guidance in determining how much cost this locksmith can afford to spend so as to meet this price and hence the adoption of motorized engineering technology to duplicate the key. This is the economic concept in measuring the value of an asset. The accounting subject can be taught more efficiently by applying this concept.

3. Teaching Profit Measurement in Accounting by Means of Sociology

The second most important accounting function is to measure the profit of a business entity. The dilemma is who is entitled to the profit? This requires use of concepts of sociology. Under the proprietary theory, since the investors own the company and assume the risk of their investment, the accountants naturally measure the profit for these investors(owners). Hatfield was the founder of the proprietary theory. He stated that capital, "...in the initial bookkeeping equation, represents the net worth of the proprietor"(5, p. 171). "And since income is an increase in wealth, it is immediately added to the owner's capital or proprietorship"(6, p. 453-454). In this concept, profit would be measured as a residual revenue after subtracting cost of goods sold to the suppliers, wages to the workers and interest to the creditors.

On the other hand, according to the entity theory, since both the investors and the creditors(such as banks) contribute capital to the company, the ownership of a company is broadened to include both of them. As such, both the owners and the creditors are entitled to the profit. Husband advocated this entity theory. He asserted that "income earned by the corporate endeavor is the property of the corporation, per se."(8, p. 554) which is the "corporation's proprietary equity in itself"(8, p. 554). In this version, profit is the residual revenue after subtracting cost of goods sold and wages only. Profit now belongs to both the creditors and the owners. Interest is the distribution of profit to the creditors, and dividends to the owners. Paton and Littleton also claimed that "...the net income of the enterprise consists of resources of the entire amount available for apportionment among all classes of investors. Interest charges from this standpoint, are not operating costs but represent a distribution of dividends(10, pp. 43-44).

However, in accordance with the enterprise theory, a company is operating not only for the interest of its owners and creditors, but also for its own employees as a corporate family. It is true that both the owners and the creditors contribute funds to the company, but for the company to function, it also requires the contribution of labor from its employees. The owners and the creditors on one hand, and the employees on the other are equally important to the output of the corporate operations. Therefore, profit must be measured from the viewpoints of the owners, the creditors, and the employees as a whole. This is the sociological concept of a publicly held corporate business entity. Hendriksen explained that "...in the enterprise theory the corporation is a social institution operated for the benefit of many interested groups. In the broadest form these groups include, in addition to the stockholders and creditors, the employees, customers, the government as a taxing authority and as a regulatory agency, and the general public. Thus, the broad form of the enterprise theory may be thought of as a social theory of accounting"(6, pp. 458-459). In this sense, profit is the revenue after subtracting the cost of goods sold only. Wages, interest and dividends all are treated as a distribution of profit.

To illustrate: a company sells its $40,000 cost of inventory to its customers for a price of $100,000. But it also has to pay $10,000 wages to its employees and $10,000 interest to the bank(creditors), and $10,000 dividends to the stockholders. What is the net profit of this company? The answer obviously depends on what theory one adopts. In the case of the proprietary theory, the net profit is $40,000($100,000 sales revenue - $40,000 cost of goods sold - $10,000 wages -$10,000 interest). While in terms of the entity theory, it is $50,000($100,00 sales revenue -$40,000 cost of goods sold - $10,000 wages). In the entity theory, the payment of $10,000 interest to the creditors is considered as a distribution of dividends. The creditors are treated as owners. However, according to the enterprise theory, the net profit is $60,000($100,000 sales revenue - $40,000 cost of goods sold). The payments of $10,000 interest and $10,000 wages all are considered as distributions of dividends. Both the creditors and the employees all are treated as owners. This demonstrates that the teaching of profit measurement in accounting should include reflection on sociological concepts.

4. Teaching Budgeting in Accounting by Means of Psychology and Behavioral Science

Another important accounting function is budgeting - i.e., expectations for future operations, such as sales, purchase, capital, requirements for production materials and labor, etc. If the expectation is reached, rewards are given; on the other hand, if expectation fails, punishments result. This immediately involves human psychology and behavior. When the expectations and goals are used to measure against their performances, people tend to be conservative and protective in setting their objectives. In order to avoid punishment, they understate their abilities to perform, and overstate the material and labor or capital required to perform the job. This is a fundamental aspect of psychology and behavioral science.

For example: a salesman rendered a budget of 5,000 units to indicate his ability to sell in the following year. Likewise, a production worker submitted a budget of 8 pounds of material as his requirement to produce a unit of product next year. How much should the production budget for material be in the following year? Without critical thinking into the human psychology and behavior behind these two people, one may fall into the trap by taking their face values of 5,000 units and 8 pounds per unit, and giving the answer of 40,000 pounds(5,000 units x 8 pounds). In fact, the salesman's 5,000 units are always understated out of the fear that he may not be able to reach his goal due to uncertainty in the market condition. The true expectation could be, for example, 6,000 units. A cushion is understandably built into the salesman's budget. Similarly, the production worker's 8 pounds of material are likely overstated so as to avoid punishment in case of waste of material in his production process. A protection zone is likewise built around his production budget. In reality, he may need only, for example, 7 pounds per unit. As a result, the correct answer is 4,200 pounds(6,000 units x 7 pounds). This answer can never be derived from the face values of their budgets. It requires the understanding of an individual's position and his psychology and behavior.

This aspect is what Schiff and Lewin called "budget slack"(12, p. 134). Their study demonstrated that "Since budgets are the criteria for measuring performance, and management participates in their formulation, it clearly serves management's interest to have slack in the budget"(12, p. 134). It concluded that "managers intentionally create slack"(12, p. 134).

Salesmen and production workers all practice this kind of "budget slack." As pointed out by Schiff and Lewin, "Sales estimates often fell below a division's attainable estimates primarily due to interorganizational conflict. Average price estimates seem to be initially budgeted at the low of their expected range"(12, p. 140). With respect to the production cost, "Slack in standard cost arises from the discrepancy between the cost budgeted and what they actually would be if various known cost improvements were introduced"(12, p. 140). This indicates that both the sales budget and the production budget have a built-in "budget slack."

In the teaching of budgeting techniques in accounting, it becomes crucial to take into account this budget slack phenomenon. "In our exploration, we concluded that slack may account for as much as 20 to 25 per cent of divisional budgeted operating expense(12, p. 140).

This aspect of budget slack is yet another example to prove that accountants do not just add and subtract numbers, they do engage in critical thinking. It further indicates that one can teach the accounting subject of budgeting better by eliciting the concepts of psychology and behavioral science.

5. Teaching Accounting Procedure by Means of Decision and Communication Sciences

Probably the most difficult subject to teach in accounting is the formulation of an accounting procedure. In view of the fact that the financial statements consist of five items, assets, liabilities, equity, revenue and expense, and consequently profit, there must be a certain order to measure them. Should the assets be measured before the profit can be determined? Or should the profit be determined before assets can be assessed? What is the proper sequence in measuring these financial elements? No asset is purchased without expectations of a series of income in the future. Income is conceived before an asset can be purchased. In fact, asset is the capitalization of this series of income. In a decision sequence, a manager first decides on a certain amount of income to be desired. He then decides how much expense is required to derive this income. Thereafter, he determines how much revenue must be raised to meet the requirement of the expense and the desired profit. In order to generate this amount of revenue, he then decides how much capital from equity and liability is needed. From the amount of funds available, he finally determines what kind of an asset he can afford to purchase. In other words, income was decided before the asset to be purchased was determined. This is the essence of a management decision procedure. It immediately leads to the implication that profit must be determined before the asset can be measured. This aspect is supported by Fisher as he stated that "But capital in any of these senses stands for anticipated income, which consists of a stream of services of its value. When values are considered, the causal relation is not from capital to income, but from income to capital; not from present to future, but from future to present"(4, p. 328). Fisher's capital is an asset, and income is profit in the accounting sense. This means that profit is the first order in the sequence of accounting measurement.

How should this decision process be carried out into the formulation of an accounting procedure? When a transaction occurs, its economic reality immediately emerges. Accounting procedure is merely a system to carry out this economic reality into its periodic measurement process. The important aspect to teach is that the economic reality exists before an accounting procedure can be formulated. This economic reality is not the outcome of an accounting procedure. An accounting procedure is not supposed to dictate the economic reality. Instead, it is the economic reality to serve as a guidance in formulating an accounting procedure. Furthermore, the overall economic reality of a project should over-rule the periodic accounting measurement. This is the essence of the financial communication science. The accountant is supposed to communicate the economic reality of a transaction through a series of financial statements. This procedure can be termed the "backward approach."

Unfortunately, most accounting professors start with debits and credits without defining what the accounting problem really is. And accountants begin with an arbitrary accounting procedure without identifying what the economic reality of that transaction is. As a result, the net income becomes the function of an accounting procedure. By using different kinds of accounting procedures, it ends up with different amounts of net income. This produces many economic realities, and the accounting procedure dictates the economic reality. Naturally this leads to the conclusion that there is no truth in accounting. This procedure can be called the "forward approach."

This misconception of accounting procedure can be found in almost every standard accounting textbook today. As stated by Paton and Littleton, "Depreciation, moreover, cannot be made to vary with the rise and fall of income, as income is the resultant of application, in production, of a complex of services, including those rendered by plant. Income is measured by offsetting the costs, including depreciation, against the revenues represented by goods or services furnished to customers. Cost accrue; income (or loss) emerges"(10, p. 17). This forward approach has dominated the entire history of the accounting teaching profession, up to today.

Canning complained about this misconception. He questioned, "Is there, in economic reality, any such fluctuation in real net earning as is exhibited in the accountant's figures of earnings? Is there, in economic fact, a large class of fixed expenses, that is, of annual expenses that are independent of the annual volume of operations? I shall answer each of those questions in the negative"(3, p. 56). This points to the fact that the forward approach of accounting procedure is very arbitrary without a well conceived purpose to pursue.

Here is an accounting problem to explain the difference between these two approaches: A machine is purchased for a cost of $6,000 with the following cash inflow:

Year 1 = $4,000
Year 2 = 0
Year 3 = 5,000

Should there be a profit in year 2? By the forward approach," no matter how the machine is depreciated, the depreciation is determined first, and is always positive or at least zero. As a result, there will be negative profit in year 2, or at most zero. This approach ignores the very fact that this project does make a positive profit overall. This is the economic reality of this machine. This information must be communicated to the periodic financial statements as the first priority. The depreciation procedure is then formulated to carry out this truth. In other words, the net income must be determined before the depreciation amount can be figured out. As long as there is a positive profit overall, there must also be a positive profit in year 2. As a result, the depreciation must be a negative amount. This is the outcome of the "backward approach." In order to teach this approach in the formulation of an accounting procedure, it requires the understanding of the principles of decision and communication sciences.

6. Conclusions

This paper first described the dilemma in the teaching of accounting. The problem stemmed from the fact that accountants are required to present a single amount for assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, expense and profit from various components. But these components may have divergent characteristics. The fact that a single annual report is presented indicates the necessity to measure a single and unique truth of economic reality. However, these diversified accounting elements may or may not have a true value. Some of them may even have many different values depending on the perceptions of the users. These two aspects are more than often incompatible. For example, the value of an asset can be completely different from the viewpoints of the buyer and the seller. The scope and the amount of profit of a corporation are not quite the same from the perspectives of owners, creditors, and employees. With respect to budgeting, the salesmen's forecasts do not represent their actual abilities to sell. Likewise, the production workers's budgets tend to overstate their actual needs. Without critical thinking into the truth of a transaction an absurd situation can occur: the accounting procedure may become a tool to dictate economic reality, rather than the other way around.

This paper pointed out that, in fact, these problems were not created by the accountants themselves. Instead, they originated from other disciplines. Without a thorough understanding of the relevant disciplines involved, accountants can never properly measure these financial elements. The concept of value of an asset actually came from the disciplines of philosophy and economics. From the viewpoint of philosophy, the value of an asset depends on its service, productivity and usefulness - "value basis." While from the aspect of economics, it lies in its exchange value - "price basis." Neither is totally practical and feasible in the real world of financial measurement. They are two extremes, but one serves as the check and balance of the other. This compromise gives birth to the "cost basis" of accounting. Thus, it defines asset as the minimum inevitable burden at the most advanced engineering technology to create utility in the future. As a result, the teaching of the value of an asset requires the instructions of philosophy and economics.

The concept of profit was rooted on the perception of sociology. In the narrowest sense, profit is a reward for the owner's investment only - "proprietary theory." In a much broader view, profit is compensation to those who contributed capital to the company, including the creditors and the owners - "entity theory." On the other hand, in the widest aspect, profit is a distribution of dividends to those who serve the company, including the employees, the creditors, and the owners - "enterprise theory." As such the teaching of profit requires integration of the discipline of sociology.

The budgeting technique is deeply involved with psychology and behavioral science. According to the conservatism doctrine of human behavior, salesmen's budgets are always understated, while the production workers' budgets are always overstated -"budget slack." A correct master budget requires proper adjustment of these two budgets. Therefore, the teaching of budgeting needs the deliberation of psychology and behavioral science.

How to formulate an accounting procedure to determine the order of sequence in measuring the financial elements of assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, expense and profit was theorized in decision science. It is true that income is conceived before an asset is purchased. When this transaction occurs, its economic reality immediately emerges. The accounting procedure is to carry out this economic reality into its measurement scheme. This leads to the conclusion that profit must be determined before the asset can be measured - "backward approach." It is a fallacy that the measurement of an asset leads to the determination of profit - "forward approach." It further follows that it is not the accounting procedure that dictates the economic reality; instead, it is the economic reality which serves as an objective in formulating a correct accounting procedure. This illustrates the need to incorporate the principles of communication science in teaching accounting.

These examples demonstrate that the accounting subject is actually an inter-disciplinary subject. It requires the application of concepts from philosophy, economics, sociology, psychology, behavioral science, decision and communication sciences. Only in this way, can accounting professors be engaged in educating accountants, rather than training bookkeepers. This aspect has sustained the substance of this paper.

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James G.S. Yang is Associate Professor of Accounting at Montclair State College. Diane K. Shulz is Assistant Professor of Accounting at Montclair State College.

Critical Thinking: The Role of Management Education

Gloria Pierce

Context

If business enterprises are to remain viable in the 1990's and beyond, their learning agents (employees at all organizational levels) must learn to question current operating practices in order to revitalize and improve organizational functioning. Without such renewal, organizations are in danger of decline and death. In the face of such high stakes, critical thinking may be our best chance to increase the odds for organizational survival in the 21st century.

The context in which private corporations, public institutions and non-profit agencies operate is characterized by highly turbulent, rapidly changing conditions which require continued questioning and challenging of current operating practices and their underlying assumptions and premises. Concurrent with this need for double-loop learning there is a developing awareness that humankind inhabits an interdependent world in which cultural institutions and organizations are open systems with permeable boundaries, that is, they affect and are affected by their environment. The development of this awareness, however, does not appear to be occurring as rapidly as events demand; therefore, the need to focus on critical thinking in management education takes on greater urgency as several highly visible events dramatize the serious consequences of a failure to think critically about organizational decisions.

Significance in the workplace

It is in the authentic self-interest of organizations to develop critical thinking among employees, especially managers within the organization. Management education has both the opportunity and responsibility to stimulate and facilitate the development of critical thinking throughout the organization.

Several assumptions lie beneath these statements. The first is that critical thinking improves rather than diminishes the success, effectiveness and viability of the business enterprise. Second, improvement in organizational health benefits members of the organization, in turn. Third, many organizational decisions are made on the basis of unconscious or semi-conscious assumptions which may be inadequate, erroneous or obsolete. When these deficiencies and the consequences resulting from them are revealed, better judgments are possible.

The central role of assumption analysis in critical thinking becomes evident. In fact, the critical thinking process itself may be defined as follows:

1. Reflecting critically on the assumptions underlying actions.
2. Making these implicit beliefs explicit.
3. Considering alternative perspectives.
4. Framing the issue or posing the problem from an expanded perspective.
5. Speculating on consequences of decisions.
6. Choosing action from the expanded perspective.

Two components emerge as essential in this process:

1. Assumption analysis -- becoming aware that assumptions underlie behavior and operating practices and scrutinizing beliefs and values which are culturally constructed and socially transmitted.

2. Creative speculation -- the willingness and ability to imagine and explore alternatives to current ways of working, thinking and acting.

Toward a holistic model

The process and components of critical thinking indicate a more holistic conception and definition of critical thinking that incorporates previously underemphasized elements of critical thinking. First, because of the central importance of assumption analysis, the affective component of critical thinking must be emphasized and the implications for adult education and management education considered. Because adults tend to become emotionally invested in their belief systems, there is a heavily emotional component in educating adults in critical thinking. Learners can experience a sense of loss, disorientation, anxiety and threat when asked to question their assumptions. For this reason, management education requires a judicious mixture of support and challenge. Second, because critical thinking combines decision and action with reflective thought, management education must endeavor to develop propensities toward critical thinking as well as proficiencies such as reasoning skills. Third, creative, imaginative and receptive abilities and tendencies must be developed in conjunction with analytical skills.

Rationale for critical thinking as an ideal for management education

Evidence is mounting that poor organizational decisions are costly and harmful to the internal functioning and health of the organization. Furthermore, poor organizational decisions can also be detrimental to the environment in which the organization operates because decisions made within a particular workplace can and often do extend beyond its boundaries and affect stakeholders, not only stockholders in the company.

Two highly visible events illustrate both claims. One is the flawed decision - making process at NASA and Morton Thiokol which was revealed by the investigations into the Challenger tragedy. The other is the series of events resulting from management policies and practices at Exxon, Alyeska, the U.S. Coast Guard and the state of Alaska that led to Valdez disaster. Both misfortunes took great financial tolls on organizations involved and were harmful in less tangible ways as well.

Other incidents and examples demonstrate that decisions made within the walls of organizations extend beyond their boundaries and affect the health and well-being of many stakeholders who do not share in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the decisions of a few can have a great impact on the many. Toxic waste disposal and industrial emissions pollute air, water and soil. Petro-chemical wastes deplete the ozone layer. Destruction of the rain forests threatens the biosphere that supports life on the planet. Love Canal, Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl evoke images of destruction that lead to the NIMBY syndrome--"not in my backyard." Yet, in a very real sense, the entire planet is the backyard of all its inhabitants; no less than the interconnected nature of the ecological system, the reality of life on earth, makes it necessary to develop critical thinkers who are capable of making better judgements. Management education for critical thinking can play a vital role in this effort to enhance internal organizational health and the environment that supports it.

Gloria Pierce is a member of the faculty of Counseling and Human Development at Montclair State College.

Critical Thinking and Moral Dilemmas

Robert Zweig

My topic is the role that a discussion of moral issues might play in a critical thinking course.

It seems natural to me that students would expect that the evaluation of information, the analysis of legitimate models of argumentation, and the freedom from various prejudices that is received - among other things - in a critical thinking course would help in thinking clearly about questions of right and wrong. And undoubtedly ethical questions are at the root of much discussion and thinking that we are exposed to every day. Questions regarding drugs, abortion, criminality, the homeless and punishment all have strong ethical components and are talked about, written about, and thought about often by our students. The analysis of such matters should form an important component of a critical thinking course.

Traditionally, philosophy has offered several models in explaining our understanding and behavior about what might be characterized as the right thing to do. I believe that these models must be understood at least in a basic way by anyone discussing moral dilemmas and that recourse to many of the methods that critical thinking seems to teach may be inadequate in helping students realize and understand their moral attitudes. Moral questions, it seems to me, are different in kind than other matters to which recourse to clear thinking may well yield more successful results. Understanding basic problems with language such as ambiguity, discovering hidden assumptions in arguments, knowing the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning, understanding the relationship between premises and conclusions, are all obviously useful in ethics as they are in other areas such as problem solving; yet, these methods do not loosen the grip on our convictions - our students are not likely to betray their own feelings about what they believe to be right or wrong after their application. This may be considered unfortunate; that is, we may hope that reason be wholly persuasive; we may believe that the world would be a better place to live in if everyone were persuaded by reason. Nevertheless, it is difficult to achieve that suspension of judgment which is needed to make moral choices. Perhaps it is too threatening to admit that one's moral choices are not the result of some deeper foundation than authority to reasonable, reflective thinking implies. After all, many moral beliefs are deeply held; undeniably, the source of many beliefs can be exposed to be cultural prejudices and various types of biases that critical thinking may help a student to see. Even in such a case, even though desirable, the usurpation of one's prejudices, particularly as it relates to moral issues, is a very tricky business. I am not implying that it would not be good to have students think critically, only that critical thinking is a valuable asset in the context of a very broad discussion of moral reasoning. My own "bias" is that any understanding of morality must consider the "subjective" inclinations of the subject. Reason, I believe, is not wholly convincing because it is not wholly explanatory. As David Hume in "A Treatise of Human Nature" has perceptively remarked:

> Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affectations, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone,...can never have any such influence. Morals excite passion, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.

Let me give a few examples of what I have been discussing. I am sure that no one will find it surprising that there is little problem in getting students to suspend their judgment when they are asked a hypothetical question based on certain presuppositions such as: What kind of a car should I buy? A new one or a used one? A large or small one? It is a rather simple matter for students to discuss these questions from several points of view. I have no trouble believing that a student in a similar situation, one who was contemplating buying a car, would apply "reasonable" criteria and buy a "sensible" car. Obviously, even in this area what is reasonable will not always prevail. I am sure that no one will find it surprising that students have a much more difficult time, indeed feel very uncomfortable about suspending their judgment, and analyzing their response to such matters as: Is it proper to betray a friend in certain circumstances? This is obviously a very complex question with more far-reaching consequences than a decision about which car to buy involves; but I do not think it is this greater difficulty that is the cause of the problem. Rather, it is the implicit understanding that there is a moral question involved for which reason alone "seems" inadequate. How many of us would expect that a student confronted with a similar situation in the future would betray a friend based on the reasons given and defended it by clear and rational thinking.

In many of my English Composition classes I have been reading an essay on drugs which defends the legalization of drugs. The essay is often discussed as a form of argumentation, one of many rhetorical modes that is common for composition courses to discuss. Students are asked to defend or challenge several points and assumptions of the writer. One of the presumptions of the writer is that if drugs were legalized, labeled and the dangers clearly acknowledged fewer people would engage in an activity which does not have the allure of being illegal. In addition, several other points are made in defending the legalization of drugs; legalization might decrease crime; revenues could be generated for the government; there would be control over the distribution of drugs and therefore the possibility of monitoring use and helping the addict. After a careful discussion of the many points in favor and opposed to legalization, students often agree with the major premise of the essay and concede that the writer has made many good points. They usually find the arguments in favor of legalization more convincing than those opposed. They are convinced that the reasoning is sound, yet they have not fundamentally changed their minds. If it came down to a decision about whether or not to legalize drugs, along the suggestions outlined in the essay, even those convinced by the logic would not wish to do so. I think they see the issue as one of right vs. wrong and reason cannot dislodge those feelings or that intuition, or whatever else we may wish to call it. There is undoubtedly a value in getting students to think clearly and critically about such an issue as the legalization of drugs. They may consider issues that they were not aware of. They may see the practical results of certain areas of inquiry. Many of these benefits might be by-products of the moral nature of the argument; I am not optimistic however that despite all of these advantages that the rational analysis of a problem is sufficient to fundamentally change behavior.

Some critical thinking texts, although they offer some clearly valuable guidelines for thinking about moral problems, simplify many of the issues involved in ethical thought. They do not account for the multiple source of our beliefs. One critical thinking text, for instance, offers the following advice.

> If you require that each of your value assumptions be justified by moral reasoning, you will always ask, Why is this my value preference in this situation? Is there some rational basis for believing that one value or set of values is any better than any other? Though you have already selected your value preferences you should make a systematic attempt to justify their reasonableness. (Asking the Right Questions)

I find this advice perfectly clear and to the point. It begins with a conditional phrase and suggests what to do. The text, continues, however, with what I find objectionable and I think should not be the way to approach the matter. The "reasonable" type of moral reasoning is contrasted to "values based on personal hunches, authority and tradition." These three sources, according to the text, "all share a common problem. The person who accepts them as a proper source of justification tends not to ask himself whether the value assumption is reasonable. Instead, he obeys commands from sources beyond his control." (Right Questions, p.53) I agree with much of this but it seems simplistic to me and presumptuous to reduce values involved in moral reasoning to "reasonableness." And I don't see why appeal to authority outside of oneself is necessarily a problem. Are we to infer from this that our own decisions, simply because they are our own, are more likely to be right than an appeal to authority would yield? I don't see why a matter of right and wrong must necessarily be reasonable. It may be right to risk one's life in order to save another or to sacrifice one's well being for the sake of bettering someone's life who we may not even know. Is it necessarily reasonable to do these things? The following assertion is also made: "What will be the societal effects of acting on value preferences you have chosen? Answering this question should form the basis of moral reasoning." I do not find this idea objectionable at all, but it should be noted that it probably stems from a kind of "Hobbesian" notion about the source of our values to be found in what many have called "the societal contract." This kind of thinking about morality is one of many theories. Philosophers have disagreed sharply about these issues for centuries. Is the writer revealing his own bias? What's wrong with that? Nothing; but shouldn't a student with all his or her critical skills have access to the origin of these ideas? Shouldn't we concede that it is possible that critical thinking may not satisfy our urge to understand our own moral nature? Could not the use of critical thinking itself be used in this endeavor?

What then might the skills of critical thinking be useful for, how might they be applied to an understanding of moral dilemmas? I think critical thinking skills are of paramount importance in understanding the issues involved in moral problems, in deciding what the nature of a disagreement might be in a moral argument, in making clear distinctions between those issues that are moral as opposed to those which are practical, for instance. For example, in discussing abortion, students often follow two paths of reasoning that is common to much of the rhetoric on the subject. One side argues that a woman has a right to do with her body as she pleases. The other side argues that life begins at conception. In this dialectic there can be little hope for resolution, for each side has different premises and is not responding to the assumptions of the other side. If life begins at conception what then is the mother's right in relation to that other life? Can life be said to begin at conception and does that life have the same rights as others? I think these questions are more to the point and offer the possibility of greater understanding for both proponents and those opposed to abortion. Such questions, I believe, also offer the possibility of reconciliation, although this may not necessarily be desirable. Critical thinking skills are essential to a clear discussion of the moral issues involved in such problems. It is important to have these skills in order to ask the right questions. And that is the foundation upon which a discussion of moral dilemmas is to be built.

Many explanations might be offered as to why students are not moved by reason when it is applied to moral issues. It may be a psychological matter. It may be that one's prejudices are very stubborn, and indeed they are. It may also be a partial explanation that there is something in our nature, when we consider right and wrong, which is not susceptible to reason in the same way that other areas of knowledge are. The philosopher Thomas Nagel has written: "For the purposes of ethics, should we identify with the detached, impersonal will that chooses total outcomes, and act on reasons that are determined accordingly? Or is this a denial of what we are really doing and an avoidance of the full range of reasons that apply to creatures like us? (View from Nowhere, 185) This is a very basic and important question. I would hope that someone teaching critical thinking and moral dilemmas would account for our own subjectivity, our very different perspectives. Although critical thinking implicitly directs understanding towards greater objectivity, I see no reason, why, it may not help to unravel our multifaceted and complex relationship with matters of right and wrong.

Robert Zweig teaches English at Manhattan Community College.

Humor and Critical Thinking

John Morreall

Anyone who thinks critically about society and culture finds lots of humor. But humor is more than a by-product of critical thinking. Cultivating our sense of humor can help us think more critically. In this workshop, I'll give a quick sketch of my view of critical thinking, then a sketch of my view of humor, and then show how they are related. After that we'll discuss the value of humor in the classroom.

Critical thinking is the opposite of automatic thinking. Most of the time most people do what they're told and believe what they're told. They process what they hear, read, and experience automatically, without stopping to ask, "Does this make sense?" "Is this true?" "Would this course of action really have the best results?" To think critically, by contrast, is to process information reflectively, analyzing and evaluating it.

The nature of humor is more controversial than the nature of critical thinking. I don't have time to rehearse 2500 years of humor theory here, so let me give you what I consider the most adequate theory, the Incongruity Theory. The basic phenomenon to explain about humor is humorous amusement, which is analyzed as the enjoyment of incongruity. Some thing or event is incongruous if it doesn't fit our conceptual patterns and expectations. If the doorbell rings, I expect it to be a clothed human being. If it's a naked human being, or a llama, or a giant zucchini, that's incongruous. Not all incongruous experiences are enjoyable, of course. If it's a guy with an AK-47 at the door, I'll probably feel fear rather than amusement. Even with the naked person, llama, or zucchini, I may feel puzzled rather than amused. So two things are involved in amusement. I experience something incongruous, and I treat it playfully--I enjoy it.

What's the connection between critical thinking and humor, this enjoyment of incongruity? One place to find the answer is in the history of comedy--dramatic comedy, comic essays, and today's standup comedy. In all of them, the creator of comedy looks at what's going on in the culture and asks "Does this make sense?" Stock comic characters from the earliest days have been the liar, the windbag, the hypocrite, the unfaithful spouse. The incongruity in comedy is largely the lack of fit between what these characters are and what we expect people to be (and what they say they are). Aristophanes, Daumier, Jonathan Swift, Will Rogers, Art Buchwald, Tom Wolfe--the essence of all their humor is social criticism. Standup comedy today is 95% critical thinking about our society, especially its crassness, its overcommercialization, and its hypocrisy. When McDonald's came out with their Egg McMuffins for breakfast, for instance, Jay Leno commented, "Oh great--before I could only eat two meals a day in my car!"

Notice that comedians present incongruous features of culture in a way that we can enjoy, rather than in a way that puzzles or upsets us. This, I think, is a primary value of humor as a kind of social criticism--it helps us keep our cool, keep our perspective on events, and thereby think about them more rationally. The person who lampoons and satirizes some aspect of culture is more the distanced observer than the passionate crusader. Some people, for example, may hate George Bush for his wishy-washiness, muddle-headedness, and duplicity. But Garry Trudeau in Doonesbury portrays Bush as invisible, which evokes a more appropriate attitude than hate, I think, toward Bush--the feeling that the lights are on but nobody's home.

Let me now say something about the value of humor in the classroom. There are actually many such values. Because humor is enjoyable, for instance, students pay attention to the teacher who uses it. They also remember humorous examples better than dull, prosaic ones. And humor in the classroom promotes imagination and creative thinking, however, so let me concentrate on the way humor in teaching fosters critical thinking.

In trying to get our students to think critically, we want them to look at everything with a questioning, experimental eye, and not assume that a view is correct simply because it is popular or old. Critical thinking requires a lack of reverence for popularity and for tradition. And here humor is valuable, for it is essentially questioning and irreverent. The spirit of humor is to search for discrepancies, contradictions, inconsistencies, and other kinds of incongruity. When a teacher uses humor, especially about the subject matter and even about himself or herself, the student sees that this person has an open attitude which will allow for real questioning and criticism.

Openness in the classroom is especially important when people are criticizing each other's views. In ordinary conversations, after all, to criticize people's views is to attack their judgment, their intelligence, or those people themselves. Discussing things with a sense of humor can provide a distance between discussant and ideas, and so reduce or eliminate the ego-threatening aspect of critical discussion.

Let me offer you two examples from my Aesthetics class of how I use humor to get students to think critically. The first is to break the automatic reverence most students have for all artists. I show them a page from the 1986 Neiman-Marcus Christmas catalog describing "The Nieman-Marcus/Aramis 900/Andy Warhol Experience"--a day in New York sitting for a portrait with Andy Warhol, and a case of Aramis 900 cologne and after-shave, at a cost of $35,000. "Become a Legend with Andy Warhol and Aramis 900. As a Neiman-Marcus exclusive, Aramis has arranged for you to join the ranks of other celebrities from Marilyn to soup cans by becoming artist Andy Warhol's latest (and possibly greatest) subject for a painting in a super-charged special trip." By the time I've read this catalog page, interspersed with all my wisecracks, most students, even those given to artist worship, see what a whore Andy Warhol was.

The other example is a class I do early in the Aesthetics course to get students to be more critical of the bad taste all around them. It's a lecture and discussion on the development of Kitsch. I show how the Industrial Revolution reduced or eliminated two important sources of good taste--familiarity with nature, and craft skills--and produced the aesthetically alienated consumers of today. To emphasize how bad current bad taste is, I show thirty slides of Kitsch objects from mail-order catalogs. These include telephones in the shape of mallard ducks, that quack instead of ring; video cassettes of crossing the Rockies, made to be watched while pedaling an exercise bike; and toilet paper dispensers with a built-in radio and telephone. I put alot of humor into this presentation, and find that it loosens the students up, makes them comfortable discussing things in class, and gets them to think critically about the culture they live in.

John Morreall is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Rochester Institute of Technology.

Emotional Intelligence, Critical Thinking, and Human Survival

Vivian M. Rosenberg

Introduction

Until very recently, philosophy and critical thinking conferences (and publications) have given little or no attention to the emotional dimensions of experience. Even now, when there is some evidence that this situation is changing, the fact remains that a focus on emotion is enough of a novelty at conferences like this so that when I tell people I am presenting a paper on "emotional intelligence"[1] or that I'm specifically interested in the concept of empathy, they inevitably assume I'm a psychologist. I'm not. My field is the History of Ideas and I teach social and political philosophy, critical reasoning, and general humanities courses. I have decided, therefore, to begin this paper by describing how I came to focus on emotional intelligence in general and, more specifically, on the concept of empathy. By supplying a historical context for my remarks, I believe I can best explain and legitimate my interest in this topic and support my contention that emotional intelligence is essential for critical thinking. I will then develop the theoretical component of my argument, defining emotional intelligence and explaining its connection to critical thinking and, more significantly, to the survival of human communities.

Historical Context

I came of age in the 50's. I don't know how many of you remember the 50's--but they were strange times.[2] I say this not only from a personal perspective, but also with the background information and insights I've accumulated through my professional interest in the history of ideas. A comparison of the underlying assumptions of college students in the 50's with those of educated people in the past and then with today's students, suggests that, in many significant ways, the 50's represented the last glow of 18th Century Enlightenment fantasies. Certainly, we had our anxieties: the bomb, third world overpopulation, the perpetual gap between rich and poor countries and rich and poor people in this country--we were aware of all these problems. However, as this country recovered World War II, it appeared to many of us that the progressive ideas that had been developing since the 18th Century had, after a long struggle, won out. We weren't naive enough to believe that reason, education, science and technology would solve all human problems, but we hoped some problems could be tackled and ameliorated. Our parents had suffered through depression and war, but these were over. We were ready to be happy.

In new suburban utopias all over this country, families gathered around the TV set and the newly invented backyard bar-b-que, devoting themselves to fun, to family togetherness, and to the accumulation of the products designed to make our lives more comfortable and convenient.[3] Meanwhile, back in the cities something called "urban renewal" was going to improve the lot of the poor, thus protecting the self-indulgent middle and upper classes from guilt as well as from the possible threat posed by alienated and angry people.

In the 60's this world of dreams blew apart as winds from the civil rights movement, the Vietnam war, and later the women's movement whistled through our lives. Violence erupted in our cities; moreover, some people rediscovered a significant message from the 18th century: they saw that many attitudes and practices long taken for granted were nothing more than human inventions. And what was made by human beings--whether in the realm of artifacts or cultural customs--could be discarded or changed. Young people, flouting social conventions their elders had never questioned, grew long hair, took off their clothes, and openly had sex without wedding rings and even without any pretense of love or commitment. The generation gap opened wide as children accused the older generation, including many who thought of themselves as "liberals," of empty talk and hypocritical acceptance of the status quo. They also indulged in civil disobedience, desperately and sometimes violently trying to bring about the world adults had said they believed in.

In 1960, John F. Kennedy, bright, witty, and Harvard educated (one of us, we thought) was elected president of the United States. On Nov. 22, 1963, he was assassinated. We hovered around the television set, trying to figure out how to explain all this to our young children who stared, puzzled and confused, at the casket, the solemn funeral procession, the widow, and two other little children-- John-John and Caroline--who were part of the somber ceremonies. My own son, not quite four at the time, looked up with wide eyes and asked: "But why did Oswald have to shoot President Kennedy? If you don't like someone, you just don't have to visit him!" Two days later, the assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, was gunned down by Jack Ruby. Again, we watched this--live!--on our television sets. On April 4th, 1968, Martin Luther King was assassinated; in May of that year, three young men, Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney, were murdered by ku-klux-klanners in Mississippi; a month later, Robert Kennedy was shot. Meanwhle, American "boys" began to die in Vietnam; we also began to see, again in our own living rooms, the terrible suffering Americans were inflicting on others. And in 1970, college students demonstrating at Kent State against US involvement in Vietnam were gunned down by the National Guard.

I have included some personal memories as well as historical data here because I believe these details tell us not only about one person's history but about the modern age and its dilemmas. As we reeled from one catastrophe to another in those years from Kennedy's murder to the Kent State killings, a door to the past closed: how could we believe that reason, education, science and technology could solve or even ameliorate serious human problems?

In the late 1960's, during my early years as a college instructor, I experimented with teaching materials that might help me and my students make sense out of what was happening in the world around us.But now I had something to distract me from my worries about the world. At home in the suburbs, we were beginning to see families crumbling, families established by well-educated professionals who had expected a stability their parents never enjoyed. Something had gone wrong. After years at college and graduate school, we were dragging ourselves to marriage counselors, to family therapists, to consciousness-raising sessions, and even to encounter groups, seeking some sort of enlightenment that had been missing in our formal educations.

Emotional Intelligence

As I questioned my own role as an educator, I knew that I had adopted materials and a teaching style very much like those of my college teachers. But I realized that something important had been left out of my own education: very little had been done to cultivate what I now refer to as *emotional intelligence*.

Emotional intelligence, as I have come to define it, has two components, *personal psychological insight* and *empathy*. Personal psychological insight involves the individual's ability to identify and to some extent understand and appropriately express his or her own emotions; empathy involves the individual's capacity to sense, understand, and appropriately respond to someone else's feelings.[4] In college and graduate school, only psychology and literature instructors had seemed at all interested in the emotional dimensions of experience, and even these instructors had made no attempt to teach students, in any formal or structured way, how to identify or talk about their own or other people's feelings.

In 1977, in an article entitled "Criticism and Feeling,"[5] literary critic Jane Tompkins raised this very issue. She noted that even literature specialists "seem to think that talk about the feelings is lowering, a kind of intellectual slumming best left to encounter group sessions or appointments with one's analyst."[6] Contending that "we are ignorant of the tremendous subtlety and complexity of our responses to literature because we have not been trained to focus on their affective dimension," Tompkins asserted that emotions must be brought into "the circuit of legitimate critical discourse." "Because thinking and feeling are continuous, interdependent, and virtually inseparable activities," she stated, "I see no reason to pretend that they are alien to each other--the one impersonal, objective, and exalted, the other unseemly, self-centered, and base."[7] If, as Tompkins contended, this avoidance of discussion of emotion was prevalent in most literature courses, where emotion is central to the subject matter, it was hardly surprising to find in other disciplines a similar failure to address affective issues.

In the late '70's, when I was teaching both philosophy and freshman humanities courses, I undertook an informal survey of freshman composition and critical reasoning texts. Checking the tables of contents and indexes of these books, I found that most of them included no references to "affect," "emotion," "feelings," or "empathy." English textbooks were more likely than reasoning texts to have discussions of emotion, but these were generally limited to passages about the inappropriate uses of emotional language and warnings about the manipulative or unfair nature of arguments making emotional appeals. There was one important exception to this tendency to ignore or denigrate emotions. In at least two influential composition texts of the 70's, Rogerian argument, based on psychologist Carl Rogers's ideas about empathy and active listening strategies, was introduced as an alternative approach to traditional argument patterns.[8] Unfortunately, Rogerian argument in such contexts often seemed more like one more persuasion technique, a strategy aimed at convincing a reader that the writer had, indeed, seriously considered other points of view and found them unconvincing, when, in fact, there had been no honest engagement with alternative perspectives.

Turning to many of the logic and practical reasoning texts of that era, I found that most of these avoided the topic of emotions altogether or gave it only a cursory treatment; some, no doubt reacting to the excesses of the '60s, actively disdained emotion.[9] In fact, looking over philosophy books from that era, I actually came across one logic text that instructed students to "eschew emotion." Meanwhile, the literature of the times was becoming overpopulated with characters who had, unwittingly no doubt, "eschewed emotion," many of them (like the protagonists in Walker Percy's *The Moviegoer* and Sloan Wilson's *The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit*) unhappy and alienated people walking numbly through life.

I began to look for ways of fostering emotional intelligence in my own classes, hoping to give students something useful for their lives, something my generation had missed. I must admit to you, however, that at the time, I frankly did not see that such an approach might actually help students with course material; nor did I seriously consider the possibility that the cultivation of emotional intelligence might improve critical thinking skills.

Emotional Intelligence and Critical Thinking

I have described elsewhere my early attempts to foster emotional intelligence in the classroom and the unexpected academic advantages of such a focus.[10] Here, I'd like to summarize some of the features of the program I subsequently developed and explain how I see these related to critical thinking.

First of all, I designed focusing exercises to help students recognize their own feelings;[11] I also suggested that they try to notice how they felt when sitting in class or doing a homework assignment.You may think that students are already too immersed in their own feelings. However, there is a difference between having feelings and being able to identify and describe them. The personal psychological insight that a focus on feelings encourages is important in any situation, and certainly in any kind of problem-solving, decision-making, or learning task, both when individuals initially approach a situation or task and then during the time they actively grapple with it. Sometimes, merely sorting out feelings of resistance, anxiety, confusion, or resentment tends to dilute and even neutralize them, whereas when unnoticed, such feelings interfere with an activity or learning experience. And if certain feelings continue to undermine our efforts, we can--when we notice this--consider a range of problem-solving strategies.[12]

Personal psychological insight also facilitates critical thinking by helping us uncover underlying assumptions about ourselves and the world. We all have ideas, assumptions, and attitudes that profoundly affect us even when we are not aware of them. The problem is that these habitual thoughts may be inaccurate or distorted interpretations of experience, and yet they have enormous power over us, often leading to rationalization and self-deception. Reflecting on our feelings, trying to become aware of what triggered them, is one way to trace such hidden assumpions; then, when such ideas are uncovered, we can use our critical thinking skills to examine them. [13]

Note, however, that feelings don't indicate only distorted thinking. Recent work on affect and epistemology suggests that, despite the age-old philosophical prejudice against emotion, feelings can be avenues to knowledge; this has been demonstrated even in scientific investigation.[14] In the Spring 1989 issue of *The Philosophical Forum*, in an article on "Subjectivity & Emotion," Cheshire Calhoun criticizes "the philosophical devaluation of emotion," pointing out that "emotions do not always rest on false beliefs," that they do not "always imbue objects with unreal qualities," and that they don't always "myopically bias our perceptions."[15] Selectivity is a factor in all perceptions and interpretations, and an emotion, Calhoun notes, may, in fact, "draw attention to evidence...we might have overlooked." [16] Of course, the Enlightenment faith in the possibility of impartial and disinterested reason has been challenged by Marxist critics, and now feminist and deconstructionist critics have joined the fray, but only recently have scholars begun to explore the possibility that emotions may actually be a positive source of knowledge.[17] However, in a society that has devalued emotion, it may be necessary to train ourselves and our students to recognize and describe feelings before we can critically examine them and use them as resources for knowledge.

Before turning to the second component of emotional intelligence--empathy--I'd like to point out that some emotions are particularly important in the development of critical thinking skills. *Confusion, uncertainty*, and *anxiety* --and the ability to tolerate these--are essential for critical thinking. One reason student writing is often so bad is that students move to closure too quickly because they cannot tolerate such feelings. They want to say "this is what I think"--and be done with it. Unfortunately, schooling has probably exacerbated this problem. From their earliest school years, students are asked questions and expected to come up with the "right" answers. When they can't do this, the anxiety and the threat to self-esteem can be paralyzing.[18] Furthermore, attempting to critically evaluate our own ideas is particularly threatening, especially if these ideas have shaped our lives. Confusion is most debilitating when seen as a deficit; we need, instead, to help students see that this emotion is a healthy sign, indicating involvement and reflection. If we really want to facilitate critical thinking, we must give students permission to experience confusion; and we must remind them, explicitly and often, to give *themselves* permission to experience confusion.

Empathy

I'd like to end now with a brief consideration of the second component of emotional intelligence--empathy. The capacity for empathy is essential whenever a task or a situation involves other people, even though others may not be present. For instance, whenever we write for or to others, as we do in almost everything but diaries and journals, audience awareness (which surely depends upon some degree of empathy) is necessary for effective communication. And the reading we do, except for subjects like mathematics or the sciences, is generally about other human beings. Thus empathy can improve reading comprehension and facilitate understanding of the people and situations described in course material. This is so not only in humanities and social science courses, but also in professional courses like business management,[19] law, education, nursing, and medicine.

Outside the classroom, of course, the significance of empathy is well-recognized. In the practical world of business, books like Peters and Waterman's *In Search of Excellence* assume the importance of empathy skills for successful management. [20] Similarly, in the area of family life, Thomas Gordon's Parent Effectiveness Training program[21] and other parenting and communication programs help people improve personal relationships by teaching them to identify and effectively express their own feelings and recognize the feelings of others. Carl

Rogers, of course, has inspired countless therapists to cultivate empathy skills and to teach their clients to improve communication skills by developing their capacity for empathy.[22] Furthermore, in the last decade, psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut's work, locating empathy as a central human need, has emerged as an important alternative to the Freudian psychoanalytic paradigm.[23]

It is not hard to see why empathy is crucial in private life. The title of this paper, however, implies that the need for empathy goes far beyond the improvement of personal relationships at home or at work: the title suggests that emotional intelligence is essential for human survival. This was not hyperbole. Richard Paul, Director of Sonoma State University's Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique, has observed that a democratic, pluralistic society requires what he calls "intellectual empathy" : in such societies, with their conflicting needs and values, we need to be able to engage in "dialogical reasoning," he writes, "thinking critically and reciprocally within opposing points of view" ; [24] Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project have outlined a program that depends upon empathy to facilitate negotiation and compromise; [25] Ninian Smart, a leading scholar in the field of comparative religion, argues that empathy is essential in "the exploration of religion" [26] and advocates "the Phenomenolgoical Method" of study, a method which involves an "'entering in' to the thought world of the believer";[27] psychologist Martin Hoffman's research indicates that empathy is the foundation of moral development[28] and Nel Noddings, Professor of Education at Stanford University, sees empathy as vital for ethical behavior in general and good teaching in particular;[29] Carnegie Mellon philosopher and computer specialist Preston Covey, also insisting on "the centrality of empathy" in ethical decisions, have designed a videodisc to facilitate the interactive and empathic consideration of ethical issues. [30]

In an address before the American Psychological Association in 1979, Kenneth Clark pleaded for an intensification of research into the phenomenon of empathy.[31] In this address Clark looks at global crises. The lack of empathy, he asserts, is "the basis of social tensions, conflicts, violence, terrorism, and war." [32] If we want to assure "a future for humanity," he states, "we need not only to study and understand the nature and determinants of empathy," but also "to develop the ability to increase the number of human beings who are functionally empathic." The "survival of the human species," he contends, "now appears to depend upon a universal increase in functional empathy." [33] Surely those of us committed to what Richard Paul calls "strong sense" critical thinking[34] must heed Clark's warning and improve our own emotional intelligence; we must also search for new ways to help our students develop personal psychological insight and increase their capacity for empathy.

Notes

1. I have taken the term "emotional intelligence" from Jane Tompkins' article on "Criticism and Feelings" (*College English*, Oct., 1977, pp. 169-178).

2. For a lively description of this era, see Benita Eisler, *Private Lives: Men and Women of the Fifties* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1986).

3. For an excellent discussion of rising expectations and affluence in this era, see Thomas Hine, *Populuxe* (New York: Knopf, 1986).

4. In his book *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), Howard Gardner identifies seven "human comptences": "linguistic Intelligence," "musical Intelligence," "logical-mathematical intelligence," "spatial intelligence," "bodily-kinesthetic intelligence," and what he terms "the personal intelligences." Gardner's "personal intelligences" are equivalent to what I call "emotional intelligence"; his "intrapersonal knowledge" is what I refer to as "psychological insight," and his "interpersonal knowledge" is nothing more nor less than "empathy."

5. Jane Tompkins, "Criticism and Feelings" (*College English*, Oct., 1977, pp. 169-178).

6. Tompkins, p. 176.

7. Tompkins, p. 176-177.

8. Richard E. Young, Alton L. Becker, Kenneth L. Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1970), and Maxine Hairston, *A Contemporary Rhetoric*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1974).

9. In the introduction to his 1975 critical thinking text, Vincent Ruggero does make some positive comments about feelings, reminding his readers that they are "natural." However, the title of Ruggero's text, *Beyond Feelings:A Guide to Critical Thinking*, certainly has pejorative overtones, suggesting that we can and should rise above or "beyond" emotion.

10. Vivian M. Rosenberg,"Effective Reading and Affective Growth: Connecting Strategies" (*Freshman English Resource Notes*, Spring/Summer '79, Vol. 4, Number 3).

11. Vivian M. Rosenberg, *Reading, Writing, & Thinking: Critical Connections* (New York: Random House Inc., 1989).

12. Two recent books dealing with such issues are *The Psychology of Writing: The Affective Experience*, by Alice Brand (Greenwood Press, 1989) and Douglas B.McLeod & Verna M. Adams, *Affect and Mathematical Problem Solving: A New Perspective* (New York: Springer- Verlag, 1989).

13. Cognitive therapy is based on this insight. See *Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders*, by Aron Beck (New American Library, 1979). Also, psychologists exploring the phenomenon of "assumptive worlds" note that "people generally operate on the basis of important assumptions that generally go unquestioned and unchallenged." Emotional reactions can help us figure out our own and other people's "assumptive worlds" and so open these up for critical examination. See B. Janoff-Bulman, "Assumptive Worlds" (*Social Cognition*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1989, pp. 113-136).

14. See Evelyn Fox Keller's *A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock* (New York: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1983).

15. Cheshire Calhoun, "Subjectivity & Emotion" (*The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. XX, No. 3, Spring, 1989, p. 195).

16. Calhoun, p. 197.

17. See Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, *Explaining Emotions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions* (New York: Doubleday, 1977); Alison M. Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion as an Epistemic Resource for Feminists," in Alison M. Jaggar and Susan Bordo, eds., *Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being & Knowing* (Rutgers University Press, 1989); Cheshire Calhoun and Robert Solomon, eds., *What is an Emotion?* Oxford University Press, 1984); Mary Belinky, et al., *Women's Ways of Knowing* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

18. Roberta Kern, in her brief but useful book on *The forgotten Art of Learning: a book about textbooks and the emotional experience of learning from them* (Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co, Dubuque, Iowa, 1989), notes that boredom is often a protection from the pain that comes from feeling confused and uncertain.

19. I was surprised to find the topic of empathy included in many management texts.

20. Thomas J. Peters and Robert H.Waterman Jr., *In Search of Excellence* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982). *Note:* An interesting article illustrating the importance of empathy in the business world is "Clear Writing Means Clear Thinking.........", by Marvin Swift (*Harvard Business Review*, 51:1, Jan.-Feb.1973, pp.59-62).

21. Thomas Gordon, *P.E.T.: Parent Effectiveness Training* (New York: New American Library, 1970).

22. Carl Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961).

23. H. Baker & M. Baker, "Heinz Kohut's Self-Psychology: An Overview" (*American Journal of Psychiatry*, 144 :1, pp. 1-9).

24. Richard Paul, "Critical Thinking: Fundamental to Education for a Free Society" (*Educational Leadership*, Sept. 1984, p. 10).

25. Roger Fisher and Wm. Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

26. Ninian Smart, *Concept and Empathy* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 224.

27. Smart, p. 211.

28. Martin Hoffman, "Empathy, its development and prosocial implications" (*Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* ,Vol. 25, Lincoln: University of Nebraska. 1979, pp. 169-218).

29. Nel Noddings, *Caring* (Berkeley: University of California Press,1984).

30. Preston Covey, "New Media & Values Education" (*Proceedings of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Invitational Conference on "A critical Examination of Technology in Higher Education: Importing Real World Information into Education,"* Dartmouth College, 1988).

31. Kenneth Clark, "Empathy: A Neglected Topic in Psychological Research," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 187-190.

32. Clark. p. 190.

33. Clark, p. 190.

34. Richard Paul, "Teaching Critical Thinking in the 'Strong Sense': A Focus on Self-Deception, World Views, and Dialectical Analysis" (*Informal Logic*, 4:2, 1982, pp. 4-14).

Vivian M. Rosenberg is Associate Professor of Humanities at Drexel University

Analysis of Communication Patterns in Social Studies Discussions: Strategies to Promote Discourse

Judith B. MacDonald

Effective discussions in which students and teachers share and develop ideas are a scarce commodity in classrooms despite their widespread approval as a learning mode. From elementary school to graduate schools of law and business, the group discussion has been touted as an optimal setting for the exploration and articulation of ideas (Dewey, 1902; McQuaid, 1983; Jacobson, 1984). Despite the consensus about their value, discussions are not flourishing in classrooms, and teachers are talking as much as ever in settings in which they intend to evoke student talk and participation.

To study discussions which would consist of more than "recitations" (Hoetker & Ahlbrand, 1969), I sought an environment where such interchange might occur. The Bank Street School for Children, the laboratory school of the Bank Street College of Education in New York City, seemed to be a likely setting in which to observe and analyze the techniques of discussion-leading. The School takes a "developmental-interactive approach" to education (Biber, 1973), valuing the articulation of student ideas and promoting learning through children's interactions with each other and with adults.

Method

To learn more about how the interactive approach would work in a classroom setting, I observed for a period of sixteen weeks in a classroom of 26 sixth/seventh grade students and their teacher during their social studies discussion sessions. I was also present during the 16 week period for other aspects of the school day, but my focus was centered on the whole group discussions of this group of students. To learn about the teacher's goals and approach to discussions, I had five audiotaped one hour interviews with her. When I observed the class, their social studies curriculum focused on American colonial history. Twelve discussions from 20 to 40 minutes in duration were audiotaped, transcribed and analyzed using an adaptation of the Bellack system (Bellack et al.,1966).

The Bellack system has four types of moves: structuring (STR), soliciting (SOL), responding (RES), and reacting (REA). The system reveals who speaks and when they speak. For example, a structuring move begins a new topic (Teacher: What I'd like to talk about today is Gustavus Vasa), T/STR. A soliciting move is a question (Teacher: What would you say are the differences between *Amos' Fortune* and *Gustavus Vasa*?), T/SOL. A responding move is a reply to a question (Student: Well, Gustavus Vasa was not a king even though his father was a chieftan or elder), S/RES.

In my adaptation of the Bellack system, a reacting move is identified as a comment which follows a response. Thus, a reaction is an unsolicited comment and is of special interest because it indicates that a participant chose to speak after a response to a question was made. How the teacher and students use reacting moves tells us something about the communicative environment of the class and is reminiscent of Green and Wallet's (1981) conceptualization of teaching as a conversational process.

Analysis of the content of the discussions resulted in classifying the moves into three categories of meaning: substantive, functional, and procedural.

Substantive meanings

Substantive meanings refer to the cognitive and affective processes expressed in the discourse.

1. *Explain* (EXP): to give the function or purpose of an object; to give the reason for or cause of an event; to define a term.

Examples
T/SOL/EXP: What is meant by morality?
S/RES/EXP: What you think is right and wrong, what you think is fair.

2. *Speculate* (SPE): to conjecture, to consider a possibility or alternative; to hypothesize. Indicators of speculate are words such as "could", "might", and "maybe."

Examples
S/REA/SPE: You could get very dispirited.
S/REA/SPE: Well, maybe she thought Amanda Cruff was a witch.

3. *Infer* (INF): to draw a conclusion or make a deduction based on facts or indications.

Examples
T/SOL/INF: If you had read only the first chapter of *Amos' Fortune*, do you think you could infer something about the effects of slavery on Africa?
S/RES/INF: It must have made them very dependent on their leaders.

4. *Opine* (OPR): to state a point of view, a judgment; to express a preference, inclination or personal choice.

Examples
S/REA/OPR: I love those cats!
S/REA/OPR: I'd much rather be alive now than 200 years ago.

5. *Inform* (INFO): to state facts which relate to an event, circumstance, condition; to describe.

Examples
S/REA/INFO: Christmas is on Wednesday this year.
T/SOL/INFO: When did George Washington live?

Functional Meanings

Functional meanings are concerned with the course or direction of the discussions. They narrow or broaden the focus of the discourse. Moves in the functional categories are usually made by the teacher.

1. *Clarify* (CL): to elucidate, to narrow the focus of discourse.

Examples
T/SOL/CL: Are you adding something to what Tome said or are you agreeing with him?
S/RES/Cl: I was really agreeing with him.

2. *Amplify* (AM): to add to or extend prior discourse.

Examples
T/REA/AM: Extending Harriet's ideas, they (slaves) were considered property.
T/SOL/AM: Anyone want to give another definition of slavery or add to that one?

3. *Highlight* (HL): to call attention to, single out, make particular note of.

Examples
T/REA/HL: That's a very important fact about slavery.
T/RES/HL: Yes, that's right, the one thing that absolutely indicates "Puritan" is their black hat.

4. *Recapitulate* (RC): to summarize; to relate to and/or connect with prior information or discourse.

Examples
T/REA/RC: So, according to Steve's comment, we know Washington had slaves, and Cynthia explained why he waited to free his own slaves. He was not what one, today, would call a liberal.
T/REA/RC: So people who live in this country, were born in this country, brought up in this country, have a very strong association with the word "slavery", and we tend to think of it only as the American phenomenon that we know.

5. *Hold* to make a holding remark.

a. *Restate* (RE): to state again in a new form.

Examples
S/REA/INFO: She should wear a black dress.
T/REA/RS: Certainly a dark one, right.

b. *Repeat* (RP): to state again in the same form.

Examples
S/RES/OPR: They needed more help.
T/REA/RP: They needed more help.

c. *Minimal* (ML): comment which seems insignificant but which keeps the discussion going.

Examples
S/REA/INFO: They had no choice in the government. They couldn't give their opinion.
T/REA/ML: Uh-huh. Okay.

Procedural Meanings

Categories of proçedural meaning relate to classroom organization and management and are usually made by the teacher.

1. *Give Directions* (GD): to tell someone to do something, the nature of which is not related to matters of discipline or control.

Example
T/REA/GD: Take this book home and find examples of the Reverend's point of view.

2. *Manage* (MA): to discipline and/or control.

Example
T/RES/MA: Quiet, everyone!

3. *Turn-taking permission* (TP): the calling on of a student who raises his/her hand to speak after a comment, not a question.

Example
T/REA/RS/TP: He was afraid of its being an unpopular decision. Yes, Chris?

Discussions were also analyzed according to Bellack's concept of a "teaching cycle". A cycle begins with a question or structuring move and lasts until the next question is asked. Using the teaching cycle it is possible to note the extent to which students respond to a teacher's question.

The following excerpt from a protocol (MacDonald, 1982) illustrates the coding procedure and interpretation of the coded information.

Teacher (Move 1): If you had read only the first chapter of *Amos' Fortune*, do you think you could infer something about the effect of this on Africa? We all have ideas about how it affected our history, but do you have any idea of what effect it would have on Africa?

Student (Move 2): They didn't know what to do. They never planned for this. They panicked.

Student (Move 3): I wouldn't say they panicked.

Code: Move 1 T/SOL/INFER
Move 2 S/RES/INFER
Move 3 S/REA/OPINE

Interpretation

The teacher solicits an inference about the effect of the slave trade on the Africans by asking two questions which invite students to infer (Move #1). A student responds with an inference (Move #2). A second student reacts and gives an opinion to the first student's response (Move #3).

Results

In the discussions the students talked more or made more moves than the teacher (MacDonald, 1982). This finding differs from other studies in which the Bellack system was used (Fey, 1970; Lundgren, 1972; Neujahr, 1976) and from recent reports on classrooms (Goodlad, 1983; Sizer, 1984). As might be expected, the teacher asked most of the questions. However, both she and the students used the reacting move as their primary mode of expression. This phenomenon is of interest because of the characteristics of reacting moves: They are comments which are not conventionally necessary in discourse as are, for example, answers to questions. Thus they are unsolicited or voluntary. Teacher reactions are more commonplace than students' reactions. That is, it is less likely for students to comment on the remarks of a teacher or their peers than it is for a teacher to do so. Yet this unusual behavior occurred frequently, indicating that the students' participation was more self-initiated than teacher solicited.

That reacting moves were the favored move of both the teacher and the students indicates a similarity of participation in a setting where the teacher traditionally asks the questions and students answer them. Examination of the data revealed that 54 percent of the discourse was composed of five or more moves. A common cycle in the discussions was teacher question - student response - teacher reaction - student reaction - student reaction. Since the teacher was the principal initiator of the cycles, she was responsible for permitting them to continue to the extent that they did. These long cycles provide information about her teaching style and reveal that she allowed a flow of talk before making her next initiating move.

What can we infer from the abundance of reacting moves? The worst scenario is that the participants blithely shared banalities. Such is not the case because we know the main substantive categories used were "explain" and inform". Are reacting moves inherently better than questions? Clearly we need questions to initiate discourse. The categories "speculate" and "clarify" were developed to identify common patterns in this teacher's behavior: She frequently asked questions of speculation and when students responded, she probed for clarification. Teacher reactions of recapitulation, highlighting, restatement, and repetition seemed to have an invitational effect on student participation and suggest that we as teachers might generate greater student engagement by asking fewer questions and listening more carefully to students' comments.

Discussion

It would seem that efforts to analyze student-teacher discourse should include a consideration of non-questioning teacher behavior. Susskind (1969) has described the negative effects of rapid-fire teacher questions, and Rowe (1974) has reported on the positive effects of teacher "wait-time". Dillon's (1987) studies of teacher statements have provided alternatives to asking questions. The notion which the present study suggests, that fewer direct questions generate greater student participation, has a parallel in therapeutic settings. A therapist stimulates patient participation not by direct questioning but rather by commenting non- judgmentally on the patient's remarks (MacKinnon and Michels, 1971; Lennard and Bernstein, 1960). The "holding environment" described by Winnicott (1965) in which the analyst provides the patient with an "atmosphere of safety" (Modell, 1976) resembles the holding remark in this study in which the teacher subtly encourages the flow of thought and talk by saying very little substantively, as in the categories "restate", "repeat", and "minimal." If as teachers we want to promote discourse and develop students' abilities to participate in discussions, we may need to examine our discussion-leading behavior. The combination of asking questions and creating a low-risk atmosphere may encourage students to express, develop, and share ideas. The use of reacting moves may work toward developing this atmosphere of safety and is a strategy to be considered in the promotion of discourse.

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Judith B. MacDonald is an Associate Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Teaching at Montclair State College.

Assessing the Potential of Underachieving College Students: Feuerstein's Learning Potential Assessment Device

Judi Hirsch

Answers are largely based upon who is asking the questions, their purpose, and the context in which they are asked. When we look at the context of our social and cultural inquiry, we should note who we are, to whom we are speaking, and what we are speaking about. We should note the current composition of our student body and faculty, and we should note which groups in our society are underrepresented.

What accounts for the low enrollment of working class people and people of color at institutions of higher learning? How can we transform what Freire (1970) calls this "culture of silence"?

One of our roles as "critical thinkers" is to ask questions. For instance, we might want to think about why each of us is here. Did we come to share? to learn? to find others who share our vision? What is our vision? How have our different backgrounds affected us as learners? as teachers? What struggles were involved along the way?

As we look around and notice who is here, and who is *not* here, and as we focus on social and cultural inquiry, it is incumbent upon us to ask why there are so few people of color or of the working class included in this discourse on class and ethnicity.

If we are committed to an honest critique, we must make an effort to include members of all economic classes and cultural groups. As representatives of the group currently in power, we *must* do the work of broadening the discourse at the level of inquiry. We can decide to become responsible for everything we care about. If we want to change society, we must change the schools. We must decide to work for educational change.

As educators, we must constantly be working against isolation and building alliances. The main function of a leader is to assist others to empower themselves to become leaders, and we are in a unique position to do this.

Motivation is one of the biggest factors affecting student performance, which is, in turn, highly correlated with teacher expectation.

What can we expect? As the philosopher Martin Buber said, it is the duty of each teacher to see students as they can be, not as they are at the moment.

As with the women's movement, the support of our male allies made it easier for us; the civil rights movement included many whites as allies who believed that democracy meant that *all people have the right to vote.*

If we really believe that all people have the right to learn, if it is unacceptable that there are more black men in prison than in college (Cockburn, 1989), we can lead the struggle in the schools against racism and classism.

We may need to take some risks; we might even upset some people, but we need to challenge the passivity of learners and teachers. We need to surround ourselves with others who share our vision.

We must watch our words and our assumptions. We can either accept responsibility for repeated failure, or continue to blame the victim--the students, their parents, their class, their ethnic group.

Of course, we may not want to risk the chance that increased competition may cause some of us to lose our jobs. If the pie stays the same size, sharing it with more gives each a smaller piece. We also need to be aware that those who are not sharing the pie at all might be resentful. But if we maintain our insular lives, what is done to our psyches when we must consciously and continuously ignore large masses of people as we go about our increasingly more insular lives? Furthermore, the existence of a permanent underclass will ultimately erode the foundation of our democratic society.

As Ron Edmonds, (cited by Clayton, 1989), one of the founders of the Effective Schools movement said:

> We can, whenever and wherever we choose, successfully teach all children whose schooling is of interest to us. We already know more than we need, in order to do this. Whether we do it must finally depend on how we feel about the fact that we haven't [done so] so far.

What we need is a pedagogy of liberation (Freire, 1985). This requires a political decision. Once we decide, we need to commit ourselves fully to supporting people along the way. This is imperative if they are not to succumb to the internalized oppression of racism and classism.

The reason many people don't learn is because of internal and external oppression (Jackins, 1983). We can help them to overcome both. We can help people see themselves as they really are: fully intelligent and capable of learning.

We also need to share what we've done to make the schools a force for liberation (Hirsch, 1987). We need to share successes as well as failures. We need to learn from each other. I would like to share some of what I have learned from Reuven Feuerstein.

Feuerstein is interested in learning potential. Those of us who use his Learning Potential Assessment Device (LPAD) ask the learner to risk success. We set up the assessment situation so that it will reveal to both of us--the learner and the examiner--the most accurate picture of the student's potential for learning. At this point in time, the LPAD seems to be one of the most hopeful tools we have for broadening the discourse by bringing more people of color and working class people into institutions of higher education.

According to Feuerstein, people learn in two ways: they learn by being taught, and they learn from contact with the world around them. For education to be meaningful, certain factors must be present. The teacher, or mediator, must make the interaction important; the mediator must be interested in transcending the moment, so that the learner will be able to act appropriately and independently the next time a similar situation is encountered. For this reason, a mediated learning experience (MLE) must involve the learner in the learning process. The need for the requisite behavior must be explained, as well as its connection to the future.

"Please take out the vegetables and wash them," prepares someone to make a salad at some future date. "Please let me know how many eggs are left" leads to counting and then deciding whether or not to purchase more. These are empowering activities. Asking someone to "Sit down and eat," or "Answer the questions on page 115," doesn't prepare the recipient for independence.

The more MLE a person has had, the more one can benefit from encounters with the world. People who have experienced less mediation are less able to benefit from contact with the world around them. Part of this world includes school.

There are reasons why certain groups of people may experience less mediation than others. Much of this was discovered by Feuerstein when he was chief psychologist for Youth Aliyah, the agency responsible for finding placement for the adolescents who came to Israel when that country was first founded in the late 1940's. Part of his responsibility was assessment. As it turned out, many, many of the youth who were arriving from North Africa and war-torn Europe scored so poorly on standardized intelligence tests that they were thought to require custodial care (Feuerstein, 1979).

Feuerstein is quoted as saying that, "after losing 6,000,000 people in the war I couldn't bear to lose any more" (Cordes, 1984). He began to look for deficits in the test rather than in the children. This led him to focus on the *process* of learning rather than on its product. He surmised that those who were deprived of MLE would do much better if the assessment included some mediation. His theory proved correct.

Children from war-torn environments, like children raised in extreme poverty, are not living in situations which are predictable or stable enough to allow for planning and organization on the part of their parents. Often, as a result, these children are being deprived of their culture. We also see the lack of mediation among groups whose children are deliberately culturally deprived. This happens when people decide not to pass down their history, traditions, and customs to the younger generation, often out of a desire and hope for better treatment from the dominant culture.

Unfortunately, this decision usually backfires. Children who grow up bereft of their past are unable to plan for the future. They find it hard to be tolerant or appreciative of themselves--or others--because they lack an understanding of who they are. They are deficient in the very cognitive skills which would enable them to learn from the world around them which they wish to become a part of. Finally, being deprived of their own culture does not automatically make them part of or acceptable to the dominant group. Thus, they are left in a state of cognitive undress.

Fortunately, people can always benefit from remediation, and that is what Feuerstein decided to focus on. His LPAD is a means by which to assess the current cognitive functioning of an individual, note how much mediation is necessary for intellectual growth, and then recommend a plan for remediation. It's that simple.

Perhaps a case study would be most helpful at this point (Hirsch, 1984). S. was brought to my attention by his parents when he was sixteen years old and in the ninth grade. They were concerned because he did not seem to be making any progress in school. His teachers all said that, while not a behavior problem, S. was not benefitting from his classes.

S. had spent most of his life in Mexico, and had not attended much school. He spent two years at our junior high, was in one bilingual class--math--and had two ESL (English as a Second Language) classes. Although fluent in Spanish, he was illiterate in both Spanish and English. A recent physical examination revealed that he was in excellent physical condition.

The school psychologist attempted to assess S.'s intellectual functioning using standardized tests, but was unable to do so; S. did not appear to know enough for there to be any meaning attached to his score. As the Resource Specialist, I was also involved in the assessment. I asked S. to draw a person, and was given this (Figure 1):

It appeared like the drawing of a six year old. Then I tried to see if S. knew his colors--a task usually asked of children in the primary grades. The following chart (Figure 2) indicated the order in which S. named the colors; the letters refer to his language of response, English or Spanish.



FIG. 1



FIG. 2

Certain behaviors were noted: S. seemed to name the colors in random order; his choice seemed rather arbitrary. At this point I suggested using the LPAD, since he appeared to be lacking in the rudimentary skills associated with schooling, such as proceeding from left to right and top to bottom on a page. He was assessed in Spanish over a two-week period with the following results.

It should be noted that during a dynamic assessment, the examiner is constantly making tentative hypotheses about the learner's cognitive functioning which might account for his current behavior. These hypotheses are confirmed only when the same patterns are repeated across different modalities and on various tasks.

Part of the investigation of the learner's thinking skills involves an attempt to locate his strengths and weaknesses in a particular phase of the mental act: input (information gathering), elaboration (using available data and cues), and output (communication of insights, answers, and solutions). Additionally, the examiner notes how much investment of effort and time is required for the subject to make use of the assistance offered. This information will be very important in determining how accessible this person is to efforts at re-mediation.

Although five different instruments were used in this assessment, I will only discuss one: the Complex Figure Drawing. I usually begin with this particular item for several reasons: it doesn't require much time; the results are usually quite powerful for both the learner and any observers who might be present; it is the most empowering of all the sub-tests, since it requires more action on the part of the student than any other; it is easily understood by observers.

As with all of the instruments, the pattern is the same. A baseline is established showing current cognitive functioning, Then the examiner intervenes and mediates. The amount of mediation needed to move the student forward is noted, as is the time required to this effort. Another sample of behavior is taken, which will hopefully show the benefits of intervention. We can then extrapolate and see how responsive this person would be to re-mediation.

Figure 3 shows the Complex Figure Drawing. The student is asked to reproduce this while the examiner is noting the way in which this is accomplished. Figure 4 is S.'s Copy I. After a few moments, he is asked to draw the figure from memory. The results are shown in Figure 5.



FIG. 3



FIG. 4



FIG. 5

Aside from noticing the 90° rotation, which indicates problems with spatial orientation, people unfamiliar with the purposes of the LPAD might erroneously conclude that the reason for S.'s lack of progress in school was attributable to his very poor "short term memory."

The importance of the difference between the LPAD and standardized, psychometric measures is very clear. We are not interested in what S. can do without intervention, so rather than use this as an example of what S. can do, we use it as a baseline, and see how much better he can do with help.

The next step is for the examiner to try to help the student improve upon his copy and memory drawings by discussing those deficient cognitive functions noted while he was working without mediation. In Copy I the examiner noted that S. began the drawing at the left, with the "antenna" and just proceeded along until the drawing was completed. The "gestalt" was ignored. It was surmised that this approach accounted for the results seen in Memory I.

After much discussion about what was the most important part of the CFD, the analogy of building a house seemed to be the most helpful. S. understood that one can't put on the windows until there's a foundation and frame, and so, in this learning phase (Figure 6), he saw the necessity of drawing the large rectangle first, then the two diagonals, etc., and finally, the less important parts, such as the "antennas." He began to see the need to organize his thinking before beginning to draw. The next two steps are a repetition of the first two: Copy II and Memory II (Figures 7 and 8).



FIG. 6



FIG. 7



FIG. 8

While it is true that his second memory shows a rotation, it is not only far superior to his first memory, but it is also much better than his first copy! Note: more time could have been spent on mediating all of the "errors" so that these last two drawings would have been even better, but that is not the point of the assessment. We are interested in noticing how much time and effort is required to move this student forward, and how much he can be moved. It is rather obvious that this student is very capable of learning.

Four other assessment tools were used in order to obtain a clear picture of S.'s cognitive functioning. The results showed the following deficient cognitive functions:

At the input phase
blurred and sweeping perception
unplanned, unsystematic exploratory behavior
impaired verbal tools

impaired spatial orientation
impaired need for precision and accuracy in gathering data
difficulty in considering two or more sources of information at once

At the elaboration phase:
impaired planning behavior
episodic grasp of reality
narrowness of mental field
impaired need for pursuing logical evidence
lack of strategies for hypothesis testing

At the output level
deficiencies in visual transport
egocentric communication modalities
impaired verbal tools
impaired need for precision and accuracy in communicating responses
impulsive and unplanned behavior

The result of this assessment indicate that S. is very capable of learning. He is also highly motivated and very interested in what he was doing. He was able to tolerate a lot of frustration when involved in a mediated learning experience. This strong desire to learn, coupled with parental concern and support, lead to a very optimistic prognosis.

Recommendations for intervention included remediating the following deficient cognitive functions:

blurred and sweeping perception
precision and accuracy in data gathering
using all sources of information
improved spatial orientation
planning behavior
improving verbal tools
improvement of visual transport
precise and accurate communication
pursuing logical evidence and hypothesis testing
contradicting an episodic grasp of reality

This case study points out Feuerstein's concern about American schools. He says that they "must shift from static measures of ability, which encourage giving up on some children, to dynamic assessment, which point the way to sharpening. . . children's mental skills" (Cordes, ibid).

His goal is to help children increase their ability to benefit from encounters with all kinds of stimuli and experiences. "Schools must . . . create an atmosphere conducive to change" (Cordes, ibid). Teachers must change their beliefs about children.

We must ask ourselves: are we part of the problem or part of the solution? What is your next step in making educational change?

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Judi Hirsch teaches Educational Psychology at California State University, Hayward.

Critical Thinking and the Teaching of the Social Sciences

The papers in this section discuss issues that arise when critical thinking is implemented within the context of instruction in the Social Sciences.

Jack Zevin, in *"Textbooks as Vehicles for Promoting or Inhibiting Critical Thinking in the Classroom,"* presents an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of textbooks. He expresses concern about its dominance in classrooms in which teachers rely heavily on its use as a "nearly closed system of assignments, readings, discussion questions, and evaluation. "The quandaries, dilemmas and paradoxes" of history are omitted in favor of efficiency." Use of a single textbook, particularly in history, "places students at a serious disadvantage because their views are shaped by materials that is predigested and summarized. It is often very difficult to decide how conclusions were reached either in terms of reasoning or by way of evidence..."

Zevin reminds us that textbooks themselves are open to criticism and revision, and recommends the application of critical thinking to textbooks by both teachers and students. He recommends such techniques as "adoption of different viewpoints, comparisons of multiple sources, side-by-side reading of two or more texts, and the examination of language and concept use by the authors" of textbooks, as well as the use of fine arts and literature in social studies classrooms. Student involvement in simulations and experimentation. and in such exercises as separating theory from evidence, drawing standards from conclusions, and content analysis of text material for such purposes as the identification of the value judgments of the author through attention to the emotional content of the language used and of the space devoted to various topics.

George Bernstein's critical content analysis, *"American Social Studies Texts View Late Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union,"* is an example of one of the approaches recommended by Jack Zevin. Bernstein, like Zevin, is concerned that the "information and ideas presented in such texts help shape students' attitudes and reinforce teachers' perceptions...fighting on the forefront of simplification," making broad generalizations without presenting the necessary supporting evidence, and discouraging student involvement and dialogue. He, too, notes that the information and ideas presented in textbooks reflect the political ideologies and institutions in power. In this preliminary report on a more extensive study, he presents a review of the sections dealing with Russia and the Soviet Union in four high school textbooks, studying the extent to which each textbook met its own goals as stated in its preface, the extent to which its coverage extended beyond the activities of the central government to the everyday lives of the ordinary person, to recent events, and to the arts, as well as to which explanations were afforded, especially for social changes. Bernstein recommends, too, the transcending of elementary information, attention to major global issues such as pollution, following through on essential ideas, and providing a setting in which points of views are open to self-examination and challenge by others.

With concerns similar to those of Zevin and Bernstein, Richard Mumford, in *"Teaching History Data and Concepts through Analytical and Reflective Thinking Skills,"* describes an approach to the teaching of history through the analysis of issues, theses, dilemmas, or questions which"call for intensive scrutiny of evidence and arguments and for which ample evidence to reach definitive conclusions is usually not available...The psychological impact of a dilemma motivates thought better than logical or chronological arrangements of information around a topic." Noting that rote memory does not imply understanding, Mumford's skills-based history text involves students in general thinking skills exercises, such as "defining clearly the problem or issue," and "assessing the strength of evidence and arguments." Mumford focuses, in addition, on specific skills needed by students of history; topic selection and analysis of source materials are among these. "Students learn content but in a context of critical thinking and judgment and develops skills of argument and debate while defending and supplying evidence to support choices." Student assignments, including the preparation of family histories, surveys of library sources, and exercises in the philosophy of history and historical causation encourage students to "actually 'do' history."

Pawel Boski, in *"World Knowledge and Critical Thinking on Political Matters: College Students' State of Mind,"* defines critical thinking as the "ability to form alternative models of...reality." He reports a social psychological study relating background world knowledge to critical thinking, as measured by two scales designed to assess "ideological beliefs and attitudes to American socio-political dilemmas." Boski found that the more knowledgeable students were, the more critical they were about American society; that is, they were more able to conceive of alternatives to the current American socio-political system and thus more critical of them.

Nancy Tumposky relates an experience in organizing information for a presentation as a guest speaker, in *"Teaching American Students About China."* Rather than assuming that she know what information would be of most value to students and lecturing about her topic based on her own assumptions, she started by eliciting students' background knowledge and information that they would like to have. Building on each others' comments, the students shared their knowledge and questions. This technique was effective in preparing them for the lecture material, which incorporated students' interests.

In *"Social Inquiry and the Civil Rights Movement,"* Stephen Lilley suggests the involvement of students in the production of social-scientific knowledge in order to deepen their understanding of the subject as well as to develop their abilities to think critically. Using the Civil Rights Movement as an example of a social science topic for which this approach is recommended, he suggests that students engage in interviews with participants, reviews of primary records such as diaries and correspondence, in contrast to presentations of "refined" secondary analyses to students by professors. Through this method, students develop interests, historical and human sensitivities, and breadth of understanding, going beyond the popular characterization of the movement, and develop the ability to consider civil rights issues in other contexts, such as South Africa. Lilley presents a series of examples of suggested tasks for students to complete as they analyze source materials.

Janet S. Pollak, in her paper "Cultural Relativism and Critical Thinking: The Nacirema Study Themselves,"describes a writing intensive course in Anthropology which utilizes a classic from Anthropology, Horace Miner's classic essay, "Body Ritual Among the Nacirema," to introduce college students to the search for "the strange in the familiar." Her goal is to explore the " role of critical thinking in the development of cultural relativism among undergraduates who now face "Non-Western" course requirements in their general education programs."

Students are asked to select one custom or ritual from their own culture and analyze it. She sees this a strengthening the " capacity to step back and observe with a rational, dispassionate, and critical eye." This is a fundamental need if students are to be able to critically appraise the " beliefs, practices, norms, and values that are programmed by culture into students."

In the final paper in this section, *The American Social System,* Lazaros Michailidis offers an account of social science in which he claims that students learn "mainly isolated pieces of the American Social System without having someone to help them put the pieces together."

The paper is an attempt to remedy this by offering an analysis of "three related systems: Political, Economic, and Religious/Moral." His analysis, which concludes that "these three systems are organized and interwoven in such a way as to minimize the conflict between private and public interest and maximize the difficulty for an individual or even a group of individuals to control the American Society or any of its systems," is a model for the sort of integration that characterizes critical thinking within a discipline.

Textbooks as Vehicles for Promoting or Inhibiting Critical Thinking in the Classroom

Jack Zevin

> ". . . In the European Schools the teacher was at the center of the learning process; he lectured, questioned the pupils, and 'buil(t) up new knowledge in class.' In contrast, in the American classroom, 'clearly . . . the master is the textbook.' The teacher does not really teach but 'acts rather as chairman of a meeting, the object of which is to ascertain whether the students have studied for themselves in a textbook.'" (Burstall, 1909, pp. 156-58; quoted in Hoetker & Ahlbrand, 1969, p. 150.)

Overview

Textbooks are in widespread use throughout the educational system at all levels. Often a textbook is more than a bound volume of narratives, but includes a complete program for the subject with tests, teacher's guide and supplemental readings. Teachers frequently find themselves in a situation where the text defines both the curriculum and the teaching plan. Many states and communities require that a text be utilized in the social studies classroom, frequently a particular text is prescribed for all. Particularly in social studies, heavy reliance on a single textbook for civics, United States or world history, places students at a serious disadvantage because their views are shaped by material that is predigested and summarized. It is often very difficult to decide how conclusions were reached either in terms of reasoning or by way of evidence. Textbooks inhibit student reasoning by either omitting the data and references that support a conclusion or by omitting one or more parts of the reasoning chain; or both. In addition, texts may consciously or unconsciously incorporate biases and distortions into the material students learn, yet present themselves as objective and fair. Emotionality is carefully avoided except where political and culture heroes and heroines are extolled, in short, where there is a desire to promote patriotic fervor and build commitment to social causes.

For example, a good deal of criticism has been directed at texts for what they have included or left out on race, gender, and ethnicity. Some texts attempt to be affect and "problem-free" rather than deal with issues of a disturbing or unpopular nature, or with concepts and definitions that demand critical thinking skills. Student-initiated questions and inferencing are virtually precluded by textbooks which are written in language that while seemingly neutral, is seductive in promoting an image or idea based on interpretation rather than fair assessment of the facts.

While textbooks are a great classroom convenience, those in the social studies close off possibilities for philosophical inquiry more often than they promote it, and dull curiosity as well. Nevertheless, critical thinking can be applied to texts through adoption of different viewpoints, comparisons of multiple sources, side-by-side reading of two or more texts, and the examination of language and concept use by the authors. The very disadvantages and distortions of textbooks can be converted into an exciting source of philosophical reasoning and in-depth analysis of logic and evidence.

A. Pervasiveness of Texts in the Social Studies

1. Widespread Use

Studies have proven time and again that social studies teachers generally rely upon the textbooks as the mainstay of their instruction.[1] Virtually no classroom escapes without a required text.[2] This is true for almost every course taught, from those which are most common such as World or American studies, to less frequent offerings such as problems of democracy or ethnic studies.[3] As soon as a new course is required by official state mandate or an old one is revised, publishers are ready to supply the market with one or more textbooks on the subject, varying in scope from review books to elegant, beautifully illustrated narratives.

The social studies are not alone in relying upon textbooks, other fields do as well, but perhaps not in as dependent a fashion. In many English programs, for example, a constructive textbook may be assigned but many teachers often develop their own reading lists of novels, poems, plays, and short stories, supplementing these with a text. Science courses depend more heavily than English programs upon textbooks but have the advantage, if taken, of built - in laboratory exercises and hands-on experiments that bring theoretical concepts to life in the classroom.

Most social studies teachers, unfortunately, tend not to view the classroom as a place to design and conduct experiments, although this is certainly both possible and potentially exciting. Nor do social studies teachers consistently draw upon 'Great Books' or documentary collections as an important source of evidence for classroom discussions. Indeed, even where texts are utilized, there is usually a single book available to an entire class, all of whom must rely solely upon this secondary source for their information without benefit of any comparative examples of outside verification.

Across the nation, people often remember their social studies teacher assigning readings from a textbook followed by answers to end of chapter questions. The reading-and-end-of-chapter-questions routine is common throughout social studies education, further indicating widespread reliance upon textbooks for the basic substance of the programs. Source books, simulations, the fine arts, literature, roleplaying, and other materials and group dynamics techniques are usually regarded as peripheral to the centerpiece - the textbook![4]

Nevertheless, as much as textbooks are deplored by some teachers, parents, and experts, they are a fact of life that is accepted by the majority of teachers and supported by a vast array of state requirements, standardized tests, city, county, or state mandated courses, and a powerful publishing lobby. This is not to say that it is anyone's 'fault' that social studies teachers depend so heavily upon textbooks, but that it is an entrenched feature of a mutually supportive system. Teachers, parents, and state agencies like to have textbooks in every classroom and publishers generally aim to please this large market.

2. *Course Dependence*

The widespread use of textbooks is not the only or perhaps the major problem facing the social studies. Rather, it is the way the textbooks are often utilized in "teacher-centered classrooms" that is far more worrisome than their prevalence in classrooms.[5] As noted before, many teachers tend to follow the textbooks as their main source of ideas and material, without much enrichment of supplementation from other sources.

In addition, the textbook is used as part of a nearly closed system of assignments, reading, discussion, questions, and evaluation that provides great security but very little imagination. While texts vary widely in format and quality, most share a commitment to providing teachers and students with the factual background deemed necessary by law, tradition, and scholarship. Hence, relatively little attention is given to reasoning, argument, controversy, or group activities unless these are built into the text, which research surveys prove is usually not the case. The exercises 'at the end of the chapter' tend to emphasize students' ability to recall information or at best define terms and comprehend the basic outline of events. While students need to know their 'facts,' a steady diet of reading-recitation-and-recall can be dull and boring, reducing students' opportunities to practice reasoning and creating negative attitudes toward the subject as a whole.

Part of the dependence on textbooks arises out of teachers' needs for quick, easy, readily available materials that can serve multiple uses. Homework assignments in most classrooms are geared specifically to the textbook in use, and test items are drawn from each chapter or in some cases are provided by the publisher as part of a kit for the teacher. Many textbooks offer you a manual for use, a test handbook, supplemental activities, and the student narrative itself, virtually an integrated system requiring little of no outside planning or research on the part of the instructor. Such a system also insures, at least theoretically, uniform course outcomes, and uniform performance on departmental or standardized tests if these are required.

Homework and testing are supported by most teachers and parents as positively related to learning and to building students' character, and are periodically revised in the light of new events and theories. Textbook authors do try to keep up with significant changes but encounter many difficult questions on the way (e.g., how can a problem be judged significant? Which facts and ideas should be included and which excluded? where differences in viewpoint are extremely far apart, how can this be communicated to students? How can we be certain that an account is 'balanced'?) Because of the need for condensation in a textbook, as in any summary, the way in which the authors's conclusions were developed and defended is largely lost. Generally room exists to report only major conclusions and facts but often without indicating why these are important or upon which bases of evidence or logic these are supported. In short, students may memorize the 'facts' and be able to repeat the pre-digested conclusions in a textbook but frequently have no ideas why certain names and dates are important or why decisions were made. The connective tissues, the reasoning, the process of research are often missing experiences for students who use textbooks as their main source of knowledge.

While textbooks reduce complex events and theories to manageable proportions, they also eliminate much of the opportunity for students to think for themselves; to see how conclusions were arrived at; and to make judgments about history. Consequently, in this learning role, students are passive for the most part in the social studies classroom.

B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Textbooks

Whatever problem is created by reliance on textbooks in the social studies, they are likely to remain an integral part of the educational system. There are clearly advantages for texts to be so much a part of classroom life, and there are also dangers and disadvantages. Arguments for and against reliance on textbooks will be reviewed and summarized. Think about where you stand on the text book issue as you read the sections that follow:

1. Advantages

Textbooks solve a basic problem in the social studies (i.e., that there is far too much to know about the world in which we live and too little time to 'learn' it). It would be far, far better for each student to consider each important event and person in detail, basing an informed judgment upon primary sources, secondary narratives, and well-written scholarly research. But, obviously, there is insufficient time for a thorough inquiry into even the highlights of history and the social sciences. Thus, the textbook was born as a device that summarizes large quantities of factual material in much the same way that *The Reader's Digest* condenses literature, and with some of the same problems. Even with textbooks, teachers and students often feel that they have far too much to learn and can barely manage to store the knowledge that is expected of them. Thus, the textbook serves as a compendium of knowledge for subject matter that would otherwise be impossible to learn and which is unwieldy to manage.

Furthermore, textbooks are efficient because they usually offer pre-digested conclusions based on the author's study and research of complex topics. It would require enormous inputs of effort by the students to develop the same conclusion that is readily supplied by the author. Statistics, dates, names, the causes and consequences of events, conflicting interpretations, bibliographic references: all are integrated into a single volume in which the authors and publishers summarize facts and key conclusions in a relatively easy, assimilable, readable format. Students may approach a text more easily than many original sources which present reading problems or many scholarly studies which present statistical and comprehension problems. The history in texts is usually organized into succinct accounts offered in a vocabulary geared to the average reading ability of a specified grade level in junior or senior high school.

In addition, textbooks serve to integrate the functions of teacher and student through an established, orderly, and well defined curriculum. The textbook, after all, can be appealed to as a resource at any time, both sides know its contents, and expectations for accomplishment are exact (i.e., so many pages of reading and homework, so many questions at the end of the chapter, and so many items on the final examination). Students are able to predict with a relatively small margin of error where the course is going and what the teacher is likely to ask for homework and on examinations. Teachers and students accept the textbook as reliable and valid in the sense that it represents a compendium of knowledge that has been checked for accuracy by the authors who wrote it and by the publisher's advisors - a function that is usually performed before a book is marketed to the schools.

Finally, textbooks tend to be 'safe': theoretically safe, and pedagogically safe! They are theoretically safe because, by the very process of cross-examining conflict viewpoints in history and competing social sciences theories, textbooks, at their best, present carefully balanced interpretations based on evidence that has stood the tests of time and scholarship. Confusion and controversy are largely eliminated and at least suppressed in favor of knowledge that has been judged important and well-grounded; knowledge that is worth knowing and can be reviewed for any test in almost any school with good results because it represents a common core of accepted details and ideas.[6]

Pedagogically, textbooks are relatively safe because most of the contents are didactic, presenting almost everything as 'factual,' which requires a lecture-recitation teaching technique where the goals are clear and the questions are crisp, with answers that are either right or wrong. Thus, textbooks have a number of advantages that serve them well; manageability, summary power, comprehensibility, readability, and safety. Texts also serve as bridges on many subjects between the teachers and the students, including homework, method, content, and criteria for assessment. Textbooks help to create a reasonably manageable and predictable world for the social studies classroom out of one that can be and probably is actually very confusing, frustrating, and overwhelming in scope and complexity.

2. Disadvantages

Unfortunately, the very qualities that give value to textbooks also provide a number of problems. Consider the value of a textbook as a compendium or storehouse of knowledge for an enormous field like world history or American studies. Tremendous amounts of data, literature, and theory are available for either world or American studies, and this knowledge is increasing at an exponential rate every day, hour, and year. There is always more to know, it seems, even about a 'dead' past. Students, too, often support the system because this textbook-driven system, as they see it, sets up goals, defines knowledge, and measures results based on clear, specific criteria and follows a precise calendar that all can follow and feel comfortable with as educational resources.

Thus, we have a portrait of a teaching system supported by all but a minority of those involved, including significant segments of teachers, parents, students, and administrators. It is a system that is self-contained and efficient, making for easy grading of student work, quick student recognition of success or failure (based usually on the quantity of knowledge acquired), and parental comprehension of tasks and standards with which they can judge the success or failure of their offspring. Students are spared the great difficulty of dealing with complicated events and people, of interpreting raw data on their own, and of examining the accuracy of witnesses and reporters. Unfortunately, these students end up with a view of the social sciences and history that is largely unreal. Students come 'to know' a carefully scrubbed, neatly packaged, tightly condensed view of social studies topics that bear little relationship to the often convoluted, ambiguous, and antagonistic situations that exist beyond the textbook in which even facts cannot be agreed upon and issues are endlessly debated without conclusions.

It is the quandaries, dilemmas, and paradoxes that are left out of textbooks in favor of efficiency; product substitutes for the whole process of scientific inquiry.

Add to this concentration of summarized information the relatively easy reading level of many textbooks and you have a narrative that may be so bland, so agreeable, and so monotonous in style that students cannot keep awake reading it. Critics point out that 'easy' is not always 'good' nor is manageability necessarily the same as effectiveness. Perhaps the most difficult problem posed by texts is that they feed into a teaching-learning system that prizes information above all and rewards recall rather than thought of a higher order. By obscuring the way conclusions were developed, by condensing vast subjects into brief capsules, by providing largely didactic questions, and by offering little or no involvement in the investigative process, textbooks discourage the growth of student reasoning and thinking skills, and they offer an oversimplified vision of the historical record and its meaning. By its very nature as a secondary source, and a summary of information at that, the social studies textbook tends to gloss over differences in interpretation and issues, losing the flavor of the past that would come from the study of first-hand and/or conflicting evidence.

Finally, however much the authors of textbooks seek to write a finely tuned, fair, and well-balanced approach to the standard social studies topics, they invariably permit their own biases and interpretations to slip through, or they omit materials deemed objectionable by some groups but very desirable by other groups. The influence of political, social and economic conditions seems inescapable.[7] A good deal of the controversy about textbooks stems from criticisms of the amount and quality of the attention given to women and minorities, to different racial and ethnic groups, and to the positions of particular religious or political interests. Whether the textbook developers do or do not bow to such pressures, rightly or wrongly, the text itself will suffer errors of omission or commission, or both.

Thus, textbooks, particularly in world history and American studies, but in other fields as well, may be viewed as suffering from a variety of inherent defects. Among these are a tendency to obscure or suppress controversial or emotionally sensitive issues; to homogenize people and time periods in an effort to create a brief, but fair treatment; to reduce complex events to simple explanations; to ever-simplify historical problems and theories or to omit these entirely; and to support and encourage an almost wholly didactic set of goals in which 'correct' information becomes the major object of study to the exclusion of reflective thinking and affective concerns.

3. Over-all Evaluation

While the debate about the quality of textbooks continues, teachers are likely to continue to rely upon them as a major teaching tool. To be fair, it must be pointed out that, given the lifestyle and demands placed on a typical secondary school teacher, few will have the time, let alone inclination, to replace the textbook with a system more attuned to reflective or affective goals than to didactic ones.[8] Indeed, the entire educational system from kindergarten through graduate school uses textbooks, nearly all of which suffer from the same disadvantages and advantages that we have discussed. Textbooks serve as a vital resource and point of reference for both students and teachers, incorporating or trying to incorporate (like this one) a fair-minded review of what is known in a field of study. Bias, distortion, omission and style are constant and unsolvable problems in any books that purports to 'cover' any subject in its entirety. Full coverage in a textbook is an impossibility and must be accepted as such. A saner view of the material is as a condensation of selected topics based on an assessment of their relative importance to the total amount of knowledge available. As society changes, people may alter their view of what is important and the curriculum will also shift to new emphases and/or entirely new topics and interpretations.[9] In social studies, just like all other fields, the curriculum does change, often dramatically, in concert with the values prevalent at the time. Therefore, the problem is not to do away with the texts, but to use them intelligently and to develop criteria that distinguish between those which are better and those which are worse given a particular set of goals. Among the major problems to be solved are the creation and selection of more thought-provoking content and questions for texts, and the incorporation of more activities that involve students actively in the learning process, such as role-play, simulation, mock trials, group projects, writing a newspaper of the time and the like.

In addition, teachers should think about how they use textbooks. A 'read and answer the questions-at-the-end-of the chapter' approach is probably the most monotonous and mind-dulling method, especially if it is a daily classroom feature. Students are frequently confused about the aims and the meaning of the narratives in the texts and about the questions and homework assignments that accompany them, (Cooper, 1986, Kerzie, 1966), while teachers frequently assume that the material speaks for itself, and that the text contains an absolutely accurate, truthful rendition of the subject. One solution to the problem of student confusion and boredom is to increase the variety and intensity of involvement in the reading process (i.e., approach the book as material suitable for individual, committee, or group discussion rather than simple recitation, and spend much more time probing and criticizing controversial, vague, or illogical passages). In short, do more work with less material. A solution to the problem of monotony and homogenization in textbooks is to have students critically analyze rather than memorize the material for recall on a test. Interest is heightened when texts are viewed as subject to error, pressures, bias, and distortion rather than as sources of completely verified history and social science. Keep in mind that, no matter how objective an author tries to be in the social sciences and history, ultimately values, preferences, and viewpoints are expressed.[10] Each and every textbook is based on a conception of human action that controls the selections and presentation of content, and there are always at least a few competing conceptions capable of producing different versions of the same event. While these competing theories may cause students who want to know the 'absolute truth' frustration and worry, a teacher who introduces a variety of viewpoints also creates a much more exciting classroom atmosphere, one far more conducive to student participation and debate than the classroom with a fixed agenda and set answers. The simple device of using *two or more* textbooks at the same time in a course (e.g., US history) to compare and contrast accounts on the same topics, will change the whole goal structure and complexion of a social studies program. Adding a sample of primary readings will also bolster reflective goals, and a variety of group activities will enhance affective aims and concerns.

C. Using Textbooks to Meet Different Goals

Textbooks, despite much of the criticism directed at them, can be used for many purposes and in many ways that will alter their impact on student learning. Generally speaking, textbooks are viewed by many teachers as supportive of knowledge goals. Students can find out the facts they need from a text, but are asked to do little more with the material. However, narrative textbooks can also enhance reasoning and critical thinking, especially if multiple texts are available on the same subject and if one or more of these volumes includes primary sources and activities to supplement the basic reading material. Furthermore, textbooks, if subjected to critical analysis, can be the basis for discussions of values, philosophies, and viewpoints on how these ideas affect our thinking about the world - past, present, and future.

1. Using texts to increase knowledge

Textbooks are probably best suited to increasing the quantity of student knowledge. To the extent that factual material has been subjected to verification, the contents of a textbook will provide teachers and students with a solid introduction to social studies subjects (e.g. World Studies, US History, Civics, Economics, Psychology, or Sociology). If well designed, the textbook can serve as a source of information, a dictionary of terms, and a reference all rolled into one. Given the scope of information and ideas provided, the text provides a basis for planning the course calendar, assigning homework, and developing tests. However, for most students, the knowledge in the textbooks is seen as authoritative and, frequently, complete. Whatever is in a textbook on a subject is the source of student knowledge and the basis of examination, with outside references omitted or avoided. Thus any mistakes or distortions in the knowledge presented must be accepted at face value because there are few methods for testing its validity except for internal criteria.

Where knowledge is the major goal, and the contents of a textbook are viewed as factually correct, the teacher and students still need to think about questions of accuracy and reasonability (e.g., is the presentation consistent and does it meet normal standards of logic?). When elements of a formal argument or syllogism[11] are left out in a text's description when conclusions are stated without premises, or assumptions made that appear unwarranted, then the teacher has a perfect opportunity for a class discussion that will clear up confusions and misunderstandings that may have arisen.

Teachers can help students improve their recall and grasp of factual material in texts by using a few simple techniques:

1. Read small portions aloud and ask students to identify key dates, names and places.
2. Assign only a few pages of reading at a time, directing students to list the five most important terms or definitions or concepts, either in class or at home.
3. Provide a grid or framework of periods, themes, or issues as a bookkeeping device *under which* students will group facts rather than accumulating information in the form of lists.
4. Assign certain events or famous people or places to one or two students who will 'own' this portion of the text and be responsible for that knowledge, standing ready to supply this data to classmates for review and discussion purposes.

2. Using textbooks to promote critical thinking

Textbooks are very adaptable to meet critical thinking goals if they are viewed as open to question. The inevitable problems of summarizing vast quantities of information lead to omissions of what many people see as vital information, or to biased and distorted presentations of controversial events and personalities. Furthermore, textbooks do not usually identify the assumptions, interpretations, and theories they have absorbed from the community, other accounts, or from scholarly research. Whether the theories adapted are proven largely true or are highly questionable, in either case they are useful as springboards for discussion aimed at pointing out authors' views or for comparing the author's presentation of the 'facts' with their basis in evidence (i.e. is the theory adequately supported by case studies, statistics, or examples in the text and if not, then why should it be accepted?).

The questions students are expected to answer in a text for homework or recitation can themselves be questioned, and this is particularly productive if the questions are 'leading' the students to a particular answer that contains biases for or against a particular theory. Separating fact from opinion, and theory from evidence, is a fun-filled way of building student thinking skills and affording young people the opportunity to discover how chains of evidence lead to sets of conclusions. For a more ambitious program, the teacher can even encourage students to develop their own standards for a good conclusion, testing these criteria against a sample of conclusions from one or more textbooks.

If two or more textbooks are utilized on a regular basis in a social studies classroom, then the teacher has a ready made structure for comparing and contrasting different versions of the same people and events. Opportunities abound in the use of multiple texts for identifying biases, analyzing the logical qualities of a narrative, defining cause and effect factors, and deciding if the same causes are assigned to the same effects in the competing versions. In addition, the two or more narratives used may contain subtle distinctions that promote student's language skills through decoding and encoding meanings.

For many events, such as the Vietnam War or the Algerian Revolution, textual passages from two or three books lined up side-by-side are very likely to raise both factual problems and issues of interpretations, leading to the identification of different ideologies or philosophies that may infuse the entire account. The teacher can use multiple passages as the basis for a historiography lesson about how we interpret events (i.e., 1. what sources of data are reliable and how these may be influenced by cultural perspectives and values; and 2. what are the dangers of jumping to conclusions when a story may be incomplete, politically motivated, or based on untrustworthy eyewitnesses). From analysis and discussion, students could be encouraged to identify their own principles for evaluating evidence, to rate eyewitness accounts, to cross-examine conflicting sources, and to test the logic of proposed theories and explanations.

A multi-text approach could revitalize interest in otherwise dull, monotonous material and build reflective skills through though-provoking questions, assignments, and examinations. Whether a single text or multiple texts are used, narrative accounts can be dealt with in a number of ways to increase interest and build a better conceptual framework for students. For example:

1. Students can be subdivided into small groups, each of which is responsible for only a portion of a unit or chapter, reporting conclusions to the whole class after thorough reading and deliberation.

2. Each student may be assigned only a few, perhaps just one, of the many questions that usually follow a chapter or unit, with the student answering that question for the class as a whole.

3. Students may be given a role to play (based on previous cases) and asked to rewrite the text from a new point of view (e.g. minority, ethnic, female, foreign, or outside, or as a news or TV reporter).

4. Students may be given a 'process' task to perform on a given question or reading such as testing the material for internal consistency or checking to see if assertions are backed up with facts and/or reasons.

5. Students may be regularly offered one or more sources outside the textbook as a basis for cross-checking content and conclusions, or students may be asked to seek outside data, primary or secondary, to prove or disprove what they read in their textbook.

Finally, teachers should examine the textbooks they will use carefully as they would an expensive personal purchase for quality craftpersonship and reliable content. Textbooks vary greatly in style, philosophy, and substance, some being better choices for certain purposes than others. It is not even realistic to consider all large books used in classrooms as textbooks in the sense given them in this chapter. While most are basically narrative accounts of a didactic nature, many texts are more like teaching programs that include regular sprinklings of activities, primary source readings (either within the text or in a supplemental volume) and questions on both lower and higher intellectual levels. Clearly, if the teacher is interested in promoting thinking skills and concept formation, the latter type of 'text' would be considered far superior to the predominantly factual account. Even where states or communities require a particular text, the same possibilities exist for critical analysis, comparison with other books (excerpted or whole), and enrichment through primary and secondary sources which are copied, read, or taped for classroom use. Increasing demand for more thought-provoking textbook programs would help to change both the educational market and teachers and students expectations about what a textbook is supposed to do. In evaluating a basic social studies text, writing style, a consciously expressed educational philosophy, frequent higher level questions, representative original sources, and thought-provoking illustrations might all be part of the criteria for choice, resulting in adoptions that move away from narratives that are the usual compilation of information.

3. Using Textbooks to Develop Attitudes

Although not specifically designed for the purpose, textbooks can be used to develop attitudes toward social issues and subject matter interests in the social studies. In the hands of a clever teacher, even poorly written and confusing textbook narratives can come alive as a series of value and methodology problems that may surprise and delight students. In fact, poorly designed narrative with factual and theoretical inaccuracies are often the most productive sources of discussion. Again, use of *two or more texts* for comparative purposes (a frame of reference strategy) greatly enhances affective goals aimed at examination of values, beliefs, and philosophical claims.

If our goals are to help students develop greater interest in social topics than they had when we found them and more willingness to express and defend their opinions and decisions in public, then a number of techniques and strategies are available to you for regular classroom implementation. First, your perception of a textbook must change from a didactic perspective to one in which the text material is viewed as a source of issues and judgments rather than information alone. If we assume that the narratives, however bland, contain hidden values, historical interpretations, biases and distortions, as well as authors' opinions, then we are all set to criticize and debate the reading material.

Second, the textbook may be used as a data set that we can research for underlying values and for the importance of topics. Using such simple devices as counting words, phrases, and pages we can measure which topics or people are 'in' or 'out' in the text, and which topics or people are treated positively or negatively. We can also check for an author's consistency by following ideas from their introduction to their conclusion in a text. In this way, we will be able to determine if the content of the text is consistent or eclectic in approach. Most students, for instance have a great deal of trouble understanding the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era in US history. The conflicts and politics of the time are usually 'fuzzy' for them since texts generally gloss over the more brutal aspects of the period. The impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, Lincoln's successor, is often portrayed quite ambivalently in history books, for example:

> Led by Thaddeus Stevens, the House of Representatives quickly impeached Johnson on the grounds of 'high crimes and misdemeanors.' The House bill of particulars, however was repetitious, vague and muddled. With Supreme Court Chief Justice Salmon Chase presiding, the Senate sat as a jury and heard the evidence. As seven Republican Senators voted with the Democrats, the Radical Republicans failed by one vote to secure the two-thirds majority neccessary for conviction.[12]

First of all, note that the politics of this trial are not made clear to students. Upon which accusations was Johnson impeached? Impeachment is a very serious business and if the "House bill" was so vague and muddled, then why was the President saved by only one vote? Why did seven Republicans vote with the Democrats? after all, wasn't Johnson himself a Republican like Lincoln? Most confusing, indeed. Perhaps he should have been thrown out of office. Perhaps there was a solid case against him. Isn't the conclusion difficult to discuss in this narrative?

Given the view of a textbook narrative as a source of values and as a subject for research, we are ready to try out a number of activities designed to encourage discussion and thought about attitudes and values.

Focusing on the language used in a text is one way in which teachers can call students' attention to values in historical and social science writing. Exercises can be developed around counting adjectives and underlining 'hot' and 'cold' words, that is, words with positive or negative connotations. Students can conduct their own research study on the degree to which topics are portrayed in a positive, negative or neutral light in a textbook, either by informally identifying judgments or by counting the number of positive and negative words in a paragraph and setting up a ration for comparison. For example:

> The score here is 113 negative phrases and 43 positive phrases with a ratio of about 3 to 1, clearly indicating that the passage is basically negative about the formation of the People's Republic of China.

Word counts and identification of author judgments work particularly well for dramatic, emotional topics such as wars, rebellions, revolutions, changes in public policy, political heroes/heroines, international affairs, and descriptions of foreign countries. The Vietnam War, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or environmental issues or abortion, or a discussion of civil rights in the United States would all be excellent subjects for value analysis.

Another method teachers can use to call students' attention to underlying values in particular texts is to direct students to measure the amount of space and information devoted to a topic, either comparing two topics within a single text (such as how much space is devoted to Germany and to Japan in a discussion of World War II, or how much space is given to the People's Republic of China *compared* with the Soviet Union), or by comparing two or more treatments of the *same topic* from different textbooks. In the latter case, the possibilities for discussion are almost endless because multiple excerpts can be taken from different levels or time periods, different publishers, or even different nations. For example, Mexican and American narratives about the Mexican War would be interesting to compare in terms of their portrayal of the United States' motivation for conflict and their judgments about that war. Pre-Nixon and post-Nixon descriptions of the People's Republic of China would be rich in contrasting value judgments and probably quite different in tone.

Junior, senior high, and college text discussions of political participation could form the basis for a group discussion of matching ideas to maturational level, i.e. students could look at the way authors simplify and sometimes oversimplify topics for different age groups. For example, voting and participation are seen as nearly synonymous in many texts for younger students while texts for older students may give much greater attention to protests or pressure groups as means of participation. Textbook accounts of the causes of the Cold War would serve as an exciting introduction to both the history itself and to analysis of how different accounts give differing weight to the key factors contributing to an event of such international significance.

The identification of 'hot' and 'cold' adjectives in narrative descriptions, counting the amount of space devoted to a topic, and comparing treatments from different authors, nations, or time periods belongs to a tradition of social studies research in which textbooks are used as a database for the study of national values and social change. The techniques described here come out of this tradition of using exercises and activities for lessons that focus on attitudes and values. Much of the research that has been carried out using textbooks has focussed on the way in which women, minorities, and foreign countries are described in the narratives presented to young people. In brief, textbook analysts have argued that these nationally distributed books represent events and people to millions of students, influencing public images and often serving as the sole knowledge base for school curricula in a given subject. Furthermore, researchers and critics point out that the contents of textbooks are subject to the historical milieu in which they were written, reflecting prevailing norms and prejudices. A social studies text from World War II or the Korean War period would undoubtedly treat Asia very differently than current textbooks do now; race relations or women certainly would receive far different treatment now, even by the most conservative authors, than these subjects received in the 1950s or earlier. Thus, textbooks change their contents to reflect national concerns and attitudes of the times. Analyzing these changes can serve as the focus of classroom study and to enhance awareness of how attitudes and values expressed in textbooks change over time. Questions of reliability and validity, consistency and truth are always useful in a social studies discussion and particularly so in discussions of attitudes.

Understanding that textbooks reflect the values of the times in which they were written, and contain problems of bias, distortion, selection, and judgment does not necessarily invalidate them nor imply that they are useless. Rather, teachers should treat textbooks in much the same way that they deal with all historical writing and social science theory, *as open* *to criticism and revision.* It is only when teachers use textbooks as sources of revealed and absolute truth that students accept the knowledge offered without seeking proof and without feeling the need to make their own judgments.

Summary

To summarize what has been said in this chapter, textbooks can be very interesting and useful if students are involved with the material, seeking to identify and solve problems, trying to recognize values and theories, and eventually making their own decisions about what to accept or reject as conclusions. While textbooks are popularly perceived as compilations of facts and are used in a purely didactic way by teachers, these narratives can also be used to support reflective and affective goals as well. Reflection and the examination of attitudes may be easily stimulated by an overall view of textbook contents as open to question and analysis, for example:

1. through comparisons of two or more accounts of the same event;
2. by checking for consistency and logic;
3. by asking if the right kind of data supports conclusions;
4. by research into the amount of space devoted to a topic; and
5. by investigating the type of language, objective or subjective, used to describe historical periods and personalities.

While the textbooks themselves may be of good quality, including more than basic material and questions in their program, it is still beneficial to subject all textbooks to verification and to cross check by both primary and secondary sources.

Given the complex issues and sensitive feelings of many groups who have been overlooked or poorly treated by social studies textbooks and given past acceptance of biased perspectives into standard historical accounts, it is incumbent on you to be aware of and sensitive to problems that may result from reliance on a single source of information. Teachers should share their perceptions of textual inconsistencies and biases with their students, training their pupils to recognize weak and fallacious reasoning, or unsupported judgments and viewpoints, as part of their general development of thinking skills using historical and social science methods. Students should be assisted to consider the problems inherent in any portrayal of human behavior; ranging from factual inaccuracies to unconscious bias and emotionality to purposeful distortion for political or ideological ends. Your reward for the process of inquiry into textbooks will be students who can better make their own judgments, draw more reasoned conclusions, and know why a question must sometimes remain open and unanswerable.

Endnotes

1. Hoetker, J. and W. Ahlbrand. "The Persistence of Recitation." *American Educational Research Journal*, Vol. 6, 1969, pp. 145-167.

2. Thard, Roland G. and Ronald Gallimore. *Rousing Minds to Life*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

3. Shaver, James, O. L. Davis, and Suzanne Helburn. "The Status of Social Studies Education: Implications From Three NSF Studies." *Social Education*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Feb, 1979), pp. 150-53.

4. Numerous research studies have found that half or more of social studies teachers depend upon a textbook as their major teaching tool. Supera, Hawke, and Morrissett report that reliance upon textbooks is characteristic of the United States as a whole at both the elementary and the secondary level with this reliance increasing as the grade levels rise.[a] Shaver, Davis and Helburn report that by far the majority of the textbooks used in social studies classrooms are commercially available, follow a narrative format, and promote recall over higher level thinking skills.[b] Armento seconds these findings and goes on to conclude that textbooks tend to stress breadth or coverage over depth, yielding little insight into the reasons behind conclusions that are presented on various events. A thorough national survey by the EPIE institute, though somewhat dated, found that two-thirds or more of classroom time in a typical social studies classroom was devoted to reading, reviewing, and answering questions from commercial textbooks and related printed matter.[c]

> a. Superka, Douglas P., Sharryl Hawke, and Irving Morrissett. "The Current and Future Status of the Social Studies." *Social Education*, Vol 44 (May, 1980), pp. 362-69.
>
> b. Armento, Beverly. "Research on Teaching Social Studies." *Handbook of Research on Teaching*, 3rd Ed. (M. C. Wittrock, Ed.) New York: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 942-51.
>
> c. "EPIE Staff Report on a National Study of the Nature and Quality of Instructional Materials Most Used by Teachers and Learners." EPIE Report No. 71, New York: EPIE Institute, 1976.

5. Cuban, Larry. *How Teachers Taught: Constancy and Change in American Classrooms, 1890-1980*. Whaite Plains: Longman's, 1984.

6. Evans, Ronald. "The Societal-Problems Approach and the Teaching of History." *Social Education*, Vol. 53, No. 1, (January, 1989), pp. 50-52.

7. Spring, Joel. *American Education: An Introduction to Social and Political Aspects*. White Plains: Longman's 1989. (See Chapters 3 and 4).

8. Anderson, Lorin W. "What Teachers Don't Do and Why." *Education Report*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Dec. 1984).

9. In an analytical and anecdotal, but unsystematic study of American history textbooks published over a hundred year period, Frances Fitzgerald points out that content is strongly influenced by political, social, and economic changes. Within this context of change, however, publishers and authors try to develop products that yield large sales and appeal to a broad spectrum of pressure groups, often resulting in books that are bland and inoffensive but also generally uninteresting to young people. See Fitzgerald, Frances. *America Revisited*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

10. An exercise such as this offers "Food for Thought:"

"In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bomb on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or recitification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable elements. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them." Orwell, George. "Politics and the English Language." *Collected Works of George Orwell*, 1946.

1. What is the author's main point?

2. Why does the author believe that ". . .political language has to consist largely of euphemism. . ."?

3. If we take this author seriously, how would we have to teach the social studies, what cautions would we exercise?

11. Syllogistic reasoning is a form of logic that sometimes leads to unwarranted conclusion (e.g. stereotypes, as follows: all Chinese are sly and cunning, Confucius is Chinese, therefore, Confucius is sly and cunning).

12. Gordon, Irving L. *American History*, 2nd Ed. New York: AMSCO School Publications, 1989, p. 235.

For Further Study

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Jack Zevin is Professor of Education at Queens College, CUNY, Flushing, New York.

American Social Studies Texts View Late Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union

George Bernstein

Introduction

This is a preliminary study of selected American social studies text-books to see how they portray late Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union. One of the assumptions with which I have been working is that the information and ideas presented in such texts help shape students' attitudes and reinforce teachers' perceptions. Some very broad generalizations might be made at the outset. First, textbooks -- and most certainly those in the social studies function within a political context.[1] I am employing the word "political" in a rather broad sense. It is the exercise of power through ideologies and institutions to maintain and strengthen the position of those who possess such power. This would ordinarily mean that some groups have it within their means to shape ways of perceiving self, other groups and the larger community. Radio, TV, movies, newspapers and magazines certainly have that capability.[2] Textbooks as well possess a similar power to convey, convince and control.

In relation to texts dealing with Russia and the Soviet Union in more or less traditional works, the overwhelming emphasis would probably be on the structure and nature of political power in the sense of State activities. That is understandable for several reasons. First, traditional historiography, at least until about thirty years ago, still considered the central government, its activities and matters related to its activities as the most sensible and legitimate focus for serious studies. Over roughly the last generation or so there has been a significant shift, at least among scholars and to a fair degree among teachers, toward incorporating the history of "racial" and ethnic groups, of women and of working people. In a modest way, some U. S. history texts mirror that modification in emphasis and tone. But texts ordinarily play the tortoise and slowly shift their weight. The books which devote some attention to the Soviet Union and earlier Russian history would probably give little or no attention to such realities as family life, social patterns of education, the development of visual arts, the literary heritage which has affected the Western world, the diversity of dramatic landscapes, the Soviet impact on women's lives and on the experiences of various ethnic groups and nationalities (Turkistanis, Usbeks, Azerbajanis, Kirghiz, Turkomen, Kazars and others). Generally, the texts do little to acknowledge the fascinating variety of Russian and Soviet life. The more complex reality of Russian life has rather dramatically been brought to the attention of some Americans through the sometimes unexpected consequences of Gorbachev's policies.

Among the twelve texts read for this paper, one is being used by an upper middle-class New Jersey high school, one by a middle-class New Jersey school, one by a New York City high school where the majority of students are rather poor Hispanics, another in a New Jersey city school of poor blacks, and one in a New York City middle-class private school.

Aspects of U. S. Textbook Treatments of Russia and the Soviet Union

One text being used today is *A World History*(1979) by Lindner, Selzer and Berk. The Soviet Union is treated in a chapter which also encompasses Nazi Germany and Communist China. The chapter title is "Totalitarianism", a title which in many respects is accurate, but which necessarily sets the stage for presenting Russia in a certain light.[3] The introduction of less than two pages is inadequate in several respects. So, for example, they write that people "listened to the promises of power-hungry demagogues", but they had already mentioned to the readers that there were problems such as unemployment. They seem to be suggesting a connection between the two, and the language employed points to change in Russian society as due to demagogues who fight for power.

In the preface to this work the authors state that students are "brought into the action" through "role plays, mock interviews with famous people, psycho-histories, and real life descriptions from contemporary literature and song".

Let us return to the terminology employed. The use of words shape perceptions . So, we find that on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War either the Socialist Democratic Party or "several members of the Socialist Democratic Party" attempted "to stir up unrest. . . and strikes". In the next brief paragraph we find that "added unrest was caused by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. . .Russia's defeat in the war seemed to confirm the stories the Social Democrats and the newly formed Social Revolutionary Party spread about the corruption and inefficiency of the tsarist regime". We as readers are not clear what is meant by "stir up unrest", although it might be almost equivalent to stirring up "strikes" since strikes constitute in the eyes of some a type of "unrest". What is the tone suggested by the words, "the stories . . . spread". What do the words ordinarily mean? What are they taken to mean in this context? A story may be a narrative that has as one of its aims to get to the heart of human life. It is fiction in some obvious sense. Do the authors here suggest that it is fiction when critics of the regime spread "stories"? Who is deceiving whom? What is the reader expected to react to. How should he or she react? How might the teacher deal with the phrase -- if he or she does notice it and wants to deal with it?

The text continues in the same vein, fighting on the forefront of simplification. What were some difficulties that Russia faced in early 1917? Each condition is allotted a ration of one sentence. "There were shortages of guns and ammunition". There is no explanation of why. "Russian generals did not seem to understand that methods of fighting had changed since the days of Napoleon". Why not? "It was not long before the soldiers were in a mood to support revolution". Why? "Civilian morale was undermined by food shortages, caused by the drafting of peasants into the army. Available stocks of wheat and other grain could not be brought to the cities because of poor transportation". This "because of" is the only attempt in the paragraph to look for some cause and effect connections.

From the point of view of critical thinking, the book lacks a few of the characteristics that could be most helpful to students:

> 1. It makes rather broad generalizations without providing even a reasonable amount of information to serve the reader. So it is not possible to argue from the information or to see the conclusions as somehow being drawn from it. Either little or nothing is present which can justify a conclusion.
>
> 2. It does not make clear the nature of the evidence when some is provided. Sometimes it appears to be a quotation from a historical source of that time, and on others it appears to be a semi-fictionalized creation, presumably with the intent of making "the reality come alive" for students. A writer of non-fiction is obligated at some point to explain the nature of the sources and how they are used.

The text by Mounir Farah and others, *Global Insights: Peoples and Cultures* (1980)[4] states in the preface that the peoples and subcultures "are presented as they really are -- not as we Westerners tend to see them". The work, it promises, is "both historical and contemporary". If these are the goals stated by the authors, it is legitimate for readers to ask whether they in fact accomplished what they claim they set out to do. In this book, much of the orientation is still from the West, that is from the "educated West". The sources -- if we limit ourselves to what the authors do with the Soviet Union -- are often those of Westerners who went to Russia. At the same time there is a rather liberal use of quotations from the Russian publication, *Soviet Life* and *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* Many quotations from non-Russian writers succeed in using Russians as sources so the reader does have the feeling of having come at least somewhat closer to the texture of Russian and Soviet life from the Russian's point of view.

The general pattern of the book is the following: first there is a brief statement by the author(s), followed by a rather lengthy quote. This may or may not be followed by a logical development of the quote by the author(s). Then there are some questions. These are also what the authors designate as "case studies" but they seem little more than autobiographical accounts without any commentary. In the section labelled "exploration" there are some quotations, generally shorter than those in other sections, and followed by other questions which are not different in logic or implication from those offered earlier. The text does not conclude with any generalizations that might help students understand the major developments that occurred within Russian and Soviet society.

However, there are some strengths in their presentation:

1. There are quotations from some Russians, and they appear to grow out of the circumstances and are not tainted by dogmatic language, which must be decoded.

2. It makes clear that Russian society did not begin with the revolution of 1917. In other words, there is at least something of a historical perspective.

3. Many of the non-Russians quoted offer fairly vivid descriptions of their experiences.

4. It does not limit itself to what has often been the heart of Soviet studies in the United States -- the nature and functions of the central government.

Marvin Perry, principal author of *man's Unfinished Journey: A World History*(1978) has the support of distinguished historians as contributing area specialists.[5] It should be said that Theodore H. Von Laue, who wrote the pages on Russia was an extremely distinguished historian and his book, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?* was an important essay. How, then, might a major historian write about the Soviet Union twelve to fifteen years ago if it is done within the context of the American textbook world in which other contributors, principal writers, editors and publishers can all have an impact on the final result which sees print?

The first sentence under the heading, "Barriers to an Understanding of Russia" is: "To understand what has happened in Russia since 1917, Americans must observe the Russian people in their century of crisis." There is at least the promise of a more mature approach. The writer offers what he believes is helpful advice. For the historian it is crucial. One of the human concerns that historians pay attention to is a period of crisis, what led to it and what it led to. It might be possible, with this kind of hint, to begin to look at a society as a large human entity which has to deal with problems in different periods of time. The crisis will be placed within some larger context, another foundation of historical thought. Nothing really stands by itself or exists by itself. We are all in settings, one of which is the movement of time. Von Laue is the only writer studied for this paper who says that without a knowledge of the Russian language, our capacity for understanding will be limited. The language is another element of the larger context.

Von Laue's treatment is not extraordinary. By and large it can be put in the context of most texts, although he does offer some information and an occasional idea that might really be helpful. There are also times he does something which does not quite make sense.

The section, "Reasons for the Backwardness of Tsarist Russia" begins with a contrast, an approach he uses elsewhere: The Americans are such-and -such, and the Russians are such-and-such, that is, the opposite. This leads him to ask the reasons for Russia's "backwardness." "Tsarist Russia is underdeveloped -- socially, politically and economically" (p. 635). That is his reason for her backwardness. But that is really begging the question. It is circular, and really saying the same thing twice but in different words. To suggest that a country is underdeveloped -- if one wishes to use this kind of vocabulary, and one need not -- and that that is the cause of backwardness is almost literally nonsense. The underdevelopment *is* the backwardness and the backwardness *is* the underdevelopment. Neither term when employed with the other leads us forward to understanding. One is simply saying the same thing twice. It is nothing approaching an explanation. Global educators and critical thinkers want to see movement toward explanation.

In the next to the last page on Soviet Russia, Von Laue says: "Stalin wiped out much of Soviet Russia's creative spontaneity, but he created, for generations to come, that monolithic uniformity for which Russia's rulers had yearned for centuries" (p. 659). In the light of what has occurred in Russia since Gorbachev has come to power, that kind of thinking -- clearly coming out of a monolithic tradition of interpretations -- seems ripe for revision. Earlier I had suggested that many views of the Soviet Union have been rooted in political concepts, and that recent scholarship has shifted significantly so more scholars are working on social structure and social behavior in other areas of life, but also paying attention to the relationships between political life and social and economic structure. *Man's Unfinished Journey* also points to the unfinished task of the social studies textbook writer: learning how to pay attention to more than government politics and policies in order to bring the possibility of deeper understanding to our students and ourselves.

People and Nations by Mazour, Peoples and Rabb provides another telling example of the difficulties faced by the professional historian when he or she attempts to present a topic to high school students. Since Anatole Mazour was a Professor of History at Stanford University for many years, teaching Russian history, one can assume he wrote the section devoted to the Soviet Union and the troubled and troubling eve of the revolution. Four pages of text and one of photographs are given to the Soviet Union. Approximately one page covers the conditions leading to the revolution and three pages are offered on the revolution from 1917 through the 'thirties. He tells the reader that "there were . . . grave economic problems" in the years just before the upheaval. What were they? "Russia was far behind Western European countries in its industrial development and agricultural methods. For example, in 1914 only 1 1/2% of Russia's people were industrial workers, compared with 40% of Great Britain's population. For their part, the peasants in Russia were unhappy with the results of their emancipation. Debts, taxes and rents kept the Russian peasants in poverty" (p. 614).

Each of the statements concerning "economic problems" is important but stated so simply it is hardly likely that high school students in the United States would understand. There is one "statistical figure" given, in the form of a comparison. But one might very well ask why the comparison of a condition in 1914 be made between Russia and England. If one is paying attention to economic and related matters, England was the first country to industrialize, so it understandably had a significant percentage of the workforce as industrial workers. Why not make comparisons with countries that were at a roughly equivalent stage of economic development, where there was clearly the beginning of industrial development but where the overwhelming majority of the work force was on the land? Beyond this there are no details whatsoever about the quality of life. There are no descriptions of conditions of life, no observations of visitors, either Russian or foreign. The specific conditions which led to indebtedness, for example, are not touched upon. One of the techniques for reaching, touching and teaching students on any level is to use the details of everyday life, both as evidence and as incitement to dialogue. So, very broad statements when they are not buttressed with description or accounts of personal experience may, in themselves, be accurate, but there is little that can be done with them as texts for teaching.

Historians are often concerned with what are sometimes labelled the "elements of continuity and change." Such terminology permits at least the possibility of investigating whether a society has moved in new directions in significant ways, and in what ways it more or less remains what it had been before. In a section entitled, "A Police State" we are told that the "czars had used secret police and spies to maintain their absolute rule" and that "Stalin used similar tactics" (618). That is true, but if stated so succinctly, the reality cannot easily be grasped by the student. Even when there are rather dramatic circumstances which can be used to draw students into serious reflection, there is little effort made to show how developments in the past had a real impact on the present.

Another problem is that writers who are in a position to bring "the story" up to date to the extent that it might be done, often shy away from the task. Teachers in the classroom often find themselves with very little time to discuss the last twenty, thirty or forty years. But even when one teaches so the present can be reached, the text, -- in this case the Mazour book -- gives little or no attention to the last generation or generation and a half. One statement is made about 1936 and one about 1938 and the reader is left with that. But the readers -- teachers and students -- are left without Russia since 1938 except to the extent that a few paragraphs may be devoted to World War II and Russia.

Again, the omissions point to a perspective which assumes that major political events are the only thing worthy of description and analysis. There are any number of reasons why such emphasis is often the most common. But we are left with a highly truncated view of reality. Again, there is almost no attention given to the dimensions of life which are the immediate experience of all human beings -- the nature of their daily work and how they relate to it, the structures and styles of family life, the passion for or neglect of education, the availability or scarcity of medical care, popular philosophies of life, leisure time lost and gained, used and abused, people's perceptions of their needs in domestic politics, their relationships to foods and a number of other possibilities. There is again in Mazour no effort to show the significance of (high) culture in Russian society. What has been most accessible to the rest of the world -- even when in the form of political exiles such as Rostropovich the cellist and Brodsky, the poet -- is often not noted at all. If Russian dance, theater, music, poetry, novels, painting, sculpture from 1917 on are treated as though they do not exist, there is both distortion of reality seen from a psychological point of view, an abuse of the writer's power of choice, and a terrible loss for the student who might be introduced to that world.

Conclusions

Insofar as these texts might be viewed with assumptions of critical thinking, what broad observations might be made?

1. Sensible conclusions should be based on available evidence. (Certainly one of the characteristics of historical thinking as well.) The approaches of the texts in this matter are quite mixed. Some offer no evidence to speak of, even if we limit this to what reasonably might be accomplished in a high school text. The books run the gamut from those which selfishly offer rather brief paragraphs with elementary information to those which add an element of drama through excerpts from eyewitnesses. But in neither these two cases nor others is there enough for students to work with.

2. There is little and sometimes no development of a theme or thesis. There is no elaboration which gives evidence of thinking, other than perhaps showing that the writer wishes to condense so much that it risks becoming unintelligible. If the writer wants an audience that is capable of response through dialogue, an idea must be developed. (Of course, writers may not want dialogue.) It could be the presentation of a main argument, followed by either a lengthy excerpt from an eyewitness or interpretations from various scholars, and then a return to the central idea, perhaps expanded and then weaving in material from other sources. The ideas, if offered, should not be there in so compact a fashion that the teacher and students find it impossible to move forward intellectually.

3. If there is a central idea, it should be clearly stated so that students and teacher can begin to see why the evidence should be clear. If clarity is present, students are helped to understand that the two elements are necessary for one another.

4. Critical thinking demands that one not ignore factual information because it is essential to substantiate the idea. Factual information without interpretation is dead, without relevance. An interpretation without evidence may be interesting but it may be nonsense. In critical thinking, interpretation and facts should be allies and friends of one another.

5. If there is no idea offered explicitly, the text further reinforces the sad conditioning that students by and large have already experienced. They are again being led to believe that knowledge and education mean the accumulation of factual information. It is a fact that George Washington was the first American president, and although that is a historical reality, it is a meaningless abstraction unless one succeeds in placing it within a historical context.

6. The social studies texts have an elementary chronology, something particularly appropriate when they are supposed to be histories. Despite the chronology, neither factual information nor ideas are arranged so students can see main lines of development. They are chronologically ordered much of the time but are intellectually fragmented.

7. One of the most serious deficiencies of the texts is that they are not designed to encourage or facilitate dialogue. For the most part they lead toward passivity, exactly the opposite of what critical thought aims at. If the text is seen as a product created to satisfy the least demanding of consumers, perhaps it accomplishes that purpose. But if it is perceived as a person or persons talking, reaching out to the potentially curious students of our schools, then it should possess a strength and sense of direction which will arouse the intellectual energies of the young.

What are some of the basic principles of global education and critical thinking that social studies texts should aim to incorporate for teaching at the end of the twentieth century and the first quarter of the twenty-first century?

Perhaps the major principle that guides global education is that we have to move beyond local and even national perspectives to grapple with problems and cultures beyond our immediate experience and the society with which we are best acquainted. So, for example, when text writers present the Soviet Union, they can take into account the kinds of cultural contact that Russia had with other societies. They might give some attention to Italian artists who came to work in St. Petersburg or German physicians who served in various capacities before the revolution. Just as the United States should not be interpreted within a demographic and cultural vacuum as though we created ourselves, neither should that be the approach when we approach any other society. In studying the cultural relationship between Russia and other societies, we need not limit ourselves to the culture of politics, in which case the most obvious example is the importation of the Marxism which began in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century.

If the above -- moving beyond local and even national perspectives -- is the core of global education, it is necessary to consider what some of the more specific implications are of such a view. One should see major problems as belonging to large regions and even the world. Near the end of the twentieth century, many of them should be crystal-clear, but one might nevertheless refer to (1) pollution, (2) atomic armament or disarmament, (3) population control, (4) the international drug traffic, (5) market developments. These are simply among the most obvious. Global education demands not only a perspective which is international, but is able to view a lot of situations as problems that human groups of many kinds have to deal with. Not that humans always do deal with the problems. But the latter exist, and can be seen and studies within a very large global framework. Most recently, Gorbachev's policies -- whether seen as problems in themselves or reactions to problems or both -- constitute problems for the American government. Whether our government has sufficient depth of understanding to alter some of its own policies is open to question, but the situations that exist are networks of interrelated problems. If one perceives a situation as a problem, then it might be possible to seek a "solution." But if no problem is seen, no solution can be made available through struggle. If texts and teachers believe, sincerely believe, that education means the dispensing of factual information, then it is hardly likely that they could permit a frame of mind in others that encourages analysis. The social analysis may involve comparison, contrast, shaping the context, seeking elements of important continuity or change. But all of these approaches demand transcending elementary information. An interesting example of what might be done -- although it is written rather simplistically -- is the beginning of the chapter on "The Soviet Peoples" in Hope Ludlow's *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*: "Unlike, say, New York or Paris, Moscow is not an international capital. That is, it does not play host to many visitors from foreign countries. . . In another sense, however, Moscow is a world capital -- for the Soviet world." (p.25) At least we have here the possibility of making comparisons between a metropolis which is open to the world and one which is not. It can lead to a study of the dynamics of demography, in this case to why peoples gravitate toward particular urban centers. It should be said that there are times in texts when an interesting idea is tossed out but there is little follow-through. If that is the case, then the writers who involve themselves in creating social studies texts have their tasks set out for them in the next generation. Ideally, the texts offer students both accurate and interesting pictures of the world. Global education and critical thinking can both provide some of the principles that such writers could employ in the future. They both call for an open-mindedness that is not yet present, but toward which we are capable of working. That open-mindedness demands not only thinking more clearly but acting more clearly. The two hang together. We need to think in a more disciplined fashion, but not confuse discipline with rigidity. We should open our minds to the world but that does not mean that people sacrifice their identity with their own past or land. Both critical thinking and global education are ways of our going to the world and bringing the world to us. They do not diminish but enlarge us.

Social studies textbooks which condition the young to assume that societies are ossified do a profound disservice to the students. Students, given half a chance want to learn about their world, but the adults have the responsibility of presenting that world to them. The nature of the world that children perceive is not a given. It is what the adults offer to them. The textbooks are a very powerful instrument in shaping how the young see the world. Unfortunately, they along with the rapid succession of television images are often among the few sources that they know of. A shift in consciousness is necessary among those adults who are responsible for the creation of social studies texts. Otherwise our students are going to become even more rather than less ignorant of the world in which they live. Critical thinking and global education offer useful tools for reshaping textbooks for our future.

Critical thinking presupposes that one should not prejudge. The point of view expressed is or is supposed to be open to challenge and to self-examination through the person making the statement. This predisposition not to prejudge is a characteristic of successful global education. We do not judge others in the world through the use of prejudicial ideas. In this area of not prejudging, Americans (and others) carry the heavy burden of the Cold War which began in 1917, very soon after the Bolsheviks gained power in Russia. How might it be possible to study the Soviet Union without immediately weighing ourselves down with all the baggage of traditional antagonisms? (The need for this kind of intellectual and emotional liberation does not mean we should assume that there has not been a dictatorship of a horrendous kind in Russia.) In this search, both critical thinking and global education can help because they possess elements of realism. They are rooted in and assume the real world that we live in now. At the same time, both have a strong sense that we need mental and social models which can strengthen us as thinkers and citizens.

Critical thinking assumes that human beings have the capacity for improving their ways of thinking and knowing. In global education, there is the assumption that people will be able to look at one another without being hopelessly blinded by prejudice, recognize the essential and common humanity of others, and recognize the legitimacy of their culture.

Notes

1. Among the more recent works dealing with this problem are Henry A. Giroux and Peter McLaren, eds., *Critical Pedagogy, the State and Cultural Struggle* (Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1989), Michael W. Apple, *Teachers and Texts: A Political Economy of Class and Gender Relations in Education* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986) and Ann Bastian et. al. *Choosing Equality: The Case for Democratic Schooling* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).

2. Todd Gitlin, "Prime Time Ideology: The Hegemonic Process in Television Entertainment," *Social Problems*, Vol. 26 (1979), pp. 251-266.

3. For the debate among historians on the significance of the use of the term, "totalitarianism" in regard to the Soviet Union see Robert C. Tucker, ed. *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation* (1977), particularly Stephen Cohen, "Bolshevism and Stalinism". Sheila Fitzpatrick writes elsewhere: "In the 1930s, it is generally agreed, a new political system was consolidated in the Soviet Union. Whether this system should be classified as socialist, totalitarian or simply Stalinist remains a matter of debate, and there has been so little agreement on the nature of the regime that even descriptive analysis tends to be controversial." *The Russian Revolution 1917-1932* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 153.

4. Mounir A. Farah, Thomas Orin Flickema, James Neil Hantula, Ellen C. K. Johnson, Paul W. Kane, Andrea Berens Karl, Ella C. Keppert and Robert H. Ratcliffe, *Global Insights: Peoples and Cultures* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1980). There are 127 pages on the Soviet Union and earlier periods of Russian history. Each section of the book has separate pagination. The sections are "China," "India," "Latin America," "Middle East," the "Soviet Union," and "Sub-Saharan Africa." The titles reveal something of how they decided to look at the areas.

5. Marvin Perry, *Man's Unfinished Journey: A World History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), pp. 628-661.

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George Bernstein is a faculty member in the Department of Educational Foundations at Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, New Jersey.

Teaching History Data and Concepts Through Analytical and Reflective Thinking Skills

Richard Mumford

"I think therefore I am." Note that Descartes did not say, "I can memorize correct answers therefore I am." Nor did he infer that existence related to the identification of items in a true/false or multiple choice test. Descartes was not interested in a list of topics, knowledge of which would identify an educated person. He did not mean that knowing the dates of the major battles of the Civil War or the names of the three ships in Columbus's expedition produced recognition of individual actuality or authenticity. Human beings are, at their best and in full realization of that which distinguishes them from other living beings, thinking creatures. They are not data collectors nor storehouses for collections of an endless and incoherent myriad of facts, but living beings who can act upon data, manipulate it, rearrange it, evaluate it, and use it for sensible and beneficial purposes.

At every level of formal education we seem preoccupied with this effort to accumulate data in the memory, to store facts in the mind, to offer quiz-show answers to simple questions. The irony is that as the amount of data multiplies and as the mechanisms for storage and for quick retrieval of that data expands, we attempt to register more information in the limited and nonexpandable brain. Students are lectured at, set to work coloring (highlighting) textbooks, drilled in recitations, and examined in order to implant more and more data through the synapses and into the neurons of the tightly-packed gray matter inside the cranium.

The Japanese have taken this process to the extreme in their lock-step movement from school to school from pre-nursery to graduate school. They spend long evenings and attend special tutorial cram schools so that they can memorize facts, statistics, and formulae to reproduce exactly on written exams. They are too perceptive and innovative a people to continue in this pattern and are now searching for alternatives. We search for these alternatives in the United States, also.

This paper, and the book that is an outgrowth of the ideas in this paper, describes an effort to move beyond this preoccupation with data-accumulation in the direction of the promotion of thinking over memorization, the *use* of data rather than its accumulation, and the development of the student's analytical thinking processes over the recall function.

> Those who have read of everything are thought to understand everything too; but it is not always so--reading furnishes the mind only with the materials of knowledge; it is thinking that makes what is read ours. We are of the ruminating kind, and it is not enough to cram ourselves with a great load of collections; unless we chew them over again, they will not give us strength and nourishment.
>
> John Locke

Analytical or critical thinking is an approach, process, and response to problems or issues which call for intensive scrutiny of evidence and arguments and for which ample evidence to reach definitive conclusions is usually not available, yet careful processing of evidence and arguments leads to decisions about what to think and do.

Certain assumptions are central to the teaching of history through the use of analytical and reflective thinking skills:

-- that all collections of data worthy of serious study are best coalesced and attached to problems (issues, theses, dilemmas, or questions) rather than arranged in outline form around standard topics.

-- that the problems important to study are open-ended, requiring critical/analytical thinking with careful reflective consideration of the evidence.

-- that the psychological impact of a problem or question is a superior motivator to the logical or chronological arrangement of data around a topic.

-- that conclusions or solutions to those open-ended questions are tentative, in need of constant revision, and continually open to new evidence and arguments.

-- that many of the elements of critical thinking can be broken down into component parts and taught individually before they are brought together for the full process of analytical and reflective thinking.

-- that students *can* be taught to consistently follow the process of critical and reflective thinking, that they may prefer not to think but to listen, to take notes, and to be entertained (at least at the outset).

-- that students taught without the use of critical or reflective thinking often show this response:

- tell me what I should know.
- what do you want for an answer?
- will this be on the test?
- how will this be graded?
- tell me the correct answer.
- where is the answer in the book?
- should I take notes on this?

-- that students who are taught to use critical and reflective thinking skills often show these characteristics:

- ask productive questions that lead to useful data and the asking of further questions
- judge and evaluate what is important
- challenge the answers of the instructor and other students
- attempt to understand why they are learning
- have a respect for evidence and rational arguments
- seek out problems and questions rather than topics and answers
- are content with temporary solutions, subject to modification

-- that the moral, theoretical and philosophical basis of this paper assumes that critical and reflective thinking about a problem or issues is preferable to the memorization and recall of data that describes a topic.

--that the process of forming problems and seeking thoughtful solutions to these problems is in keeping with the basic elements of a functioning democracy, a complex pluralistic society that is both open and free and that promotes basic human rights in an atmosphere that is receptive to freedom of thought.

> Intellectual ability, on which history rests, can, without question, be enhanced by further education, not indeed through theoretical precepts, but only through practical exercises.
>
> Theodore Mommsen

In the non-mathematical areas of the humanities and social sciences the thinking process can be divided into two types--the analytical, critical, more mechanical thinking activities on the one hand and the reflective thinking about open-ended, controversial issues on the other.

There are a large number of specific analytical thinking skills, perhaps dozens, depending on the manner of classification. Most of these skills are related to the work of the historian and can be practiced and developed through the use of and manipulation of historical data and concepts. I have chosen eight of these as of essential importance for the student of history. These are as follows: (The appendix offers examples of some of these exercises.)

a. Distinguishing between fact and inferences from facts.
b. Perceiving similarities and differences.
c. Questioning--forming productive questions.
d. Determining relevance of evidence.
e. Categorizing and classifying.
f. Evaluating arguments.
g. Evaluating and applying evidence
h. Analyzing quantified data.

In the book that I have authored, each of the above skills is applied to the subject matter of American history in a chronological setting.

A large section of each chapter provides opportunity for reflective thinking as well. Reflective thinking has been defined in many different ways. I have encouraged the following approaches and thinking processes in an effort to develop this skill in the student's approach to problems and issues:

a. Defining clearly the problem or issue.
b. Detecting and factoring in assumptions.
c. Determining types and amounts of data needed.
d. Recognizing and evaluating arguments.
e. Evaluating relevance, quality, and applicability of evidence.
f. Assessing the strength of evidence and arguments.
g. Detecting inconsistencies.
h. Organizing evidence and arguments into proper categories.
i. Eliminating alternatives to reach conclusions.
j. Determining if conclusions follow from the evidence and arguments.
k.Applying the conclusions or attaching them to broader generalizations.

Throughout the book there are specific thinking skill exercises which move along skill level progression from simple to complex. There are two different skills introduced in each of four consecutive chapters. The eight different analytical skills are repeated, with more challenging exercises, throughout the book. Finally, in each chapter, a varying number of open-ended "thought" questions related to controversial historical issues and decisions encourage the student to reflect, advance arguments, and make choices. The specific analytical and reflective thinking skills are developed as follows:

1. At the basic level the student distinguishes between factual-type statements and statements of inference and opinion. The student is not called upon to apply data but to identify and distinguish among items of data. This distinction between fact and inference is essential for the choice of data as evidence.

2. At the next level the student again identifies statements by picking out similarities and differences in two essays on topics that have some comparative relationship. In the early exercises the student discovers factual differences in the two essays. Later, the student discovers similarities and differences in ideas and attitudes. Together, skill exercise one and skill exercise two, once mastered, enable the student to sort out information, to identify factual-type statements, and to select points of similarity and difference in prose paragraphs.

3. In the third skill exercise, the student determines the relevance of evidence. Here the student breaks down information and distinguishes between data which applies directly to the thesis and data which may be interesting and important but does not relate to the thesis.

4. In the questioning level the student selects techniques to acquire data. In science, the experiment is used to acquire data. The social sciences use polls, surveys, clinical observation, and similar techniques. The historian must ask productive questions about specific unique events and then search for answers to these questions. This requires development of the skill of questioning. Productive questions are those that draw out usable evidence and lead to the careful evaluation of this evidence. Questions are the essential technique of historical investigation both in beginning the study of a topic or thesis and in evaluating the evidence related to the topic.

5. The skill exercise involving the organization of data requires the student to relate, assemble, classify, and place into categories diverse data usually acquired in a random manner. Some structure must be applied to data which, although all related to a period or topic, is scattered, at the outset, into a disconnected conglomerate. The classification most often used by historians is the placement of data into the separate categories of political, economic, social, diplomatic, and cultural. Although synthesis can sometimes be artificial and contrived, it allows the historian to deal with a mass of data while forming it into a useful heuristic design. There are features of analysis also in this skill since bits of information, appearing randomly, are separated and examined individually before being placed under the appropriate heading.

6. The final three exercises require the student to operate on a higher level of thinking than the earlier exercises. For exercise six the student must evaluate the type of arguments being used by those who make statements about events and situations in history. Evidence to the historian consists not only of facts and statistics but also of arguments by people involved in an event, by experts, and by historians who have investigated the events. Identification of these arguments is essential for their evaluation since the basis of the argument determines the degree of reliance which can be placed on the argument. The five types of arguments used in the exercises include the types that circulate in the non-mathematical, non-scientific area. The student, in evaluating each argument, distinguishes between the more powerful arguments of the empirical form from those of reason and authority down to the lower reliability level of anecdote and intuition. Picking out and reflecting upon these various types of arguments helps the student determine the degree of reliability and strength of support for statements about history. The student becomes aware of the *quality* of support for an historical interpretation.

7. The thinking skill exercise that centers on the evaluation and application of evidence gives practice not only in the determination of the applicability of evidence but also allows practice in deciding the manner in which the evidence applies to a thesis--as a challenge, as a refutation, or merely as data to be included as significant but neutral. Since historians usually operate on the basis of a thesis (revealed at the outset or sometimes hidden in a narrative account), it is important that the history student develop this skill of recognizing the proper placement of data and arguments either in favor of or against the thesis statement. The student, through the practice of the skill exercises, learns not just whether evidence is or is not relevant to the thesis but learns to divide data into supportive or non-supportive categories.

8. Drawing inferences from statistics, from quantified information is also among the higher level skills of thinking. Considering factual data in quantitative form, the student reacts to inferences drawn from this data and thinks both analytically and reflectively on the accuracy of the implications drawn from the quantitative data. Numerical data is deceptive in that it seems exact and indisputable; however arriving at supportable implications from statistical data is hazardous. Normally statistical data is eventually converted into descriptive language. Assessing inferences from quantitative data brings into play the elements of sound judgment and judicious balance which takes the student beyond the obvious and into the realm of thinking in a context of uncertainty, of fairness and impartiality which cannot always lead to provable statements. It also produces an attitude of questioning analysis of all statements of conclusions based upon statistical data.

9. The final thinking level encourages students to reflect upon controversial issues related to history, to synthesize critical thinking processes into reflective thinking leading to tentative conclusions. Here, open-ended questions that call for the application of individual values, that encourage personal input, that require the student to make decisions related to attitudes, outlook and personal beliefs are posed. Each controversial question is couched in enough information to allow for some immediate judgment and yet, each leads the student to search for additional data. The student is, at the end of each section, offered criteria or standards by which to compare her or his personal conclusions, more data and reflections, as well as the author's personal perspective on the particular issue. Of course the answers are not exact or precise or "correct" as they might be if the questions involved a mathematical or scientific answer. History is a product of the research and writing of those who function in the humanities and social sciences. As such, one must evaluate, judge, and then live with tentative, temporary, inexact, and incomplete conclusions. The skills developed in the open-ended questions are suited to the less precise humanities and the non-mathematical segment of the social sciences.

As a result the student is led through an organized, sequential step-by-step process, reinforced by practice, covering many aspects of analytical and reflective thinking. The student practices exercises which are designed to develop specific skills and to combine those skills into a consideration of significant issues and problems in United States history. The data upon which the student's mind operates in exercising these skills revolves around a chronological arrangement of the traditional subject matter of the survey course in American history. The student practices and develops analytical and reflective thinking skills while absorbing the data, ideas and interpretations of American history.

There are certain skills that, although helpful in the research and study of any discipline, are especially important to the student of history. These all involve critical thinking (and have been included as appendices in the book of exercises in thinking).

One of these concerns thesis and topic selection. Here the student is required to examine a list of subjects related to history and decide which represents a topical approach to history and which represents a thesis approach. At the same time the student must decide whether the statement (topic or thesis) is suitable as a research project for a student paper. Some statements are too broad and general, some are too narrow or are unimportant. Others seem appropriate and ideally suited for student research. Thus, the student develops the ability to evaluate and judge subjects suitable as projects for the study of history and learns the two major ways of studying history--through topics or through a thesis approach.

Another special historical skill calls for students to discriminate among a random list of sources labeling each as a primary source, a secondary source, or a tertiary source (textbooks or popular history). At the end of the exercise there are questions about the difficulties in interpreting primary sources.

A third skill especially useful to the historian is that of the analysis of sources. In this case the student is given a primary source (the Declaration of Independence in the specific exercise). The student is required to answer several analytical questions about the source. For example:

- What do you consider to be the five most important ideas in the source? Why?

- Which two ideas might be interpreted in more than one way?

- Are the ideas in the Declaration of Independence meaningful in the contemporary world? Why or why not? Be specific.

- What other rights do you consider unalienable?

For each of these special historical skills some thoughts and helpful hints have been provided for the student.

Since the instructor and student usually focus on a textbook in history courses, the problem of how to use the textbook as a tool for critical thinking is a significant one. Certainly answering fact-oriented questions at the end of sections or chapters is not adequate. Neither is class oral recitation on the contents of the chapter after a reading assignment. A more productive strategy for the use of the textbook involves the student in an analysis of the contents of the textbook. Students must, for a textbook chapter or section of a chapter, independently, choose:

- The two most important decisions made by individuals or groups.
- The two items of statistical or numerical information that are most important.
- The two concepts or ideas that are a major influence on the developments described in the chapter.
- The factors of causation, the impetus to change.
- Moral or ethical issues raised in the description of events and developments.
- Events or ideas that are similar to contemporary events and ideas.
- The picture or sketch that best reveals the main theme.
- Etc.

Ideally, the student will carefully choose all of the above and then be prepared to engage in class discussion using the student's answers as a basis for the discussion. The student learns content but in a context of critical thinking and judgment and develops skills of argument and debate while defending and supplying evidence to support choices.

Three special exercises involve the student in developing skills useful to the study of history (and other academic areas) but take the student beyond the classroom. For the first two the student is given detailed guides and asked to produce a personal history and a family history. The personal history calls for data such as child-rearing methods, influence of families and friends, special childhood memories, celebrations, travel experiences, rules of living, fads, customs, and the recognition of artifacts or material items of importance in the student's life. Analysis questions require the student to reflect upon this historical "document" that has been produced by the student, its possible use in the future by historians, and its accuracy in describing memories of past experiences.

The family history encourages the student not just to gather data about the family but to interview family members. The student must include information on national origins, residences, occupations, military involvements, cultural activities, travel, religious activities, political experiences along with the analysis of family records--letters, checks, calendar notations, cancelled checks, newspaper clippings, pictures, and of course, the results of interviews of family members. Once again, this exercise is followed by an analysis of the process of creating this historical source. For help in the interview phase, a lengthy list of topics that can be used to stimulate the memory of family members is included.

In a guide to library sources the student is required to choose a topic and examine sources in the library to find at least one significant item of data about the topic in each source. The student is led through the *Readers' Guide*, periodicals, various indexes, dictionaries, encyclopedias, reference books of statistics, and other library sources. This collection of items related to the single topic might eventually be pulled together for a student paper on the topic.

Finally, a special exercise on philosophy of history and historical causation is included. Several philosophies of history are described--the religious view, the idea of progress, the absence of ultimate meaning--and the student must react to these and develop a personal philosophy of history. Next, traditional "causes" of historical change (fifteen are chosen for this exercise) are listed and explained briefly. The student must rank these either for a particular period of history or as an overall view of what causes change in history. Gathering examples and evidence to support these choices, especially the first two or three in the ranking, helps the student develop the skills of finding and using evidence to support an evaluation or judgment.

Thus, the student is encouraged by these eight special historical skill exercises to actually "do" history, to function as an historian, to use and analyze history rather than merely memorizing it. While completing the assignments the student is using critical and reflective thinking skills and applying these skills to historical data and processes.

There are caveats related to analytical and reflective thinking. Most organized critical thinking systems leave out affective considerations--emotions or love, mercy, compassion, and many personal feelings. The process of analytical thinking can be mechanical unless the emotional element is factored in as evidence or argument. Even here the element of emotion is difficult to gauge in intensity and influence. The logical solution to a problem may not correspond to the high ethical teachings of the Sermon on the Mount. Moral and social issues are replete with emotional content that is not easy to evaluate and include in the steps and relationships that emerge in critical thinking exercises. The definition of the problem, the relevance of evidence, and the reasoned judgment to conclusions may not correspond to the instinctive or intuitional attitudes of those involved in the problem.

Also the incorporation of firmly-held philosophical or religious principles such as those that involve the relations between the sexes, the nature of man, the sanctity of human life tends to interfere with the rational development of thinking and becomes even more influential in the episodes of reflective thinking. Causation, the importance and relevance of evidence, the formation of tentative conclusions, and even the separation of fact from inference is difficult if philosophical and religious "truth" is applied to data without open analysis.

Cultural differences must be considered in many of the skills of analytical thinking and in most moral and social issues that form the framework for reflective thinking. What is a logical process, or relevant evidence or a valid inference in Japanese society may not be the same in American society. In Japan a group consensus may prevail over a valid conclusion formed through the process of analytical thinking. A traditional way of doing things may be preferred to a rational and efficient resolution of an issue.

Finally, analytical thinking assumes the availability of sufficient evidence to provide a basis for analytical and reflective thinking. In many cases this data is not available, indeed one critical thinking skill is to determine if enough data is available to warrant even a tentative conclusion. This evaluation is a complex one and most higher level processes of thinking must take place with limited data and insufficient evidence. One could argue that it is better to reach a decision after careful analytical thinking even with insufficient evidence than to follow impulses or intuition; however additional evidence may have led to a significantly-altered conclusion.

These caveats hold true especially for the historian who considers societies and cultures in a variety of times and places, must deal with strongly-held ideologies that assume certain true principles before any analytical thinking begins, evaluates evidence loaded with emotional values, and nearly always works with insufficient data. Yet, despite these sometimes discouraging difficulties and unavoidable factors that interfere with the effectiveness of critical thinking, the historian must apply the techniques of analytical and reflective thinking in the search for truth. The data and concepts of history provide an excellent vehicle for the practice and development of analytical and reflective thinking. At the same time the accumulation and retention of subject matter is enhanced because this data is acquired through the process of thinking rather than through rote memorization.

Of course, history is enjoyable on its own. There is a delight in learning, in knowing, in following a good story. And, those who have read history know that it is oftentimes more unusual, more ironic, and more fascinating than fiction. To render accurate history in clear prose form has always been the goal of historians. However, the student of history needs to go beyond entertainment and pleasure to comprehend the usefulness of history, the manner of applying the mind to historical data through analysis, criticism, evaluation, comparison, and insightful connections. In an open, free, democratic society, these skills are vital and indispensable. Thus, it is hoped that the student will not only enjoy history and thrive on knowledge of the past, but also will make use of history as a data base and issue-producer for the development of skills of judgment, insight, and analytical thinking.

The expectation is that the student will develop, along with a retention of *some* important information, an approach to learning, an attitude of confidence in the ability to think clearly, an instinctive attitude of applying incisive questions to accumulated data, a habit of organizing and categorizing knowledge, an ability to reflect and analyze, a willingness to make judgments and reach tentative conclusions, and a development of respect for relevant evidence and reasonable arguments. These habits and approaches are lasting, and, if they can be encouraged and developed, the student will enjoy a lifetime of successful reflective and analytical thinking. In the sixteenth century Yang-ming observed, "To know is to know how to know and to know what one ought to know."

Richard Mumford is Professor of History at Elizabethtown College.

World Knowledge and Critical Thinking on Political Matters: College Students' State of Mind

Pawel Boski

Abstract

This paper presents a social psychologist's contribution to the discussion on Critical Thinking, within the area of socio-political beliefs and attitudes. It is assumed that critical thinking is one's ability to form alternative models of surrounding environment (reality). Such ability should be a consequence of formal cognitive maturity and of *content knowledge* in a given domain of a physical or social world. Hence, the main hypothesis of the presented study predicts world knowledge to be the causal antecedent of critical thinking on socio-political issues. Subjects were 77 undergraduates of William Paterson College, enrolled in various psychology classes. They filled out a World Knowledge Test (WKT) and two scales measuring ideological beliefs and attitudes to American socio-political dilemmas (CRITICAL 1 & 2). Results confirmed the main hypothesis: the more knowledgeable students were more critical about the present socio-political system of American society. This relationship was not mediated by students' GPA but depended on their age (experience). Also of interest, and in line with diagnoses from other sources, was the finding of students' dramatically low level of general world knowledge: the mean score was 25% of the possible maximum. Educational and political implications are discussed.

The area of "critical thinking" is obviously one of these Renaissance-type intellectual domains, so rare in today's era of growing specialization in science. Psychology is one of its contributors; it attempts to determine the cognitive conditions (or antecedents) of that mode of thinking which is based on critical appraisal of arguments and which goes beyond the consensus of popular beliefs.

Perhaps the most important input should be here attributed to Piagetan psychology of cognitive development (Piaget, 1950; see also Baldwin, 1968, ch.8 & 9). From this perspective, critical thinking could be equated with reaching the intellectual stage of formal operations. It is during that stage that an adolescent person can understand the *general laws* or *principles* governing the observable, immediate reality and transcending it. Earlier, i.e. in the phase of concrete operations, child's judgments are bound by the context of that immediate reality and its constraints. Essential for formal operations is the ability of understanding perceived situation in terms of its controlling variables (causes) and transforming it mentally in search for alternative effects. Formal operational skills provide the individual with a cognitive equipment for *alternative* representations or constructions of reality, based on understanding of general laws, and hypothetico-deductive logic. Here, unlike during the phase of concrete operations, reality "as is" (or as it appears) becomes only one of many options carried by the abstract models. It may be questioned mentally by asking "what would happen if we changed so and so antecedent element of the cause--->effect relationship?" (e.g. classical Piagetan demonstrations of pendulum or arm weight scale). - This is the essence of experimental thinking, basic for any scientific endeavor, and qualitatively different from "fantasy models," typical of child's pre-operational thinking.

Piaget's theory has been mostly elaborated in the area of "pure" cognitive abilities, with research demonstrations employing mainly principles of physics. Yet, it found extension in the domain of moral development and judgment (Piaget, 1932). Here, isomorphic to formal operations is the stage of autonomous morality, where the "right" and "wrong" judgments are based on viewing specific cases in terms of ideal moral standards. Piagetan works inspired the next generation of psychologists of morality (e.g. Kohlberg), but also researchers in the field of social psychology, to where the present study belongs. Perhaps less known in America but of notable importance are works of Polish psychologists, Reykowski (1982, 1986), and Obuchowski (1970, 1974).

Reykowski's (1982, 1986) theory concentrates on personality mechanisms of helping (prosocial behavior) vs egocentrism. Borrowing from Piaget, his starting point is that individuals develop standards of reality: real or ideal, and motivation for behavior is generated by discrepancy between these standards and perceived reality to which they are applied. Theory postulates, and studies confirm, that by enhancing cognitive representation of external objects the motivational potential of prosocial behavior on behalf of these objects increases. One could say, in other words, that the more articulated one's knowledge of a given object the more sensitive the person becomes to that entity's present state and the more *critically* will s/he appraise its possible departure from a desirable state of being.

Obuchowski (1970) contrasted two modes of personality functioning: *Concrete* vs *Abstract* and applied this distinction to the study of goals, plans and effectiveness (1974). A person at a concrete mode of functioning responds to stimuli of familiar and predictable situations but is unable of creating alternative models nor of finding solutions to unpredictable situations. Model creation, farsighted future-oriented planning, and its flexible execution are the indicators of abstract personality regulation.

With the above theoretical inspirations, we can now conceive of critical thinking in socio-political matters in contrast to acceptance of a status quo. Or, it can be defined as sensitivity, conceptualization and evaluative expression of problems existing in one's societal environment. Critical thinking should result from a person's representations and ideal standards for society (Reykowski); and from abstract/theoretical models providing for alternatives (Piaget, Obuchowski). The theoretical framework outlined above also suggests that antecedent conditions of social critical thinking could be sought in terms of *cognitive representation* or *World Knowledge* and its structural characteristics. What is the width, depth or capacity of person's *World Knowledge* beyond the immediate environment and what are its consequences? According to the proposed reasoning, individuals with "wider horizons" will perceive their immediate social environment in more relativistic points, will have more comparison points when making judgments about the social world they live in, and will be more critical of this world.

The context of this work comes close to the large literature on authoritarianism (Adorno, et al., 1950), ethnocentrism and nationalism (Ichheiser, 1970; Boski & Rudmin, 1989; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Although not directly concerned with measuring World Knowledge, these studies have demonstrated that nationalistic attitudes go hand in hand with rejection of different ways of life (ethnocentrism), discrimination and blaming of minorities (e.g. antisemitism) and support for own nation imposing over others. A recent study by Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) found that individuals scoring high on Nationalism scale expressed support for nuclear build-up policy, had negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union and towards people standing for nuclear freeze; the opposite was true for those scoring high on Internationalism scale. It should be reminded that the evidence for a relationship between cognitive narrowmindedness and national idolatry (lack of critical thinking) has been so far at best indirect. Yet, Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) do not show any evidence for their scales of Nationalism, Patriotism or Internationalism being related to World Knowledge. The present study will attempt to bridge this gap.

Irrespective of its integration within a larger theoretical framework, the study of *World Knowledge* among American college students may also be of value for itself. It is alarmingly often that we hear of shocking ignorance about the world among our students, or we ourselves spread such anecdotes (e.g. "Some students could not find Canada on the map"; "So and so did not know who Stalin was", etc). The case of American cultural illiteracy became a subject of a book by Hirsch (1987), and seems to be attracting a growing attention among the educators.

To sum up, the present research was set up to answer two questions. The first one is diagnostic: What the level of World Knowledge among American college students? The second problem is of theoretical nature and concerns the mechanisms of critical thinking in social domain: Is there a relationship between the level of World Knowledge and Critical thinking about American problems?

Method

Subjects were 77 undergraduates of William Paterson College, enrolled in various psychology courses; males and females participated.

Research materials: World Knowledge Test (WKT) consisted of one hundred items pertaining to broadly defined social, geographical, historico-political, religious and artistic knowledge. The items referred mainly to European cultural background (76 items); Asia, Africa and South America were much less represented. *Deliberately, none of the items had any direct reference to American history and cultural heritage.*

Each item was a name which required a "Who/what is it ?" answer. Some of the examples follow:

> "Berlin Wall," "R. van Rembrandt," "Mahatma Gandhi," "Immanuel Kant,"
> "Vladimir I. Lenin," "Perestroika," J.J. Rousseau," "Leo Tolstoy," "Sorbonne,"
> "Sanskrit," "Yom Kippur."

Research materials: Critical 1 and Critical 2 Scales. Two scales of critical thinking were created. *Critical 1*, called *"My private beliefs on public matters"* had twelve Likert-type items. Items were so constructed as to fall, by their face validity, on a dimension extending from Status Quo Acceptance to Criticism of American Society.

Critical 1

My private beliefs on public matters

Please answer the following items by circling one of its alternatives.
SA= strongly agree; A= agree; ?= neutral, hard to say; D= disagree; SD= strongly disagree.

1. We have perhaps the most open and uncensored press and TV information in the world which makes Americans thoroughly knowledgeable about our country and the entire world. SA A ? D SD

2. I believe the US is in a good and sound shape in all important aspects of the nation's life. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it!" SA A ? D SD

3. I do not share the official media and government optimism so I spend much time thinking, reading, and discussing the difficult problems facing our country. SA A ? D SD

4. American system works better than any other in the world does. If less fortunate nations followed our example and advice they would be much better off. SA A ? D SD

5. These Americans who complain and criticize our system use it as a cheap excuse for their own failures which they themselves are responsible for. SA A ? D SD

6. Well, we have some problems but they come as a result of our generosity and leniency to other nations and of immigrants taking advantage of our prosperity while not accepting the American way of life. SA A ? D SD

7. In the world of poverty and hopelessness, America is the island for Freedom, Justice, Prosperity and Opportunity for all. SA A ? D SD

8. The American Dream is a mystification to justify the privileges of the few rich and to fool the masses. SA A ? D SD

9. Americans should be more open to the other countries and cultures, to understand them better, but also to learn from them how to solve some of our own problems. SA A ? D SD

10. This country is great, the problem is only with those minority people who instead of being hard working and honest have chosen the path of idleness and crime. SA A ? D SD

11. All other nations admire and envy us, openly or secretly. We ourselves should be more patriotic and proud of being Americans. SA A ? D SD

12. I wish I am not a prophet of doom but our social fabric simply does not work, it requires a dramatic overhaul. SA A ? D SD

At face value, the items at their non-critical pole appear similar to Feshbach's nationalism factor (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Some items express also external, prejudicial attributions for social problems.

The *Critical 2* scale, called *"The way I see things to be"* had thirteen forced choice items, each representing opposite political positions in important domains of social life: Health care, Education, Crime, Racial relations, Distribution of wealth (poverty), etc. In each item, one of the alternatives covered an apologetic, and the other expressed the critical option.

Critical 2

The way I see things to be

Please select one of the two alternatives at each of the items below. To do so circle an A or a B answer, indicating the statement with which you agree more.

1. Health Care

   A. We have perhaps the most advanced medical technology and professional skill which adequately take care of all individuals and families who need any type of treatment.

   B. Our health care system works for the rich; it leaves a large proportion of the nation without any viable health insurance plan. We really need socialized, universal medical plan.

2. Education

   A. It is a well known fact that kids learn less in American than in European or Japanese schools. Illiteracy is rampant. We must dramatically improve the quality of our education.

   B. All major hightech advancements are Made in America. It shows better than anything else our brain power and the top quality of education at any level for all who really want to learn

3. Whites vs. Blacks

   A. Let's face facts, except for some overpublicized cases there is no racism in America. We have equal opportunity employment, Afro-Americans reach the top career positions even to the extent that reverse discrimination becomes a problem.

   B. In recent years racism has been visible even to the blind. The desperate existence of our inner cities' Black underclass is the unquestionable indicator of a racially divided nation.

4. Crime

   A. There is this growing wave of crime because the laws are not tough enough; what we need is death penalty, more jails, more cops on the streets. Punishment and deterance, that's what will bring peace to our neighborhoods.

   B. Violent crime is a simple consequence of extreme poverty in the underclass ghettos. What is needed are government-community programs to create decent socio-economic conditions for these living in misery and hopelessness.

5. College/University Education

   A. Things are going OK. College education is expensive, it must cost, students need to work to support themselves; it has always been that way and it works that way.

   B. We need more loans, grants, scholarships and student employment at college, to spend more time at school, to study at a deeper, more meaningful level.

6. Gun Control

   A. To own a gun is a fundamental right and freedom. What could be accomplished by outlawing firearms would be like taking them from the hands of good citizens and leaving them to the outlaws.

   B. Firearms serve to kill, even the sight of weapons enhances aggression. Everyone who owns them is a potential killer. A ban on guns is a civilized necessity.

7. Trade Unions

   A. To protect workers' rights, to defend them and to fight for better pay and improved work conditions we need much stronger labor unions, all around the country.

   B. It is very fortunate that unions have been weakened and their membership is declined. This is the way to restore the spirit of work and productivity, rather than conflict and lower standard of living.

8. My political belief

   A. It is really difficult to categorize oneself with a single label. Still, if I were to make such a decision I would call myself a Liberal Democrat.

B. I am against tight labeling categories in social life. But if I had to, I would call myself a Republican or Conservative.

9. Strength and Power

A. This world is so far from heavenly peace! If We Americans really want peace, we must be strong, so that no one will dare attack or impose any threat upon us and our friends. Strong defense is a must.

B. Arms race is madness, it brings us to the edge of destruction. And it costs us billions of dollars each year. That money should be spent on health care, education, better housing, international aid on all the programs that bring internal and external peace.

10. Immigrants

A. This country has been built by immigrants, people who were oppressed and lived without hope in other lands. We are all immigrants and we should stick firmly to our best traditions of Open Society, always open to New Americans.

B. Even if this country has been built by immigrants, it does not mean that it should continue that way for ages. Right now we need to build a more united, patriotic nation. Constant waves of new peoples bring us chaos, confusion and crime.

11. The poor and the rich

A. The landmark of our prosperity is a private enterprise and individual drives for success in business. Those who are rich deserve it with all their talent and hard work. And they create jobs for others. Finally, everyone gets what s/he deserves.

B. Economic distances in America are far too large. The rich are too rich and the poor are too poor. This country is run by the rich for the rich. The privledges are unjustified and should be curbed by proper changes in income tax.

12. My future

A. I study to learn more about this world for the sake of knowing. Sure, I will have some interesting job in a couple of years. My goal however, will never be to make money, to be rich and respected for that, but to be useful and make a difference.

B. I try to be realistic. I am in college because it will give me a better job, more money, a better life in all respects. I will work to go ahead in social space, to improve my and my family's life conditions.

13. My interest in public affairs

A. We have politicians elected to take care of public matters, so I leave that business to them and do not bother myself.

B. I either do not trust politicians enough or find it important to be well informed about what's going on around the world, so I kep my own interests wide open.

Procedure. The World Knowledge Test (WKT) and two versions of Critical Thinking Scales were administered and filled out by the students during the regular classes. Respondents were assured of anonymity and that the results would not carry any consequences for their grades. Nonetheless, they were urged to fill out the WKT to the best of their ability.

Scoring system. The open ended nature of the WKT items prevented the Yes (1) - No (0), dichotomous scoring of the answers; there was definitely a wider range of answer quality to each item, running from excellent to completely false or no-answer. For that reason, a scoring system was developed, with the answer scales from 2=highest to 0=lowest for each item. For instance, answers to *"Feodor Dostoevsky"* could be scored as follows:

2.0 = "Russian novelist, author of "Brothers Karamazov", "Crime and Punishment";
1.5 = "Well known Russian writer of 19th century";
1.0 = "An author";
0.5 = "A Russian";
0.0 = "Politician" (or No answer).

Similar rating scales were developed for all 100 items. Scoring was done separately by the author and a student assistant. The interrater reliability was very high (correlation between two sets of total scores was r=.89), the cases of divergent scores were discussed until a perfect agreement was reached.

Items on *"My private beliefs on public matters"* were scored on 5-point scales, whereas *"The way I see the things to be"* had forced choice, dichotomous answers. The scoring system took care of reversed items and the numbers of missing answers. High scores indicated more approving, *less critical* attitudes on socio-political issues. Respondent's total score was divided by the number of answered items (after subtracting the missed ones).

Results.

World Knowledge Test: The areas of ignorance. Descriptive statistics is of interest in this case by its own right: How much do American college students know about the world outside their immediate environment? - Our results confirm the most incredible anecdotes about the large pockets of ignorance. The mean score in the WKT was X=55.93, that is 27.97% of the 200 maximum. Looking at the results from the college grading system point of view where 50% = D passing grade, 71 students out of the total 77 would fail. It tells us that a few of very knowledgeable students raised the mean; indeed, due to these exceptions, the distribution is positively skewed (skewedness= +1.24). The four highest scores, ranging from 127.5 to 172.5, definitely belong to a different ball league.

Which were the easiest and the most difficult items in the WKT? To answer this question, percentages of zero-scores for all 100 items were calculated. The twelve easiest items, with less than 20% of zero-scores were: "Aristotle," "Johann Sebastian Bach," "L. van Beethoven," "Eiffel Tower," "Hamlet - Macbeth," "Wolfgang A. Mozart," "Quebec," "Pablo Picasso," "Socrates," "Leonardo da Vinci," "Yom Kippur," and "Reincarnation." Items from the opposite side of the spectrum, with more than 85% zero-scores were: "Battle of Britain," "Simon Bolivar," "Common Market," "Federico Fellini," "Budapest 1956," "Forbidden City," "Gen. Pinochet," "Perestroika," "Baltic Republics," "Prague Spring 1968," "Suez Canal," "Marshal Josip Broz-Tito," "Yalta Agreements," "Sorbonne," "Timbuktu," "Thomas Mann," "Francisco Franco," and "Niccolo Machiavelli." It may be safely concluded that the easiest items represent the classics in world history of arts and humanities. The pockets of almost total ignorance exist in the domains of current affairs and recent political history.

Who are the students who do better in the WKT? They are first of all older in age (but not in the student status), r=.560, p<001, and also with a higher GPA, r=. 390, p<.001. As age is also positively correlated with GPA, r=.442, p<.001, it can be concluded that mature students learn better in their formal college education and acquire more knowledge about the world from other sources.

Testing the hypothesis: Is World Knowledge related to Critical Thinking? The main hypothesis of this study was tested by running correlational analyses between WKT and the two tests of socio-political attitudes. WKT correlates *negatively* with Critical 1, $r(76)= -.337$, $p<.001$. It means that with higher scores in world knowledge goes stronger disapproval of American status quo, or *more critical thinking.* The Critical 2 test (forced choice) correlates positively with Critical 1, $r=.343$, $p<.001$ but is not significantly related to TWK, $r= -.062$, ns.

As the two tests were specially designed for the purpose of this study, and their psychometric characteristics had not been known earlier, reliability and factor analyses were performed on the item scores, to explore their inner consistency or possible dimensional structure.

Critical 1 has a respectable reliability, Alpha=.752; this internal consistency can be also interpreted as a one-factorial structure of the measured variable. CRITICAL 2 lacks such desirable psychometric characteristics, its coefficient of reliability Alpha= .542 suggests a more complex factorial structure. A two factorial, Varimax rotated, solution was obtained, following factor extraction by the method of principal components. Factor I: *Prejudice-Punitiveness* has its highest loadings with the following items: "What we need is death penalty, more jails, more cops on the streets" (.805); "We need to build a more united, patriotic nation, constant waves of new peoples (immigrants) bring us chaos, confusion and crime" (.584); "To own a gun is a fundamental right and freedom..." (.535); "...There is no racism in America" (.529); "Strong defense is a must" (.468). Scores on this factor negatively correlate with WKT, $r(50)= -.222$, $p=.06$. Factor 2: *Individual Responsibility*, has high loadings in items that emphasize a need for individual hard work, rather than for government support in education (.669) or for union action (.641), it also stresses a need for active interest in public matters (.580). This factor shows a marginal positive correlation with the WKT, $r(50)= .200$, $p<.10$.

Discussion

World Knowledge. In the European cultural tradition, Knowledge is a non-instrumental value of itself: "It is good to be a knowledgeable person". The roots of this intellectual tradition goes back to the times of ancient Greece and its first academic institutions. In a pragmatic America, the sui generis character of knowledge is of less importance, yet universities and colleges claim to be the oases of liberal arts and sciences. Seen from this perspective our results in WKT are shocking indeed. All the subjects were college students and all of them took the required general education courses, and yet only 6 of 77 would pass the test, had it been given as a routine exam.

Two questions could be raised regarding validity of this test: 1) Was it too difficult?; 2) Were the students motivated enough to answer 100 items of the test? Concerning difficulty, it should be reminded that most items were taken from the list of "Cultural Literacy" for Americans, suggested by Hirsch (1987). They did not require any advanced historical, geographical or art-related knowledge and one should believe that most of them should be easy enough for high school students to answer. Also, the scoring system was lenient, assigning credits even for loose associations with the correct answers.

The motivational argument, that students were not willing to put an extra effort in answering the WKT can not be dismissed. But in view of a positive correlation between WKT and GPA, it appears that low motivation during the research session was consistent with low effort in regular studies. Thus, there are good reasons to believe that low motivation to fill out the WKT coincided with low factual knowledge.

It is of some comfort that students scoring higher in the WKT had higher GPA in their academic background. However modest their world knowledge happened to be, students with better grades knew more. Yet, more impressive is the correlation between age and WKT: older, mature students showed broader world knowledge, along with better grades. These findings encourage a hypothesis that studenst more advanced in age are more serious (motivated) about their studies but also that they acquire world knowledge through channels other than formal college education alone, such as own readings, life experience, etc.

World Knowledge and Critical Thinking. This study was initiated from a theoretical perspective linking world knowledge to critical thinking on socio-political issues and the findings pertaining to this hypotheses are most important. Reported correlations between the WKT and CRITICAL 1 test and with factor 1: Prejudice-Punitiveness in CRITICAL 2, give support to that hypothesis. The less people know about the world outside the US, the more are they likely to uncritically approve this country as is or as the best of the possible worlds, the more are such unknowledgeable people likely to be blind to the problems facing their society. Those who know little about the outside world are also more inclined to blame (externalize) minorities and immigrants for possible American troubles; they also, paradoxically, tend to favor violent punitive measures in restoring law and order (death penalty, stronger police and arms at individual and national level).

Summary: A causal model. All our findings reported above are of correlational nature, and in this context an important question of their causal interpretation has to be addressed. Our theoretical reasoning suggested a causal link from complexity of cognitive representation to socio-political criticism, rather than the reverse direction of their relationship. On the empirical ground that reasoning is further supported by a significant correlation between GPA and Critical 1. It would be difficult indeed to argue that critical socio-political thinking leads to better grades and to more advanced world knowledge, than the other way around.

Theoretical interpretation of the correlational coefficients may be empirically tested by a path analytical approach (Pedhazur, 1983). Four variables which show significant intercorrelations are candidates for entering such causal model: Age, GPA, WKT and Critical 1. We assume that Age is an exogenous variable, which determines (indicating higher motivation) GPA and WKT (because of "life experience"). GPA should be seen as a scholastic cognitive cause of WKT. Finally, Critical 1 should be viewed as a direct effect of WKT, while its correlations with GPA are GPA can be decomposed into direct and indirect effects. The model is graphically illustrated and statistically tested in Fig.1.

FIG. 1: A PATH ANALYTICAL (causal) MODEL OF THE MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS



Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; ---ns

In the first step, we can see a highly significant path from Age to WKT, while the path from GPA to WKT becomes insignificant as much of the initial correlation between these variables turns out to be spurious (due to indirect effect of Age). In the next step, the path from WKT to Critical 1 is highly significant while the correlation between GPA and Critical 1 is again reduced to a nonsignificant direct effect. Finally, Age in its direct effect, suppresses critical thinking.

Results of the path analysis give a sound causal interpretation to the correlations between variables of this study, reported earlier. In particular, the theoretical hypothesis that broad, complex knowledge as representation of the world should lead to critical thinking in socio-political domain, has received a considerable support. When trying to improve and to internationalize American higher education, educators should realize (with hope or with a conservative anxiety) that more knowledgeable students will also think more critically about America.

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Pawel Boski is Professor of Psychology at William Paterson College, Wayne, NJ.

WORLD KNOWLEDGE TEST

Do you know the meaning behind this name?

I would like you to briefly describe the sense or meaning of each of the names you will see below. Just a few words will be enough. If you don't know, just make a slash (/) and leave it, and don't worry, you may always have a look at any encyclopedia later. It is not a test that matters for any course, and I am not interested in your names.

Stud. stat.: Fr So Jun Sen; Sex: F M; Major: Age: GPA:

Before you start, an example, how to answer these questions

Example: Franklin D. Roosevelt: US President, 1932-1945; Author of New Deal, one of the principal actors in WWII.

1. 1914-1918
2. Allah
3. Acropolis
4. Alexander the Great
5. 1939-1945
6. St. Thomas Aquinas
7. Aristotle
8. Auschwitz
9. Johann Sebastian Bach
10. Berlin Wall
11. Battle of Waterloo
12. Inca
13. L. van Beethoven
14. Battle of Britain
15. IRA
16. Simon Bolivar
17. Winston Churchill
18. Chernobyl
19. Common Market
20. Battle of Stalingrad
21. Confucius
22. Copernicus
23. Charles de Gaulle
24. Wailing Wall
25. Don Quixote
26. Eiffel Tower
27. F. Engels - K. Marx
28. Francisco Franco
29. French Impressionism
30. Mahatma Gandhi
31. Napoleon Bonaparte
32. V. van Gogh
33. Niccolo Machiavelli
34. Greenwich mean time
35. Federico Fellini
36. Feodor Dostoevsky
37. Budapest, 1956
38. The Inquisition
39. Mecca
40. Immanuel Kant
41. Iron Curtain
42. Koran
43. Kilimandjaro
44. Nikita Khrushchev
45. League of Nations
46. Bastille, 1789
47. Mein Kamp
48. Renaissance
49. Mao Tse-tung
50. Vladimir I. Lenin
51. Hamlet - Macbeth
52. Wolfgang A. Mozart
53. Kremlin
54. Forbidden City
55. Benito Mussolini
56. PLO
57. Falkland War
58. Pablo Picasso
59. Gen. Pinochet
60. Perestroika
61. Baltic Republics
62. Quebec
63. Shiite - Sunni
64. Prague, Spring 1968
65. Pierre Eliott Trudeau
66. Red Square
67. R. van Rembrandt
68. Bethlehem
69. Gothic
70. J. J. Rousseau
71. Jean Paul Satre
72. Sistine Chapel
73. Socrates
74. Joseph Stalin
75. Romanesque
76. Enlightenment
77. Suez Canal
78. Marshal Josip Tito
79. Fidel Castro
80. Leo Tolstoy
81. Third Reich
82. Trojan War
83. Versailles
84. Nuremberg Trials
85. Warsaw Pact
86. Yalta Agreements

87. Lech Walesa
88. Leonardo da Vinci
89. Zimbabwe
90. Sorbonne
91. Glasnost
92. Ingmar Bergman
93. Yom Kippur
94. Timbuktu
95. Dalai Lama
96. Bolsheviks
97. Thomas Mann
98. Victor Hugo
99. Reincarnation
100. Sanskrit

Teaching American Students About China: Combining Global Education and Critical Thinking

Nancy Tumposky

The dramatic events in Tiananmen Square are now over, but China stays in the news. The 40th anniversary of the founding of the republic was celebrated recently, amid fanfare and some sour grapes. Many of the intellectuals seem to have gone abroad, or underground. "So this is happening again," I thought to myself, remembering the waves of repression and underground hiding in the late 1920s, and then in the 1950s, and again in the late 1960s.

The Dalai Lama has won the Nobel Peace Prize. "How humiliating for the Chinese, " I thought to myself. "I wonder if they're trying to supress the news within China. Or maybe they're trying to dismiss the prize itself and so undercut its importance as an international symbol. That might be more effective. Hey! That's just what Reagan did when the World Court ruled against the U. S. for mining the harbors in Nicaragua. His response was, 'World Court? Who are they anyway?' Lots of people (not critical thinkers!) bought it. I could see it working in China."

My mind is jumping around, making interpretations, making connections, trying out theories which may be lame brained or may have something to them. I don't really know enough about the Chinese news media these days to speculate as to how they're treating the Nobel Prize story. But if I met a journalist who'd just come back from there, I think I'd be able to ask some of the questions which would help me understand all this better. And right now I'd understand it better if I had someone else to toss the ideas around with.

Could my students do this? Could they take what they already know and connect it to something in the news? Could THEY ask the good questions?

Can I create conditions in the classroom to show them that this is possible, and desirable? Is school the place where this can be done?

In my work, I think a lot about what the function of schools should be. One perspective which I have found to be very stimulating is that of Neil Postman, and his thesis in a book entitled *Teaching as a Conserving Activity*, (1979). Postman holds that the function of education is "to always offer the counter argument", by which he means that schools should function as a kind of intellectual and cultural thermostat, counterbalancing the forces which exist in any culture so as to provide equal time for ideas and perspectives which otherwise might not be encountered by students. The type of cultural norm which Postman focuses on is that of television, which he calls the "tv curriculum" - a curriculum which instructs our young people in fragmented and narrative, image-centered ways. He suggests that we need a school curriculum which corrects for this phenomenon by presenting information in an alternative mode: analytic, expository, requiring abstract levels of thinking not demanded by the "tv curriculum."

I use Postman's perspective to think about the role of global education for our students, and to consider the value in particular of learning about China. The case for global studies has been made eloquently by many educators who decry our students' lack of awareness of global issues or even of elementary geography. There's more to it than that, though - it's the idea of getting inside of another way of thinking, as well as developing more sophisticated general knowledge. What is it about China that is different enough that it could open our students' minds to new levels of thinking? Could learning about China function as a cultural contrast such as the ones Postman has described?

I ran across a clue to this question in an unlikely place - Seymour Papert's book *Mindstorms* (1980), which is the story of his study with Piaget and his work with computers, developing a computer language called LOGO. Papert was concerned with the ways in which children build their own intellectual structures, and how they use the metaphors and models they find around them in the culture. He designed LOGO in order to help children learn to think in more systematic ways, since, as he pointed out, our culture is relatively poor in models of systematic procedures. By introducing children to the language and culture of computers, he hoped to provide an alternative model of thinking.

The more I thought about Papert and his brilliant work with LOGO, the more I realized that Chinese culture, too, like computer culture, is rich in systematic procedures - even the written language is a model of complexity built upon brush strokes carried out in a certain sequence. The language, in both its oral and written forms, demonstrates a level of abstraction which our alphabetic and inflected Western languages do not posess. This insight bolstered my confidence that for American students, learning about China could truly be a mind stretching enterprise. It could, as Postman says, offer the counter argument.

Last spring, before the uprising in Tiananmen Square, I was invited into a colleague's classroom to speak about China to his students in a course entitled "Philosophy of Education"; I was asked to describe the school as a social institution within a specific culture. Thus, for the first time in several years, I reflected on my own experiences in China and thought about what I could say in 55 minutes to those undergraduates.

I started my own presentation with the question, "What's important to know about China?" Content is necessary, right? We can't think unless we have something to think about. I made several outlines to guide my talk - focusing on the role of the family, the long history, the politics, the geography, the poverty -- all of which are relevant dimensions of modern Chinese life if one is to understand why schools are the way they are. But I quickly became uncomfortable with my own emphasis on these facts. Some of them after all are ephemeral; others may turn out in the light of future historians to be untrue. Much of the factual information which I can impart is suspect anyway - I got it second or third hand; I can't even read Chinese.

I found myself unsure as to how to make my presentation. This is a common dilemma of teachers.

I switched gears and started thinking about what I wanted them to be able to do with these understandings, and thought about what kind of gap still existed between that hope of mine and their present knowledge and skills. This change of focus helped me to organize my presentation. I realized that I'd like them to be able to follow current events in the newspapers with some understanding, and connect the surface structure of the words to some background knowledge. I'd like them to be able to make connections between their own roles as students in a culture where they are imperfectly empowered and the situation of students in China. I'd like them, ultimately, to be able to make some kind of judgments of worth about contrasting patterns of government, family life, and so on.

In the end, what I did with the class I visited for 55 minutes was this: I handed out index cards, and asked everyone to write down one thing they knew about China, one thing they didn't know, and one thing they'd like to find out from me, who had been there. I modelled possible ways of doing this, such as writing down "I know that they don't use our alphabet" or "I don't know what the role of women is like." The students carried out this task, then I collected the cards, and read some of them aloud. A few were quite interesting, and after several minutes, the students had all activated whatever background knowledge of China had been there to begin with. Also, some people picked up on others' questions, thereby expanding their own background knowledge base. Some made comments like, "Yeah, what IS the role of women", and so on. I allowed a few minutes of comment and additional related questioning, and then I moved into a traditional lecture presentation, during which I outlined 5 or 6 of the features of Chinese life which I felt related most prominently to how schools function in that country. I added personal observations often to make the information more real.

If I had had time at the end, I would have asked them to fill out another set of cards about China beginning with the statement "I never realized that. . ." so they could see for themselves what new information they had actually acquired during the class period.

To answer my original question, I would say that the connections our students make, while hesitant at first, ARE possible (as well as desirable) and that school IS the place where this can be done. By inviting learners to become aware of what they know and what they don't know in a preparatory phase of the lesson, the teacher is carrying out valuable training in metacognition, which will carry over to other learning situations as well as generating important background information for the task at hand.

I am confident that learners of all ages can benefit from this type of global education and that our schools and colleges should be providing it.

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Nancy Tumposky is a member of the faculty of the Department of Curriculum and Teaching at Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, New Jersey.

Social Inquiry and the Civil Rights Movement

Stephen Lilley

During the latter half of the 1950's and throughout the 1960's the Civil Rights Movement raised civil rights to such an urgent national issue that Americans were compelled to form an opinion and to take a stand. Very much like today's controversy over abortion, failure to arrive at a personal decision, whether pro or con, was rare.

However, over thirty years have passed since the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement, when a young preacher by the name of Martin Luther King, Jr. was chosen to lead Montgomery's black community in their struggle to desegregate the city's bus lines. Most contemporary college students were born after the civil rights era. They have no personal experience of the civil rights events and issues. The Civil Rights Movement has become part of the social memory, dependent on present-day teachers to keep it and its cause fresh and bright in the minds of contemporary students.

I contend that conventional production and consumption of social-scientific knowledge are ill-suited to this goal. Conventional methods yield a superficial understanding of the Civil Rights Movement, while a deeper historical sensitivity to the Civil Rights Movement, an ardent interest in civil rights, and critical thinking are not developed. A pedagogy that restores the historical event as it promotes critical thinking and personal involvement is offered instead.

The production and consumption of social-scientific knowledge

Karl Marx (1976, p. 716) suggests that workers under capitalist enterprises suffer from alienation when the products that they create are sold as commodities. The fruit of their labor is no longer consumed or used by themselves or their families, thus workers are detached, alienated from their creations. Expanding on Marx's insight, Alvin Toffler (1981, pp. 37-39) suggests that the separation between production and consumption is endemic to industrial capitalism. Producers and consumers are not one and the same. For example, most Americans do not make the automobiles that they drive, the food they eat, the clothing they wear, the mass media that they tune into, the laws that they follow, etc.

The same is often true in regard to social-scientific knowledge. Too often professional social-scientists generate knowledge and students consume it. Students are not encouraged to produce. As pure consumers students are easily alienated from the subject matter. As pure consumers students remain passive and fail to develop their creative and investigative potential. On the other hand, if teachers involve students in the productive process the students' knowledge of the topic will be deeper and their critical thinking more developed.

The fruits of production

There are two stages in the production of social-scientific knowledge: exploration and analysis. In the exploratory stage researchers become immersed in primary source material. In regard to movements for instance, they conduct interviews with participants, peruse records in archives, read diaries and correspondences, etc. At this stage researchers glimpse mood and motivation, fears and convictions, values and beliefs. They sense the tremendous excitement, tension, and tumultuous fervor associated with the issue. They experience wonderment and revelations and gain a deep understanding of the underlying conflicts.

Dealing with actual participants of the movement and/or their records fosters a certain amount of intimacy with the subject matter. This intimacy coupled by the provocative nature of the movement often compels the researcher to develop personal opinions and positions on the issues raised by the movement. For example, people wrote letters to King calling on him to end civil rights campaigns because it caused unrest, others urged him to continue the non-violent confrontational approach, while still others demanded that he approve violence as a weapon in the struggle. The reader of these letters would be hard pressed to remain detached. The human tendency is to consider one's own response vis-a-vis the stated positions.

The exploratory stage, thus, involves an intense learning experience where understanding a movement and its cause is achieved by 1) seeing it through the eyes of supporters and opponents and 2) through the development of personal insights.

The push for refinement

Researchers rarely publish these first impressions and these descriptive, rough accounts, instead they subject them to analysis and refinement. This is primarily due to mandates of publication. The researcher seeks to have his/her work published in a professional journal and/or published as a scholarly monograph or text. His/Her work will be evaluated as to its publication merit by experts in the field with a central criteria being its novelty or its contribution to the extant literature. Researchers realize that exploratory impressions are often bold but undeveloped; that experts have also thoroughly explored the issue and have acquired preliminary understandings of the event.

To add something new to the specialized, advanced body of literature the researcher must refine the analysis, perhaps utilizing sophisticated statistical techniques and/or focusing on just one or a few variables such as the social movement's organization, ideology, interaction with other social institutions, etc. Some recent examples in the literature of the Civil Rights Movement include Jack Bloom's (1987) evaluation of class and race, Aldon Morris' (1984) analysis of the indigenous organization, and Doug McAdam's (1982) emphasis on the movement's political process.

Refinement and pedagogy

Refinement of theory and methods is necessary and beneficial for the advancement of a field of inquiry. However, a predilection toward refinement in a field may have unforeseen negative consequences when it comes to pedagogy.

Refined works not only come to dominate the literature they become central to course reading lists, lectures, discussions, and test material. However, these are specialized, polished studies far removed from the rough, multifaceted, emotion-laden movement. They can not establish within the student a basic personal connection with the movement and its cause. The student learns concepts and theories, which is good, yet without exploration on their own, without developing that base line understanding, the concepts and theories are so much esoteric information. In particular, historical sensibility and critical thinking are not developed.

Historical sensibility

Today's college students were born after the Civil Rights Movement, hence the movement is not a part of their life experience. Efforts must be made to acquaint the students with the movement. However, if students are only exposed to refined studies they most likely will not develop what Anthony Giddens (1987, p. 19) calls 'historical sensibility', i.e., the ability to become familiar with distant cultures and/or time periods and the ability to compare them to one's own social world. It is extremely difficult to achieve the necessary historical sensibility when the details of how people lived, what they thought and believed in the Civil Rights Era are absent, as is usually the case with refined accounts of a movement. Exploration of primary source material, in contrast, yields a detailed picture of the social, economic, and political landscape of that time.

By not having the students engaged in the exploratory stage of social research students are unable to sense the raw energy, excitement, and challenge created by the social movement. Since abstract concepts are presented but not the viewpoints of flesh-and-blood participants the students fail to empathize with those involved. Disinterest is often produced. The learning process remains superficial, a matter of regurgitating terms, concepts, etc.

Exploration, on the other hand, encourages the human connection as students implicitly compare their values and experiences with those of supporters and opponents of the movement. This in turn triggers student interest.

A well-developed historical sensitivity to the Civil Rights Movement would, moreover, take students beyond a caricature of the movement. There exists a popularized understanding of the Civil Rights Movement in which leaders of the movement take on the status of legends, supporters are portrayed as saints, and opponents as devils. The movement per se appears larger than life. If students were encouraged to explore primary source material they would go beyond this caricature. They would become aware of the human frailty of the leaders, the doubts, the impure motives, the mistakes, as well as the goodness and heroics, of the participants. Perhaps they also would see the human side of civil rights opponents. The movement then would not seem so foreign, distant, and unreal. It would not be treated as a morality play of yesteryear.

Reading pertinent letters written in the 1960's students may come across a middle-aged black woman's demand for better education for her children, a young black man's anger at the slow pace of reform, a pacifists call for the end of racial violence, or the deep-rooted, ignorance-fed hatred of a white bigot. Taking the next step they realize that these are not sentiments frozen in the past (just as the concerns of the Civil Rights Movement are not trapped in a previous era)-- these sentiments and concerns are with us today. This promotes a more intelligent, sensitive response to current civil rights violations.

Refined studies, on the other hand, stand the risk of simplifying the Civil Rights Movement. Analysis of a movement entails the whittling of a multi-faceted, complex, and comprehensive social phenomenon to a few salient points. Inconsistencies, contradictions, and nuances of the movement may be swept to the side to accommodate this process. However the more the movement is simplified the harder it is to discover those connections with the variegated present. And yet such connections are necessary for an enlightened response to contemporary civil rights issues.

Critical thinking

According to Stephen Brookfield (1987) "when we think critically we come to our judgements, choices, and decisions for ourselves, instead of letting others do this on our behalf." (x, preface) When students are not encouraged to explore primary sources, when they are simply presented with finished works and required to 'absorb' the content, then they are not being encouraged to develop their critical thinking. The work has been done for them, the conclusions drawn, the questions closed, such that their own creative and investigative talents are wasted.

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The student should instead be encouraged to explore and participate in the *production* of knowledge. Participatory research as described by Paulo Freire (1973) should be developed:

> [The] method of investigation which involves study--and criticism of the study--by the people is at the same time a learning process. Through this process of investigation, examination, criticism, and reinvestigation, the level of critical thinking is raised among all those involved. (p. 30)

Members of the Frankfurt School worried that where self-learning ceased state propaganda would fill the void. But the void per se is of concern. It is discouraging to consider all of the personal insights never formed and the new perspectives never born. In regard to the Civil Rights Movement it is disheartening to consider all of the invaluable lessons lost rather than being discovered anew.

Also of concern is the failure to develop individuals who have the ability to critically analyze an issue and make intelligent decisions. In regard to the teaching of the Civil Rights Movement, the objective is for students to be capable of more than a recitation of the movement's history. They should develop the capacity to consider civil rights in different cultures and under divergent conditions. For example, students should be able to apply their sharpened cognitive skills to an understanding of Apartheid in South Africa.

Our responsibility as teachers goes well beyond the sharing of information. We must foster active inquiry and learning beyond the classroom. This creation of critical thinking is encouraged first, however, through exploration in the classroom.

Exploration in the classroom

The fruits which researchers reap through exploration of an issue-- a deep understanding of the social phenomenon, a personal involvement in the issue, a sharpening of investigative and cognitive skills-- will be attained by students if they are encouraged to also produce knowledge. Presented below is a course structure which emphasizes student exploration of the Civil Rights Movement.

To engage students in discovery of the Civil Rights Movement and civil rights I suggest the following program. Locate primary source materials circa 1950-1970 such as diaries of movement participants; articles, editorials, letters to the editor dealing with civil rights issues; correspondence of movement leaders; taped or written speeches and talk show discussions; pamphlets and fliers, etc. Select and then xerox-copy (where allowable) examples from these sources. Present each student with a package of xeroxed material at the beginning of the course.

Throughout the first half of the course have the students answer questions as they explore the material. The questions should provoke the students to extract from the material 1) an understanding of the fundamental ethos of civil rights; 2) knowledge of the movement's fundamental position, disputes within the movement, and opposition to the movement; and 3) a sense of the importance of the movement and its cause both then and now. Some example questions and/or assignments are listed below.

> --Based on your reading of the primary source material discuss why some Americans participated in the Civil Rights Movement while others opposed it.
>
> --Respond to the accusation contained in letter #21 that civil rights advocates were harming America with their protests.

--Of all the letters, editorials, etc., which one contains a position most akin to your personal stance on civil rights? Explain why.

--Imagine a debate between a movement participant and opponent over the merit of the movement's objectives. Write a transcript of the debate.

While the students are reading the primary sources and completing the assignments establish through lecture and videos the historical and socio-economic background of the Civil Rights Era including an account of slavery, emancipation, Jim Crow legislation, prejudice, segregation (both dejure and defacto), and discrimination in education, employment, military, etc.

Only in the latter half of the course, after the students have acquired knowledge of the complexities of the Civil Rights Movement and an understanding of the subjective dimension, should more sophisticated, refined analysis be introduced. Once again, this is not a matter of simply depositing the goods. The students should be provoked with questions and/or assignments to perform their own analyses and arrive at their own conclusions. For example, they may be asked to complete the following tasks:

--Based on your reading of the material discuss how white supporters contributed to the movement and how black supporters contributed to the movement.

--How was the Southern conflict over civil rights similar to and different from the Northern conflict?

--Which supporters' expectations for the Civil Rights Movement were fulfilled and which have yet to be met? Why did the movement fail on some accounts?

The students' creative and investigative talents once exercised can then be supplemented by readings and discussions of refined studies, so that their insights into the class factor, the geographic context, the movements' organization, success and failure will be doubly enriched.

Finally, when the students have a good handle on this movement provoke them to broaden their understanding by considering contemporary civil rights issues and abuses. For example, ask the students how the student uprising in China can be understood in light of the Civil Rights Movement; how black and Asian South Africans have adopted methods similar to those used by civil rights activists thirty years ago.

Conclusion

The above mentioned course structure is an illustration. The exact format utilized to promote exploration in class is not the crucial point. The key is creating structures, any structures, which force students to explore and produce. The benefits are worth the effort. On the one hand students develop deep, extensive, active knowledge from this 'hands-on learning.' On the other hand issues that are dead in the minds of countless contemporary men and women, but should not be dead, are revived and recycled through another generation.

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Stephen Lilley is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Sacred Heart University.

Cultural Relativism and Critical Thinking: The Nacirema Study Themselves

Janet Pollak

In May of 1985 I signed up for a week-long faculty seminar entitled "Writing As Process" at William Paterson College, where I teach anthropology and archeology. The seminar was taught by English professors Donna Perry and Robert Kloss, and was designed to convert colleagues from so-called "content disciplines" to the Writing Across the Curriculum pedagogy. I waded through all the exercises, learned how to cluster, do collaborative writing in a group, do peer critiquing, learned how to pronounce the word revision as RE-vision, knock out zero drafts, and bare my soul in journal entries. When the fall semester began that year, I audited the freshman composition course, Writing Effective Prose, as a fully-participating student. This course was taught in the "process" mode by Donna Perry.

When the spring semester was about to begin in January 1986, I agreed to transform the basic General Education anthropology course into a writing-intensive one. I was already convinced that learning and understanding content was greatly enhanced by writing: "writing as a mode of learning." I established a special notebook requirement and designed fifteen separate writing exercises linked to topics addressed in the course. One of the two 75-minute class meetings each week was set aside primarily for writing activities. A class of 40 or 45 students was divided into permanent groups of about five students each. Some of the writing exercises were group tasks and some were individual ones. Most were accomplished in class. At intervals, students were asked to take in-class work home for revision, and peer-critiquing occurred on a regular basis. I collected the notebooks (which also contained bi-weekly journal entries) every other week and "dialogued" with the students. Professor Perry audited this course as a participating student and worked on all of the assignments along with the class.

Critical Thinking and Writing

Over the past three years I have been teaching two sections of Introduction to Anthropology every semester. This scheduling has provided a built-in potential for evaluating student learning and understanding in the course. I decided, therefore, to teach one of my sections in the standard lecture format as a "control" group, and the other in the writing-intensive mode. This is when I began to see firsthand the relationship between writing and critical thinking.

Students who enrolled in the writing-intensive sections over the past few semesters have achieved test scores equivalent to the ones earned by the control group, yet the students in these special writing sections have received roughly fifty percent less lecture time. The students in the writing-intensive sections have been, however, active learners. This paper focuses on just two of the fifteen writing exercises used in the General Education anthropology course at William Paterson.

Critical Thinking, Cultural Relativism, and the Nacirema

A cursory examination of the critical thinking literature reveals abundant variation in the definitions; education/psychology scholars have formulated nearly as many definitions of critical thinking as anthropologists have of the concept of culture. Joanne Gainen Kurfiss, who is a teaching consultant in the Center for Teaching Effectiveness at the University of Delaware, offers a definition that seems useful here. She says of critical thinking that it is "an investigation whose purpose is to explore a situation, phenomenon, question, or problem to arrive at a hypothesis or conclusion about it that integrates all available information and that can therefore be convincingly justified" (Kurfiss, 1988, p. 2).

Anthropology Assignment #1

This assignment is given in the very first writing workshop class on the course, usually in the first week of the semester. At this point in the course, some students have not as yet purchased the textbook. However, they have heard me define anthropology and outline the anthropological perspective in the social sciences, among other things.

The exercise reads as follows: This exercise should take about 30 minutes. (1) Listen carefully as Horace Miner's short article, "Body Ritual Among the Nacirema," is read. (2) Select a custom or ritual you know very well. (3) Place yourself in the shoes of an observer from a different culture who has been assigned the task of writing a formal ethnographic description of that custom or ritual. (4) Using this sheet of paper, write a report about the custom or ritual and, if you like, give a "Horace Miner" treatment. Think carefully about all aspects of what you are observing, including details, behaviors, surroundings, order of events, etc. Remember, you are from a foreign culture and you are viewing this custom or ritual for the first time. You probably would not even know the correct term for the custom or ritual.

The Nacirema exercise asks students to do a little anthropology of their own and try our their observational and analytical skills. The task is introduced with a quotation from James W. Fernandez: "It has often been remarked that the challenge to anthropologists, as well as their opportunity, is to show the familiar in the strange and the strange in the familiar" (Lehmann & Myers, 1989, p. viii). Students feel comfortable with this assignment because they know they are being asked about things they already know. They are being asked to become their own native informants. Yet, they must find the "strange in the familiar."

When Horace Miner published "Body Ritual Among the Nacirema" (1956) over thirty years ago, it was a huge success and anthropologists everywhere kicked themselves for not thinking of writing the piece first. Miner's tongue-in-cheek look at attitudes about the body in this society, although somewhat dated in parts, is still very useful for showing students how to step back from their own cultural matrix. As this very short, four-page article is read aloud, the instructor can usually hear or see flashes of recognition across the classroom as students begin to realize who the Nacirema really are.

The assignment sheet is handed out only after the reading of Miner's piece is finished and students have had the opportunity to talk about it for a few minutes. Now that more than three decades have passed since its publication, we also explore a bit about how culture changes. A few students usually suggest that the article should be updated. This first exercise provides that opportunity, but in a truncated fashion. I ask them to write about only custom or ritual, and I give them a specific time-frame for completing the task. Students are asked to identify a custom or ritual they want to write about as an observer and they are expected to write down as much information as they can before the class hour ends. They usually make, from memory, lists consisting of sequences of events or specific behaviors. The students then take these "preliminary field notes" home, evaluate them, order them, and then write the exercise. The assignment is turned in at the next class meeting and I read several aloud, or else the students meet in their groups, read their assignments to each other, and each group picks one that will be read to the entire class.

Examples of Student Answers to Assignment #1

> (1) People of this country are allowed to be members of whatever religion pleases them. An overwhelming majority of the population follow the Wetnork. Much in the same way that Buddhists will have a figure of Buddha in their homes, the followers of the Wetnork (called Sta-Chions) keep Boxes. These Boxes are quite unusual. Unlike a normal box which may be opened, filled, emptied and/or shut, these Boxes are completely closed. One side--which always faces toward the worshipper, is silvery-gray when not being worshipped, yet becomes multi-colored once the proper ritual has been performed. [It is true that some Boxes do not show color, but only light and dark images. I believe that this has been caused by age and a lessening of the power of the Box.] There is a cult within the religion that believes that the Box should be in continual worship. The members of this cult are called Cotatoes. It seems that their ranks are growing. More and more of the Sta-Chions are increasing the amount of time they spend to worship. Those who have been worshipping for a long time have achieved

the discipline to control their bodily functions until the Box gives some sort of signal. In fact, an entire family may come to a standstill until this signal is given. Once it has, then may they do household chores, acquire nourishment, or relieve themselves. Another signal calls them back. While worship does not require a priest in attendance, should something interfere with worship, a priest will be consulted to perform an exorcism. These priests must be greatly rewarded whether the exorcism is a success or not. I have acquired a Box so I may study the. . . I must continue later. The Box beckons.

(2) Entombed. A weekly journey to a great hall is not uncommon by this kind, although some may frequent this place more than others. As they enter secured doors a lone soldier stands to protect and to guard this place of many riches. Eyes from above peer down to watch the people as they move among one another. A long, furry snake-like creature, hanging loosely from poles protruding from the earth, is kept to contain the people as they form a procession to a great wall. Behind this wall are servants who exchange and receive certain materials appearing to be of paper and metal. Silence seems to be the rule, although an occasional hostile confrontation to those barred as servant behind this wall occurs from those honored to wait their turn to receive gratification from a substance so powerful as to possess greed and happiness. This ritual seems to cause joy and frustration. Reactions vary among the people. In another area of this hall, the people frequent a great room barred from easy access. Written permission is necessary to enter the cold, metallic room which holds many entombed boxes. Keys held by a guard allow an individual to retrieve a small coffin, with which they may retire to yet another room. Within this room one is able to scrutinize and occupy oneself with what exists within such a coffin-- a multitude of life's possessions, wondrous jewels, and gifts precious to their existence. A sometimes long ponderance is essential to some of these people for peace of mind. After the recounting of their belongings, the small crypts are once again buried within the hardened walls of this great room. It is usual for frequent visits to this mausoleum to ensure safety of loss or damage to their sacred treasures. At the end of this journey, some leave with a feeling of great accomplishment and richness and look forward to the return for more of this mystical power. They feel secure with the knowledge that their life savings are, indeed, entombed.

The Nacirema assignment incorporates a number of critical thinking skills as it focuses on what Arendt has termed "re-sensing"-- or the need to remove an object from our presence so that we can think about it (1977, p. 128). In this case, a custom or ritual is artificially removed from the student's culture so that he/she can turn it around in his/her mind. For most students, this is the first time in their educational experience that they have ever stepped back from their own culture and thought of it as potentially being as weird or silly as they think other cultures are.

Anthropology Assignment #4

This exercise is assigned at the beginning of the course unit dealing with human evolution/the fossil record and reads as follows: This assignment should take about 20 minutes. Bipedalism: Human beings are proficient in the mode of locomotion known as bipedalism: striding or walking on two legs. Imagine you have the job of writing part of an "owner's manual" for the human body. Provide detailed directions for standing from a seated position (no hand allowed) and moving forward for about 10 feet using the legs.

This "writing about walking" exercise is very deceptive because it looks a lot easier than it really is. As in the previous assignment, it proceeds from the students' prior knowledge; they all must know how to walk because they all walk and have been walking for two decades or more. There is one caution about using this exercise in every class, however. Sometimes a differently-abled student is present so it will be necessary to speak with that individual ahead of time an perhaps recast the assignment to deal with some other motor skill that everyone possesses. The bipedalism assignment is ideally suited to the human evolution course content when students are faced with the sobering realization that the earliest human ancestors' claim to fame was, for the most part, walking-- not big brains, not elaborate stone tools, but just walking.

Assignment #4 is completed in class and students are allowed to move around and "practice" to review the discrete motions required to accomplish the tasks of standing and walking. I do not suggest anything about "acting out" the motions, but usually one or more students will begin "testing" motions while others watch intently or squirm around in their seats to see what body parts move in which order. In completing this assignment, some students write paragraphs and some write lists. Less than ten percent of a class makes drawings. I give them a few minutes to think about the exercise and make some preliminary notes. Then I give them about twenty minutes to complete the assignment. In the same class period, I select a few of their papers to read aloud and, since this exercise is written in the form of directions, I ask for a volunteer to come to the front of the class and follow them. Students become instantly aware of which sets of directions are adequate or inadequate, based on what the volunteer is asked to do. The usual result is that there are too few specific directions to get the volunteer to his/her feet or, if they get the person standing, a couple of key components for moving the legs are missing.

Examples of Student Answers to Assignment #4

> (1) 1. Place your feet on the floor. 2. Lean forward. 3. Place the weight of your body on your feet. 4. Extend your legs at the knees. 5. Now you're standing. 6. Take your right foot and place it in front of your body. 7. Take your left foot and do the same while your right foot is stationary. 8. Alternate back and forth between the right and left foot. 9. Now you are walking.
>
> (2) 1. Sit in a chair. 2. While sitting, stretch your legs straight out. (This is how you want your legs for step 3.) 3. Stand up slowly maintaining your balance. Lock your knees. Your upper body should be straight up. 4. After standing in place with your knees locked and your body upright and balanced, take your left foot slowly and lean forward a little, bending your knee and step forward about 6 inches. Remember to stay upright and maintain your balance. 5. Then take your right foot and place it about 6 inches in front of your left foot, maintaining your balance and leaning forward slightly to maintain your balance. 6. Continue this motion slowly until you are able to move faster.

Problem Solving

This Assignment #4 involves problem solving skills and the need to identify a logical progression of motions in a behavior that most, if not all, students have never given much thought to. In a sense, therefore, it also asks them to identify the "strange in the familiar." The bipedalism assignment, in addition, is an excellent way of emphasizing the complexity of two-legged walking. Students suddenly gain new respect for *Australopithecus*. By reading the directions aloud while one of their peers attempts to follow them, students become aware of the need for sequencing and explicit detail. At the end of this class, I usually return the papers and ask students to revise their directions to turn in at the next session. Less than five percent of the students comes up with the complete set of directions the first time.

Summary

This paper, in focusing on just two of the fifteen writing exercises in the course, argues that students derive enhanced learning experiences from direct and active participation. Requiring carefully structured writing assignments that incorporate critical thinking skills achieves this goal. Evaluations of the writing-intensive sections against the "non-writing" or lecture mode control groups reveal equivalent achievement in content learning.

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Janet Pollak is Associate Professor of Anthropology at William Paterson College.

The American Social System

Lazaros Michailidis

1. The Purpose of this Paper

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a method of inquiry which I believe can help the students of social science to understand better American Society by thinking critically about it across the disciplines of *Economics, Political Science*, and *Ethics*. The novelty of my inquiry is in the method rather than in the factual details I use. Within the space of this paper I can only make general statements which may be void of empirical verification. I am aware of this defect.

But a partial cancellation of this defect can be found in the Declaration of Independence. In a space of a few phrases the Declaration distills the moral, political and legal vision of the classical liberals beginning on the point of epistemology that the conclusions to follow are asserted not as empirical but as "self-evident" truths of reason. The moral truths come first, then come the political and, by implication, the legal.

2. Introduction: The Human Concerns

My self-evident proposition is that in a most general sense all human problems concern *Economics, Politics* and *Morality* or, *Ethics*. Other human problems may be easily considered as part of these three. Analytically, one may consider two extremes in regard to the relationship among these concerns. At the one end of the analytical spectrum of the relationship, the three concerns are inseparable, they are three aspects of one concern, they form a unity similar to the one Christians attribute to the Holy Trinity. At the other end of the spectrum, economics, politics and morality are separate concerns and one must treat them as such.

No society operates at any one extreme of the analytical spectrum. *Theocracies* are under dominance of religion and, associated with it, morality and ethics. *Western liberal democracies*, however, have placed certain people's concerns above and beyond the control of society. For instance, the 1st and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution prohibits the Congress and the States to control and dictate religious beliefs and morals to the American people. There is a consensus among the American people that there must be a *separation* betwen morality and ethics on the one hand and politics and economics on the other. In Thomas Jefferson's words, the 1st Amendment requires "a wall of separation between Church and State." There is however a perpetual argument about the size of this "wall." Clearly the U.S. Supreme Court plays an important role in determining the outcome of this argument.

When it comes to the nature of the relationship between politics and economics, things are different. Article I, Section 8, the 5th and 16th Amendments of the Constitution grant powers to Congress to regulate the economic affairs among the several states and with foreign nations, to coin money and regulate its value and to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever soure they are derived.

However, the Constitution defines neither the degree or nature of regulation nor the rate of taxation. For the last fifty years there seems to be no "Wall" of serperation between politics and economics. During the first two decades of this century the U.S. Supreme Court in its leading cases: Lochner v. New York (1905), Adair v. United States (1908), Coppage v. Kansas (1915), and Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), raised a "wall" of seperation between economics and politics by stating that some human problems are purely economic concerns and therefore, their solution must be left to the individual facing the problem to be solved through the free market mechanism.

But by 1937 the Supreme Court changed its mind and in the leading cases: West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co. (1937) and

Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) demolished the "wall" of separation that was raised earlier and thus, opened the door for the American Political system to exert a high degree of control and regulation over the economic affairs of the people. Two problems facing the nation now come to my mind: Drugs and Abortion. Recently, in exchange of open letters in the Wall Street Journal between Prof. Milton Friedman and Director William Bennett[1], Friedman had argued that legalization and the use of free market is a better mechanism for attacking the drug problem, while W. Bennett believes that the use of government will bring better results on the drug problem. Abortion is another example. If one believes that abortion is a moral problem, thus private, then the freedom of choice for its solution must be protected. If, on the other hand, one thinks that abortion is a public problem, then solution for it must be sought through the political mechanism.

Thus, the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence and some leading Supreme Court opinions have suggested to me that the systems approach may be a more fruitful method for one to use in order to understand the American society.

3. The Systems Approach

The Systems Approach offers an appropriate framework for critical thinking across the disciples of economics, political science and ethics and hence it can help one to make better sense of the American society. This approach is closely related to the Aristotelian method of analysis and synthesis and it is used extensively in natural science and mathematics.

However, this method's fruitfulness is in doubt when it is used to study social systems. Some social scientists claim that due to the fallacy of composition, the whole social system may be different from the sum of its parts. According to them, when we analyze social systems it is erroneous to believe that what is true for the parts of the system when they are studied independently is also true for the whole system and conversely. I do not have an answer for the fallacy of composition. I believe, however, that the best way to deal with it is to study critically the interdependence and the feedback among economics politics and morality or ethics.

Thus, I consider the American society as a composite of: (1) *Political*, (2) *Economic*, and (3) *Moral/Ethical* systems. First, I will briefly describe the main characteristics of each system. Then I will discuss the interdependence and feedback among them. It is this inquiry that fosters critical thinking across the disciplines and helps the student to understand himself and to form a judgement about the American society.

4. The American Political System

The American Political System is a Constitutional representative democracy and it consists of two parts: (a) *The Political Powers* and (b) *The Political Parties.*[2] The nature, structure and the relationships among the political powers are specified by the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution states nothing about political parties.[3] Their constitutionality relies on the fact that they are voluntary social organizations whose current structure is the result of two hundred years of American political development.

(a) The American Political Powers

The political powers of the American political system are: 1) The *Legislative*; 2) the *Executive* and 3) the *Judicial*. These powers are carefully defined in the first three articles of the Constitution and in a series of Amendments to it.

The framers of the Constitution *separated* and distributed the political authority to these three political powers; each has its own political jurisdiction. However, the three political powers are highly *interdependent* since each one can exercise restraints against any other. This makes each one of the political powers an indispensable part of one political system. Congress can enact laws, but the President can veto them. In turn, Congress, by two-thirds majority, can override the Presidential veto. However, the Supreme Court, whose members are appointed by the President, can declare a law unconstitutional, and therefore void. Yet for any appointment to the Supreme Court, the President needs senatorial approval. It follows from this that a collaboration of all three political powers is necessary for the enactment of any important legislation. It is no wonder that so much negotiation takes place before any important Congressional bill becomes a law. This mechanism of *checks* and *balances* prevents any one political power from ignoring or overpowering the other two.

The three political powers, taken together, possess a substantial degree of control in determining the way *personal* and *public* problems can be decided and resolved. More importantly, *the political powers together determine whether a certain problem is strictly personal or public.* If it is decided by the political powers that a certain problem is strictly personal, its solution is left to the free will, decision, choice and ability of the individual who has the problem. On the other hand, if it is decided that a certain problem concerns the public, the political powers will enact the necessary legislation to determine the nature of its solution. For example, until recently, the Supreme Court had decided that abortion is a strictly personal problem (Roe v. Wade). Therefore, any decision about it is left to the free will of the pregnant woman. Hence, any laws which try to regulate abortion are unconstitutional. On the other hand, Congress, back in the year 1936, made a minimum financial security for senior citizens a public concern. And for its solution, Congress enacted the Social Security Laws.

Section 8, Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power ". . . to lay and collect taxes, imports and excises, to pay the debts and provide fo the common defense and general welfare of the United States; . . ." There are two times that the term "general welfare" appears in the Constitution. First in the Preamble, and then in Section 8, Article I. What does "general welfare" mean? Is there any particular type of legislation which, *if* enacted by Congress, will make everyone in the US better off, or at least make one person better off without making anyone else in the US worse off? If indeed there is no such legislation, then the statements "promote the general welfare" and "provide for. . . general welfare" make no sense. Certainly, these statements have caused enormous difficulties and conflict among the American people.

The Congress in order to "promote" and "provide" for the "general welfare" and other goals, is granted economic powers such as the power: "To borrow money on the credit of the United States;" "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states. . ." "To coin money, regulate the value thereof, . . .". The Constitution, however, specified neither the precise meaning of these terms nor does it define the ways and means by which all these regulations must be accomplished. It only states that the Congress shall have the power ". . . to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers. . . ". This, often called, the necessary and proper clause, certainly opens a Pandora's box.

Metaphorically, one may think about the separation and distribution of the American political power to American social institutions as contained in a pyramid which is demarcated both *vertically* and *horizontally*. The horizontal demarcation reflects the separation and distribution of political power between *Federal* and *State* governments (Federalism). The vertical demarcation reflects the separation and distribution of political power among the *Legislative*, *Executive* and *Judicial* branches within a given type of government (Federal, State or Local).

The lines of demarcation, however, are not well defined and this allows for much political maneuvering and power struggle over the size of the sovereignty of each institution. Proponents of the American political system claim that this system provides the necessary *political stability* which forms the basis of the stability for the whole American Social System.

b) American Political Parties

Political democracies similar to the U.S. are based on three fundamental principles:

Principle #1

The political wisdom of any one member of a group of people is as good as the political wisdom of any other member of the group. Thus, the political opinion of any one member of the group freely expressed carries the same weight in the ballot box as the opinion of any other member of the group.

Principle #2
The collective political wisdom of any group of people freely expressed is superior to the wisdom of any of its sub-groups. This means that in group decision-making the majority rules. However, depending upon the importance of the issue upon which group decision is about to be made, a 51% majority may not be enough.

Principle #3
People have the right to organize voluntarily political parties in order to gain political power through the mechanism of free and honest democratic elections.

At any one election time in the United States, there is a relatively large number of different political parties or independent candidates ranging from the radical right to the radical left which run for political office. Some of the most well-known political parties are: The Libertarian[4], the Republican, the Democratic, Workers, Socialist, and the Communist Party. Each one of the political parties has a core of fundamental beliefs about the current nature of the American society and a vision of what its nature should be. However, there are differences of opinions within any one of the politcal parties. This is even more so for the Democrats and the Republicans.

The American political parties have no direct legislature, executive or judicial power. They are, however, an important part of the American political system and they have indirect political power because almost any elected official is a member of a political party, is supported by it and is believed to have a moral obligation to it. That is why we often witness open disagreement among elected officials who belong to the same political party. An elected official is not even legally responsible to be consistent between his campaign promises and his official actions. Despite all this, the system works. According to the supporters of the American political system, *the genius of the American political system is that the health of the American democracy need not depend upon the availability of virtuous political leaders.* A politician's "good" behavior is necessary if he wants to gain political office or retain one. It is the *self-interest* of the politician, not his benevolence, which forces him to satisfy the largest possible number of his constituency.

The American political system potentially can exercise a high degree of control and regulation on all aspects of the American life. The realization of this potentiality is, however, difficult because it requires the consensus of a relatively large percentage of the American people. But in a large society like the United States in which people have so many diverse interests, opinions, beliefs and morals such a consensus is hard to achieve. In the Federalist, Number 10, James Madison makes exactly this point. According to him, the larger the society and the greater the variety of interests, opinions, beliefs and morals of the people, the less likely that any one particular group shall acquire a large enough political majority to impose its will upon the rest of the society.

Based on the powers granted to them by the Constitution, the political powers have enacted a series of laws concerning the economic life of the American people and in the long-run have defined the American Economic System.

5 The American Economic System

We usually characterize the American Economic system as a *Free Market Capitalism.* Free Market Capitalism denotes a human society in which the vast majority of economic decisions, such as employment, consumption, savings, investments and production are made by the individual and carried out in the private sector by private businesses for private economic gain. The private economic unit is the main economic actor who bears the losses and the benefits of his economic decisions. The free market system is the main social mechanism which the American people use for discharging the functions of resource allocations and income distribution. There is a fundamental difference in decision making between the Political and the American Economic Systems.

In the American Political System, decisions are made *collectively* by voting and for most issues a simple 51 percent majority is sufficient for the decision and its implementation, which carries the police power of the state, to be made. The American Political System provides the social mechanism through which the American people collectively, via their representatives, decide whether a certain concern is in the domain of *public interest* or in the domain of *personal interest*.

Decision making in the American Economic System is *Individualistic*. The decision is left to the individual to be made and implemented through the free market according to his private economic interest.

Knowledge of the legal characteristics of the free market system is not sufficient to provide a good understanding of capitalism. The special character of capitalism will be brought out more clearly if we consider the spirit of it. The spirit of capitalism is dominated by the ideas of *Aquisition, Economic Competition, Economic Risk Taking and Mobility of Productive Resources.*

In a free market capitalistic society, a person is economically successful if he is "independently wealthy." This usually means that the person has acquired enough private property so he can live comfortably from income he earns from his property. Thus, acquisition constitutes the purpose of economic activity. But in order to realize this purpose, an economic unit must be able to compete in the market place, evaluate economic opportunities, take economic risks and be willing to allocate his productive resources to the uses where they will earn the highest possible economic return. This implies that many times, due to changing economic conditions, individuals must relocate to find jobs, take wage or salary cuts or even change their occupation. All these changes constitute a painful economic and personal experience for the individuals and their families and thus they constitute a serious problem to be dealt with.

In a free market capitalism, economic considerations appear to take presedence over all other aspects of life and tend to minimize personal attachments to family, friends and local communities. These tendencies are counterbalanced by the Moral/Ethical System which tends to operate in the opposite direction. It tends to maximize personal commitments to family, friends, and local communities.

The American Economic System is not *economic socialism* but it is not *pure*[5] free market capitalism either. How close the system is to pure free market capitalism is a debatable question. For the Libertarians, the American economic system is far from being pure free market capitalism. For them, because of the proliferation of social welfare programs, trade embargos and unemployment benefits, the American economic system has drifted towards a form of state socialism. On the other hand, for liberals and radicals from the left, the American economic system is even worse than free market capitalism, it is *monopoly capitalism.*

6. *The American Moral-Ethical System*

The American Moral/Ethical System is Pluralistic. *Pluralism* or *Moral/Ethical Liberalism* is a doctrine which holds that in matters of personal morality, ethics and religious beliefs there may be different points of view on which the political system must maintain strict *neutrality*, neither supporting nor opposing any particular point of view.

The spirit of the Constitution on the issues of independence between Church and State provides two-way protection. It protects the Church from the control of the State and vice versa. The Founding fathers were well aware of the many social problems Eurpoean societies had, precisely because either the Church controlled the State or, at other times, the State controlled the Church.

According to an even more liberal interpretation of the Constitution, separation and independence is not just between the Church and the State, but between the general life-style (type of entertainment, religious activities and other strictly personal decisions people make) and the State. In the short-run, the Supreme Court defines what is a strictly personal problem and thus, it determines the boundaries of personal freedom. Ultimately, the American people collectively through the political process determine the scope and the limits of that freedom.

Certainly, at the one end of the ethical/moral spectrum there are the *Traditionalists* who demand absolute respect for the old established moral values regarding family, human relationships and moral behavior. At the other end of the spectrum, there are the *Relativists* who claim that there are no permanent and absolute moral standards. According to them, morals are flexible and may differ between two groups of people in a given time period or differ within a given group from one time period to the other.

Constitutionally, the Political and the Ethical/Moral Systems are *separate* and *independent*. But the Constitution does not provide hard and fast rules concerning the "proper" degree of separation and independence between these two systems. Whatever the degree of separation, there are fundamental differences between the two systems. The differences are: (a) In the nature of the decision-making process and (b) in the nature of the implementation of the decision. Decision making in the political system is accomplished collectively as we discussed above.

Decision-making and implementation in the Moral/Ethical System is ultimately *individualistic* and *voluntary*. Voluntary organizations or religious groups may exercise psychological or other social pressures on their disobedient members. However, they do not have the legal power to inflict physical or financial penalty on them.

7. *The American Social System Defined*

We call the American society *Free Market Democratic Capitalism*. In general, this means a predominant free market economy, a democratic system of government and a pluralistic system of religious, moral and ethical beliefs and behaviors. The American social system is Free Market Democratic Capitalism in the sense that it compromises the American Economic, Political and Moral/Ethical systems. But, while all these are not far from describing the true nature of the American society, they do not convey the whole truth about it. For one to say that the American society is simply a composite of the American Economic, Political and Moral/Ethical systems, it is as saying that a painting is simply a composite of paint, canvas and frame, paying no attention to the way these ingredients are blended to form the painting.

The nature and form of any social organization is determined by the nature, relationship and the degree of interdependence which exists among its component parts. The nature of the whole social system does not only reflect characteristics of its component parts, but it also reflects characteristics which result from the special interaction of its parts. It is this special interaction which makes social systems different and much more difficult to analyze than mechanical or natural systems.

8. *The Relationship Among the American Political, Economic and Moral/Ethical Systems*

What is the exact relationship, the degree of interdependence and feedback among the American Political, Economic and Moral/Ethical Systems? As for any triangular relationship among people, this relationship is very difficult to analyze and almost impossible to draw definite conclusions about it. Social science, unlike natural science, is not developed enough to have established a satisfactory degree of causality among the three systems on which social scientists have reached a satisfactory level of agreement. There are social theories, however, which claim that a causal relationship among the three systems does exist.

At one end of the spectrum of social theories is the Marxian theory of history which claims that there is a definite causality which runs from the Economic to Political and Moral/Ethical systems. Karl Marx in his famous Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* writes:

> "My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life,. . .; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political *economy*. . ."

At the other end of the spectrum of social theories, there are the Idealists who hold that the causality runs from a given set of ideas, morals and beliefs, to the other aspects of social life. According to idealists, human nature is fixed, there are standards of morality, religious and political beliefs and principles which have independent existence. They neither change from time to time nor differ from one society to another. Societies, then, must allow their economic and political institutions to grow in accordance with these ideas and principles.

Between these two extremes, there are many other social theories which claim that only partial causality can be established among the three systems. It is probably true that the great majority of social scientists are *Eclectics*. According to them, any generalization as to causality from any one of the systems to the other two, is incorrect.

A detailed explanation of different social theories is beyond the scope of this paper. My purpose here is to propose a framework that can facilitate critical thinking about the nature of the American society rather than to provide a single social theory which purports to explain it. I conclude with the following observations.

It is rather characteristic of modern western democracies to retain a relatively high degree of formal independence between morality and politics. The early Americans established a set of political institutions and mechanisms which they thought are most appropriate for keeping peace, order and liberty for generations to come. They separated the life and rules of the church from these of political and economics. This separation, of course, had introduced a distinction between the moral and legal aspects of human behavior. The moral aspect of a given action or inaction is left for the individual to judge. The State must only enforce the proper legal behavior. To be sure, the American society encourages proper moral behavior and duty, but the majority of Americans are not ready to enforce it by law.

The individual is the ultimate link among the American Political, Economic and Moral/Ethical Systems. Proponents of the American society believe that these three systems are organized in such a way as to *minimize the conflict between private and public interests and to make it extremely difficult for any one individual or even a group of individuals to control the American society or any one of its systems.* Political, Economic and Moral outcomes are the results of the social interplay among the three systems. If a certain outcome has been in existence for a long period of time, it is presumed that it has the approval or the tolerance of the majority of the American people. Most Americans strongly believe what Abraham Lincoln said:

> "It is true that you may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all the time; but you can't fool all the people all the time."

Notes

1. *The Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 7 and 19, 1989.

2. One may wish to introduce explicitly in the American Political System different special interest groups that have political power which reflects their economic power, and their ethnic, religious or other social unity. Nonetheless, all these are pressure groups which exercise whatever power they have on the political powers or the political parties.

3. The truth is that the framers of the US Constitution were not very fond of political parties. They believe that political parties lead to disunity rather than to the unification of the Nation.

4. The reader is cautioned not to identify the term *Libertarian* with the term *Liberal.*

5. *Pure* free market capitalism is used here only as a theoretical extreme that denotes a human society in which *all* economic decisions, resource allocation and income distributions are made via the free market mechanism.

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Lazaros Michailidis is Associate Professor of Economics and Business at Bloomfield College.

Critical Thinking and Narrative Discourse

Brian Altano, Paul Griffin, Sharon Spencer, Lesley Cola, Sidney White and Richard Beauchesne all address issues relating to the individual in society, although each approaches narrative discourse from a different point of view.

In *"Storytelling and the Fostering of Critical Perspectives,"* Brian Altano describes the latent possibilities inherent in the tradition of storytelling for critical thinking and critical discourse. "Storytelling is a mirror of the power and poetry of language." Storytelling is "minimalist," and thus provides ambiguity, placing the "imaginative burden on the listener." A good story, according to Altano, sets into motion the elements of critical thinking so necessary for the critical reflection on the social norms of society.

Paul Griffin, in *"There's No Place Like Home: Critical Thinking in Three Popular Novels,"* describes critical thinking as enterprises in which we seek to become aware of the structures, values, and media which inform creative activity and of the "standards" underlying our reactions to that activity." Involved too are larger questions; the extent to which creative processes are culturally constructed and thus modifiable; if so, "critical thought in this sense is an ethical undertaking..." Griffin suggests that modern moral foundations are increasingly private, located within the "soothing icon of the family...The image of family and home, if not the reality, has become tired and overworked." In contrast to the potential Altano ascribes to storytelling, the novels Griffin discusses "exhibit a stunted kind of critical thinking; one that almost seems afraid of carrying the debunking of institutions through to its logical conclusion...

In *"Masking: East and West,"* Sharon Spencer contrasts different cultural approaches to the self and its concealment. The ambiguities and ambivalences reflected in a cross cultural approach to the literary treatment of masked identities, activities and transformations provide a setting for profound insights into human experience and creativity. In addition, it provides an opportunity for exploration of the relationship between individual and cultural identities.

Lesley Cola addresses autobiography as a narrative genre concerned with the conception of the self and "our interest in it from an educational point of view," in *"The Role of Autobiography in Critical Thinking."* Critical thinking and autobiography share a commitment to seeing the individual at the core of the educational process, and an individual's experience and concerns as relevant and important in the classroom. Moreover, both critical thinking and autobiography demand personal reflection and thoughtfulness concerning one's development, history, and relationship with others and the world.

Sidney W. White, in *"Critical Thinking and the Narrative Discourse of Psychotherapy,"* calls into question the "promise we ordinarily bestow upon our capacity for reasoning and critical thought..." In "re-presenting" one's own experience through oral narrative, as in psychotherapy, one expresses one's concerns and tells one's story as best one can. The truth, however, often lies in what is unsaid, in "the discourse of the unconscious...the 'underside of the mask.'" There is an ironic contradiction in cognitive or problem-solving orientations to psychotherapy, as they seek to avoid objectify the problem narrated by the client and strengthen his/her seemingly "reasonable, rational, self-critical discourse" for which treatment was originally sought. From a Freudian perspective, however, the effort to think self-critically is not a matter of inherent skill or the application of the scientific method, but the best effort of the ego to "mediate between culture and instinct." Human consciousness may not, in fact, be capable of thinking about itself with the same efficacy that it manages with the 'object world.' "The experience of anxiety is not a matter of skill deficiency or functional incompetence, but rather a discourse, not yet fully articulate, that has only begun."

Richard J. Beauchesne, in his paper, *Mystery and Expressions: Myth, Theology and Pluralism*, addresses the issue of religious narrative as "linguistic expressions of ultimate mystery." He sees religious formulations as pluralistic in that they include, "the ability to perceive the truth of diversity" in order to "protect religious formulations from dogmatic irrelevancy and idolatry, and allow as well for linguistic approximations of mystery." The paper distinguishes between mythic pluralism and theological pluralism: "Myth suggests pre-reflective consciousness while theology -- whether enunciated in the language of philosophy or social sciences, traditional or liberational -- suggests reflective consciousness."

The pluralism of religious myths are "lived historically" within environments of meanings that change with the passage of time and with shifts of social or cultural context, including "alterations in social relationships differentiated by ethnicity, class, and economic status." Thus, Beauchesne sees myth within the "postmodern historical consciousness which foregoes the witch-hunt of 'error' and situates one within the arena of systematic distortions," in order to retain the sacramental "ultimate transcendence" while being respectful of "finite humanity."

Storytelling and the Fostering of Critical Perspectives

Brian Altano

Folk Tale I: The Hyena of Zimbabwe

In the land of Zimbabwe, there once lived a hyena, who spent his nights preying on other animals. One day hyena got stuck in a deep well. He called out for many hours and had no response when he saw ox pass by. He shouted, "Ox, hang your tale down the well so I can climb out." Ox shook his head, "You're a bad one. You ate those two young heifers at the farm." Hyena answered, "No, ox, that wasn't me. It was somebody else in the dark." Ox continued, "No, you're a bad one. If I help you up you'll bite me and attack me and eat me." Hyena called out, "No, ox, if you get me out, I'll be your best friend."

Well, ox, who was a friendly creature, hung down his tail, and hyena scampered up. But as soon as he got close, hyena started to bite ox, getting ready to eat him. Just then, elephant passed by, and said, "What's all this? Fighting like little children? Let us reason things out calmly as they do in my part of the forest. Explain the situation to me." Ox couldn't talk. He was in too much pain. Hyena lied and lied and lied. Finally, elephant answered, "This seems like a complicated situation. Perhaps if you could show me how it happened I could understand better."

Hyena was much meaner than intelligent, and he went back down to the bottom of the well. Elephant turned to ox and said, "Come on ox, let's take a walk and talk about this further." So elephant walked away. And ox walked away. And hyena was left in the well. And he is still there today.

I. Explication and Introduction

How can such a simple tale, one that takes just two minutes to narrate, be so powerful in its message and so latent in possibilities for critical thinking and critical discourse? It is in the nature of storytelling itself, an elemental genre that necessarily trims narrative to its bare bones, and allows the listener free reign to interpose and insert fundamental characteristics that are quite personal and unique, all through the utilization of that picture making facility of imagination. In a story like Hyena, which is a native African tale, there is a sense of justice, a clear distinction between good and evil, retribution for the denial of trust, and the supremacy of reason over cunning. However, there also exists a rather large gray area of moral ambiguity, inherent in the dichotomy between the denotative and connotative value of each animal. While their denotative value justifies their actions, and thus rids hyena of any guilt, their connotative symbols allow the listener an interpolation of a clear demarcation between good and evil. It is essential that the story exist on two planes. We can forgive hyena's cunning and ox's gullibility as instinct on the one level, but have greater trouble with the betrayal of friendship on the second level.

The characters are clearly delineated, even though the storyteller has chosen, intentionally, to avoid descriptive phrases as much as possible. Effective storytelling eschews adjectives and places the onus of imagination on the listener. While each listener's hyena might look different, the creature is universally seen as the negative element in the story, cunning and malicious. But hyena is not entirely evil. In fact he is acting according to his instincts and using the skills granted him in lieu of prodigious strength. In other circumstances, we might admire someone like hyena. At various times, we are even quite like hyena. Ox is slow, but ultimately friendly. He believes in the goodness of creatures. However, he is also representative of stupidity and gullibility. We are all ox at certain times, and can thus feel empathy for his predicament. We have bought that faulty used car or helped someone who could never be grateful for it, and we realize our mistakes.

In these circumstances we wish we had been more like elephant, who is pragmatic and subtle. He is also cunning, but in a gentler sort of way than hyena. And yet, we might call elephant a meddler and a bully, taking advantage of his superior size or reasoning power to get the best of hyena. At times we do not appreciate the intrusion of elephant in our lives, because we always want to learn from our mistakes. With the assistance of elephant we win our skirmishes, but do we really learn? Will ox be able to resist the cunning of hyena the next day?

It is the interplay between the characters that gives the listeners their joy. Each interacts on a different level: hyena-ox is a predator-prey relationship, elephant-hyena a struggle between masters of cunning, elephant-ox a session between advisor and advisee or intercessor and oppressed. These intricate relationships reveal an interplay of prototypes, which the listener, using critical thinking apparatus, should understand to get every kernel of pleasure out of the story.

II. The Folktale as Unifying Element of a Society

One indication of the morals, standards, and goals of a culture is its inherent storytelling tradition. This is because stories are often the most effective and subtle means of transmitting positive values from one generation to the next. Depiction of unquestioned respect, for example, breeds more respect in our children. This means is far more efficient than demanding respect, in blatant and threatening tones, with overtones of reprisal hovering in the air and tingeing the scene with forced acquiescence.

Although stories vary greatly from culture to culture, there is an underlying substance that is remarkably similar. With the correct critical apparatus the careful reader (or better, listener) can penetrate the facade of nationalism to arrive at the core of the text. Having performed this critical slip, the privileged audience should then come to the realization that didacticism in stories is quite universal and indicates both a forming and reforming demand of the hierarchy (king, government, parents), and a healthy dissension from the substructure (peasant in European culture, the oppressed in Asian culture, the slave in Black American culture, and children around the world).

This is not to imply that the world depicted in stories is blatantly and iconoclastically divided into binomials (black/white, moral/immoral, good/evil, correct/incorrect). Rather, most stories present a gray area, a zone along whose edges exists the transgression of critical thought. Instilling a healthy dose of critical thinking into the audience, making them conscious of nuances in context and reflective on the realm of a-moral behavior, should be the goal of the storyteller, who seeks to present a polyphony of paradigmatic tropes to which the audience is forced to react.

III. Storytelling: The Role of the Listener

It should be an integral part of a culture to study its roots in folk tale, because storytelling is the oldest art. Storytelling had its genesis with the birth of language itself. Storytelling is a mirror of the power of language and the poetry of language. A good story plants a seed in both children and adults, one that may be allowed to germinate and flower through the power of imagination, not of the storyteller, but of the listener. Storytelling is a minimalist genre; that is, the raconteur avoids the excessive use of adjectives and adverbs, choosing, instead, to place the imaginative burden on the listener. A fundamental human characteristic is our ability to make pictures in our minds. We all live in narrative, and are all storytellers at one level or another. Even a three year old child who cannot read can notice when a story that has been told or read to her has been changed, even in the slightest bit. She can also recreate and retell the story herself, because her mind has made such a vivid picture that her art consists in transposing that image to words. The image itself is wonderful, real, and almost palpable. It exists, and it endures, because it is an active image, imagined by the listener herself, without the visual aid of a television screen or a Nintendo game pack.

Images elicited in the mind of the listener are also quite personal. A story about a bridge, one narrated without excessive utilization of adjectives, should inspire fifty different pictures of bridges in the audience. One person thinks about the Brooklyn Bridge, another the Golden Gate, a third about a cement overpass passing over a highway, while a fourth thinks of a rope bridge traversing the mountains of a primitive village, where construction materials are unknown. These are all valid choices. In fact, it is precisely because of the liberation of imagination that stories are so attractive to us. A good storyteller should not clutter the listener's imagination. The story should be minimal, yet inspiring enough to set the listener's fancy on flight.

Storytelling is an elemental form, a genre that focuses on time and place. The setting of a tale should be distinct, and not easily translated to different locales. In order to reflect the intricate nuances of a culture, stories generally focus on the three unifying elements of a society: marriage and the family, the rituals of religion, and the rites of burial. These bring about the 'forming' of respect, for family, for God, and for the dead. Any society that does not respect these three elements cannot be called a humane society. If we study history, during war and peace, one of these fundamental respects has always been discarded during war. In fact, it is during war that we reveal ourselves to be less humane, and less human, than at any other time.

I have studied stories that unify the society through these three elements, and focused on the teaching of respect for family, religion, and burial. There is the heavy-handed way, through direct admonishment and threats. However, anyone with a liberating spirit might reject this approach. There is a much more subtle way, and that is by creating and projecting prototypes, ones that are paradigmatic. We can achieve this best through storytelling.

The storyteller projects images as given and assumed; yet, it is the intrinsic role of the listener to question them. A good story sets in motion the elements of critical thinking so necessary for the acceptance or rejection of societal norms. It is ultimately the listener who will decide whether to emulate the model proposed, or not.

It may seem overly simplistic to try to unify a society through an element so basic as the folk tale. Yet, if we think upon it, that is the way that societies have always been unified. We can take Homer's stories as the unification of the Greeks, Virgil's as the unification of the Romans, Dante for Italians, Beowulf for the Norse, and so on for every culture. It is the simple folk that is transformed into epic at a certain point.

IV. "Honey Boy"

"Honey Boy" is a traditional story set in the south during the depression of the 1930's. I have heard it told many times, at the Pinkster Festival at Philipsburg Manor in Tarrytown, New York, at the American Storytelling Festival in Fayetteville, North Carolina, and most memorably, by Jackie Torrence at Avery Fisher Hall in New York's Lincoln Center. In addition, I have narrated this story during various storytelling festivals and appearances. I must confess an ignorance as to its originator, and as far as I can tell, this is probably the first time that it has been written down. However, I have codified this work not without a certain trepidation. Until today, the story has always been "alive" for me. In fact, one of the joys of an unrecorded story is the fact that the storyteller cannot err in its recounting. I have never heard the story told, nor have I narrated it, in exactly the same manner. Thus, the 'glory' of my neo-Homeric act should be greatly mitigated by the permanent damage that I have performed to the vibrance and spontaneity of the tale.

Honey Boy

A Traditional Story of the American South

The old woman sat on the old couch in the steaming heat of an August afternoon in Bayou, Mississippi, which is about ten miles from the County line. She was all alone, and sat looking around at her old furniture and the frayed rug on the floor. She got up to sweep the dust around a little bit, then settled back into her favorite chair, the one with the bright yellow pillow that her Aunt Ivy had made so many years before. Everything was old and still. Even the flies on the window sill were too lazy to lift themselves from their resting place in the cool shade of the sash.

Everybody called her Mom, although she had only had one child. She got up slowly and moved to the center of the room to turn on her radio. It was a splendid radio, new, shiny, of glistening mahogany wood. It stood out even more because it was the only new thing in the whole house. But Mom didn't like it for that, she worshipped that radio because it had been a present from Honey Boy. She still remembered the day he had brought it two years before, riding down the dusty road with his hot rod, blowing the horn and yelling and singing, with his best friend Big Blue, his sidekick he called him, right by his side. They had made her close her eyes and stand there in the middle of that room while they carried it in, all shiny and bright, all the time laughing like little kids. Then then turned her around and around like ring-around-the-rosy in the second grade until she was all dizzy and faint. Then they had made her open her eyes. Mom cried and cried and hugged Honey Boy and hugged Big Blue, and they had a celebration with iced tea and molasses cakes, and they sang and danced with Rudy Vallee and Eddie Cantor and laughed with Amos and Andy and Allen's Alley.

They called him Honey Boy because when he was born he had a big birthmark on his right shoulder that looked just like a beehive. Nobody knew his real name. Everybody liked Honey Boy because he was a good friend, a wild, uncontrollable sort in school but so genuine and unaffecting that even his teachers had a hard time scolding him. He was so full of life that he could never sit still. He was always squirming and plotting, he and Big Blue always, making big plans to get rich and take their mamas to live in big houses right in the middle of town.

Mom sat on the old couch that August afternoon watching the radio. She always said she "watched" the radio because she heard the voices and the music, but she saw Honey Boy's face on the front of the radio, with that big smile he always had. But when she heard the words "WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE", and then heard Honey Boy's name, she got up, turned the radio off, and began to wait. She didn't have to wait long. Just a few hours later she heard the car moving very slowly down the dirt road that led to Mom's house. It was moving so slowly that it sounded like it never wanted to get there. Mom knew. Mom waited. And a feeling of deep weariness came over her whole body, as if something was pressing down real hard on her.

The sheriff was the biggest man in the County, and the wooden steps creaked as he ascended. Despite his size, he could have the softest voice, just a little higher than a whisper, but everyone understood him just fine. You just had to look in his eyes to catch his meaning. His eyes told everything. The sheriff knew this, so sometimes he put on a pair of dark sunglasses. He had these on now, but when Mom came to the door, he took them off. His words were orderly:

"Hello, Mrs. Summers. Sorry to bother you. I hate to do this. But it's my job. I have to ask you to take a ride to the station house with me. It's official business. I wish you didn't have to. But it's official business."

Mom understood right away. Her face had no expression at all. She replied:
"All right sheriff. I just have to get my coat."

Now the sheriff didn't tell her that she didn't need a coat, in that great heat in August. Her dress was a little old, and had been mended in a few places. But she had a beautiful pink coat, spotless and new, that Honey Boy had given her one Sunday morning, as he came flying through town, ready to embark on a new adventure, and he promised her that he would come back rich and take her to live in a big house. With her new coat on, she was ready, and she accompanied the sheriff to the car.

On the way, the sheriff remained silent for a long time, and drove so slowly that you could count the weeds along the side of the road. Finally, he coughed a little, and began:

"Ma'am, I hate to have to do this, but I have to. You see, I have a dead body in my office, and they think it's Honey Boy. There was a $10,000 reward to turn in Honey Boy dead or alive, and Big Blue, he come struttin' in this mornin' and he say that he'd shot Honey Boy. For the reward. He wants the $10,000. So we need you to identify Honey Boy. You see, he was shot in the face, and we can't recognize whether it's him or not. So that's why I have to bring you out there. They say a mother always knows her son. I'm awful sorry. But it's official business, you understand."

When they pulled up in front of the station house, there was a big crowd of people, all talking and milling around. On the top step was Big Blue. He was telling a bunch of them what he was going to do with all his money. He said:

"I'm going to buy myself a new car, and a house and some land. I'm going to buy myself some new clothes and get myself married, oh yeah."

But when Mom came slowly up the steps he hushed and bowed his head. She walked right up to him and said:

"Big Blue, how've you been. You've not been to the house lately. I've not seen you with my Honey Boy. Don't you like my iced tea anymore?"

Big Blue didn't say a word, but kept his head down.

The sheriff led Mom into the dusty station house. They moved slowly towards a small room in the back where on a table in the corner was a large mass covered with a bright white sheet. The sheriff apologized again:

"Ma'am, I'm terribly sorry to have to make you do this. But you understand. Now, I'm going to show you the body. As soon as you're sure, tell me."

Then the sheriff slowly peeled the sheet from the body, starting at the top of the head and unrolling oh so slowly down, past the disfigured, unrecognizable face to the broad shoulders. It seemed that he lingered a bit in this position, as they both looked at the beehive scar on the right shoulder. Mom did not make a sound, did not move. However, if you looked real close you might have been able to perceive a tiny tear welling up in the corner of one eye. Then the sheriff continued, moving down the chest, until Mom said softly:

"That's enough sheriff. I'm sure. I know now. You know that a mother always knows her son. That's not Honey Boy."

There was utter silence in the room. Neither person said anything. They just stood there looking at the whiteness of the sheet covering the body. Finally, the sheriff moved slowly towards her and said:

"Thank you ma'am. I'm real sorry. But you understand. It's official business. Thank you for your help. I'll take you home now. Could you wait in the car a moment?"

As Mom walked out the door, her face without a trace of emotion, the crowd outside hushed. She walked over to Big Blue and touched his face, and said to him:

"So long, Big Blue. Say hello to your Mama for me."

And she moved down to the car, opened the door and sat in the front seat and looked straight ahead at the dusty main street.

When the sheriff came out, the crowd suddenly came to life. Big Blue had a big smile on his face, and an expectant look in his eyes. The sheriff came over and said:

"Big Blue, put out your hand."

Big Blue said: "Oooo eeee, sheriff. I can't wait to get that reward."

The sheriff continued, as if not hearing, "Big Blue, put out your other hand."

Big Blue went on, "Woooo, it's a powerful lot of money."

Just then the sheriff clapped the handcuffs on his wrist, and looked him right in the eye: "Big Blue, you're under arrest. For murder. Mrs. Summers has identified the body. It's not Honey Boy. You've killed an innocent man."

Big Blue just stared out, his eyes wide in amazement. Then he bellowed out: "What do you mean sheriff? Are you telling me I don't know my best friend? I killed my best friend! I killed Honey Boy!" He was still shouting as the sheriff led him away.

As the car rolled slowly down the dirt road leading to Mom's house neither spoke a word. It wasn't until he had brought Mom to the door, that the sheriff finally spoke: "Thank you ma'am. I'm just doing my job."

The old woman sat down on that old couch and looked around at her old furniture and the frayed rug on the floor. Now, in the calm of her sanctuary she looked at the glistening radio, which she never turned on again in her life, and started to cry very profoundly, to the accompaniment of a moan that sounded like a chant: "Oh, Honey Boy ... Oh, Honey Boy ... Oh, Honey Boy."

Brian Altano is a writer, storyteller, and Professor of Humanities at Berben Community College in Paramus, NJ.

"There's No Place Like Home": Critical Thinking in Three Popular Novels

Paul F. Griffin

Conditions and constraints

One useful way to talk about critical thinking is to see it as thought that is self-conscious. In the introduction to *Critical Sociology*, Paul Connerton points out two aspects of this self-awareness that distinguish the use of the term "critique" in the twentieth century:

> In the first, critique denotes reflection on the *conditions* of possible knowledge: on the potential abilities of human beings possessing the faculties of knowing, speaking and acting. Critique in this sense has its roots in Kant. [. . .] But the term 'critique' also contains a second new meaning. Here it denotes reflection of a system of *constraints* which are humanly produced: distorting pressures to which individuals, or a group of individuals, or the human race as a whole, succumb in their process of self-formation. (17-18)

Connerton is concerned with the political aspect of this dichotomy which he finds embodied in the work of the Frankfurt School. But the two types of self-consciousness he describes also occur in other activities we sometimes call "critical thinking:" the more formal analysis taught in some philosophy courses which focus on the ability to recognize and use various logical propositions and forms of argumentation, as well as "criticism" in the more general sense in which the term is commonly used. In all these enterprises, we seek to become aware of the structures, values, and media which inform creative activity and of the "standards" underlying our reactions to that activity. We must then confront the larger question of whether these parameters are conditions objectively dictated by the nature of our minds and the world or whether they are restrictions created by humans, powerful but nonetheless subject to human revision and reform. Critical thought in this sense is an ethical undertaking: it seeks to examine exactly what we know, and how we know it, in order to determine how knowledge can lead to action.

I want to consider three examples of American popular fiction which illustrate this ethical definition of critical thinking: L. Frank Baum's *The_Wonderful Wizard of Oz* (1900), Sloan Wilson's *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit* (1955) and Scott Turow's *Presumed Innocent* (1987). In each novel, the protagonist has to "see through" a previously opaque social institution: Dorothy unmasks the fakery of "Oz the Magnificent"; Thom Rath decides to escape from the "rat race" of the television industry; and Rusty Sabich foils a corrupt judicial system. Yet each novel also honors a limit beyond which critical thinking cannot pass, a new opacity that the protagonist finds when institutions become transparent. In all these novels, this limit takes the form of the family.

'Humbug the Magnificent"

Dorothy, the heroine of *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz*, almost literally stumbles onto the scam perpetrated by the carnival hack and balloonist known as "Oz the Magnificent" by the inhabitants of the Emerald City. Actually it is Toto, her dog, who knocks over the screen at the rear of the wizard's audience hall that hides the diminutive Oz and allows him to deceive a gullible populace by means of ventriloquism, a giant papier-mache head, masks, and a flaming ball of cotton suspended on wires from the ceiling. Readers will remember that Oz has assigned to Dorothy and her travel companions what he hopes is the impossible task of killing the

Wicked Witch of the West. When they succeed at this test, Oz is at a loss; he cannot reward them with the promised gifts: brains for the scarecrow, a heart for the tin-man, courage for the lion, and a return trip to Kansas for Dorothy. When Toto "discovers" him behind the screen, he is forced to admit that he is a charlatan:

> "When you came to me I was willing to promise anything if you would only do away with the other Witch; but, now that you have melted her, I am ashamed to say that I cannot keep my promises."
>
> "I think you are a very bad man," said Dorothy.
>
> "Oh, no, my dear; I'm really a very good man; but I'm a very bad Wizard, I must admit." (159)

Baum's novel takes a *caveat emptor* approach to the Wizard's shenanigans, a position we see in its use of the device of the green glasses, which figure prominently in W. W. Denslow's original drawings for this part of the novel. The Wizard tells Dorothy of his unwitting coronation as leader of the people among whom he lands when the balloon in which he was riding to advertise a local Nebraska fair veered out of control and far off course. He decides to put his new subjects' loyalty to the test and has them construct the fabulous city where he now resides:

> "Just to amuse myself, and keep the good people busy, I ordered them to build this City, and my palace; and they did it all willingly and well. Then I thought, as the country was so green and beautiful, I would call it the Emerald City, and to make the name fit better I put green spectacles on all the people, so that everything they saw was green.
>
> "But isn't everything here green?" asked Dorothy.
>
> "No more than in any other city," replied Oz; "but when you wear green spectacles, why of course everything you see looks green to you. . . .But my people have worn green glasses on their eyes so long that most of them think that it really is an Emerald City, and it certainly is a beautiful place, abounding in jewels and precious metals, and every good thing that is needed to make one happy. . . ." (158-59)

Oz feels no remorse for his exploitation of his subjects, since, in his own words they worked "willingly" to construct the city and his palace. And even if the name "Emerald City" is literally a misnomer, his followers do have "a beautiful place, abounding in jewels and precious metals, and every good thing that is needed to make one happy." In other words, if they have been duped, it is their own fault and they are not really worse off for accepting Oz's arbitrary restrictions as enabling conditions of their lives.

In fact, Oz extricates himself from the difficult situation in which his discovery as a fake places him by using his accusers' gullibility against themselves. Things turn slightly ugly as Oz delays making good on his promise, and Dorothy and her companions consider resorting to strong-arm tactics: calling on the help of the Flying Monkeys, now at their service for three wishes because they are in possession of the magic cap of the Wicked Witch of the West. Oz responds by doing what he knows best: scamming. He stuffs Scarecrow's head with bran and pins and tells him he has new brains. He cuts a hole in Tinman's chest and inserts a stuffed heart. In his own snakeoil salesman's version of transubstantiation, he has the lion drink a strange liquor that may look like ordinary spirits on the outside of his body, but which will provide "courage" once ingested. Oz reminds the cowardly lion, "courage is always inside one;

so that this really cannot be called courage until you have swallowed it" (168). "Humbug the Magnificent," as Dorothy has taken to calling him, is working on a susceptible set of pigeons: each of his guests leaves the throne room delighted that the Wizard has kept his word. Significantly, Denslow's illustration for this scene shows the trio still wearing their green glasses, days after the power of the Wizard has been publicly debunked; Tinman, Lion, and Scarecrow seem perfectly content with their now self-imposed "blinders" and the practical rewards they have got.

Oz cannot scam Dorothy so simply, however, since to fulfill his promise to her, he must physically transport her to a specific place: her home in Kansas. When the bumbling Oz succeeds only in whisking himself from the Emerald City in the balloon he has constructed in a good faith effort to get her (and of course himself) home, Dorothy must appeal to a higher authority: Glinda, the good witch of the South. Glinda runs a scam of her own, since she forces Dorothy to trade the magic hat of the Wicked Witch in exchange for the information that her safe passage home has been within Dorothy's power since she acquired the Silver Shoes (evidently too colorless an image for the authors of the script of the M.G.M. movie version forty years later) from the Wicked Witch of the East when Dorothy's house fell on the witch and killed her. To be sure, Glinda reveals her intentions to use the powers imparted by the hat wisely, but her behavior reminds us that to the last Dorothy remains in a world where every transaction is self-interested, or, to put it differently, there's a sucker born every minute.

Dorothy has been a sucker because she has not realized that the power to escape from Oz was always within her and did not depend on the humbuggery of the Wizard. But if she had become aware of that fact immediately, her companions would never have received their wishes. Self-deception, as the Wizard has already pointed out, can work out for the best; humbuggery when seen through the right lenses can be a beneficial condition of human existence. In the end, Dorothy does get home to Kansas, both despite and *because* of the Wizard's scam. She, too, keeps on a figurative pair of green glasses even after the Wizard has been debunked.

The Wonderful Wizard of Oz exhibits a restricted kind of critical thinking, a process of debunking and substitution that couples the story's "muckraking" energy with an affirmation of traditional Sunday-school values. The chicanery of Oz turns out not to be the inevitable constraint it first seems, but for Baum the home and family life to which Dorothy escapes functions as the "real world" which does impose inevitable restrictions. In asking to go home, Dorothy offhandedly remarks to Glinda:

> "My greatest wish now. . .is to get back to Kansas, for Aunt Em will surely think something dreadful has happened to me, and that will make her put on mourning; and unless the crops are better this year than they were last I am sure Uncle Henry cannot afford it." (212)

"God's in his heaven. . . ."

After his first day working as an assistant to the head of a television network, Thom Rath, the protagonist of *The Man In the Gray Flannel Suit*, cannot avoid a dash of sarcasm as he describes his job to his wife:

> "I got to write a speech. I mean, I have to help Mr. Hopkins with a speech. I might as well get the terminology of this thing straight from the beginning."
>
> To his surprise, Betsy looked hurt. "I wish you'd stop being so damn bright and cynical," she said. "It's no way to start a new job. You ought to be enthusiastic. Damn it, Tommy, try being naive!" (106-7)

In other words, Betsy Rath wants her husband to find a pair of emerald glasses through which to view the corporate world. None of the characters in Wilson's novel holds any disillusions about that environment: it is full of sycophants, yes-men and drudges all worshipping money. And though it is not as easy as Betsy might wish for Thom to find a positive perspective on the rat-race, he eventually does find in family life a safe haven from the hucksterism of the workaday world.

The difference between the Kansas of Baum's novel and the Fairfield County of Wilson's story is that the magic of the latter comes already debunked. In place of Dorothy's heartwarming concern about the current crop back on the farm, Wilson's suburbanites have a restlessness that can only express itself through upward social mobility. Betsy Rath captures this spirit in thinking over the cocktail-party banter in the neighborhood in which her family lives and in which, she realizes "contentment was an object of contempt:"

> As the evening wore on, the men generally fell to divulging dreams of escaping to an entirely different sort of life--to a dairy farm in Vermont, or to the management of a motel in Florida--but for the most part, the cocktail parties simply gave everyone a chance to prove he considered Greentree Avenue no more than a stepping stone to the same kind of life on a bigger scale. There's nothing wrong with that, Betsy tried to tell herself. This isn't a bad place to be, it's just....
>
> Dull. That was the word she usually used for Greentree Avenue, but tonight she rejected it. If this were just a dull place, I wouldn't mind it so much. The trouble is, it's not dull enough--it's tense and it's frantic. (109-10)

Thom Rath at first buys into the gray flannel suit mentality. He soon discovers, though, that he is not cut out to be a business executive, a decision he justifies to his boss by appealing to family values:

> "I'm not the kind of person who can get all wrapped up in a job--I can't get myself convinced that my work is the most important thing in the world. I've been through one war. Maybe another one's coming. If one is, I want to be able to look back and figure I spent the time between wars with my family, the way it should have been spent." (251-52)

The problem with this strategy, both in real life and in Wilson's novel, was that it depended on an idealized and totally unrealistic model of family life. Wilson never specifically calls attention to the point, but the irony of Thom Rath's decision to quit his job to devote more time to his family is that he works for a television network, the very medium that helped to create the unrealistic picture of white middle-class suburbia that motivates Rath. *The Man In the Gray Flannel Suit* takes a decidedly ambiguous attitude toward this myth. On the one hand, it shows that none of the families whose lives it describes measures up to it; on the other, it ends with a twisted affirmation of this same unrealistic idea of "family" values.

Thom finally achieves domestic happiness in a roundabout and highly unlikely manner: by telling his wife of the existence of an illegitimate son whom he fathered while stationed in Italy during World War II. The climax of the novel is the scene in which Betsy accepts the son and agrees to the plan Thom has devised for sending money to maintain the boy in Italy. Appropriately enough, Thom speaks with Betsy in the garden of his grandmother's estate, where there is a fountain inscribed with a famous verse from Browning:

> "Ever since you came back to me tonight, I've been remembering a line from a poem that used to sound ironic and bitter. It doesn't sound that way any more. Tonight, for a little while at least, I feel it's true."

> "What is it?"
>
> "'God's in his heaven,'" he said, "'all's right with the world.'" (273-74)

Thom, with Betsy's assistance, achieves the naivete she wants him to have. He overcomes the self-conscious restlessness of suburban life by reasserting family with a vengeance.

As embodied in Betsy, this notion of domestic happiness is so strong that even Thom's unfaithfulness to it only serves to reinforce it. The ending of the story celebrates this idea of the raw power of family. We see through the eyes of Bernstein, the town Judge whom Thom asks to handle the mailing of support money to his son in Italy:

> "I know this must sound a little odd to you," Thom said, "but I met a girl in Italy during the war, and I've told Betsy all about it. The child the girl had needs help, and Betsy and I are going to send it. I suppose that may be a little unconventional, but to us it seems like simple justice." (276)

Bernstein is so taken by this powerful and simple notion of justice ("The kind I generally deal with is so complex," he tells Thom) that he waives his legal fees and beams as he watches Thom walk off down the street arm-in-arm with Betsy. Just as Aunt Em and Uncle Henry represent the harsh reality Dorothy opposes to the humbuggery of Oz, Rath finds in the compelling and simple morality of family a "truth" that can withstand his own restlessness.

"Some matters remain your secret"

Scott Turow's *Presumed Innocent* takes this restricted critical thinking to a logical and unsettling extreme. As in *Gray Flannel Suit*, institutions come already debunked. A matter-of-fact corruption marks the world of lawyers, politicians, and police which it portrays. Rusty Sabich, the novel's protagonist, has always "seen through" these institutions. He cannot, though, just substitute for them another, sounder source of values, like Dorothy's hardscrabble sense of family or Rath's "simple justice." In this story, the "real" values which sustain characters and allow them to put up with the humbuggery of everyday life are as nakedly contingent as the institutions they challenge. They do not come from God or the world, but from private emotions.

The novel tells the story of Rusty Sabich, an assistant prosecuting attorney in a large, corrupt midwestern city we take to be Chicago. When one of his colleagues, a woman with whom he has had an affair, is found murdered, Sabich is assigned to investigate the crime. His investigation bogs down under the weight of political intrigue, official ineptitude, and his own wife's hostility, until finally, he is brought in front of the prosecuting attorney and arrested for the murder he is investigating. The remainder of the novel details Sabich's trial. We do not know, until the very end, that Sabich is innocent and has protected the real murderer, his estranged wife.

Turow makes it clear that the real action of the novel occurs in private, not in the public world of police investigations and criminal trials. Sabich's attorney consciously omits to ask him whether he is guilty, because, as he tells his client at one point, "I am convinced, after observing you for several months now that you will not testify to everything you know. Some matters remain your secret" (341). The lawyer makes this observation not to goad Sabich into talking about the murder, but to acknowledge that there are aspects of the case that can rightly remain out of bounds in their legal discussions. "I am confident," the lawyer tells Sabich, "that the choice you have made is a deliberate one, and well considered" (341).

It is significant that the defense attorney does not tell his client that the decision to withhold information is just or moral or even legal. He merely says that it is "well considered," a representative comment in a novel in which everything, all human interaction, finally becomes a question of self-interested strategy. The narrator himself does not operate as crudely and obviously as the other characters, but when the legal system creates a niche where the murderer can hide, and Rusty acts on what believes is a valid *personal* reasons for letting her doing so. The institutions in which he operates are riddled with corruption: in the course of his story we meet judges, policemen, and prosecutors all on the take, and bureaucrats who care more about preserving their power than serving the cause of justice. In response to this environment, Sabich also operates from the principle of self-interest and an ethical code dedicated to the preservation of what Hannah Arendt would call his intimacy, the part of him that he holds beyond the law and all the other institutions of the social order.

In the novel's final scene, Sabich reveals to a friend that this part of him instinctively seeks to preserve the mental well-being of himself and his family. He tells his friend that he has not turned his wife in to the police because he believes it would irreparably damage his seven-year-old son, who has already suffered psychologically during Sabich's trial. He acts as he does to preserve his own peace of mind:

> "I couldn't do it, Lip. I couldn't do it to Nat. We've all had more than enough. *I* couldn't take it. I don't owe anybody that much. (415)

his mother, Rusty reveals that he believes the boy will be alright because he will allow Sabich's wife to achieve the same state of mental balance that his refusal to go public gives him:

> "That's one thing I don't worry about. She's in better shape with him. It pulls her back. Barbara needs someone around who really cares about her. And Nat does. I always knew I couldn't split them up--it would be the worst thing I could do to either one of them." (417)

On the surface, Sabich's reaction to his false accusation is motivated by the same principle as Thom Rath's dropping out of the corporate world: a desire to preserve "real" value within the family. But the sense of family which served as a refuge for Dorothy and Thom Rath here does not shelter Sabich, his wife and son and allow them to function *in* the world, but works instead to allow each of them to achieve a private mental stability by remaining apart from that world and from each other.

"The universal light"

These popular novels exhibit a stunted kind of critical thinking, one that almost seems afraid of carrying the debunking of institutions through to its logical conclusion. In each, some remnant survives, held out from the critical gaze the work directs on the rest of the protagonist's situation. For Dorothy it is the economic and filial demands of family; for Thom Rath the necessity of providing for loved ones; for Sabich the requirement of keeping some place free for one's own emotional refuge.

This strategy echoes Plato's pronouncement in the seventh book of *The Republic* that people should not practice true dialectic until they are fifty years old. Before that time, callow students have no basis for using the powerful tool and "like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them" (232). The point of Socratic dialectic, after all, is not so much to destroy false beliefs, but to reveal "the universal light which lightens all things and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals. . ."(232).

What we see in the popular novels we have considered is a series of substitutions for the absolutist "universal light" that for Plato guarantees the validity of critical thinking. These modern moral foundations are increasingly private in the pejorative, privative sense and located within the bonds of the family. Social Historians Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg describe the rise of this soothing icon of the family in the context of post-World War II American society:

> Reacting against the poverty of the depression and the upheavals of World War II, the instability of international affairs, and the increasingly impersonal quality of social relations, couples placed a new emphasis on family as the source of hopes and aspirations. As two contemporary observers explained: "The employee of a large, bureaucratic-type organization [finds that his job] offers little in the way of meaningful personal relationships.... In this mushrooming of size and anonymity, the family stands out as a haven of intimacy.... (180)

Seen in this light, it is small wonder that the image of the family and home--if not the reality--has become tired and overworked. From the television sitcoms of the fifties to the rhetoric of the last three presidential campaigns, we have made our family ideal serve a crucial function in our public discourses. "Family" in the novels I have considered is the place where critical thinking stops, the site of the private emotional fulfillment that counters the increasingly obvious humbuggery of social institutions.

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Paul Griffin directs the Liberal Arts Program at the Peabody Conservatory of the Johns Hopkins University.

Masking: East and West - An Exploration for Use in Cross-Cultural Teaching

Sharon Spencer

In W. B. Yeats's poem "The Mask" a male voice commands: "'Put off that mask of burning gold/ With emerald eyes.' But the female voice is defiant: "'O no, my dear, you make so bold/ To find if hearts be wild and wise, and yet not cold.'" He insists, revealing his motive; "'I would but find what's there to find,/ Love or deceit.'" She fences:"'It was the mask engaged your mind,/ And after set your heart to beat,/ Not what's behind.'" More candid still, the pursuer charges: "'But lest you are my enemy,/ I must inquire.'"

Yeats, who studied the Noh drama of Japan, created in this short lyric dialogue an essential contrast between Western and Eastern attitudes toward human masking. Rooted in the centuries of individualism, the Westerner wants to see what he/she takes to be truth, wants to see reflections on a surface. The Easterner, rooted in a tradition that values the submission of the individual to the far more important needs of the collective (usually, professional group or family), values depth far more than surface and regards the act of masking as a necessary and powerful mode of human interaction.

A simple way to verify the suspicion with which masking is regarded in the West is to look up "mask" in the Random House College Dictionary: "(1) a covering for all or part of the face, usually worn to conceal one's identity; false face; anything that disguises or conceals, a pretense; a masquerade or revel; a representation of a face or head, usually grotesque, used as an ornament; to disguise, conceal. Synonyms: veil, cloak, shroud, cover. . ." What do we do when we wear masks? We hide. We do things we wouldn't normally do because of our inhibitions, as at Carnival time. Or we commit crimes.

Accordingly, the best known literary example of masking among Westerners is likely to be Hawthorne's story "The Minister's Black Veil," in which the protagonist has ambivalent properties, enhancing his impersonal power as a spiritual force in his community, yet causing people to fear and shun him as an individual.

Turning to a literary example from Japan, we have a complex treatment of the subject in a 1959 novel *Masks* by the great woman writer Fumiko Enchi. *Masks* incorporates major allusions not only to the masks of traditional Noh theater (each of the three parts bears the title of a specific Noh mask) but also to an episode in Murasaki's Heian era masterpiece, *The Tale of the Genji* (giving the ambitious teacher a graceful way to introduce students to the major Japanese literary tradition).

Masks is, in part, a tale of revenge. As a bride, Mieko Togano was deeply wronged by her husband. By means of a series of intricate strategies, the first of which is what we would call a persona that conceals her formidable and tenacious being with the appearance of an elusive submissiveness, Mieko perpetrates a chain of related deceptions that enable her to place directly in her deceased husband's bloodline a single heir who not only is the grandchild of Mieko's lover, but who is also likely mentally retarded.

Scrupulously and meticulously masked until the novel's end, Mieko draws incredible power from the belief in the mask's ability to transform. In Noh tradition, to wear a mask means to cast a spell. What the mask conceals, besides the surface, is the depth of the one who wears it. The mask, which in the West would imprison its wearer behind an impenetrable surface, in the Eastern tradition liberates: behind it one may act from his or her deepest desires.

This is the enormously important psychological advantage gained by Mieko Togano. "She's like the face on a Noh mask, wrapped in her own secrets," one says. A poet, Mieko is associated with an "aesthetic of mystery and depth." Again and again, she is described as wearing a Noh mask: as "elusive," "obscure," "secretive," and even as "indestructible."

To generalize dangerously, the contrasting perspectives gained from studying such works as those mentioned here reveal how Westerners suspect masks of causing people to behave falsely, of wrenching people into deceptive shapes and tricking them into false or insincere behavior. The contrasting view suggests that the mask is liberating because it provides a screen behind which one can actually be oneself. Thus, both freedom and authenticity can be attained through masking. The duplicity and the mysteriousness that are feared and suspected by Westerners are regarded as positive attributes that can lead to a deep and powerful expression of being. Study of works that embody such contrasting views can lead to profound questions, to say the very least, and perhaps the final issue one might want to explore is whether the distinction between the "real" (individual) and the "false" (the impersonal role or persona) is really so easy to define, after all. When Yeats's masked lady urges her aspiring lover to "let all that be," she is suggesting that there is something false about the urgency he feels to know whether she might, in fact be his "enemy." Here lies another ambiguity, one that might be fascinating to explore with students: to what extent is gender itself a mask.

Sharon Spencer is a faculty member of the English Department at Montclair State College, This article was previously published in The Aegis, a publication of the Institute for the Humanities at MSC.

The Role of Autobiography in Critical Thinking

Lesley Cola

Although there seem to be many advantages from a critical thinking perspective to the inclusion of students' autobiographies in Higher Education programs, autobiography is a genre which admits of deep philosophical tensions which are of relevance to the aims and practices of critical thinking. Of particular note is the conception of the self which lies at the centre of our understanding of autobiography and our interest in it from an educational point of view. In this paper I shall be primarily concerned with a central aspect of this conception: the assumption of the unity of the self over time. The aim of concentrating on this aspect of autobiography is to point to some of the implications that the various interpretations of both its meaning and importance make available. Through the examination of this crucial aspect, it is hoped that our appreciation of autobiography in a critical thinking context will be furthered.

Autobiography appears peculiarly appropriate to critical thinking in a number of ways. In the first place, it draws on a general philosophy of education which rests on a commitment to seeing the individual at the centre of the educational process. Thus, in the reference it makes to the condition of the individual, autobiography is justifed by a philosophy to which critical thinking adheres.

Besides this general justification, autobiography, in its demand for personal reflection and thoughtfulness concerning one's development, one's history and one's relationship to others and the world, is closely aligned to theories of strong-sense critical thinking. Autobiography makes a particular contribution in its emphasis on the specificity of individual experience and the importance of its personal interpretation. By focusing on the personal, on the self as knower rather than on the coming to possess an impersonal body of knowledge, it serves to shift attention to the expression and clarification of individual experience, and the need for personal reflection as part of the learning process. In autobiography, the site of analysis becomes the students' histories.

A further advantage, not to be underestimated, lies in its positive contribution to the hidden curriculum. Implicit in the giving of time to the articulation of students' autobiographies is the message that students' experiences and concerns are relevant and important in the classroom. It thus plays a role in the provision of an education which is relevant to students' lives by recognising the validity of students' experience and in assigning value to students' voices.

Clearly the value of autobiography from a critical thinking perspective lies primarily in what we hope the students will achieve. Given that our interest does not lie in the direction of self-justification, self-aggrandisement or encouraging the desire to convert or confess, the motivation behind its use in Higher Education would seem to lie in the provision of a means of enhancing personal meaning. A primary function of autobiography, from this perspective, is to give insight into one's present situation through reflection on and interpretation of one's past, and so forms part of the attempt to understand life now, and how to continue. It is the forward-looking nature of autobiography that is of importance in this context.

The attempt to determine the subjective meaning of a life as undertaken by the person whose life it is, as an aim of introducing autobiographical writing, is to be taken to include the enabling of students to further their understanding of themselves and their relations to others. Experiences, as Sartre (1957) has pointed out, are inclined to dissolve into objectivity. From an educational point of view autobiography plays a valuable role in its accentuation of the place of the subjective in our lives. The meaning sought though autobiography thus becomes the point of insertion, a mediator between the objective circumstances, the setting of a life, and the personal life of the individual. In the process, one is open to a greater appreciation of the freedoms and necessities of a life.

The extent to which the incorporation of autobiography into a curriculum informed by critical thinking will result in these advantages being achieved, depends to some extent on what we take autobiography to be. Therefore, the isolation of those features distinctive of autobiography which are relevant to education is needed.

Our common-sense understanding of autobiography is that it is an attempt to give a true account of a life by the person whose life is being described. This is to be achieved primarily through the employment of the method of introspection, using reflection on the past from the perspective of the present to construct an account which is more or less coherent and orderly. The development of the author's experience is recreated through its description and evocation. It is an attempt to show the evolution of the self, particular experiences being recounted because they represent stages of growth or development, experiences being selected on the basis of relevance according to the motivation behind the production of an autobiography. Through the particular significance which events and experiences are given in the process of reflecting on and recreating one's past in language, truths or insights about oneself are hopefully attained. Hence, the content primarily reflects a concern with the inner life of the author and it is activity which concentrates on the self and is, itself, an articulation of the importance we place on the interpretation an individual gives of her own life.

This initial description uncovers a problem which continues to exercise many of those interested in autobiography: its purported truth-value. For the aim, to give a true account through reflection on one's life, is placed under some tension by the necessary rationalisation the construction of an autobiography involves. The tension exists because while we have a conception of autobiography as having the potential to reflect an aspect of reality accurately, we also recognise that the necessary adoption of a stance or perspective, ordinarily the author's present, involves seeing autobiography as centrally a matter of interpreting a life. Attention is thus drawn to the interpetative nature of recollection and, hence, to the central role of interpretation in autobiography, in particular in the reading back into events a character, significance or meaning they did not have at the time.

The original intuition, that autobiography is an attempt to give a true account of a life, survives, as long as 'true' in this context is taken as true of, or for, a person in the context of her life rather than 'true' in the sense of some sort of correspondence to facts in the world. This causes few problems in our context, where the interest is in the benefits to accrue to the author from constructing an autobiography. In this case the verificability of the empirical events recorded is less important that the personal truths to be gained.

It was the possibility of attaining such personal truths which was intimated in the above outline of some of the most obvious advantages of autobiography, and which provides one of the main impetuses behind its introduction into the school setting. In downplaying the truth value of autobiography as a function of its ability to reflect reality, in favour of a notion of personal truth, the concept of individual identity and the value of the interpretation and significance an individual gives of her own life are elevated in importance. Autobiography, on this view, is to be valued for the preeminence it gives to this concept.

It seems, then, that our understanding of autobiography is informed by two perspectives. According to the first, it is conceived on the model of a non-fictional account, accurately reflecting part of a knowable reality, while the second sees autobiography as an interpretative account of a life, the value of which lies in the particular subjective truths the author gains from reflection on a selection of past experiences. Posing the central question we face as educators in using autobiography, in these terms, is, however, potentially misleading for it obscures the issue by framing it as essentially a choice between competing accounts in terms of a symptom of their difference, rather than in terms of the salient distinction of which talk of truth-value is one, albeit important, expression. In other words, the choice facing us is only at one remove that between some as yet vaguely defined notion of subjective personal truth, and a more objective picture, which seems from the very structure of autobiography to be unattainable. These different conceptions are available as a result of the radically different conceptions of the self from which each model draws. The first account holds that there is only one truth of which the self is the source. This claim is based on certain views concerning the self and its relation to the world, according to which the self occupies a position of epistemic privilege with respect to an aspect of a knowable reality, namely itself, as part of this reality. The self is thus viewed as an entity of which knowledge is possible, that knowledge being available through a specific method, introspection. This points to our understanding of autobiography as an attempt to resolve problems to do with the nature of the individual through self-analysis and self-evaluation. It thus relies heavily on the notion of having privileged access to oneself. The second account, which emphasises the interpetative aspect of autobiography, recognises that there are potentially many truths; these truths being a function of the narrative structure of autobiography.

While the first account may at first sight seem to smack of a metaphysics of the person which we might be inclined to reject, it is the basis for one of the primary motivations behind the use of autobiography in education. One reason autobiography is felt to be relevant here is that it is presumed that the author's interpretation of her own life, in which she will have particular interest, will have relevance precisely because of the relation between the author and the subject of the text. This relationship between the author and the subject is taken as conferring more than just relevance on the interpretation given. It is taken to ensure that the author's interpretation will have a special authority. A graphic expression of this is supplied by Rousseau at the close of his *Confessions* :

> I cannot be wrong about what I have felt nor about what my feelings have led me to do and this is what it is all about. (1964).

This articulation of the truth to which autobiography pretends, a personal truth which is not to be gainsaid by the evidence of others, posits an authority that gains its support from a particular, if common, interpretation of the status of the autobiographical self.

The aims to be achieved through the use of autobiography, which we have here isolated as an enhancement of personal meaning, relies, in the first place on autobiography being understood as self-scutiny. Thus, although producing an autobiography is not guaranteed to result in greater personal understanding of one's self or one's situation and development, the focus on the self demanded is presumed to at least have the potential for resulting in such insights, given that it is one's own subjectivity, the meaning of living one's own life which is under investigation. The achievement of these aims is thus premissed on a defining characteristic of autobiography, that the person who writes the autobiography is also the subject. This identification of the narrator and protagonist is made in virtue of an assumption, the unity of the self over time. Our understanding of autobiography itself, its coherence, and the value we give it, is, thus, to some extent dependent on a prior theory of the reidentification of persons. The separation of the person who structures an autobiography and the subject of that work, the reference of it, can only be implied, in that it is assumed that no matter what changes a person undergoes, each person has one life over which she has special authority with respect to the legitimacy of the significance and meaning which are to be given to it. This is not to say that other interpretations cannot be equally valid or that the autobiographer cannot recognise or incorporate them, but the personal meaning given to a life by the person who lives it is valued and has significance in virtue of the assumption that the person commenting is the same and as that commented upon.

It is partly in virtue of this identification that the author is granted special authority over the autobiographical text. For this identification, through the assumption of unity, supplies the narrator with grounds to judge and interpret the experiences of the subject of the text. The authority with which I interpret past experiences is different depending on whether those experiences are mine or yours. In the case of the former, my increased authority stems precisely from the identification of those experiences as mine. Thus Rousseau's confidence in his ability to tell the truth in this context, for the truth-value of an autobiography depends on this special authority assumed by narrator over the entire subject matter, which rests on the unity of the person. Our confidence is not so likely to be expressed with such conviction. Recognition of the possibility of self-deception and the related question of the possibility of being sincere with oneself and the genuineness of response where reflection on the past is involved, mean that we no longer feel there is any guarantee that reflection will lead to interpretations which are immune to error. We retain, however, some of Rousseau's confidence, if not his certainty, in the special status of autobiography. Herein lies some measure of its appeal in the educational context. The contention here is that this appeal is itself based on the assumption of the unity of the self over time.

The assumption of the unity of the self over time is such a seemingly natural and indispensable aspect of our lives, that it appears merely an exercise in academic philosophy to question it. It occupies a position of fundamental importance in our social and moral practices.The justification for its acceptance seems clear: The most cursory reflection on a range of ordinary attitudes such as praise, blame, pride, remorse as well as moral practices such as commitment and desert, reveals that the idea of the unity of the self is central to our personal and social life. Moreover, it is this conception of self which informs our understanding of agency, instrumental in defining those actions which are taken as central to a society's well-being. It is therefore, a conception which is learnt and reinforced in many social and cultural contexts. Given that the preservation of our ordinary moral concepts is of value, we are provided with ample motivation for espousing a theory of identity of persons which is at least is consistent with them.

The point of raising the issue in the present context is to enable us to make a clearer assessment of what is to be achieved by the inclusion of autobiography in a critical thinking framework, through investigation of this central feature. The assumption of unity of the self, as exhibited in autobiography does not stand alone, in the sense that it fosters a belief in a substantialist self as the reference of the autobiography, as its essence, the truth of which is be discovered or even revealed through introspection. It is thus allied to the familiar philosophical view whereby the self is seen as the foundation of all knowledge. As such the self is required to be a substantial entity, if for no other reason than that as the bedrock of knowedge it is required to have the ability to support other less substantial aspects of reality. To be so viewed, the self must be seen as an unambiguous entity to which reference can be made. Substance theories of the self, where the self is seen as either a dependent or independent existent, have the consequent that the self is essentially private and best known to itself. Along with unity, or continuity, such a conception commonly takes the self to admit of rationality, responsibility, self-sufficency and separateness. Hence the self is seen as discrete and as occupying a privileged relation to a knowable empirical reality, in particular to occupy a privileged epistemic position to that part of reality which is itself. This thesis of personal identity awards special authority to autobiography on the basis of ownership of something like an ego. This is itself a combination of two theses: that the unity of a life is assured through some theory of personal identity, and secondly that this unity confers authority on the present self with respect to earlier selves.

From the point of view of autobiography as a means of furthering the aims of critical thinking, the postulation of a unified, continuous self which can gain knowledge of itself through self-scrutiny and examination of itself, may seem too individualistic a basis on which to build. If the conception instantiated in autobiography contributes to the idea of a substantial self, then we have educational reasons to be wary of it, for the idea of a substantial self involves the idea of separateness. To postulate the existence of a fundamental metaphysical entity, myself, which is distinct from all other entities, encourages, or supplies a basis for individualist theories of schooling. It lends support, for instance, to exhortions to children to undergo experiences now for the benefit of their later selves, and to pedagogical practices and environments based on appeal to self interest.

It is therefore of some interest to see the extent to which this conception of the self is justified. There seem to be two immediate sources of justification. One can either appeal to moral concepts and practices, or to theories of personal identity. Justification in terms of moral concepts and practices alone would require some argument for the independence of moral theory from a theory of personal identity. The alternative is to provide a theory of personal identity which would guarantee the unity of persons over time in terms of the particular nature of the identity of persons, as opposed to the identity of physical objects. In other words, an argument for the identity of persons according to which persons are *entio per se* so that unlike physical objects the identity of persons does not admit of degrees. According to such a theory a person is more than a succession of mental and physical events and states; the identity of persons holding in virtue of facts of personal identity over and above the holding of these more particular facts. This view supports the interpretation of autobiography as the story of one person's life where the fact that it is one person's life is a fact of personal identity over and above physical and psychological continuities and connectedness. However, the positing of "further facts" is problematic in that whether these are understood as either subjective or objective, a satisfactory explication of them has yet to be given.

An alternative conception is reductionism, as recently formulated by Parfit (1984). According to this thesis "[a] person's existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events" (p. 210). On this view, what matters when we consider the nature of persons over time is the holding of psychological continuities and connections which hold to a greater or lesser extent. Thus what matters is not identity, a one-one relationship, but survival, which is a matter of degree. This analysis applies very much to our everyday lives where mental and physical characteristics converge to produce a seemingly single and continuous stream, for our beliefs, plans and intentions as well as memories of these are more or less connected. Memories fade and intentions change so that there may be little in common between myself now and myself at seven years old. Following Parfit, it would seem that the problem of change in the case of persons is better described in terms of survival than in terms of identity.

The unity of the self can then be seen as the holding of psychological connections and continuities. Thus there is the possibility of both identification and nonidentification (in cases where one is indifferent to earlier experiences). On this account personal identity does not have a special nature, for essential to this view is the denial of the holding of a further fact or facts in virtue of which personal identity is to be explicated.

If the unity of a life is a matter of degree, then it can plausibly be argued that the unity of a life is less important or deep than would be the case if the non-reductionist view was true. On this account the difference between lives is no longer to be accorded fundamental significance. This is to be constrasted with the nonreductionist view where identity is taken to involve a deep fact according to which all of a person's life is as much her life, and thus the boundaries between lives take on a greater importance. For, if, as Parfit (1984) claims, "a person's life is less deeply integrated than most of us assume" (p. 336) on the grounds that "a person's identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more particular facts" (p. 210), then it can be argued that the disunity between lives is less and support is gained for the claim that less importance be put on the fact that persons are separate. The separateness of persons on this account is to regarded more like the boundaries between countries than between squares on a chess-board dividing "what is all pure white from what is all jet black" (p. 33).

This account of personal identity can plausibly be seen as having consequences for how we approach autobiography in schools. The decreased importance of the separateness of persons, and the claim that parts of each life are less deeply unfied, rather than undermining the autobiographical project, with its emphasis on the self, can be seen as a move away from justifications in terms of self-interest.

This view, in so far as it denies that a person is a fundamental metaphysical entity, has affinities with social constructionism, with its distinction between the public fact of the identity of a human being as a person and an individual's sense of identity: one's sense of self (Harré, 1988). On this account, although persons and selves are viewed as belonging to the same ontological category, individuatable beings, the latter are denied reality; a sense of self being made available to members of a culture through belief in the existence of a self. In short, "self" is a concept which has sense but not reference. When applied to autobiography, which takes as its reference this ontological fiction, this thesis serves to draw attention to the narrative form itself. A social constructionist interpretation of self-narrative supports the view that the structure of the narrative itself becomes, through habituation, a directive of experience (Bruner, 1987:31). On both this account and Parfit's, selves are a consequence of language.

The argument of this paper has been that the conception of the self on which autobiography is based has certain implications for critical thinking. By focusing on a defining characteristic of autobiography, the unity of the self over time, attention has been drawn in particular to the implications of the view that an ultimate division can be made between the self and the world, between the inner and the outer world, and between self and others. This in itself can be seen as supporting individualist tendencies in educational theory and practice. Coupled with the assumption of a given and knowable reality, to a part of which the self is in a privileged epistemic relationship, autobiography encourages the idea that the self is a structure that is given outside the narrative of the self: that it is a pre-linguistic given of which the autobiography is a report or reflection.

The alternative, based primarily on a Parfitian analysis but also supported by social constructionism, sees the uniqueness and value of autobiography as residing more in the particular interpretation and structure each self-narrative takes, than in the importance of the separateness of persons. In this way it temds to deny support to the individualist aspect of autobiography, while retaining its value as a means of giving recognition to the specificity of experience.

One particular consequence of this position for the use of autobiography in the classroom is the suggestion that greater attention be directed to the structure of the narrative and its importance in our sense of who we are. With respect to the authority of the author, this can now be seen to accrue more from the construction she places upon experiences than on the existence of a self which, characterised as a fundamental metaphysical entity, effects authority in terms of identity. The authority of the author is thus to be viewed as emanating from the act of authoring itself, autobiography in the process becoming less easily distinguishable from other forms of written expression which explore the significance and meaning we give lives. This is not an extreme claim. The argument has shown that the value of autobiography as a means of determining meaning rests on metaphysical positions on the self which admit of problems, although supported by social and cultural practices. That it can continue to play this role has not been denied. All that is being suggested is that the emphasis move from autobiography as a means to self-knowledge through introspection, to autobiography as a means to greater understanding based through increased appreciation of the responsibilities of authorship. While this view gains support from certain metaphysical views on personal identity, it should not be forgotten that, on any account, the form chosen and the style used is expressive of the person writing and forms an essential part an autobiography. The main suggestion is that this aspect of autobiography be emphasised more and those aspects of autobiography which emphasise the separateness of persons be given less importance. In this way, autobiography can be seen to have a valuable role to play in critical thinking.

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Lesley Coia is a Visiting Scholar from the University of London

Critical Thinking
and the Narrative Discourse of Psychotherapy

Sidney W. White

Introduction

The overall purpose of this paper is to offer a reflection on the status of critical thinking within the context of psychotherapy. More specifically, the focus of this reflection will be restricted to a consideration of critical thinking with respect to two related psychotherapeutic concerns: the nature of the "talking cure" and the lived, training experience of beginning psychotherapists. What is at stake, so to speak, is the relative status we want to attribute to critical thinking both in terms of favoring a psychotherapeutic cure and in terms of fostering a beginning, disciplined therapeutic presence. Of these two concerns, it is the role of critical thinking with respect to the latter, concrete matter of training beginning psychotherapists that will be discussed primarily. This focus on the praxis of clinical training, however, of necessity includes some end in view, some understanding of psychotherapeutic cure and its relation to critical thinking.

In terms of organization, it will be helpful to move first in the direction of considering certain of those theoretical and conceptual understandings of critical thinking that have come to prominently inform our thought. The intent here is to get some working understanding at the outset of what is generally meant by "critical thinking" and often considered psychotherapeutic cure as well. Among these theoretical understandings, I will be paying particular attention to three: Piaget's developmental conceptualization of "concrete" and "formal" operational thought as that has become embodied in various problem-solving strategies and more formally in the scientific method; Hartmann and White's psychoanalytic ego psychology regarding autonomous, "conflict-free" ego functions; and Lacan's psychoanalytic linguistic critique of the reality-adaptive ego.

It is Lacan's linguistic understanding of the ego as an "imaginary capture" and "structure of denial" that radically throws into question the promise we ordinarily bestow upon our capacity for reasoning and critical thought within the psychotherapeutic context. According to Lacan, there is a reasonable, rational, even critical discourse that the subject "pronounces on him/herself" which establishes and maintains a fundamental self-alienation. It is this understanding of the conscious ego and its dubious capacity for self-critical thought that poses some rather thorny questions --especially for those highly cognitive, problem-solving psychotherapeutic approaches that emphasize the importance of strengthening even further those self-same critical thinking and problem-solving skills of the ego which, for Lacan, have occasioned treatment in the first place.

In contrast to this rational, reasonable, critical discourse, of which Lacan is convinced we should sleep with one eye open, I will close the paper by attempting to describe a narrative clinical discourse that is responsive to Lacan's concerns regarding the conscious ego's lack of enthusiasm for undressing in public. This contrasting narrative discourse will, accordingly, rightly respect this piece of public decorum (as if there is any real choice in the matter!) and gladly settle instead for only glimpses in the patient's everyday discourse which is a wealth of revealing intimations and allusions to begin with. I will be describing this clinical narrative discourse from the standpoint of helping beginning psychotherapists appropriate its respective moments. This perspective affords the advantage of seeing more clearly both the appeal and the limitations of that style of thought we familiarly refer to as critical thinking. But first, we need to consider those conceptual understandings of critical thinking that have become the common measure.

Piaget's Conceptualization of Concrete and Formal Operational Thought

It is Piaget's understanding of cognitive development as an ascending hierarchy of ever more sophisticated mental operations that has come to virtually define what is commonly considered mature, critical thinking. Although some (Bryant, 1974; Brainerd, 1978; Trabasso, 1975; Breslow, 1981; Delisi and Staudt, 1980; Falmagne, 1980; and Flavell, 1985) have questioned the suitability of certain of Piaget's research tasks and, consequently, the specific age of acquisition of some of the mental operations he described, few have doubted the actual validity of those mental operations that comprise his overall view of critical thinking and intellectual maturity. It is not my purpose here to present in detail those mental operations that comprise Piaget's understanding of critical thinking. Rather, I am only wanting to describe the more salient features of these mental operations and capture the attitude or spirit that welcomes their enhancement. Nor is it my intent to critique critical thinking per se, but rather to assess its efficacy only within the psychotherapeutic context. To these ends, then, I will be focusing mainly on Piaget's conceptualization of formal operational thought -- particularly in those respects in which it is viewed as surpassing certain deficiencies of preoperational and concrete operational thought.

It is worthwhile to begin by noting certain of these thinking "deficiencies" in view of which formal operational thought gains its stature. Piaget so named "preoperational" thought because it does not "operate" on the basis of recognizing and abiding by logical rules. In particular, preoperational thought is considered limited by being "intuitive" and "centered." According to McGraw (1987, p.397), the two essential deficits of intuitive thought are that reasoning and judgment are based "purely on appearances" and that successive judgments can be "mutually contradictory." In the first instance intuitive thinking is considered subject to distraction by irrelevant aspects of a problem. We may see here the early suggestion that we should become prepared, even skilled, in foresaking that which is in plain view, that which has, in fact, captured our attention, our sight. The latter deficit of rendering mutually contradictory judgments involves the failure to uphold the canon of logical consistency and thereby favors a kind of general incoherence. But here too, when we eventually get to a consideration of the psychotherapeutic, we may not want to be too quick in our insistence that the "contradictory," being of two minds, represents only a sloppy thinking with nothing of value to offer.

The observation that preoperational thought tends to be "centered" refers to the characteristic of attending to only one aspect of a problem at a time. Here an individual's reasoning ability is considered compromised whenever two or more aspects of a problem must be taken into account simultaneously. By focusing or centering on only one aspect of a problem, McGraw (1987, p.407) expresses the concern that arguments for a certain conclusion will not be "balanced" by arguments against that conclusion. On the other hand, does this talk of balancing not have the ring of a sure formula for moving nowhere? Perhaps, of holding fast? I am moved even more in this direction when I hear the semantic resonance between balancing and some sense of precariousness. For the time being, let me only hint that those we consider suffering from the doubt and rumination characteristic of certain obsessive-compulsive neuroses will not disappoint us on this score.

With the development of concrete-operational thinking, the advances in conceptual, logical and objective thought are so striking that Hetherington and Parke (1986, p.364) refer "to a new understanding of reality." There is the capacity to form conceptual classes and understand mutual exclusivity as well as part-whole relationships. With the ability to assume multiple points of view the child becomes more "objective" in evaluating events and situations. As the child comes to understand that there are "fixed relations" that obtain among objects he/she can begin reasoning deductively. With the capacity for "conservation" the child not only comes to understand invariance but demonstrates, according to Mussen (1984, p.231), a grasp of the logical principle that identity is comprised of multiple dimensions.

In spite of these advances in reasoning and problem-solving skills, concrete-operational thinking is still faulted for being restricted to the here and now, concrete experience of the "immediate world." Hetherington and Parke (1986, p.364) continue that the capacity to conserve, classify and form concepts is possible "only if the objects are things that the child experiences in everyday life." Moreover, the ability to solve problems exists only if the objects necessary for solution are "physically present." In short, concrete-operational thinking is not yet able to reason effectively about abstractions, hypothetical propositions or imaginary events.

Before making any hasty departure from this world of the here and now and the physically present, we need to look a little more carefully at this matter of being overly concrete and too tied to the immediate world. For this is, fundamentally, the lived world of psychotherapy. That which is most directly given and ever present in every session is the concrete discourse of the patient; the physical presence and sound of actual words and utterances - a language of self-evident distress that manages quite well even as it may only intimate. A lot is lost when this unadorned discourse is tidied up and straightened out into abstract, hypothetical propositions. Although any hard and fast distinction goes too far, it is not accidental that the originary understanding of psychotherapy favored the appelation of "talking cure" and not thinking cure. And so we welcome the everyday, concrete expressions of the patient, what Ricoeur (1984, pp.65-89) refers to as a "treasure house of associated commonplaces." To be grounded in and tied to this "naive" discourse is no limitation. The "objects of solution," so to speak, are "physically present," in the "things themselves," the words of the patient alone if only we hear aright and "regulate the yield of our ears" (Lacan, 1977, p.45). Apart from all of its other virtues, reasoning effectively about abstractions and hypothetical propositions is not where the patient lives.

We become familiar with Piaget's view of true critical thinking when we consider formal-operational thought, the most advanced stage of cognitive development in his theory. The individual capable of formal-operational thinking, according to Hetherington and Parke (1986, p.365), is able to think about "fanciful problems not based in reality." Along the same lines, Mussen (1984, pp.233) claims that one of the most striking features of formal-operational thought is the ability to "reason about hypothetical problems." Hetherington and Parke add that formal-operational thinking includes the realization that logical rules can be applied to ideas that "violate reality." Mussen continues that the use of logical processes in the "systematic search for solutions" is another hallmark of formal-operational problem solving. McGraw (1987, p.381) maintains that the chief, distinguishing characteristic of formal thought involves an act of imagination known as "pure conception." By this he means the capacity to know and reason about phenomena that cannot be experienced directly and therefore have to be "created in mind alone." McGraw continues that to be classified as a formal thinker, you need only demonstrate that you are "capable of divorcing your thought from reality --while, of course, maintaining logic and consistency in your thinking." And according to Mussen (1984, p.236), Piaget believed "preoccupation with thought" to be one of the principal manifestations of formal-operational thinking.

Having presented the salient features of Piaget's understanding of critical thinking, it bears repeating that my clinical remarks along the way are not meant to imply that Piaget has understood the development of formal, critical thought incorrectly. Nor am I doubting the inherent worth of the capacity for formal operational thought in a multitude of contexts. What I am concerned about is the transformation of psychotherapy into a specific procedure of logical problem-solving and a training experience in formal cognitive operations. While I have known patients who have lost their way, even themselves, and have become frightened in many ways, I have yet to meet one who is cognitively dumb. In this regard it is important to recognize that the specific mental operations that comprise Piaget's stage conceptualization of cognitive development carry with them clear notions of superiority and inferiority. As noted earlier, this has the unfortunate effect of summarily rendering anything other than formal operational thought deficient. It is as if the capacity to dwell patiently with the "pure appearance" of things or to be concretely interested in directly given experience is an embarrassment without any value in its own right. Beyond this, and owing more-to the culture generally than to Piaget specifically, we frequently live the bias that mental or cognitive functioning is itself the specific crowning jewel of human maturity and psychological well-being.

I find it interesting that Piaget devoted virtually his entire scholarly life to the understanding of cognitive development. Not that that was not enough to handle! And of course a person is entitled to devote their scholarly life in the direction of their choice. In Piaget's case, however, I do not consider it a piece of wild psychohistory to point out that his near singular interest in intellectual development was neither fortuitous nor dispassionate. In an autobiographical passage, Piaget (1952, p.238) traced his decided interest in the intellectual over the emotional realm of experience to the lonesome days of his childhood:

> I started to forego playing for serious work very early. Indeed, I have always detested any departure from reality, an attitude which I relate to...my mother's poor mental health. It was this disturbing factor which at the beginnings of my studies in psychology made me intensely interested in questions of psychoanalysis and pathological psychology. Though this interest helped me achieve independence and to widen my cultural background, I have never since felt any desire to involve myself deeper in that particular direction, always much preferring the study of normalcy and the workings of the intellect to that of the tricks of the unconscious.

With this honest acknowledgment, we are able to appreciate more fully the privileged position Piaget grants to the intellectual experience of life. And when we consider that "critical thinking" has now nearly achieved ideological status, we may reasonably wonder whether the culture, generally, is "disturbed" in the face of the irrational, the inexplicable, in ways not all that unlike Piaget's personal, private life experience.

However that may be, it is the case that those mental operations that have become the hallmark of critical thinking are viewed with almost universal regard. Entire curricula are being devoted to the enhancement of these skills. Teaching critical thinking skills "across the disciplines" is yet another curricular effort attesting to the value and importance we accord formal, critical thought. The inherent worth of fostering the development of these skills is not at issue. Rather, it is the relatively recent flurry of curricular activity in this direction that most stands out. We are left with a sense of urgency, suggesting something like salvation. In another paper (1989, pp.1-3), I have discussed the historical recency of this public effort, noting there that the word "critical" in this context of thinking seems as much or more emphatic as it does substantive. Given the impression that our ordinary capacity for thinking, alone, cannot be trusted to do its work, that it requires a special vigilance and critical attitude lest it stray from its time honored task, we cannot help but wonder when it was that our thinking fell into disrepute. Or, if our thinking has always been suspect, how could we have neglected our current efforts at fostering critical thinking for so long?

My main point here is only to suggest that something seems to be afoot. That more may be at stake here than only the achievement of refined intellectual maturity and logical problem-solving. Could it be that the intellectual fruits of Piaget's private passion for reality and preference for the normal have provided us all with the cognitive means for keeping our devils at the doorstep --or in the waiting room as the case may be. From this perspective, we might conclude that Piaget has "only" provided the conceptual foundation for a style of thinking that the culture, generally, has been more than willing to embrace. Especially as that style of thinking promises solutions and control.

It was actually long ago, without the benefit of Piaget's developmental understanding, that the natural scientific community enshrined Bacon's dictum that "knowledge is power" and proceeded posthaste to develop a procedure of critical thinking. Commonly referred to as "the scientific method," this style of thinking basically incorporated most, if not all, of the formal cognitive operations that Piaget has described. On the basis of its demonstrated success in solving a myriad of problems, this method and its critical style of thinking has long since advanced beyond the borders of the strictly natural sciences and now virtually defines the social sciences as well. The description and importance of this method of thinking is routinely inscribed in the opening chapter of our textbooks as a requirement of legitimate understanding. It is relatively recent, however, that the scientific method and its embodiment of formal, critical thinking has been embraced as a model for making psychotherapy a practice of logical problem-solving. To provide but one illustration, Guidano and Liotto (1983, p.xiii) describe the hallmark of a psychotherapist adhering to their cognitive orientation as:

> his or her consistent effort to adhere to the scientific method, both in the way of gathering data and planning a therapeutic strategy and in the implicit and explicit attempt to teach the patient how to use the same method in dealing with everyday problems.

In spite of its many and varied accomplishments, it is here, with the psychotherapeutic, that my enthusiasm for an application of the scientific method wanes considerably.

Quite apart from what the scientific method requires of its subject matter, it assumes a lot to easily presuppose that human consciousness is capable of thinking about itself with the same efficacy that it manages with the "object world." Besides this, we should not overlook a certain equanimity afforded the psychotherapist when matters are made rational, reasonable and understandable to begin with. Beginning with the method itself, my concern here is not so much with procedural precision. I recognize that one need not obey some univocal application of the method. Nevertheless, the method stands for something and it is the overall spirit that infuses this style of thinking and the problem-solving approach to psychotherapy that I am wanting to consider. Depending on the circumstance, some hunch, difficulty, or directly lived experience is typically put into problem form at the outset. That is, a given concern or difficulty is first narrowed, limited, given sharper definition, usually rendered measurable, or otherwise made manageable. Moreover, to say that someone "has a problem" is more than a semantic difference than saying one is "struggling with living" in one way or another. In any event, the rough edges are taken off and the concern, now in problem form, is made to behave in a more orderly fashion. Following this domestication, as if made approachable, the problem more easily lends itself to a further transformation involving abstract understandings of possible causal relations and conceptual meanings. Currently, for example, there seems to be no end to the range of behaviors comfortably attributed to an "addictive personality," as if this really solves anything. Nevertheless, with each transformation of the directly given state of affairs, the aim is to gain distance, become dispassionate, and thereby maintain objectivity.

No longer at close quarters and thereby possessing a radically different perspective, the likelihood of being too subjective and misperceiving is believed to be reduced. Thus removed, it is a relatively straight-forward matter of hypothesis formation and testing or, less formally, of carefully gathering and assessing evidence of predetermined relevance that will favor or reject respective understandings or solution strategies with their anticipated consequences.

Although presented in an admittedly evocative manner, we may see that this more formal, scientific method of problem-solving is, by its very design, meant to discipline our thinking, keep it consistent and systematic, but also distant and dispassionate. When we obey the method we speak confidently of impartial, objective findings and invite others or the patient to see for him/herself. We even try to falsify our best thought. As we control both the "object" of investigation and our own best thought in this manner, we end up with the impression that matters might otherwise get out of hand. When we take this up from the side of the psychotherapist, we do not want to underestimate the comfort, security, sense of control, and even the mastery that is afforded when a patient's problem or concern is too quickly domesticated and made manageable. Moreover, not all patients welcome having their lived experiences of despair and alarm, sorrow and anger immediately numbered and fashioned into a circumscribed intellectual problem to be dispassionately solved. This can leave them easily feeling diminished and misunderstood no matter how well-intentioned and good-hearted the aims of the psychotherapist may be.

There is then, I am suggesting, both a style and an appeal to formal, critical, operational thought that are not without their difficulties within the psychotherapeutic context. Insofar as this style of thinking becomes embodied in a problem solving understanding and approach to psychotherapy -- the scientific method being only the most formalized expression of this model -- it is important to see that a specific discourse and concommitant human encounter is being favored. Talking "about" a problem that one "has" is not yet really speaking to the patient. This discourse remains at a certain distance as it steps back and objectively tries to assess and treat the person in problem form. This is a mediated discourse, not yet at close enough quarters to easily be touched by true subjective distress. Moreover, the patient who "has a problem" is a narrowed person, limited and defined in terms of some affliction. With this focus and attunement, we may expect the corresponding discourse to be equally narrowed and limited as it converges on the problem. And in ultimately having the aim of informing the patient, in the direction of one recommendation or another, we may recognize the appeal of a problem-solving discourse as it suggests solution and control, a life made more manageable. These are concerns that I will be attempting to address from the standpoint of a narrative discourse of psychotherapy. But first, the perspective of psychoanalytic ego psychology offers us yet another view of critical thinking within the psychotherapeutic context.

Heinz Hartmann and Robert White:

Unlike Piaget, Hartmann, White and other ego psychologists neither estranged themselves from the emotional realm of experience nor deliberately ignored the "tricks of the unconscious." Whether they "detested any departure from reality" in the manner of Piaget I cannot say. But as a group, they did share Piaget's high regard for understanding the process of adapting to one's environment as well as the specific means for achieving this adaptation. For Piaget, as we just saw, it was the development of intelligence and critical thought, in the form of specific mental operations, that served the end of adapting to one's environment in ever more accomplished ways. From the standpoint of ego psychology, however, the matter of adapting to one's environment is considerably more complicated. At least it used to be. Here it is the ego, in several of its critical functions, that has the task of coming to terms with the external world. But not only that. Unlike the developmental unfolding of Piaget's cognitive mental operations, which depends mainly on an increasingly diversified interaction with the experiential world, the ego must contend with two additional "harsh masters" as well. The understanding of critical thinking from the perspective of psychoanalytic ego psychology is very much the story of the ego and its relation to reality in the face of powerful instinctual drives and an equally severe superego. This story begins with Freud.

Although sympathetic, Freud's overall view of the ego's situation was not encouraging. Representing as it does "reason" and "common sense," Freud's (1923, 1986, p.25) powerful metaphor of the ego as a hapless horseman in its relations with the passions of the id does not leave an impression of the most favorable circumstances for consistent, critical thought and reality-adaptive behavior. In this metaphor Freud describes the ego as having to hold in check the "superior strength" of the id while having recourse only to "borrowed forces." Thus doubly diminished, the ego is "obliged" for the most part to guide the id "where it wants to go." Throughout his writings, Freud remained forever impressed with the power and influence of instinctual dynamics and a repressed unconscious in determining human behavior. It was Freud's special regard for the passions, the irrational, the unruly side of life, that placed him squarely in opposition to the "enlightened," rationalistic spirit of his time.

With the development of his structural point of view, Freud (ibid.) did address a past relative neglect of the ego and settle on a more stable understanding of the ego's nature and tasks:

> ...the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world ...the ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavors to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id.

Given the overall task of self-preservation and the constant function of mediating between the drives inside the surrounding conditions outside, Freud (1932, 1986, p.106) fully understood that "the relation to the external world is decisive for the ego."

With respect to this decisive relation, Freud earlier on had distinguished the "reality principle" in terms of mental functioning and had further elaborated "secondary process thinking" in its critical possibilities as a form of "experimental action in thought." But in spite of these understandings and other descriptions (1938, 1986, pp.145-146) of the ego's methods of critically negotiating with the external world, White (1963, p.7) nevertheless concludes "...that learning about reality, and making reality effective in the guidance of behavior, never became more than minor and merely schematic parts of Freud's ego psychology." The fact that the function of defense and the experience of anxiety instead formed the heart of Freud's ego psychology is hardly a ringing endorsement of the ego's unfettered capacity for either self-critical thought or consistent reality- adaptive behavior. According to Rieff (1966, p.31), Freud was ever the realist, continually sensitive to the ego's plight, and therefore not given to exalted ambitions concerning the ego's capacity to master and dominate life:

> Freud maintained a sober vision of man in the middle, a go-between, aware of the fact that he had little strength of his own, forever mediating between culture and instinct in an effort to gain some room for maneuver between these hostile powers. Maturity...lay in the trained capacity to keep the negotiations from breaking down.

What we have here is an ego torn in different directions, on the run, exhausted, settling for temporary truces whenever it can, and compromised to the core. Such are the affairs of a house fundamentally divided. The problem of thinking critically from this perspective is not a matter of inherent skill deficiency, an actual inability to comprehend something so simple as the scientific method. It might be said, moreover, that the ego is a "past master" at processing information, sizing up situations we often say. For Freud, the problem of thinking critically was rather a motivated desire on the part of the ego to misperceive, ignore and misunderstand, somewhat in the manner of playing the wiley dummy without fully appreciating the toll involved. From the standpoint of psychotherapeutic cure, there is something of the tragic here, requiring first a kind of forgiving therapeutic presence, for which simple instruction or "problem" solving will not do.

It was, nevertheless, this more modest vision of our capacity to avail ourselves of common sense and reason, and to approach the external world without distortions, that the later ego psychologists set out to change. To do this, they had to wrest the ego and its critical functions from under the sway of the passions. Hartmann was, perhaps, foremost among those who sought to accomplish this undertaking by making significant revisions of Freud's theory of the ego in its conflictual relation to the instinctual drives. It was Hartmann's particular interest in the matter of adaptation that led him to re-position the ego on a more equal footing with the instinctual drives.

Reasoning that "instinctual equipment" alone could not insure human survival, Hartmann (1939, 1973, p.29) maintained that "man acquires a crucial part of his adaptation processes by learning." This would account, in part, for the prolonged helplessness of the human child compared to the animal world. But more than this, Hartmann (1939, 1973, p.8) argued that "not every adaptation to the environment, or every learning and maturation process, is a conflict."

> I refer to the development *outside of conflict* of perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking, language, recall-phenomena, productivity, to the well-known phases of motor development... and to the maturation and learning processes implicit in all these and many others.

Hartmann was careful to point out that he was not maintaining that these "adapted achievements " were untouched by mental conflict in all instances. Nor was he denying that disturbances in these developments may in fact give rise to conflicts. Instead, he proposed that "we adopt the provisional term *conflict-free ego sphere* for that ensemble of functions which at any given time exert their effects outside the region of mental conflicts" (ibid.).

Continuing further in this direction, Hartmann (1939, 1973, p. 14) claimed that learning to think and learning in general are "independent biological functions which exist alongside and in part independent of, instinctual drives and defenses . Moreover, Hartmann maintained that we could safely assume "an autonomous intelligence factor" in the codetermination of the choice and success of the defensive process. Having argued that mental development was "not simply the outcome of the struggle with instinctual drives, with love-objects and the superego," Hartmann (1939, 1973, pp. 15, 50) felt there was reason to assume that this development was mediated and served by an innate ego apparatus. With this, the very origin and development of at least certain ego functions were granted an autonomy from the id and thereby more safely distanced from the latter's influence. On the basis of these theoretical revisions, Hartmann (1939, 1973, p .11) set the investigative task of determining "how mental conflict and 'peaceful' internal development mutually facilitate and hamper each other."

A central part of this proposed investigation involved a more systematic determination and understanding of such concepts as "ego strength, " "ego weakness, " and "ego restriction. " The direction here was that of objectively determining the empirical correlates of "strong" and "weak" egos. Although this would allow the comparison of ego strength among different individuals, Hartmann (1939, 1973, p. 16) admitted that the relationship between "mastery of reality and achievement" and "ego strength" was very complex. It would, for example, (Hartmann, 1939, 1973, p.60) "be a crude mistake to assume that a person's adaptability is proportionate to his intelligence. "While not proportionate, perhaps, it is nevertheless Hartmann's overall position that intelligence in the form of causal thinking, means-end relations, and liberation from immediate stimuli is essential to both ego strength and various adapted achievements. He argues that no period in history has had a "detrimental excess of knowledge or intelligence" and summarily concludes that "we have no traffic with those who bemoan the mind as the 'adversary of the soul'" (1939, 1973, p.65).

In spite of having theoretically established an autonomous ego in several respects, there was still the matter, mentioned earlier, of relying on "borrowed forces" for its operations. In this respect, Hartmann remained close to Freud's understanding of the "neutralization" of instinctual energies for ego purposes. It was this remaining dependency of the ego on the instinctual drives that Robert White sought to remove. Believing that critical thought and adaptive activity often proceed under their own power, as if ends in themselves, White (1963, pp.22-23) proposed an hypothesis of independent ego energies without giving them the character of instincts: "it assumes an independent source of energy without casting it as an instinct, and it assumes 'neutral' energies without deriving them by transformation from erotic and aggressive instincts."

To support this hypothesis of independent ego energies, White directs our attention to the playful, exploratory and manipulative behavior of animals and young children. With respect to these behaviors, White (1963, pp. 32-33) finds them clearly motivated in the direction of "maintaining and expanding an effective interaction with the environment," while yet not conforming to features that might suggest some primary drive. There is an inherent pleasure and learning in these behavioral activities that for White is not a matter of drive reduction. Instead, White (1963, pp.33-34) argues that such behaviors are motivated by energies independent of the instinctual drives which are "inherent in the mental or ego apparatus." White refers to these inherent ego energies as "effectance" because when unclaimed by instinctual demands, they "prompt the child to keep trying out the effectiveness of his/her ripening capacities for action."

When our actions end up having an influence or producing some effect, White (1963, p.35) refers to an accompanying "feeling of efficacy." White considers this feeling of efficacy to be "a primitive biological endowment as basic as the satisfactions that accompany feeding or sexual gratification." White has thus proposed a source of energy intrinsic to the ego that guarantees its constant use in learning what effects can be had upon the environment. It is through actions motivated in this manner, and the consequences of such actions, that the child comes to learn of causality and means-ends relations in his/her effective dealings with the environment. Over the course of development there occurs a whole history of transactions with the environment, the effectiveness of which at any given time describes an individual's "competence." For White (1963, p.39) this competence is primarily a matter of learning.

The subjective experience of one's actual competence, or "sense of competence," is in turn directly related to the matters of self-esteem and ego strength. According to White (1963, p.192), self-esteem has "its deepest root in the experience of efficacy," one's sense of competence. It derives not from what the "environment gratuitously provides," but rather from what we can make the environment do by our "coordinated acts of competence." A strong ego, White (1963, p.138-139) continues, is one which has "developed substantial competence in dealing with impulse and with environment." For White, the experiences of anxiety and competence comprise a reciprocal relation from which the ability or competence to manage anxiety, tensions and conflicts becomes the measure of ego strength. That ego is strong which can keep anxiety "within bounds," without taking recourse to primitive defenses.

Not unlike the specific critical thinking and problem-solving skills mentioned earlier, there is obviously nothing inherently wrong with enjoying an efficacious sense of competence on the basis of one's skills and abilities in any number of contexts. To assume, however, that the experience of anxiety is primarily a matter of incompetence and skill deficiencies poses another whole set of difficulties within the psychotherapeutic context. Insofar as the experience of anxiety is at the heart of the psychotherapeutic experience, this view of deficiency and incompetence is hardly the most flattering first impression to hold of our patients. But beyond this, the treatment attempt to strengthen the patient's ego through various forms of skill development and competence-building in order to master and quiet the experience of anxiety passes over completely the possibility of anxiety having anything positive to offer. This is no applause for some panic attack. There are, however, less frightening understandings of anxiety that neither require its immediate control and management nor make of it a matter of skill deficiency and functional incompetence.

Kierkegaard (1844, 1944, pp.xii,92,139), for example, has told us that "anxiety is our best teacher." As another example, Heidegger's (1927, 1962, pp.228-235) Daseinanalytic identified our moodedness as one of three equiprimoridal structures of our very existence. From each of these perspectives, an existential-phenomenological regard for the experience of anxiety reveals it as an awakening, a coming alive to our ownmost possibilities in the world. It is the very experience that has managed to get the patient reinterested in his/her life. No longer asleep in the world, seldom closer to oneself, never taking one's life more seriously, the patient who is anxious, we might say, shows up for work on time. Things have come to matter in a new way. To experience some measure of anxiety is to be awake, to come alive in one's life. The ego that has experienced and delivered this call to attention is neither incompetent nor skill deficient; patient's will attest that it has managed quite well. To set out to equip this ego with skills, strategies and competencies that aim to quell the experience of anxiety is to assume that this anxiety has nothing more to say. It is to end the possibility of psychotherapy before it has even begun. In this regard, Lacan (1977, p.58) will direct our attention to Freud's *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* where he notes that "every unsuccessful act is a successful, not to say 'well turned' discourse." From this perspective, the experience of anxiety is not a matter of skill deficiency or functional incompetence, but rather a discourse, not yet fully articulate, that has only begun.

While the therapeutic attempt to develop patients' skill proficiency and functional competence is not exactly the equivalent of helping them problem solve more effectively, they share certain things in common. Both psychotherapeutic approaches aim to achieve some better adaptation to reality. To accomplish this, they each address the patient primarily in terms of strengthening his/her ego capacities. Central among these is the capacity for critical thought. Problem solving therapeutic approaches tend to embody the matter of critical thinking more formally, but it is no less important to those psychotherapeutic approaches that aim to improve the patient's skill proficiency or functional competence. For here, too, an understanding of action and its consequences is not primarily a matter of trial and error, but of ascertaining in thought more critically what is required, what will work, in order to relieve oneself of the experience of anxiety.

Patients likely welcome the news and experience a certain initial relief upon learning of only a limited brush fire, quite capable of being controlled, kept within bounds, if only they become more intellectually skillful or functionally competent in silencing themselves. But instead of dousing their symptom discourse, which has only begun to warm the patient to life, Lacan prefers to let it spread a bit and thereby speak the patient's desire more fully. It is primarily this matter of appealing to the ego as an ally -- to say nothing of strengthening it even further in the direction of symptom management -- that Lacan considers misdirected, if not foolhardy. Because for Lacan, this very ego is a symptom, not the truth of the subject.

Lacan's Linguistic Critique of the Reality - Adaptive Ego

For Lacan, there is always "another story" than the one the patient is currently able to tell. This other story, which Lacan (1977, p.55) refers to as the "discourse of the other," is fundamentally the unconscious. It is a larger text that supports the patient's conscious discourse, although he/she may know "only his own lines." Because Lacan (1977, pp. 140-141) viewed the essential "truth of the subject" to lie well beyond the "discourse that takes its orders from the ego," he was highly critical of those psychologies, including psychoanalysis, that increasingly emphasized the conscious ego in its reality-adaptive functions. Lacan viewed the latter as not only moving away from the subjectivity of the subject, but as a distorted emphasis of Freud's basic teachings as well. Lacan's "return to Freud," however, was not on the basis of repressed instinctual impulses. Instead, Lacan renders the unconscious on the basis of our inescapably being linguistic beings.

Lemaire (1977, p.68) describes how for Lacan the very accession to language results in the "division of the subject" and thereby engenders the unconscious. Once inserted into the symbolic order of language, Lacan maintains that the subject loses an essential part of himself because he can henceforth only be re-presented. That is, as a "subject of language," an individual is ever-mediated and thus distanced from his experience of himself as immediately lived. Lemaire (ibid.) elaborates Lacan's understanding of this mediated experience of oneself in language in terms of a "rupture of the inaugural continuity between self and self, self and other, and self and world." Lemaire (1977, p.7) further renders this division of the subject in terms of a self-alienating discourse:

> There is in fact no common measure between what is spoken and what is lived, between the true essence and the manifestation of that essence in spoken discourse. In the discourse he pronounces on himself, the subject moves progressively away from the truth of his essence.

Thus alienated in language, the discourse that the subject "pronounces on himself" moves in the direction of the "imaginary" as it includes, according to Lemaire (1977, pp . 72-73), "all the person's ideals and all the person wants to be or thinks himself to be." This imaginary discourse, primarily authored in light of the images of others with whom the sub ject will identify, is a substitute for the subject's actual, lived truth which language can only mediate. It is this substitute discourse, which Lacan elaborates in terms of "empty speech," that constitutes the subject as "ego." Lamaire (ibid.) quotes Lacan directly as he argues that this ego of conscious, imaginary discourse, is an alienated truth of oneself:

> The ego is absolutely impossible to distinguish from the imaginary captures which constitute it from head to foot: by another and for another.

Thus, for Lacan, the ego which the subject pronounces upon him/herself through conscious discourse is not the true subject, but a set of utterances and social roles, more in the manner of a persona or mirage, "no more than an objectification of the subject," according to Lemaire (ibid.). It is for this reason that Lacan has no interest whatsoever in strengthening the ego. Muller and Richardson (1982, p.41) quote Lacan directly on this point:

> ...the ego is structured exactly like a symptom. Interior to the subject, it is only a privileged symptom. It is the human symptom 'par excellence,' it is the mental malady of man.

That which remains most truthful of the subject, conversely, is the "underside of the mask, the repressed, life bowed before the superior force of the symbolic order of language," in short, the unconscious. Lemaire (1977, p.69) summarizes this understanding of the division of the subject that inescapably attends our accession to the symbolic by noting that:

> ...consciousness and reflection are to be situated at the level of discourse, whereas the unconscious is to be placed on the side of the true subject.

It is Lacan's (1977, pp.40-56) distinction and discussion of "empty speech" and "full speech" that moves us closer to the psychotherapeutic context. Muller and Richardson's (1982, p.70) understanding of Lacan on this distinction is that a conscious act of expression is considered empty or full "precisely to the extent to which it impedes or facilitates the realization of the truth of the subject." Lacan (1977, p.45) characterizes "empty speech" in terms of:

> ...being caught up in the here and now...where the subject seems to be talking in vain about someone who, even if he were his spitting image, can never become one with the assumption of his 'desire.'

Because the patient's conscious discourse is at a distance from his/her truth, Lemaire (1977, p.216) points out that the Lacanian analyst does not attend to the content of this discourse itself, "but to the rents in it, the 'formations of unconscious' which establish a new content: that of the motivations of the unconscious." The movement to "full speech" is thus occasioned when the analyst is able to hear "the discourse of the other" through the "gaps" in the patient's conscious discourse. After apprehending these "gaps that speak," and then introducing them into the patient's conscious discourse, it remains for the patient to recognize and affirm this more complete speech. This movement to full speech on the part of the patient corresponds directly with the way in which Lacan (Bar, 1974, p.527) has characterized his understanding of cure:

> The subject begins the analysis by speaking about himself without speaking to you, or by speaking to you without speaking about himself. When he is able to speak to you about himself, the analysis will be finished.

From the foregoing, we are not surprised when Lemaire (1977, p.216) tells us that Lacan has elected the patient's speech and discourse as the "essential, if not the only indication of the truth: the unconscious." However empty this discourse may appear, Lacan maintains that it is only if we take it at its face value. The psychotherapeutic task is to note the punctuations in this conscious discourse and "understand which part of this discourse carries the significative terms." Thus, in contrast to those psychotherapeutic approaches that aim to strengthen the patient's ego or help him/her think more critically, Lacan's aim is to help the patient speak more fully in order to realize his/her truth. And the "sole intermediary" of this truth, according to Lemaire (1977, p.216) is "the discourse of the patient in analysis."

A Narrative Clinical Discourse

As I turn now to a description of a narrative clinical discourse that attempts to be responsive to several of Lacan's main concerns, it may be helpful to indicate at the outset what it does and does not seek to accomplish. As a narrative discourse, it does not have the ambition of impatiently setting the patient straight. Nor does it strive to hone the patient's critical thinking and problem-solving skills to gain some better edge. Least of all does it seek to effect some behavioral performance that is without true authorship. Instead, this narrative discourse has as its aim what Lacan (1977, p.88) refers to as "the realization of the subject" through the advent of "true" or "full speech." What is at stake here is not a more critical, competent, functional ego, but the "truth of the subject."

Maes (1982, Seminar notes) has grounded this aim of self-emergence within a formation field consisting of oneself, others, everyday situations, as well as prevailing "Zietgeist" motifs. With this, the patient's concerns and preoccupations with self-emergence are relationally situated in the everyday world. Much of the patient's interaction within these formation fields remains implicit and nonthematic. The concerns are lived and yet in important ways remain unknown, never fully grasped. Patients are, of course, able to present descriptions of their distress upon entering psychotherapy. These descriptions are regularly expressed in an ever-unfolding story form, the purpose of which is to help the psychotherapist get a sense or understanding of their distress. Although patients often will present their distress in terms of a problem to be solved or some interpersonal skill deficiency to be strengthened, it is the story that conveys the distress that is focal for a narrative psychotherapeutic approach. From this perspective, then, the beginning psychotherapist-trainee is presented not with a problem to be solved or an ego to be strengthened, but with a story to be heard.

The stories that patients first express are, for the most part, easily recognizable, mundane struggles with living. This mundaneity is not meant to suggest that the patient's distress is any the less, only that one does not have to be a wizard to comprehend the commonsense meaning of the story of the patient's report. And so the beginning trainee typically listens with a good heart, understands the story almost immediately, and consequently does not hear the patient's distress. The trainee understands the patients story too easily precisely because it makes too much sense. That is, the patient's expressed storyline moves at an everyday, commonsense level of understanding for which the trainee's linguistic competence alone will assure a near immediate understanding. This simultaneous listeningunderstanding is a common feature that we easily recognize in ordinary social discourse. It favors the flow, the continuity, and "tranquilizing ease" of a good conversation which, according to Maes (1982, Seminar notes), can leave us "asleep in the world." When a moment of vulnerability is expressed in such a conversation, our compassion not to stare lets it pass by. We understand. In order to maintain the well-being of the other we act as if we did not hear. We turn the other way and instead listen ahead, knowing quite well that such occasional ruptures of distress will re-assume their former quietude if only we allow the conversation to resume its former smoothness. It is our commonsense understanding, then, in both senses of the word, that favors our going along with the story we are being told.

As yet unaccustomed to any distinction between ordinary, commonsense listening-understanding and psychotherapeutic hearing, the beginning trainee is only too eager to listen and go along with the patients story. Completely within the natural attitude, the focal consciousness of the trainee in fact leaps to the commonsense storyline of the patient's report. The trainee thus becomes caught up, carried along, even fascinated with what the patient is speaking about and thereby typically misses what the patient is saying in the said. There is "another story" of which the trainee is not yet aware. In this respect, Lacan (1977, p.165) reminds us that "it is not a question of knowing whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather of knowing whether I am the same as that of which I speak." Precisely because the trainees are understanding too much at the level of commonsense, assuming too easily a selfsame correspondence between the patient's discourse and his/her truth, they have to be helped in the direction of growing dumb if they are going to be able to apprehend any other story.

This matter of growing dumb, becoming opaque, is in the service of helping trainees develop a disciplined restraint in the face of an otherwise spontaneous readiness to accept at face value and leap beyond what the patient has already expressed. It requires a therapeutic posture of determined denseness to forestall the natural tendency of focal consciousness to listen ahead and understand, to become fascinated and lost in the commonsense story of the patient's report. Restraining the trainee's inclination to understand and interpret beyond what the patient has made explicit also requires a forsaking of any recourse to favored theoretical prejudices which prematurely fix the patient in one category or another. The intent in developing this restraint is to help the trainee better appreciate and safeguard what Maes (1982, Seminar notes) has referred to as "the sovereignty of the patient's discourse." In contrast to readily understanding and becoming fascinated with the commonsense storyline of the patient's report, the trainee first needs to be helped in the direction of much more carefully hearing the actual words of the patient that convey the story. From a phenomenological perspective, this may be viewed as a psychotherapeutic "return to the things themselves," the words and phrasings of the patient alone. The intent here is to help the trainee develop his/her ear in the direction of more patiently hearing the direct and immediate expressions of distress that otherwise get passed over when trying to understand and figure the patient out. Lacan (1977, p.59) tells us that "the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other." Thus, in faithfully hearing the words of the patient, in surrendering and settling for the self-evident language of distress in the patient's discourse without trying to understand and interpret beyond, the trainee is enabled to bestow a fundamental recognition and acceptance of the patient.

In order to demonstrate this recognition and acceptance of the patient's concerns, the trainee has to discipline his/her readiness to rush to familiar, commonplace understandings and/or conceptual, diagnostic formulations. Instead, the trainee needs to develop a naive, not-knowing attitude that will help him/her pause and dwell with the patient's self-expressions in their own right. To accomplish this, the first moment of a narrative therapeutic response is that of "simply" reiterating those phrases and key words of psychological significance in the patient's discourse as they appear. With reiteration there is a fundamental surrender to the patient's world of self-expressed concerns. The factual report of the patient is neither transformed nor repudiated. It is taken seriously and ratified. As the reiteration accurately and respectfully stays with the patient's first self-presentation, the trainee is enabled to maintain a close attunement to the "experiential flow" and self-described concerns in the patient's life. Far from remaining distant and objective, the act of reiterating the patient's expressions of concern is meant to move the trainee closer to patients distress. In actually taking up the patient's expressions in this manner, the trainee is put in the position of having to concretely situate him/herself in the patient's discourse instead of think about it. In having to reiterate the patient's direct expressions of concern, the trainee's everyday desire to understand, make sense and interpret is forestalled. The trainee quickly learns that the therapeutic act of reiterating requires a careful hearing of the patient's expressions which is in no way favored by theoretical insights or conceptual understandings. In order to really embrace the words of the patient, the trainee has to quiet his/her thoughtful, critical mind. Nothing is more concrete and less abstract. Settling for the "pure appearance" of the patient's words alone and "concretely" apprehending the distress they bear is no impoverishment of thought. On the contrary, the ability to accurately reiterate in a way that faithfully mirrors the patient's direct, concrete self-expressions without effecting some conceptual transformation assures the patient that he/she has been heard. And it is this, in turn, that favors the patient feeling fundamentally recognized and accepted.

As the first moment of a narrative therapeutic response, the act of reiteration is thus meant to help the trainee with several important matters. Because reiterating requires above all a careful hearing of the patient's discourse, it has the effect of idling the trainee's thought-ful mind. With this, the trainee is helped in the direction of solidly grounding him/herself in the patient's actual, concrete discourse of distress. Having to "ratify" the patient's concerns as he/she expresses them is meant to insure that the trainee will hear and accept the patient's concerns with a favorable, uncritical mind. The act of reiterating is also meant to move the trainee closer to the patient's distress. Because in truly embracing the patient's self-expressions, the trainee has to forsake his/her own more objective, distant, observer posture and surrender to the patient's self-expression of their lived experience. In contrast to "talking about" a patient's problem, and thereby only furthering his/her self-objectification, the act of reiterating the patient's direct expressions of distress puts the trainee on the side of affirming the subjectivity of the patient. It is the patient who speaks his/her distress that is at stake and not the objective assessment of some problem that is talked about.

With all of this, however, it may still be noted that the trainee is still situated at the level of the commonsense story being reported. But instead of getting caught up, fascinated and carried away in the story by inviting more and more information, the act of reiteFating takes up and punctuates only those phrasings of lived distress that the storyline already bears within itself. With this-focusing of the "saying in the said," the trainee has been helped to highlight and set before the patient the distress or psychologically significant aspects of his/her discourse. But this is only the foundation for yet helping the trainee more fully apprehend what Lacan refers to as "another story." It is the second, or narrative, moment of the therapeutic response that moves in the directions of another story.

The narrative moment follows and builds upon the act of reiteration as it "stories" the patient's self-expressions of distress alone more fully. The intent here is to move beyond the story that Lacan has said the patient has "pronounced upon him/herself." It is necessary, according to Ricoeur (Maes, 1983)), to "enliven the mundane," to restore the topic-oriented storyline that has gone dry and occasioned treatment in the first place. Having granted principal authorship to the patient through the act of reiteration, the narrative moment allows the trainee to reclaim his/her own voice and participate in the therapeutic discourse more fully. But the starting point for any narrative response is always the key words and phrasings of distress that the trainee has already focused through reiteration. While the narrative response is thus prompted by the reiterated phrasings of distress, it does not begin with some point to make. Rather, the narrative response aims only to follow and amplify the patient's phrasings of distress as they signify, according to Maes (1982, Seminar notes), as yet unexpressed "states of affairs" and self-referenced "networks of implication." The patient's phrasings of distress are seldom, if ever, whole or complete. Embedded as they are within the commonsense storyline, such phrasings often only intimate and allude to many possible condensed meanings that remain to be brought to speech. It is in this sense that the narrative aims at enriching and making more complete and explicit that which has only been intimated in the initial expressions of distress.

For the beginning trainee, the narrative response is best understood as a "working at" the patient's first selfexpression. In what the patient has "said," there is yet much more "waiting to be spoken about." In helping the trainee to narratively "get at" that in the patient's expressions of distress that is still waiting to be said, he/she has to be restrained from taking recourse in the direction of psychological insight. Past perceptions and conceptual, clinical understandings are once again forsaken in favor of the concrete discourse of the patient. For the aim of the therapeutic response, according to Lacan (1977, P.86), is not to inform, but to evoke the patient in the direction of speaking his/her truth more fully. And when Heidegger (1927, 1962, pp.203-210) tells us that language is the "house of Being," we may understand that the patient's discourse is not merely a means of communicating "about" him/herself. It is, rather, the place where the patient's greater self-emergence resides.

As difficult as it is for beginning trainees to initially idle their conceptual and inquisitive minds and "settle" for "simple, straight-forward reiterations of the patient's expressions of distress, the narrative therapeutic response presents the trainee with yet another struggle. With reiteration, trainees have the concrete words and expressions of the patient to guide their specific response. But with the narrative response, the trainee is asked to take the reiterated expressions of distress as only the starting point from which to author his/her own narrative elaboration. Having now to move beyond the patient's literal expressions, and still without theoretical or conceptual insight to structure and guide their response, the trainee is thrown back on his/her own symbolizing capacity. That is, without knowing in advance where it will lead, and without having any pre-determined point to make, the trainee is asked to narrate the patient's initial expressions of distress more fully. In trying thus to get at and render more complete that which has only been intimated or alluded to in the initial expressions of distress, the trainee is guided only by the evocative power of the patient's discourse.

According to Ricouer (1984, pp.12, 169), there is inherent in language a natural polysemy to words that allows them to radiate to different semantic fields. Given some particular context, along with the patient's more characteristic semantic style, the narrative response is meant to take up the resonance and nuance of the patient's words of distress. As an exploratory effort, the narrative response aims to flesh out and provide greater body to an initial expression of distress that is too sparse. With this, a story begins to build around the patient's immediately lived experience of distress instead of the commonsense storyline that serves only to announce and introduce the patient's distress. The trainee is favored in this narrative direction to the extent that he/she has moved closely enough to the patient's concrete discourse to actually be touched. The narrative response is also favored by not being encumbered with some obligation for immediate accuracy. When patients hear a therapist truly embrace their expressions of distress and then narratively render them-even more complete, they are more than willing to excuse and correct any particular errors of inaccuracy. For if the narrative response has at all accurately captured the patient's concern and even drawn out nuances of which the patient was not explicitly aware, it has the effect of capturing the patient's interest in a new way. Once patient's begin to hear something other than the worn out storyline, they regularly find themselves enabled and helpfully wanting to participate in a narrative restoration, re-storying, of their lives.

Once the trainee can accept that the locus of psychotherapeutic cure resides in the discourse of the patient and not in his/her own theoretical insights and conceptual formulae, there is still the matter of helping the trainee speak forth in a narrative manner. As mentioned earlier, the narrative response resides within the home of language. It issues from the power of the patient's discourse alone to evoke the trainee to speak. But with no pre-determined point to make, and the desire to ask information-gathering questions discouraged, trainee's frequently find themselves hesitant to speak, as if what to say. Precisely because the narrative response avoids getting the patient's number and instead seeks to story the patient's distress more creatively complete, there are no specific guidelines in terms of what to say. To know in advance where our speaking will lead us is to finish the patient's story, the exact opposite of what the narrative is meant to accomplish.

As an attempt to begin a more creative re-storying of the patient's distress, the trainee is first encouraged to simply build upon the expressions of distress that he/she has already reiterated. At first, trainees may introduce rephrasings or otherwise say in different words what the patient has already offered. The initial intent here is simply to help the trainee find his/her natural voice. Beyond this, however, the reverberatory effect of the patient's expressions of distress will regularly evoke the symbolizing capacity of the trainee in the direction of preconscious images. As Ricoeur (1978, p.8-9) has pointed out, we hear and speak images before we see them. But such images typically do not present themselves ready-made. Instead, they form and build as we speak their initial form and contour. Trainees are thus helped in their narrative response by simply trusting and speaking the preconscious images of the patient's distress that the therapeutic discourse has managed to evoke in them. Because these images are initially incomplete, the trainee's beginning narration of them will, of necessity, begin somewhat tentatively. However, as trainees are able to sustain themselves in this discourse, feeling their way through speech as it were, the image that has been evoked will build in the direction of greater clarity. In thus speaking the initial image of the patient's distress to more complete form, the trainee is enabled to come upon and arrive at what Maes (1983, Seminar notes) has referred to as a "narrative new idea." The narrative new idea in the present context is a new way for the trainee to see and express the patient's distress. This manner of narratively working at and expressing an ever more nuanced description of the patient's distress is a repeated feature of the therapeutic response. Each time patients can affirm successively more nuanced narrative descriptions of their distress, the trainee is then in a position to ask the patient to indicate concretely the way or ways in which a given narrative description specifically captures some aspect of their particular lived experience. With such questions, it becomes the patient's turn and work to participate in this more complete storying of their distress. Because each narrative offering awaits and depends upon the patient's affirmation of accuracy, there is assurance that the succeeding questions that put the patient to work will be received as meaningful. For it only asks them to render more complete a given narrated state of affairs they have already affirmed. In this respect, it is important for the trainee to see that the narrative description and the narrative question belong together and complement one another. The narrative images, new ideas, and descriptions that build and form on the basis of the trainees symbolizing capacity typically move in the direction of rendering a more nuanced completeness to the patient's experience of distress. Such narrative descriptions are intended to work at a more explicit expression of that distress which is often only intimated or alluded to. Issuing from "the said" in the patient's discourse, the narrative descriptions attempt to work at and capture that which remains implicit, still waiting to be spoken. In each of these ways, narrative new ideas and descriptions attempt to favor a more nuanced and explicit story of the patient's distress. The aim is to achieve a more adequate description of the given state of affairs that is distressful. These narrations are the trainee's work and contribution toward rendering the patient's distress more explicit.

But in and of themselves, even as the patient affirms them, improved narrative descriptions of a distressful state of affairs stop short of moving the patient to a more depthful understanding of their distress. It remains for the trainee to conclude each affirmed narrative description with a question that requires patients to address the manner in which they live the given state of affairs that is distressful. Without such questions, the temptation is to settle for the obvious and understand too quickly. I am thinking, for example, of a strained daughter-mother relationship in which the daughter shows little empathy and considerable anger toward her mother's willingness to be taken advantage of in different situations. While we may wish for greater forebearance, we can easily and readily appreciate the daughter's distress. Who wants to witness their mother being taken advantage of? And yet when I asked the daughter, with intentional naivette, what there was about this state of affairs that concerned her the most, she could not answer. Something so seemingly obvious that yet defies any worded response must be taken seriously. All the more so since there was no end to the instances of the mother's difficulties with this matter that the daughter was determined to provide. The daughter's inability to answer this obvious question was not a matter of clamming up or deliberately refusing to express her concern at this more depthful level. Instead, the question left the daughter somewhat dumbfounded, as she asked me to repeat it. Upon doing so, the daughter did affirm that she now "understood" the question, and was even more amazed at her continued inability to express herself in this direction. She quite honestly acknowledged that she did not know what it was about her mother's particular struggle that concerned her so. Although this example would not be paradigmatic of all ruptures in patient's conscious discourse, it may be seen as an instance of what Lacan (1977, p.44) refers to as "the gap that speaks." That is, when the daughter honestly acknowledges that she "does not know" in the face of a genuine concern with which she has a long-standing familiarity, we reach the threshold of "another story." This "not-knowing" announces what Lacan (1977, p.50) refers to as a "blank chapter" in the daughter's life, a discourse of the unconscious that yet awaits conscious -- and I can think of no word more multiply suited --"apprehension."

I am not sure that an overall, integrated sense of the foregoing narrative clinical discourse has been best served by describing its respective moments separately. Any given well-formed therapeutic response, of course, incorporates each of the moments of reiterating, narratively describing, and posing questions that move patients evermore depthfully in the direction of the unknown in their lives. As the therapeutic discourse continues in this manner, the therapist and patient together are able to author a more complete, intelligible and liveable story of the patient's life. For the purposes of this paper, however, I have focused the respective moments of a narrative clinical discourse in order to assess at each turn the relative efficacy of a critical attitude or critical thinking skills within this psychotherapeutic context. In further developing this discussion from the standpoint of helping beginning psychotherapist trainees appropriate this narrative approach to psychotherapy, the intent has been to show the efficacy, even the necessity, of quite another attitude and set of skills. This clinical attitude is a not knowing attitude, a posture of opaqueness, of deliberate naivette in the face of the patient's discourse. There is no presumption to know, to have some correct version of how to live life. With respect to skills, above all is the matter of hearing faithfully, settling for the pre-operational "pure appearance" of words and phrasings of distress -- even as they may betray mutually contradictory judgements or being"of two minds.

Beginning with the first moment of taking up the patient's discourse, there is the matter of what Lacan refers to as discerning the "significative terms" and then punctuating this dimension of the discourse through the act of reiteration. These are everyday expressions of distress which require careful hearing more than any advance conceptual thought. While the discernment of these "significative terms" certainly does require critical hearing, this needs to be distinguished from critical thinking. For it is hearing carefully rather than thinking critically that enables the trainee to keep from getting caught up in the common sense storyline of the patient's discourse that only bears the distress. Without this ability to carefully hear the patient's language of distress, trainees are ever tempted to curiously and inquisitively gather more and more detailed information at the level of the commonsense storyline, as if the initial expressions of distress which are in plain view are not enough. Instead of remaining at a distance, objectively gathering information of commonsense, trainees have to move close and situate themselves directly within the patient's discourse if they are to truly embrace the terms of distress. It is thus for the sake of carefully hearing the patient's distress that trainees are encouraged to grow dumb. Because until they can quiet their mind and idle their curiosity about getting the commonsense story straight, they will typically not hear and consequently pass over the patient's distress that has already been expressed. If trainee's are unable to apprehend patient's self-evident expressions of distress, it is not long before the latter rightly conclude that they are not really being heard.

Once the trainee has been helped in the direction of literally surrendering to the patient's discourse, of forsaking, according to Maes (1985, Seminar notes), a kind of "content lust" for the mundane and the commonsensical, it becomes possible for the trainee to hear and apprehend the patient's words of distress. With this return to the "things themselves," the patient's direct expressions of distress, their immediately lived experience, the trainee is enabled to take up and begin narrating another story. Because these expressions of distress intimate and allude to far more than they name explicitly, the narrative moment becomes a "working at" the patient's discourse. As this discourse of intimation and allusion announces and yet veils another problematic state of affairs, the narrative moment of the therapeutic response is beholden to resonance, to polysemy, to the ring of phrases that require no advance conceptual, theoretical understanding. The latter will introduce a new storyline, but conceptual transformations on the basis of what is said are not yet apprehending the subject who speaks. Such conceptual transformations of the patient's discourse run the risk of imposing only another objectification of the patient's life as they prematurely fix and finish the patient's story along the lines of some ego deficiency to be strengthened or some problem to be solved.

Instead of converging and finishing the patient's story so quickly, the narrative therapeutic response is only a beginning effort to help the patient speak his/her truth more fully. Having no pre-determined conceptual understanding in view to guide its direction, the narrative response does not require that the trainee be, according to Lacan (1977, p.115), a "subject presumed to know." The narrative response requires only that the trainee remain ever situated directly in the patient's discourse. For it is here, on the basis of a subject who speaks, that the trainee's own symbolizing capacity can be evoked in the direction of helping the patient render his/her distress more explicit and complete. Being open to the patient's discourse, as it only intimates and alludes to a more nuanced, problematic state of affairs, requires a relaxed mind. In trying to get at that which is yet waiting to be spoken, the narrative response itself is favored not by conceptual categories of understanding, but by the semantic resonance, reverberation and echo of the patient's words and phrases alone. When Ricoeur (1979, p. 6; 1980, pp. 8-9) tells us that images are spoken before they are seen, we may see the power of the narrative response to more richly describe and capture the patient's distress. That is, in both hearing and narrating the patient's discourse of intimation and allusion, images of the patient's distress will form and build in the direction of narrative new ideas that, in turn, favor new ways of viewing the state of affairs that is troubling the patient.

From the standpoint of critical thinking, it is important to note that such narrative images and new ideas arise directly from the therapeutic discourse and are not derived from critical, convergent thought. Because the trainee's image of what is being intimated is not a "faded impression" or copy of past perceptions of the patient's reported experience it can, according to Ricoeur (1979, p.126), refer "productively" rather than merely "reproductively" the the intimated state of affairs. In this sense, the trainee's recourse to his/her own preconscious symbolizing activity moves in the direction of discovering "eidetic new meanings" in the patient's discourse rather than remaining only with past patterns of complication. Precisely because the narrative image and new idea are not predicated on past perceptions of actual experience already given, they are able to refer in a productive way to the intimated state of affairs that has the patient concerned. Issuing as they do from "nowhere" or "somewhere else," the narrative image and its new meaning is in someway "unreal." The narrative image as fiction, in the sense of not deriving from perception, is thus able to effect a certain suspension of the everyday existential order of the patient. It is this power of the narrative response to disengage patients from their fixed, familiar world of perception, thought and action that lays the ground for ever helping them re-story and restore their lives anew. The narrative new ideas and meanings that continue to form and build within this therapeutic epoche may well be unfamiliar. But to help patients express their lives more creatively in the direction of the surprising and the new is surely no flaw. It is inherent in a therapeutic discourse that allows itself to be moved by the evocative power of the patient's expressions alone. From the trainee's side, it is the symbolizing capacity in the direction of the imaginative more than the critical that keeps this discourse alive.

Beginning with the patient's discourse of intimation and allusion, the narrative response is always moving in the direction of the unknown. As the trainee's narrative response may well come upon that which is "unheard of," "unsayable," or "unspeakable" in the patient's life in terms of possible new meanings, it remains tentative, awaiting his/her affirmation. It is when patients are able to affirm the possibility of such narrative ideas holding some new meaning for their lives that it becomes possible to help them speak more depthfully. For when patients are able to affirm a narrative new meaning that has issued and grown from their own original expression of distress, they can then be asked to elaborate that meaning in their life concretely. Because such questions are regularly a movement toward the unknown dimensions of the patient's experience, the ensuing patient response may be expected to grope and falter. Such linguistic regressions are no vocabular deifciency. According to Lacan (1977, p.49) we have helpfully introduced the patient to another story: "the unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse."

As with the narrative response, the questions that favor the patients appropriating more of the unknown dimensions of their lived experience cannot be known in advance. Nor can they be critically derived from conceptual understandings of distress. They are really rather simple, obvious questions that only help the patient speak more fully that which he/she has already said or intimated. They are not so much critical questions as they are imaginative questions. And as they emerge from the patient's discourse of intimation and allusion alone, we may even say with Heidegger (1927, 1962, pp.224-27, p.32) that they are the patient's own questions. And so, if trainees can settle for "only" helping their patient's speak more fully, they can unburden themselves as "subjects presumed to know." Patients will even provide them with the "critical," that is to say, self-evident concrete questions to ask.

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Sidney W. White is Assistant Professor of Psychology at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA.

Mystery and Expressions: Myth, Theology & Pluralism (Functions of Affectivity and Approximations of Mystery)

Richard J. Beauchesne

Our freedom is your only way out.
On the underground railroad
you can ride with us or you become the jailer.[1]

In this presentation, I shall focus mainly on pluralism in religious myth and theology. On the one hand, myth and theology are languages of heart and mind, respectively, as well as approximations rather than replicas of mystery. On the other, pluralism is the ability to perceive the truth of diversity[2] as well as a posture that allows for critical thinking when -- in myth and theology -- one speaks of ultimate mystery, which some people call 'God.'

Briefly, first, I shall define what I mean by 'mystery.' Then, in reference to the 'mysteric' languages of myth and theology, I shall describe the meaning of 'heart' or 'affectivity' and of 'mind' or 'cognition.' I shall discuss as well the 'approximating' rather than 'replicating' nature of mythical and theological discourses in the expression of mystery. And finally, I shall focus on religious pluralism which, I suggest, protects mythic and theological formulations against irrelevancy and idolatry and, within the field of religion, fosters critical thinking: a way of thinking which recognizes the social forces's impact on the diverse disciplines as well as the diverse disciplines's impact on social forces. Critical thinking provides one with the distance needed to assess historically rather than dogmatically -- from below rather than from above -- his/her discipline, other disciplines as well as society itself. Language itself -- such as religious mythical and theological discourses -- is 'discovery of plurality': the discovery of the contingency and ambiguity of history and society.[3]

1. Mystery

In *Truth & Expression*, Edward MacKinnon related transcendence both to the mystery of the universe, which scientists fathom, and to the Mystery of God, upon which theologians reflect.[4] It is in MacKinnon's sense that the expression 'mystery' is interpreted in this presentation. More specifically, when applied to God, mystery refers to the all-encompassing horizon of consciousness as described, for example, by Avery Dulles in *Models of Revelation.*[5]

2. Cognition and Affectivity, Mind and Heart

During my seminary days -- the mid-fifties -- when 'man' was defined essentially as rational, to be a 'man' one had to subjugate 'his' affective nature. One's spirituality comprised mainly of daily conquests of 'mind' over 'heart,' of 'spirit' over 'flesh.' In every-day life, 'particular' friendship needed be generalized, and through weekly confession, 'sins of the flesh' needed be particularized. Heart, the epitomizing force that penetrates to the very center of one's being, as Karl Rahner called it,[6] was perceived as a destabilizing demon that jeopardized one's 'assumption' into Heaven.

Life-experience, however, has taught me otherwise. The relationship between heart and mind is not one between damnation and redemption, one of opposition, but one between two amenable dimensions of my being, one of wholeness. For affectivity relates to cognition as 'what I am' relates to 'what I know,' connatural knowledge to representational knowledge,[7] and praxis to theory. On the one hand, affectivity speaks of "the unity of spirit and matter, soul and body, intellect and phantasm, will and passion, prior to these subsequent distinctions."[8] It embodies one's entire person: a function of the heart. On the other, cognition speaks of intellect and will -- of reason and thought, of freedom and choice, respectively. Cognition is a function of the mind. Both approaches, heart and mind, disclose two correlative, yet autonomous, modes of intentionality and metaphysical transcendence,[9] and together, they allow for a corrective, healing and humanizing dialectics between praxis and theory.

In Church institutions of dogmatic persuasion, to this day, cognitive processes forego often affective ones -- a habit that results inevitably in discrediting experience and monopolizing transcendence. Theory without praxis, mind without heart, cognition without affectivity -- as Emmanuel Levinas suggested -- impose a "mastery over matter, the soul and societies" and, respectively, machinates "a technique, a morality, [and] a politics . . . which assure the peace required for the pure exercise [of cognition]."[10] Cognition thus remains induratively unencumbered by life-experience. And within heartless minds -- in science and religion -- dogma is concocted.

3. Myth and Theology: Approximations of Mystery

MacKinnon has explained that transcendent reality (or mystery) is:

> . . .the ultimate ground and goal of the search for truth. But it is a ground which can only be explicated and a goal which can be only approximated by the slow piecemeal process of presenting propositions [for example, in mythical and theological formulations] which we take to be true and hope to be not too inadequate.[11]

"The abiding temptation," wrote MacKinnon, "is to absolutize the relative, to accept particular propositions as adequate expressions of ultimate truth. This is a temptation especially experienced by those who have a passion for the ultimate."[12] Having experienced the cancer of dehumanization that feeds itself within the bowels of the passion for the ultimate -- the Nazis' absolute claim to the supremacy of the Aryan race and its commitment to the annihilation of all other races -- Jacob Bronowski warned all pretenders to heavenly thrones, whether they pontificate in laboratories or in sacristies: "There is no absolute knowledge. And those who claim it, whether they are scientists or dogmatists, open the door to tragedy."[13] Where the relative is absolutized, truth is silenced and our humanness violated, and where the absolute is relativized, truth is cherished and our humanness, respected.

4. The Languages of Myth and Theology

Myth (heart's language) is a primary language that 'propositionalizes' consciousness's participation in ultimate mystery, and theology (mind's language), a secondary language. Russell Barta explained:

> Theology and faith like their languages, represent quite diverse, but equally valid modes of raising religious questions and of apprehending the real. In theology . . . we are dealing with the language of theoretical construction whereas faith speaks in the pretheoretical language of symbols and myth. . . Theology is the creation of human thought, whereas the Christian myth grows out of experiential encounter. What is primary is the myth as it is lived, experienced and handed down. Theology . . . is a second-order reflection on first-order formulations.[14]

As primary language that expresses faith, religious myths speak of the effective bond that exists between persons and what they experience as holy.[15] Myths are masks of eternity: stories made out of imageries and symbols. They unify the paradoxes of human religious experience, provide patterns for action, and are enacted in rituals.[16] Such are the primeval stories of creation and fall, the covenantal stories of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus as well as our own stories of faith celebrated in word and sacrament. Religious myths neither affirm or deny the historical existence of their heroes. They merely express first-hand consciousness's participation in ultimate mystery. Religious myths allocate in memory a home for the divine partaking, which shelters its remembrance, nurtures its life and safeguards its survival.

Theology (faith's secondary language) is the systematic and theoretical reflection upon as well as the interpretation and explanation of religious myth (faith's primary language), not its substitute. "The relationship between theology and faith is similar to that between any systematic, rationalizing theory about experience and the experience itself," clarified Barta.[17] Theology relates to faith as cognition to affectivity, as 'what I know' to 'what I am and become.'

"Religion," stated Russell Barta, "grows out of the practical concerns of everyday life. It is not the result of theoreticians working out religious ideas. Religion as such always exists prior to its theoretical formulations."[18] Disassociated from life and myth, theology becomes irrelevant: it has lost its primordial data and affective expression. Thus uprooted, theology tends toward idolatry, the monopolization of mystery itself. Humans arrogate to themselves prerogatives that are divine, as the current Vatican theology of papal and episcopal authority bears witness to (such as the recent Vatican faith profession and fidelity oath prescribed for Catholic theologians).[19] By the same token, when the 'divine' coopts the 'human,' the irrelevance of religion prevails, as the century of the Enlightenment ratifies. Idolatry and irrelevance are the temptations, and more often, the sins of dogmatic religions. Similarly, when stories become history[20] and their interpretation, fundamentalist literalism, myth itself becomes magic rather than sacrament. Alfred North Whitehead warned against symbolic distortions: "Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their symbols with freedom of revision, must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless shadows."[21]

Against irrelevancy and idolatry -- as well as against magic and fundamentalism, anarchy and atrophy -- I suggest that theological and mythic pluralism might offer a remedy: by recognizing that ultimate mystery is experienced and expressed in ways that are not too inexact while it remains an incessant source of human meaning and healing.

5. Mythic and Theological Pluralism

Pluralism[22] refers to a condition of and an attitude toward diversity.[23] As condition, it describes the world, which, according to William James, is "more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom."[24] As such, pluralism is philosophical, societal and cultural as well as ethical, racial, religious, or sexual."[25] As attitude -- the focus in this presentation -- pluralism speaks of the ability to perceive 'that which is not myself' as diverse rather than as an inferior version of who I am and believe.[26] As attitude, pluralism is a function of affectivity rather than cognition, of heart rather than mind.

David Tracy defined pluralism as 'attitude': a response to the fact of religious plurality.[27] Within one's religion or with other religions, pluralism as attitude allows for conversations which require -- on the part of participants -- not only "the ability to preserve the tension of the original symbolic language within the clarity of the concept."[28] Such conversations comprise also "a willingness to enter the conversation, that unnerving place where one is willing to risk all one's present self-understanding by facing claims to attention of the other." Even the willingness to be transformed, perhaps, to be converted![29] That ability and willingness spring forth from analogical imagination. Thus as attitude, pluralism speaks of symbolic sensitivity and 'response-ability,' willingness, risk, change of heart -- all functions of affectivity.

Similarly, Don Cupitt described pluralism, diacronic and synchronic, in affective language: the former, as "the historical realization that past ages were very different from the world of today, and the consequent attempts to enter sympathetically into the minds and world views of men [sic] of past epochs"; and the latter, as the realization that contemporary men [sic] living in other cultures have different world views from ours, which can be entered by an effort of sympathetic imagination."[30]

Even more crucial is the recognition that, attitudinally and affectively, pluralism is not passive exercise that "enjoys the pleasures of difference without ever committing oneself to any particular vision of resistance and hope."[31] Pluralistic dialogue requisitions that one's heart has been 'conscienticized' to the enslavement of individual and systemic ideologies, and converted to a hermeneutics of ideological suspicion.[32] Accordingly, for a fruitful religious dialogue -- rather than Christocentric or Theocentric theologies that perpetuate domination [who's got the true God], or even a continuous creation-centered theory of religious truth -- Paul Knitter suggested a soteriology that denounces domination and announces liberation by fostering the praxis of preferential option for the poor and nonpersons: the option to work with and for the victims of the world.[33] Thus, "instead of searching for 'one God' within all religions," Knitter explained, "we can recognized [in the preferential option for the poor or non-persons] a shared locus of religious experience now available to all religions . . . ."[34] Or in the words of Renny Golden: "Our freedom is your only way out. On the underground railroad you can ride with us or you become the jailer."[35]

Jan Barbour suggested that "in place of the absolutism of exclusive claim to finality, an ecumenical spirit . . . would acknowledge a plurality of significant religious models, without lapsing into a complete relativism,[36] which would undercut all concern for truth . . . . " He added: "We must avoid the theological imperialism to which preoccupation with doctrines, along with literalism in interpretation, have often led."[37] To obviate the pitfall of relativism in religious dialogue, Knitter -- as explained above -- suggested his soteriological model. "If there is no preestablished common ground or common essence that we can invoke before dialogue, perhaps there is a common approach or a common context with which we can begin in order to create our shared 'shaky ground'";[38] namely, that of shared praxis of the preferential option for the poor.

About relativism, Cupitt argued that the experience of relativity itself already speaks for the capacity in humans to transcend and of 'their having become conscious spirit.' "To say 'All our knowledge is relative to interpretative frameworks,'" claimed Cupitt, "is to say something which, if true, must be an exception to the rule it states: to have been for a moment able to transcend our ordinary level and way of knowing and say something about it as a whole."[39] Consequently, it seems to me, that, in religious dialogues, even our 'soteriological shared shaky ground,' religiously speaking, might not preclude -- as discussed above -- the 'shaky' experience of ultimate transcendence.[40]

* * *

Personally speaking, it remains that for each one, the challenge of religious dialogue resides primarily in the call to faithfulness, to which consciousness is summoned as it affectively 'intentionalizes' mystery in all of its soteriological, liberating and humanizing power. People experience mystery in unique yet sharable ways, but at times -- especially when mystery is 'propositionalized' -- they experience it in ways that are diametrically opposed, and there lies the challenge for religions and religious dialogue. Bernard Lonergan explained:

> What in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What is good for one, for another evil. Each may have some awareness of the other and so each in a manner may include the other. But such inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other's horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness or illusion, to backwardness or immaturity, to infidelity, to bad will, to a refusal of God's grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is desirable will make one furious. But again, rejection may have the firmness of ice without any trace of passion or even any show of feeling, except perhaps a wan smile.[41]

The realm of rejection, however, has its own limits, and beyond its boundaries agreement is possible. For example, "both astrology and genocide are beyond the pale . . . . " wrote Lonergan. "The former is ridiculed, the latter is execrated."[42]

At the core of faith -- of one's religious affectivity and dialogue -- one experiences a painful ontological aloneness, which must be embraced resolutely. For the experience of participating in mystery -- in whatever way and accordingly, of responding to it is unconditionally undeniable and compellingly calling for its affirmation. Like friendship, mystery can only be welcomed or rejected.[43] If rejected, then the self is lost: it becomes aimless and homeless. If welcomed, then hope might be affirmed in the midst of despair, meaningfulness in the midst of meaninglessness and life in the midst of death.

The salvation of both myth and theology from irrelevancy and idolatry -- as well as magic and fundamentalism, atrophy and anarchy -- might lie in the recognition of pluralism, which allows myth and theology to enflesh mystery and, at the same time, to remain a 'not too inexact explanation and approximation of mystery itself. For example: Christians may say that God's mystery of graciousness is expressed fully in Jesus. But, among other concerns, this is not to say that divine mystery is expressed fully in Christological myth and dogma. Dogmas, especially, often disclose the absolutization and dehistoricization of 'privileged' theological statements. For example, Pope Paul VI taught that "the formulas used by the Council of Trent to express the Church Eucharistic faith, 'like the others which the Church uses to propose the dogmas of the faith, express concepts which are not tied to a certain definite form of human culture, or to a certain stage of scientific progress, or to one theological school or another, but exhibit that which the human mind, in its universal and necessary experience of reality, perceives . . . . Hence they are suited to men of all times and places.'"[44] Describing such classicist assumptions -- the 'one culture' view of unity -- Lonergan had this to say:

> On classicist assumptions there is just one culture. That culture is not attained by the simple faithful, the people, the natives, the barbarians. Nevertheless, career is always open to talent. One enters upon such a career by diligent study of the ancient Latin and Greek authors. One pursues such a career by learning Scholastic philosophy and theology. One aims at high office by becoming proficient in canon law. One succeeds by winning the approbation and favor of the right personages. Within this set-up the unity of faith is a matter of everyone subscribing to the correct formulae.[45]

'Correct' faith formulae unite in holy alliances all possessors of absolute truth and give rise to Kingdoms of Certitude -- fools paradises erected on 'pure power structures.'[46] In the real world of faith, 'correct' faith formulae do not exist, and the reasons are many: linguistic, social and cultural differences, undifferentiated as well as differentiated levels of consciousness, various phases of intellectual, moral and religious conversion,[47] and most importantly, the infinite and incomprehensible nature of ultimate mystery.[48]

But there is another reason for denying the existence of 'correct' faith formulae: 'postmodern' historical consciousness which foregoes the witch hunt for 'errors'[49] and situates one within the arena of systemic distortions. 'Modern' historical consciousness, in turn, had secured its hopes in 'rational' reason, and consequently, 'error' could always be counteracted and annihilated by the 'enlightened mind,' through which again reason could retrieve its translucency. And for Churches of dogmatic persuasions -- since 'reason' was not contrary to 'faith' and faith enlightened reason -- error could always be walloped by merely restating the content of the so-called 'deposit of faith' as they proposed it. Postmodern consciousness, however, points to a 'split' within reason itself, which could be expressed in the question: "After Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as with the current accumulation of thousands of nuclear weapons that threaten the survival itself of our planet, where is reason?" "[S]omething is fundamentally and systematically awry in our history and society," wrote Tracy, and "postmodern consciousness" . . . now deeply suspects the optimism concealed in Western notions of reason."50

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Hopefully, in not too inexact approximations, mythic and theological 'postmodern' pluralism might still be called to express religious truth as fidelity of faith-consciousness to ultimate mystery. It might still remain sacramental of ultimate transcendence and respectful of finite humanity:[51] to allow us, humans, to let 'God' be 'God,' and 'God,' to let us, humans, be human.

Conceivably then, consciousness might intentionalize ultimate mystery and thus host the ineffable in its salvific graciousness. Affectively and cognitively, in myth and theology, it might express this 'divine' graciousness, and through mythic and theological pluralism, acknowledge its soteriological, undiscriminating, humanizing and saving power. And faith-experiences, therefore, might still freely be lived and deepened, expressed and celebrated by all people as they tend mystery and, by that same mystery, be forever tended. And so, not only priests, gurus and savants, but also -- from the very depths of their consciousness unviolated -- "the simple faithful, the natives and the barbarians"[52] might still treasure, know and proclaim the humanizing power of ultimate mystery. In Christian terms: "The Spirit poured out from God over all flesh" -- liberated from irrelevancy and idolatry, magic and fundamentalism, anarchy and atrophy -- might still empower all "to prophesy, see visions and dream dreams."[53]

Endnotes

1. From a poem entitled 'Women Behind Walls for the women in Cook County Jail and Dwight Prison,' by Renny Golden in Golden/Collins *Struggle is a Name for Hope.* Poetry (Worker Writer Series 3) (Minneapolis 1982), in Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "For Women in Men's Worlds: A Critical Feminist Theology of Liberation," in *Different Theologies, Common Responsibility: Babel or Pentecost?*, Claude Geffre (editor), Concilium (Edinburgh: T. T. Clark Ltd, 1984), p. 38.

2. For example in *Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutic, Religion, Hope* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987), David Tracy, it seems to me, makes a case for 'pluralism as the ability to perceive the truth of diversity.' He speaks of language as pluralistic, that is as system (*langue*) -- as distinguished from use (*parole*) -- which is a system "of differential relations" (p. 53); of language as system (through language as use and as object) to language as discourse: "someone says something about something to someone," (p. 61); and of language as discourse as the discovery of plurality, which means "to also rediscover the contingency and ambiguity of history and society" (p. 65).

3. Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, p. 65.

4. Edward MacKinnon, *Truth & Expression* (New York: Newman Press, 1971), p. 182.

5. Avery Dulles, *Models of Revelation* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1983), "Revelation as a New Awareness," pp. 98-114. *In Pluralism to World Religions* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985), Harold Coward claims "that in all religions there is the experience of a reality that transcends human conception [and] that that reality is conceived in a plurality of ways both within each religion and among all religions . . . " (p. 105). Again, this is the meaning of 'ultimate mystery' or 'ultimate transcendence' in this article. Of course, not every one agrees that 'mystery' or 'transcendence' necessarily implies 'outside' of 'here.' See for example, Don Cupitt, *The Leap of Reason* (London: Sheldon Press, 1976), especially his fascinating parable of the prisoner, pp. 31-37.

6. Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations*, Vol. 8 (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1971), "The Theological Meaning of the Veneration of the Sacred Heart," p. 211.

7. Andrew Tallon, "The Meaning of Heart Today: Reversing a Paradigm According to Levinas and Rahner," in *Journal of Religious Studies* (Vol. II, Numbers 1 & 2, Sept. 10, 1984), p. 66.

8. Tallon, "Intentionality, Intersubjectivity, and the Between: Buber and Levinas on Affectivity and the Dialogical Discourse" in *Thought* (Vol. 53, No. 210, September, 1978), p. 302. Among recent works on the role of affectivity in theology -- including the article referred to in this note -- I have found rewarding Tallon's "Personal Becoming (Karl Rahner's Christian Anthropology)," in *The Thomist* (Vol. 43, No. 1, January, 1979), pp. 1-177.

9. Emmanuel Levinas, *The Concept of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 43-45; in Tallon, "The Meaning of Heart Today," pp. 65-66.

10. Levinas, *Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l'exteriorité* (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. XVII.

11. MacKinnon, *Truth & Expression*, p. 182.

12. MacKinnon, *Truth & Expression*, pp. 182-183.

13. Bronowski, "Knowledge and Certainty," *The Ascent of Man* (Toronto/Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973) p. 353. Regarding the human instinct to absolutize, see Richard J. Beauchesne, "Truth, Mystery, and Expression: Theological Perspectives Revisited," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* (25:4), Fall 1988, pp. 555-572.

14. Russell Barta, "Demythologizing Theology," America (Feb. 5, 1972), pp. 118-119. Barta, however, equates Scripture with 'mythos' and fails to recognize that theology equally exists in Scripture. He writes: "Theology is a logos; the Gospel is a *mythos*" (p. 119). Regarding the language of faith, see also Eugene C. Kennedy, "Believe It or Not: The Language of Believing," *Believing* (NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1974), p. 23-34 and Gregory Baum, *Religion and Alienation*, (NY: Paulist Press, 1975), especially "Symbol and Theology," pp. 238-265.

15. Barta, *Id.*, p. 118.

16. Ian G. Barbour, *Myths, Models and Paradigms* (NY: Harper and Row, Pub., 1974), p. 19-28.

17. Barta, "Demythologizing Theology," p. 119.

18. Barta, *Id.*, p. 119.

19. For example, see Vatican profession of faith and oath, *Origins* (3/89, Vol. 18, No. 40), p. 663.

20. James Barr, "Story and History in Biblical Theology," *Theology Digest* (Vol. 24, No. 3, Fall, 1976), pp. 265-274. See also Barr, "Revelation Through History in the Old Testament and in Modern Theology," *New Theology*, No.I, Martin Marty & Dean G. Peerman, Editors (NY: MacMillan, Co.), pp. 60-74.

21. Quoted in Avery Dulles, *The Survival of Dogma* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc, 1971), p. 10 (not paginated).

22. Studies on pluralism: Avery Dulles, *The Survival of Dogma* (NY: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 79-94 & 163-170; Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, especially pp. 236-333; David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology* (NY: The Seabury Press, 1975); Rahner, "Pluralism in Theology and the Oneness of the Church' Profession of Faith," *Concilium* 46 (NY: Paulist Press, 1969), pp. 103-123, and "The Historicity of Theology," *Theological Investigations* IX, pp. 64-83; Yves Congar "Unité et pluralisme," in *Ministère et communion ecclésiale* (Paris: Cerf, 1971), pp. 229-258; Leroy Rouner (Ed.), *Religious Pluralism*, Vol. 5 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Raymond J. Devettere, "Progress and Pluralism in Theology," *Theological Studies* (Vol. 35, Number 3, Sept., 1974), pp. 441-466; Alan Race, *Christian and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1983); Claude Geffre, Gustavo Gutierrez, Virgil Elizondo (editors), *Different Theologies, Common Responsibility: Babel or Pentecost*, Concilium (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd., 1984); Donald G. Dawe and John B. Carman (editors) *Christian Faith in a Religiously Plural World* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1978); Eugene A. Nida, William D. Reyburn, *Meaning Across Cultures* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981); Arnulf Camps, *Partners in Dialogue: Christianity and Other World Religions* (Maryknoll, NY: 1983); "Pluralisme, Polarization and Communication in the Church," *Pro Mundi Vita* (Brussels), 45, 1973; Ruy O. Costa (ed.), *One Faith, Many Cultures: Inculturation, Indegenization, and Contextualization* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Book, 1988); Alan Race, *Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1982); and studies referred to in this essay.

23. McCoy, *When Gods Change*, p. 48.

24. William James, *A Pluralistic Universe* (NY: Longmans, Green, 1909), pp. 321-22, in McCoy, When Gods Change, p. 49.

25. McCoy, *When Gods Change*, pp. 49-52.

26. McCoy, *When God Changes*, p. 48.

27. Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, p. 90.

28. Tracy, *Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (NY: Crossroad, 1981), p. 439, note 5; see also *Plurality and Ambiguity*, partim, esp. pp. 93-94.

29. Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, p. 93-94.

30. Cupitt, *The Leap of Reason*, p. 5. [Italics are mine.]

31. Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, p. 90.

32. See Paul Knitter, "Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions," in *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness*, John Hick and Paul F. Knitter (editors) (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), pp. 178-200; and *No Other Name?* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), esp. pp. 205-231; Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, partim, esp., pp. 76-77 & 111-116. Consult especially Juan Luis Segundo, *The Liberation of Theology* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976), "The Hermeneutic Circle," pp. 7-38.

33. Knitter, "Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions," pp. 185-190. Contrast with Knitter's "continuous creation" of all religions' model of religious truth in *No Other Name?*, pp. 219 ff.

34. Knitter, "Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions," p. 186.

35. See note 1 above.

36. For example, regarding relativism as threat to and possibilities of theology, see McCoy, *When Gods Change*, pp. 53-64.

37. Jan Barbour, *Myths, Models and Paradigms*, p. 176.

38. Knitter, "Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions," p. 185.

39. Cupitt, *The Leap of Reason*, p. 66.

40. For that reason, I also appeal to Yves Congar, who equally made a case for religious pluralism and described it affectively. In *Diversity and Communion* (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third Publication, 1985), Congar wrote: "Pluralism connotes diversity in unity. It is an intrinsic value of unity. In expressing a diversity, 'pluralism' also refers to something held in common. It is not cacophony, it is not sheer dispersion, but rather the differentiation of something held in common," (p. 40). Congar then described pluralism -- the intrinsic value of unity and the differentiation of something held in common -- from a religious perspective. Religious pluralism, he claimed, holds fast to two great truths: (1) *transcendence*, which has to be translated into history; and (2) *faith*, which is "set in motion by living subjects, who have their own . . . views, their culture, and their problems." Consequently, transcendence "translated into history" calls for a number of expressions while none among them is totally adequate to what it expresses; and "individual or collective subjects who live out [their faith and] make it their own, [i]nevitably . . . express it in different ways," (pp. 40-41). Although Congar spoke of transcendence and faith as 'truths' -- connoting cognition -- he expressed religious pluralism as an affective attitude. Through faith-experience -- set in motion by living subjects and lived out diversely -- religious pluralism is the 'intrinsic value of unity and the differentiation of something held in common'; namely, the unity of transcendence diversely experienced in diverse people. Thus religious pluralism, as attitude, results from 'lived' knowledge -- affective knowledge through participation: that which engages one's whole person. Participatory knowledge is sustained by fidelity: a relation towards another (here in Congar,transcendence), which one owes to oneself by reason of one's nature (faith). And like nobility, fidelity obliges from within: a function of the heart. Inevitably, Congar concluded, the diversity of faith-experiences, individual and collective, expresses itself in ways that are different. As discussed above, that 'difference' is expressed in the plurality of myths -- languages of pre-reflection -- which obligate from within while they remain faithful to diverse

faith-experiences; and in the plurality of theologies -- languages of reflection -- which obligate from without while they conform to the diversity of myths.

41. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 236-237.

42. Lonergan, *Ib.*, p. 237.

43. Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being: Reflection & Mystery* I (Chicago: Regnery, 1960), pp. 242-270, especially pp. 255-256.

44. *Mysterium fidei* (AAS 57, 1965), p. 758, quoted in Dulles, *The Survival of Dogma* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1971), p.189.

45. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 326.

46. In *The Problems of Religious Faith* (Dublin: Helicon Limited, 1972), p. 321, James P. Mackey wrote: "The Roman Catholic Church at the present time is, at least as far as its own constitutional theory and much of its practice is concerned, one of the very few pure power structures remaining in the civilized world. Were it not for some dictatorships or near-dictatorships in the Communist world, one could argue that it is the only pure power structure left."

47. See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 326-330.

48. I have developed the themes of the relative nature of faith-expressions and of the human instinct to absolutize in "Truth, Mystery and Expression: Theological Perspectives Revisited," referred to above.

49. See Rahner regarding the principle of contradiction, which can no longer apply in theology. Even within Christianity, theologies now "exist side by side with one another as disparate and mutually incomensurable." *Theological Investigations*, Vol. II (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), p. 7.

50. Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, pp. 73-74. For a discussion of 'modernity' and 'postmodernity,' see pp. 73-81.

51. Rahner claims that religious pluralism is necessitated -- among other reasons -- because of the limitation of the human mind. *Theological Investigations*, Vol. II, p. 139.

52. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 326, quoted above.

53. Acts, 2, 17.

Richard Beauchesne teaches at Emmanuel College, Boston, MA in the Department of Educational and Pastoral Ministry, and in the Department of Religious Studies.

Critical Thinking and Gender

In this section, conference presentations explicitly referring to issues of gender are presented.

Sue Curry Jansen, in "*Information and Gender,*" writes about the "power-politics of the information age," claiming that "the deep structure of information is gendered."Cartesian dualism, upon which modern science rests, she notes, distinguishes between man-as-thinker and nature-including-woman. "Detached, dispassionate, calculating, and abstract modes of cognition" characteristic of "masculine" ways of thinking have, historically, been emphasized. Despite the current "revolution in thought about thought," and the recognition that science is a social enterprise, Jansen is concerned that the nature of academic discourse is becoming transformed by information technologies. These technological advances, especially the computer, have begun to dominate and delimit our modes of thought to classificatory information and impose the use of military/ accounting terms such as "command" and "control."

In *"Women as Knowers and Learners,"* Jerilyn Fisher reports on her workshop presentation. She reviews the epistemological schema developed in Belenky et. al.'s *Women's Ways of Knowing*, in which alternatives to the "masculine" ways of thinking are described. Fisher also discusses ways of responding pedagogically to knowledge of the epistemological and self-conceptual idea of "voice."

Wendy Hesford, too, in "*Women and Autobiography,*" reports on the processes she used in her workshop session at the conference. She discusses the "feminist project to validate and legitimize female experience;" within this, she discusses her own professional-autobiographical search for identity in literature written by women and the effect of "the embedding of someone else's narrative [within an] author's own discourse."

George Hammerbacher and Mildred S. Lawson offer a gender analysis of critical thinking itself in their paper, *Masculine and Feminine Ways of Thinking.* They report becoming convinced that their freshman level critical thinking course required modification after their experience with a variety of approaches and texts and still finding that a number of their students "found the course simply irrelevant or unrelated to the way they think." Refusing to blame the students' "immaturity," "unpreparedness," "lack of effort," or "plain stubbornness," they found "that there are more fundamental reasons for our course's (and, we suspect, others' courses') inability to be more inclusive of the ways to teach thinking." What was lacking was attention to masculine/feminine differences in ways of thinking."

In their paper they focus on research done on the difference between traditional "masculine" and the more recently defined "feminine" Using their own research findings and the ideas of Carol Gilligan and Mary Field Belenky, they employed a writing task to identify gendered styles of thinking. They urge, on the basis of the analysis of student responses, that, "Critical Thinking needs to recognize the validity of inclusionary thought processes even as it re-thinks the generally exclusionary tasks...that follow traditionally "masculine ways"."

Leonore Loeb Adler, Florence Denmark, and Ramadan Ahmed report on a cross-cultural social-psychological investigation of attitudes toward female family members that is an interesting study in contrasts. In *"A Critical Evaluation of Attitudes toward Mother-in-Law and Stepmother,"* their choice of subject matter acknowledges the feminist agenda of reconstructing our understanding of human experience by extending research most often conducted in the past with male subjects and attitudinal objects. Its conventional quantitative hypothesis- testing techniques, on the other hand, place it squarely within the empirical research tradition of the social sciences.

Information and Gender

Sue Curry Jansen

> Where is the life we have lost in living,
> Where is the wisdom we have lost in
> Knowledge,
> Where is the knowledge we have lost in Information?

T. S. Eliot posed these questions fifty years ago. They resist easy answers. The first question encourages us to reflect upon human purpose and mortality: to ponder imponderables, to confront the fact that we are all terminal cases.

The second question encourages us to reflect upon reflection: to examine the structure of knowledge. It implies temporality, challenges concepts of historical and cultural progress. It encourages us to ponder ponderables: history, philosophy, the "classics" of Western civilization, the "wisdom" of the ancients. This question may lead some of us to consider the possibilities of alternative theories of knowledge, alternative ways of knowing. It may even lead us to speculate on what might have been: to consider the forms Western knowledge might have assumed if it had been secured by Platonic, Gnostic, or Paracelsian epistemological models instead of Baconian empiricism or Cartesian dualism. (c. f. Keller, 1985; Pagels, 1979).

Pondering the ponderables posed by Eliot's second question can even empower subversion of Eliot's canonic assumptions. Reading against Eliot's text -- against his assumption that "the dead poets" of the Western world are the only ones who have ever gotten it right -- the second question could be reconceived as a warrant for exploring folk wisdom, non-Western constructions of knowledge, feminist epistemologies, and other forms of knowledge that have not been captured or colonized by the Western academy, commerce, or the bureaucratic state.

Eliot's third question provides a direct challenge to the assumptions of modernism. Here the traditional humanist challenges modernity's valorization of quantity: what Heidegger called the mathematization of the world. Eliot's question violates and subverts the rules of the modern language games of science, technology, capitalism, and bureaucracy which either treat knowledge and information as synonymous, or treat information as a sub-category of knowledge.

The framing of Eliot's third question marks a difference between the two terms and invites the reader to reflect on that difference. It poses the possibility of oppositional or antonymic rather than synonymous or adjacent relations. It seems to suggest that the modern language games which conflate differences between these terms are con games: scams that allow information to masquerade as knowledge.

Eliot's questions imply an historical transmutation of values in which wisdom is diminished by knowledge, and knowledge is diminished by information. This process, in turn, leaves life and the living diminished. We have "lost" life, wisdom, and knowledge in the cosmological bargains that have secured our passage to the information age.

Eliot posed these questions long before social scientists discovered the information age. Computers and information theory were little more than promising sparks in the imaginations of Alan Turing, John Von Neumann and Claude Shannon when Eliot framed these questions. Yet, Eliot's prescient probes capture the essential existential and epistemological dilemmas that face us today as we contemplate the implications of the artificial intelligence movement, the design aesthetics of the information infrastructures that are currently hard-wiring the planet into a global economy, feminist and post-structuralist deconstructions of the androcentric and Eurocentric assumptions of the theory of knowledge that secures information theory, the control revolutions of the computer age, and ultimately the "information" we are losing in "data" (Beniger, 1986; Bolter, 1984; Borto, 1986; Dreyfus, 1979; Edwards, 1985; Haraway, 1985; Jansen, 1988; Krippendorf, 1984; Lyotard, 1984;

Maruyama, 1980; Minsky, 1987; Moravec, 1988; Schiller, 1981; Simons, 1985; Weizenbaum, 1976; Wiener, 1964).

In this paper, I explore Eliot's third question, "Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?" Or, more specifically, I explore the evolution of the word, "information," in Western languages and culture including its incorporation during the early modern period into the discourses of the bureaucratic-state, the logics of instrumental rationality, and calculations of capitalism.

I propose an answer to Eliot's question that he never considered: an answer he would have roundly rejected (if Virginia Woolf's assessment of him was correct). I suggest that the "knowledge we have lost in Information" has been "feminized," stigmatized, and marginalized. I explore this ambitious agenda by examining (a) the history and linguistic constituents of the term, "information"; (b) the epistemological assumptions securing information theory and the design values of information technologies; (c) some feminist deconstructions of the gender politics of these epistemological assumptions; and (d) the social implications of these gender politics.

Information: a brief history of the word and the worlds it has informed

The history of "information" is informed by the position it has occupied within the cultures and power structures which have provided its auspices. The place of information and the social practices that have defined, created, and disseminated it, have changed dramatically through the ages. In a brief but very instructive history of usages of the term in English, John Durham Peters (1988) identifies four major passages that the word had undergone since its introduction into English from the Latin in the fourteenth century.

Each of these passages expresses and reflects major historical shifts in understandings of the origins of information and the kinds of expertise needed to mediate and render information intelligible. In its earliest usage in the cosmology of late medieval scholastics, the omniscient and omnipotent mind of God was conceived as "in-forming'" shaping and illuminating, all elements of the material world -- all forms -- from within and thereby endowing them with meaning.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the British empiricists secularized the term by shifting the site of information from matter to the human mind and senses so that it came to have less to do with "forms" or "formations" than with substances and sensations.

The influence of Cartesian dualism and the development of the modern state fostered another shift in the loci of information by releasing it from dependence on the sensory experience of any specific, identifiable, human agent and replacing it with the disembodied phantoms of abstract formalism which made modern science and bureaucracy possible.

In our own time, the site (and meaning) of information has undergone another shift: the shift that troubled Eliot. An Wang describes this shift noting that, "The digitalization of information in all its forms will probably be known as the most fascinating development of the twentieth century." (Wang in Forester, 1987, p. 1).

With this development, machines, specifically computer technologies, appear to assume the privileged position previously occupied by God, mind, and society. There is a transfer of power and information from the invisible, but at least formally public, Panoptic control of the State to the invisible, private control of an oligopolitic market system (Elliott, 1983; Ewen, 1988; Jansen, 1988; Schiller, 1981, 1989). This transfer is necessary because machines cannot finance, design, produce, program, manage, operate, or service themselves. James Beniger (1986) refers to this transformation in power-knowledge as "the control revolution."

Epistemological assumptions securing information theory and the design values of information technologies

The "control revolution" shifts the loci of discipline from man to machine. Man-made structures of control are systematized, formalized, translated into machine language, and downloaded into programs. These programs, in turn are used to organize, schedule, coordinate, and structure human activities and patterns of thought. As a result of this reifying process, the model rather than its makers appear to be, and frequently are, the disciplinary agent.

However, only a very limited -- and very selective -- range of human thought is ever captured by computer models. Magorah Maruyama (1980, p. 29) describes the form of thought amenable to computer modeling as "classificatory information." He points out that this mode of reasoning is only one of the forms of information routinely used by humans (in the West) to organize and analyze data. Unlike their electronic counterparts, Maruyama reports, human "information processors" also regularly rely upon "relational," "relevance," and "contextual information" in making sense and reaching decisions.

The following epistemological assumptions secure the rule structures of "classificatory information:"

> 1. the universe consists of substances or objects which obey the law of identity and mutual exclusiveness and can be classified into a hierarchy of categories, subcategories, and supercategories;
>
> 2. the information value of a "message" increases with the categorical specification of the message; or a message's information value is greater if it describes an event which has a lower probability (for example, "it snowed in Florida in summer" has a higher information value than "it snowed in Quebec during the winter");
>
> 3. a piece of information has an objective meaning which is universally understandable, without reference to other pieces of information;
>
> 4. discrepancies within messages or differences between messages must have been caused by error; therefore, the discrepant positions should be discarded as inaccurate (Maruyama, 1980, p. 29).

Sharing logical positivism's dream of unified science, the architects of information theory, cybernetics, and artificial intelligence embrace methodological imperialism in their pursuit of the "one true story" -- the master narrative -- of human reason. Thus, for example, artificial intelligence modelers claim all "interesting" forms of human intelligence can be captured by computer programs (Minsky, 1987). Their conceptions of "interesting" manifestations of human reason are, however, reductionist, essentializing, and tautological. As a result, "classificatory information" is conceived as the most "interesting" form of information. Not coincidentally, it is also the only form of information or human reason that is readily amenable to computer simulation.

Psychological studies by O. J. Harvey (1966) suggest that only about one-third of white, middle-class Americans routinely think and act according to the rules of "classificatory information." When the patterns of thought typically invoked by members of some non-Western cultures are assessed, the practice of treating the rules of "classificatory information" as the rules of human reason is exposed as not only inaccurate but Eurocentric (Suchman, 1987). As we shall see, when gender differences in modes of reasoning are considered, this practice is also exposed as androcentric (Gilligan, 1982; Harding, 1986; Jansen, 1987).

In sum, the "information" of the information age, what Maruyama calls "classificatory information," is a distinctly modern, Western, market-oriented construct that is re-presented in current discourses of power as the issue of an immutable, universal evolutionary logic.

In spite of their claims to universalism, the designs of the information technologies produced by these discourses bear the scars of their social genesis. Thus, for example, computer operating systems such as MS-DOS, UNIX, and CPM are based upon the rules of the "command" and "control" functions of military hierarchies and business accounting systems (Bolter, 1984). The phantom objectivity of these operating systems facilitates their occupation of the factory floor, college campus, and artist's studio -- once sites of resistance to the values, rules structures, and organizational strategies of generals and accountants.

Ironically the philosophers who dreamed the dream of a "unified science" -- the members of the Vienna Circle -- saw the folly of their vision and eventually abandoned it. An artifact of that vision, information theory, escaped from the philosophers' towers and assumed a life of its own. The computer revolution has re-introduced this souvenir of logical positivism into the academy. It, in turn, is currently transforming the nature of the academic discourse.

The gender politics of information theory

During the past two decades we have undergone a revolution in thought about thought. Like members of the Vienna Circle, contemporary philosophers, historians, and social scientists have subjected their paradigms to rigorous self-criticism. As a result of this self-analyses we can no longer support the illusion that science is a form of pure cognitive activity which takes place in a social vacuum. We now recognize that science is, and should be, a social enterprise secured in human interests, values, communities, and communications.

The emergence of feminist re-interpretation of the scientific enterprise is, in my judgment, one of the more provocative developments in this revolution. Feminist deconstructions of the founding texts of Western science have established the historicity and intertextuality of these works. They have also established their strategic positioning within seventeenth and eighteenth century debates involving church, state, commerce, witchcraft, and alchemy (Bordo, 1986; Harding, 1986; Keller, 1985; Merchant, 1980). Feminist reinterpretations of the texts that informed the gender politics of early science show that scientific reasoning is secured by metaphors and myths drawn from the Inquisition. These metaphors and myths were originally designed: (a) to exorcise male fears of the diabolical powers of witches, (b) to place the powers and potions of scientists beyond the Inquisitor's suspicions, and (c) to dispel the mysteries of "mother" earth so that her orifices could be exploited by mining interests.

The new feminist epistemologies contend that the definitive texts of modern science were constructed from a specific reference point: the reference point of a particular group of literate, prosperous, European males who were interested in saving their skins and enlarging their purses. Feminist re-readings of the history of modern science and technology carry the marks of their troubled history.

According to the feminist epistemologists, both Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism carry the inscriptions of their origins (Bordo, 1986; Keller, 1985; Merchant, 1980). The new epistemologies claim that these inscriptions, in turn, continue to influence the kinds of problems that interest scientists and the kinds of methods they use to study these problems (Bleier, 1986; Haraway, 1985, 1988, 1989; Harding, 1986; Harding and Hintikka, 1983; Keller, 1985; Keller and Grontowski, 1983).

Feminist deconstructions of the language and logic of scientific discourse trace these inscriptions to what Sandra Harding (1986, p. 104) characterizes as a primitive "totemic" of gender. Feminist epistemologists maintain that gender is the difference that has made the difference in the generative categories, rules, and structures of Western languages.

Within these languages and logics, woman is conceived as the "other." Male identity is established by marking its difference from the object of man's gaze. Like Adam, Western male subjectivity names Eve and all the creatures in his earthly kingdom. Within this code, only man remains unmarked, unmediated. For this reason, male subjectivity appears to be both neutral and neuter. His view, his perspective, becomes the standard and measure of all things.

Theorized in this way, gender is not simply a means of describing body types or prescribing norms for their representation. Rather, gender "inflects and entire universe of objects and behaviors with masculine or feminine attributes, most of which remain unstated" (Armstrong, 1988, p. 2). These inflections encourage polarized thinking; they provide the scaffolding of the binary linguistic structures that secure Western languages and logics.

Advocates of the new feminist epistemologies acknowledge that they have had little impact on mainstream science (Bleier, 1986). However, within feminist scholarship itself, the authority of the old androcentric and Eurocentric models has been permanently displaced. The feminist critique has demonstrated that "the specific consciousness we call scientific, Western and Modern is the long sharpened tool of the masculine mind that has discarded parts of its own substance, calling it 'Eve,' 'female,' and 'inferior'" (Hillman, 1972, p. 250).

The knowledge "lost" by valorization of the androcentric discourses of science overlaps, in part, with the humanistic "knowledge" and "wisdom" eulogized by Eliot. The humanistic values of aristocratic cultures as well as the knowledge emanating from women's circles and material practices were marginalized and collectively "feminized" by the advance of the instrumental logics of the twin revolutions of science and capitalism (Kuhn and Wolpe, 1978; Rowbotham, 1974; Zaretsky, 1976).

As a result of the triumph of instrumentalism and the emerging markets for "classificatory information," poetry, music, and art lost their centrality in Western culture. Increasingly they were relegated to the repertoires of the "decorative arts" considered suitable for cultivation by well-born women and their less hearty sons.

Information as a gendered category

New information technologies are hardwiring the world into a global economy; Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1986) describes this economy as "information-capitalism." Information has become both a commodity and an essential component of the substructure of the new system of power-knowledge.

At prosaic levels, we readily acknowledge the gendering of information. "Linda" and "Michael" are units of gendered information. Some markets are also gendered: the magazines in the corner stores are segregated along gender lines. Programming of electronic media and product marketing are gendered to reach maximum audiences. Gender is also the salient variable in the advertiser's portfolio.

Asserting that the deep structure of information is gendered is a provocative move. Nevertheless, my analysis of the assumptions of information theory indicate that it represents one of the purest articulations -- an exemplary model -- of what Susan Bordo (1986, p. 439) characterizes as "the Cartesian masculinization of thought." According to Bordo, Cartesian dualism encourages an approach to inquiry which emphasizes (and exaggerates) separation and difference. It establishes clear boundaries between man and nature ("the other" that in the gendered inflections of seventeenth-century French included females of every species). This approach also separates reason and emotion, and valorizes detached, dispassionate, calculating, and abstract modes of cognition.

The Cartesian method marks the coordinates upon which Shannon articulated his mathematical theory of information and Turing devised his theory of computational numbers and his "logic machine." The work of Shannon and Weaver, in turn, provided essential foundations for development of the modern digital computer (Bolter, 1984; Moravec, 1988). Realization of the Cartesian dream of a clean machine reproduces at the level of abstract and formal methodological strictures the primitive totemic of gender that generates the polar categories and logics of the phonemic, syntactic, and semantic structures of Indo-European languages. Its articulation in information theory transfers the binary logic of these linguistic structures to the switches of electrical circuits which, in turn, function as gates in channeling the flows of bytes of information in computer programs.

If this interpretation is correct, it has profound implications. The infrastructures of global information-capitalism are currently being put into place. My argument suggests that these infrastructures may simply be reproducing reified and highly stylized versions of Western patriarchal gender politics, and that they may be doing so at a level of abstraction that is highly resistant to criticism.

What can be done? Obviously, Luddite attacks on computers are not in order. They would only further disadvantage women in the language games of the information age. Women need to strategically position ourselves within these games so that we can effectively challenge and change their rules. Time is short. We need to engage immediately in dialogues which raise fundamental questions about the power-politics that underwrite the information age. We need to challenge the advocates of information theory and the architects of information systems to enlarge their horizons: to remove their binary blinders. We need to encourage them to explain why the number "2" has occupied such a privileged position in Western language structures, logics, mathematics, and gender politics (Bolter, 1984). We need to encourage them to explain why we should organize our thought, technologies, and social structures according to the simplistic and inelegant principles of "base-two" mathematics. We also need to find ways to actively resist importation, without debate, of the "command" and "control" operations from non-democratic sectors of our organizational culture into designs that are reshaping all organized aspects of life.

In short, we need to reclaim the life lost living in a culture which increasingly disciplines us to respond to the truncated rule-structures of machines instead of to the fulsome possibilities of human wisdom, creativity, and knowledge.

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Sue Curry Jansen is Associate Professor of Communication Studies at Muhlenberg and Cedar Crest Colleges.

Women As Knowers and Learners

Jerilyn Fisher

Especially for women, both the difficulties and the significance of speaking in one's own voice focuses the inquiry of this workshop session.

In their pathbreaking book, *Women's Ways of Knowing*, feminist psychologists Mary Belenky, Blythe Clinchy, Nancy Goldberger and Jill Tarule develop the metaphor of "gaining or losing voice" to illustrate obstacles women often face in discovering and conveying our knowledge.[1] Based on in-depth interviews as well as the work of Carol Gilligan and William Perry, the authors of *Women's Ways of Knowing* propose a schema for characterizing five epistemological perspectives representative of the women with whom they spoke.

Using unpublished interview material from the original study, we discussed the students' answers to questions about how they determine someone else's expertise; what they do, cognitively, when experts disagree; and how to distinguish "truth" or "right" answers. Through these responses, each student's sense of her own voice, or voicelessness, emerges. Rachel, for instance, characterizes the perspective called "constructed knowledge." When asked "How would you describe what an expert is?", she replies: "An expert is probably someone who's acquainted more than other people with a field. Some people are experts who are called experts, and some people are called experts who really aren't." Rachel doesn't automatically accept what she's told; instead, she decides if an opinion or theory is valid by dialoging with herself about it, weighing her own feelings and thoughts. Helen, who represents the "received" perspective, makes more literal interpretations, and is easily confused by disagreement among experts. You can rely on experts she says, "because they have already been to school, or they have the experience or something." Helen has not yet found her "voice" for affirming and sharing her own sources of knowledge.

Acquainting ourselves with the interview data representative of the other perspectives in the schema, workshop participants considered which of these students sounded familiar, and what relevance this notion of voice and silence has to women's authority as knowers and learners. Next, we examined in closer detail the perspective called "procedural knowing." In this position, a learner "knows" by using one of two procedures: she reaches for understanding by either identifying with the author's views, or alternately, by "arguing the opposite of what someone is saying. . ."[2] Each of these procedures--called "connected and separate ways of knowing"--can also be characterized by using Peter Elbow's language: the "believing" or "doubting" mode of critical thinking.[3] As a group of educators, we were especially interested in seeing the many ways in which our graduate training teaches us to respond to students' work by "doubting" it, imagining that our taking the devil's advocate position will push a student to clarity and independence of thought. The "believing" response, however, in which learners try on another's perspective to better understand that point of view, can be of equal intellectual challenge. Moreover, a response that begins by supporting and affirming a learner's nascent thinking, seems to accelerate many women's learning because we have been socialized to prefer compatibility over opposition. In all, these possible connections between traditional male discourse and academic expectations raised questions about our real experiences with men and women students. We also acknowledged the importance of probing our own experiences as learners and as teachers, using the metaphor of "voice." Finally, we recognized that "voice" greatly influences self-concept as well as ways of knowing, and can therefore be a significant catalyst for student development.

Notes

1. *Women's Ways of Knowing*, Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, Tarule. NY: Basic Books, 1987.

2. Ibid., p.100.

3. *Writing Without Teachers*, Peter Elbow. NY: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 147-191.

Jerilyn Fisher teaches English at Westchester Community College.

Women and Autobiography: Feminist Pedagogy in the Composition Classroom

Reflections on a Workshop

Wendy Hesford

I had several goals on my agenda for this workshop. I wanted to initiate discussion about the role of storytelling and personal writing in the composition classroom, to share some of the strategies I have used in my classrooms, and to encourage participants to reflect upon their own life-stories.

We began with informal introductions, meeting people from several different states and countries, and from departments such as English, Women's Studies, and Religious Studies. Following the introductions, I asked participants to contemplate two questions: What is feminist pedagogy? What does the telling of one's life-story have to do with feminist teaching? I gave them about 10 minutes to jot down some of their ideas in writing-- ideas which I had hoped we could return to at the end of the workshop.

The sub-theme of the workshop was "The Matrilineal Descent of Texts" -- the passing on of the stories of the women in our families. I set up the ninety minute workshop as close as I could to model one class session. I did this for two reasons: a) I wanted the participants to have a felt-sense of what I consider some of the fundamental tenets of feminist pedagogy: breaking down barriers to learning about issues of gender, race, class by developing group process, providing students the opportunity to actively interact with each other, and by eliciting and attending to students' personal experience; and b) I wanted our discussion of feminist pedagogy to arise out of a shared experience. I say "as close to" a model class rather than "a" model class because the activities were clearly out of that context. To provide some of the missing context, I read a short essay about Maxine Hong Kingston's memoir, "No Name Woman." I chose to focus on Kingston's memoir because it is one of the readings which students would have read and written about prior to engaging in the storytelling activity which I demonstrated in the workshop. (Some of the other essays which I have used in conjunction with Kingston's are: Alice Walker's essay, "In Search of Our Mother's Gardens;" and Gloria Steinem's "Ruth's Song.")

Following is the essay which I delivered at the workshop. At the end of the essay, I will briefly outline the workshop activities.

We are storytelling beings. Our lives give rise to stories. Our stories rise to the occasion of our lives. Stories provide orientation; we tell stories in order to understand ourselves and our relation to the world. We tell stories in order to make meaning, to bring coherence and order to our lives, and as we grow, face new challenges, reach plateaus, and break new ground, we look to the stories of others for affirmation, identification, and sometimes for guidance. We lose ourselves in their telling and in our reading. As we read, and as we listen, we coalesce, we love, we go through their relationships, their breakups, we experience their loss, their relief, their happiness and fear.

Adrienne Rich's "When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision," is a story to which I continually return. As I re-read her autobiographical tracking of herself as a writer, I am confronted by the connections I am able to make between my experience and the young writer whom she describes:

> She goes to poetry or fiction looking for *her* way of being in the world, since she too has been putting words and images together; she is looking eagerly for guides, maps, possibilities; and over and over in the "words' masculine persuasive force" of literature she comes up against something that negates everything she is about: she meets the image of woman in books written by men (Rich, 1979, 39).

I see myself in her. I have gone through her struggle, her searching, her silence. And I have found what she has found. La Belle Dame Sans Merci. Juliet. Sleeping Beauty. Cinderella. Snow White. Rapunzel. Dora. Pandora. Eve. I found myself portrayed as submissive, as a seductress, a sex object, an old maid; but what I did not find was that "absorbed. . . inspired creature, [my] self, who sits at a desk trying to put words together" (Rich, 39). What did I do?

In search of my own way of being, I moved through the patriarchal texts -- the canonical cage -- the androcentric works of Grimm, Shakespeare, Coleridge, Tennyson, Browning, Whitman, Hemingway, Eliot and Frost. Then, when my tolerance had reached its limit, I opened Pandora's box, let down Rapunzel's locks, moved beyond the canonical to the "paracanonical" [Catherine Stimpson]. I read writing which rocked the canon. I read the fiction, poetry and autobiographies of Margaret Atwood, Simone de Beauvoir, Hilda Doolittle, Susan Griffin, Maxine Hong Kingston, Audre Lorde, Anais Nin, Sylvia Plath, Adrienne Rich, Anne Sexton, Toni Morrison, Alice Walker, and Virginia Woolf. What did I find? I found diversity. I found commonalities. I found that twentieth century women writers were challenging the images and myths ascribed to them by men, they were reclaiming -- re-naming -- the female experience, using the language of reflection as a medium for social change. They seemed fearless in their efforts to create new contexts in which to speak, act and write in revisionary ways. They affirmed the canonizers' most deep-seated fears.

Maxine Hong Kingston's autobiography, *The Woman Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood Among Ghosts* is exemplary. Essentially, it is about women's relationship to narrative, about Kingston's struggle to find her own identity and voice as a woman writer. Kingston's project is not an easy one, for as a Chinese-American from a working class family, she is inundated with two sets of narratives -- two sets of cultural myths, maxims, and legends -- those of the dominant culture and those of an ethnic sub-culture. On the one hand, *The Woman Warrior* is about the ways in which those stories serve to reaffirm and enforce the place of woman within the patrilineage, on the other hand, it exemplifies how the language of reflection and community of storytelling enables women to resist the perpetuation of their subordination by authoring their own self-representations.

Dominating the landscape of *The Woman Warrior* are the "talk-stories" of Kingston's mother. The stories which dominated her mother's past are the medium through which Maxine learns about women in patriarchal culture. Later, however, these stories become the means through which she finds her own voice. In "No Name Woman," the first of the five confrontations, Kingston's mother tells her a story about an aunt who committed adultery, became pregnant, and who after giving birth killed herself and her child. The narrative begins:

> "You must not tell anyone," my mother said, "what I am about to tell you. In China your father had a sister who killed herself. She jumped into the family well. We say that your father had all brothers because it is as if she had never been born." (1977, 3)

Kingston's mother continues:

> "I remember looking at your aunt one day when she and I were dressing; I had not noticed before that she had such a protruding melon of a stomach. But I did not think, 'She's pregnant,' until she began to look like other pregnant women, her shirt pulling and the white tops of her black pants showing. She could not have been pregnant, you see, because her husband had been gone for years. No one said anything. We did not discuss it. . . The village had also been counting." (3-4)

Kingston's mother continues to tell Maxine about the village's raid of her aunt's house and property and about her ultimate suicide. As Maxine soon realizes, the story turns out to be a cautionary tale, as her mother concludes with inscriptions about the obligations of a daughter in a patriarchal world. "Don't let your father know I told you. He denies her. Now that you have started to menstruate, what happened to her could happen to you. Don't humiliate us. You wouldn't like to be forgotten as if you had never been born" (5).

In "No Name Woman" we not only have a speaker reconstructing a story that was told to her, but in this case, we have the embedding of someone else's narrative utterance inside the author's own discourse. The embedding of narrative utterance is, in fact, a subject of the narrative, for the speaker reminds us that she is reconstructing an oral story which she cannot vouch for. Kingston does not agree with her mother's evaluative renderings of events, since it renders her aunt powerless, and so she begins to contemplate an alternative version, each time becoming more aware of the gaps in her mother's story. Kingston's autobiography is characterized by the interplay of versions and intertextuality.

Rather than blaming her aunt, Kingston imagines her as a victim of rape, remembering that "Women in the old China did not choose" (7), that women's bodies were not their own, they were vessels of patriarchal preservation. "Some man had commanded her to lie with him" she continues, "and be his secret evil" (7). "In the village structure, " she writes, "one human being flaring up into violence could open up a black hole, a maelstrom that pulled in the sky" (14). Perhaps the events turned like this. Perhaps the father was afraid of defacement and stirred up all the other villagers, villager who

> depended on one another to maintain the real [and who] went to my aunt to show her a personal, physical representation of the break she had made in the 'roundness.' Misallying couples had snapped off the future, which was to be embodied in true offspring. The villagers punished her for acting as if she could have a private life, secret and apart from them(14).

The villagers raided the farm. They killed animals and smeared their blood on the walls. They ripped up her clothes, and tore her work from the loom. Later that night, she gave birth in a pigsty -- "to fool the jealous, pain-dealing gods, who do not switch piglets" (16); and then killed both her child and herself -- "a child with no descent line would not soften her life but only trail after her, ghostlike, begging her to give it purpose" (17). In the end, Kingston interprets her aunt's death as a "spite suicide" -- for "[t]he Chinese are always very frightened of the drowned one. . . whose weeping ghost, wet hair hanging and skin bloated, waits silently by the water to pull down a substitute (19).

Kingston, in returning to the story which marked her entrance into "womanhood," gives voice to her aunt's subjectivity. She has made the invisible visible, and her story "functions," as Sidonie Smith has written, "as a sign like her aunt's enlarging belly, publicizing the potentially disruptive force of female textuality and the matrilineal descent of texts" (1987, 156).

Part of the project of feminist critics and twentieth century women writers has been, in fact, to deconstruct the patriarchal hegemony of self-representation, and to validate and legitimize female experience. Kingston is certainly not the only writer who has disrupted the autobiographical mode which privileges male experience by placing men at the center of the cosmology as separate and all-knowing. She is not the only writer to challenge the traditional representations of female sexuality, and to illuminate the relationship between gender and genre. Certainly, Audre Lorde's *Zami: A New Spelling of My Name*, Virginia Woolf's *Moments of Being* and numerous others make similar points. Yet Kingston, more than any of the others, reminds us of the relationship between storytelling and autobiographical composition, that our stories are socially constructed, and that our life-stories are our life-lines.

Following my brief presentation, I asked the participants a series of questions about the role of storytelling in their families. Participants were told that they would have the opportunity to reflect in writing at the end of the questioning session. I left anywhere from thirty seconds to one minute between these questions: Who tells the stories in your family? Where/when are they told? For what purpose are they told? What woman has been "immortalized" in your family through story? Recall a story if you can. Have you been *"immortalized" in story? Recall a story if you can. What kinds of stories do you and your mother share?*

Participants wrote for fifteen minutes, and then we divided in small groups of 3-4. Participants were asked to share stories and to look for themes and patterns amongst their group. We exchanged stories within our individual groups for approximately twenty-five minutes, and then we discussed the themes, patterns, and differences with the larger group. We shared stories about our mothers, our grandmothers, and about ourselves. We shared stories of struggle, deviance, betrayal, inspiration, and success. We shared stories about the birth of our spirituality, feelings of loss, love, hope and fear -- stories of race, class, and ethnicity. Stories which, however different, seemed to connect us in the telling.

Some of the questions which were raised by participants toward the end of the workshop were: Where do we go from here? How can we more fully integrate personal knowledge in our classrooms? What is the relationship between the politics of language/storytelling in our families, and the politics of language in our classrooms? What role does/can personal writing/storytelling have in our individual disciplines? How can autobiographical inquiry and response enhance critical thinking about issues of gender, race and class? I hope these discussions are continuing, and that others are finding themselves in the telling.

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Some Suggested Readings

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Wendy Hesford is Adjunct Faculty in the Women's Studies Program at Montclair State College. She retains copyrights to this paper.

"Masculine" And "Feminine" Ways of Thinking

Mildred S. Lawson
George Hammerbacher

[What follows is an approximation of a workshop presentation]

During the past several years, each of us has become more and more dissatisfied both with the quality of critical thinking texts available to us and with the frustration of trying to meet all students' needs with the texts. Both of us had been following the feminist discussion over whether there were "feminine" ways of knowing that were quantifiably different from "masculine" ways of knowing. Work done by Carol Gilligan (*In a Different Voice*, 1982) and Mary Field Belenkey (*Women's Ways of Knowing*, 1986) suggested that "feminine" ways were identifiable. But we kept meeting female students who thought in traditionally-identified "masculine" ways, and male students who thought in "feminine" ways. We became convinced that "masculine" and "feminine" are not accurate labels, that gender-specific labels were hindering our discussing the possibilities of thought. By removing the labels, we began to notice patterns of thought that appeared in both male and female. One pattern we labeled "exclusionary" thinking; the other, "inclusionary:

Exclusionary Thinking	*Inclusionary Thinking*
competitive	cooperative
ranking	linking
is rational, but sometimes is overly dependent on logic, rules	is rational, but will accept validity of intuitive and sensate knowledge
sympathetic	empathetic
seeks distinction	seeks equivalence
indoctrinary	empowering
power-over	power-to

The differences between the two ways of knowing seem more profound the longer we look at them and may explain our dissatisfaction with critical thinking texts, almost all of which promote exclusionary thinking. Indeed, much of the educational process itself seems "exclusionary" from our present perspective. Competition between and among ideas, powers, businesses, people, and countries defines modern life and certainly appears to be the primary quality of exclusionary thinking. In inclusionary thinking, however, cooperation appears to be the informing quality. One seeks common ground, not difference; one seeks to link ideas, not differentiate between them. Empowerment of others rather than indoctrination becomes the mode of operation.

To test our theory we decided to use a writing prompt that would give students in our required Critical Thinking course the opportunity to make and defend a choice between two alternatives (an "exclusionary" task, we recognize). The ideal existing prompt seemed to be the sort of assignment given for the writing sample on the Law School Admission Test. We found an obsolete sample in our files (see Writing Prompt below) and administered it to our students with no instructions other than those within the prompt itself.

Writing Prompt
(from LSAT Writing Sample)

A committee in Rural County has decided to commission a sculpture to commemorate 20 miners who died in a mining cave-in. Two designs have been submitted. Write an argument in favor of either the Peters or the Hadley sculpture based on the following information. Two criteria are relevant to your decision:

The committee wants the townspeople to feel a special affinity for the sculpture;

> The committee would like the artistic merit of the sculpture to attract national attention.

Hank Peters is a sculptor who has lived in New York City for the past 15 years. He grew up in Rural County, where both his grandfathers were miners, and he continues to visit his family there once or twice a year. Peters' abstract sculptures have been purchased by some of the best museums in the country. The design he has submitted to Rural County consists of several intersecting and twisting arcs of steel. Peters states that the sculpture will "suggest open spaces versus entrapment." The sculpture will be constructed to double as climbing bars and slides for children to show, according to Peters, "that joy exists alongside tragedy."

Anne Hadley has no personal ties to Rural County or to mining. She is not as favored by art critics as Peters, but she has sold several sculptures to local governments around the country for display in public spaces. All the sculptures have been well received by the public. Recently a state chapter of a labor union bought one of her works for the lobby of its headquarters building. That particular work is part of a series she is planning called "the American worker." Hadley wants the sculpture she has proposed for Rural County to be part of that series. The design she has submitted calls for a sculpture of two miners chiseled in black bronze to suggest the darkness and roughness of coal. She intends to use local miners for her models.

As the prompt shows, students were asked to choose between two proposals for a commemorative sculpture and to use two specific criteria (we know that the first criterion seems inclusionary, while the second is exclusionary) to guide their choice. We believed that the choice between the proposals would stimulate the students to demonstrate in their thinking patterns the characteristics which we have described in our distinction between "Exclusionary" and "Inclusionary" types of thinking. While our project was not a careful scientific study, we believe that the informal results we obtained suggest that we are investigating a worthwhile subject.

Of our total of 96 students in four sections of Critical Thinking, 33 females, and 25 males chose Hadley's proposal, and 21 females and 17 males chose Peters'. Having discovered that more than half of each group chose the representational sculpture, we decided to look into their justifications for all choices and to see if responses could be separated into "exclusionary" and "inclusionary" modes. Indeed they could, as the following examples show, but the interesting point is that the distinction between "exclusionary" and "inclusionary" thinking seemed not to be connected with gender. Among females who chose Hadley's representational sculpture, the majority chose it for "exclusionary" reasons; although 10 responses indicated a mix of exclusionary and inclusionary reasons, we could place 25 of the 33 in the exclusionary column and 8 in the inclusionary. Among males, 20 of the 25 responses were clearly products of exclusionary thinking, while 5 could be placed in the "inclusionary" camp. Among females choosing Peters' playground memorial, 17 of the 21 responses were firmly inclusionary. The other four were so brief or otherwise unclearly stated as to be questionable. Among males choosing the Peters proposal, the majority did so for inclusionary reasons: only 5 of the 17 males chose it for "exclusionary" reasons; 12 cited "inclusionary" ones. We noted that "exclusionary" males preferred Hadley's simplicity, straightforwardness, and objectivity, which would be free of "emotional barriers to confuse her work" (See Exclusionary Male 1 below).

Following are several examples of exclusionary thinking:

> 1. Exclusionary, male for Hadley: "the playground...would take away from the prestige of the commemorative...Hadley can be almost totally objective about this project due to the fact that she has no ties to either mining or Rural County. She will not have any emotional barriers to confuse her work."
>
> 2. Exclusionary, male for Hadley: "people might not be able to understand allowing children to express joy in something that was a tragedy."

> 3. Exclusionary, male for Hadley: "How could Peters even think of suggesting something abstract for something that was very plain and very simple. Miners died, they worked very hard, they led simple lives but we grieve for the loss, period! Miners are not complex people and so neither should their monument be complex."
>
> 4. Exclusionary, female for Hadley: "The Peters (playground) model is a poor choice for the town because it is an abstract model which the miners will not understand as city dwellers could. It also depicts open spaces while the mines are closed spaces and cave in was entrapment."
>
> 5. Exclusionary, female for Hadley: (the black bronze statues of miners) will "show the harshness and painful death which the miners suffered...Why would this design want to show joy? It should not be a celebration."
>
> 6. Exclusionary, male for Peters: "Peters is a man. People would tend to generalize that mining is a man's job and that women shouldn't be allowed to mine...The fact that Peters was raised in Rural County tells that he has some knowledge of mining.
>
> 7. Exclusionary, male for Peters: "Hank Peters, in plain English, has 'all the right stuff.' Not only have his sculptures been purchased by some of the best museums in the nation but his previous sculptures have gained national recognition."

Exclusionary Male 2 showed sympathy rather than empathy and made a sharp distinction between the sculptures on the grounds that Hadley's did not mix joy with tragedy, as Peters' did. Like Exclusionary Male 3, Exclusionary Female 4 all but insults the intelligence and sensitivity of the miners by suggesting that they are too simple to understand abstract art.

Among the few males who chose Peters' playground, student 6 makes his choice on the basis of gender only. Student 7 accepts as his primary reason the competitive, distinction-making criterion of national acquisition. Perhaps importantly, females, who generally seemed unwilling to choose the Peters proposal for clearly identifiable exclusionary reasons, numbered among the less-able writers who were unable to express themselves clearly.

In choosing the proposals of either Hadley or Peters, students who exhibited exclusionary types of thinking focused on competition, rational and objective distinctions, sympathy for rather than empathy with those who had suffered the disaster, and rankings of choice made primarily on the basis of what was perceived by the writer as "good for" the citizens of Rural County. Universally the exclusionary thinkers were unable to accept the complexity of Peters' linking of "open spaces" and "joy" with "entrapment" and "tragedy."

Whether they favored Hadley's representational sculpture or Peters' playground, inclusionary thinkers of both sexes expressed themselves in recognizably different modes. Generally speaking, the inclusionary thinkers expressed themselves more eloquently than the exclusionary thinkers. Following are several examples of inclusionary thinking:

> 1. Inclusionary, male for Hadley: "The mines were very dark and damp, all the miners had to hold on to while they were down there was each other. The sculpting of two miners would demonstrate this closeness or feeling of brotherly love. The black bronze would give this 'warm' creation a distinct 'chill' which would express the fear and anxiety from the cold and damp--also the need for one another."
>
> 2. Inclusionary, male for Hadley: "I feel that the townspeople will hold the sculpture especially dear to them because every one of them was touched by this tragedy in one way or another whether by losing a loved one or a friend."

3. Inclusionary, female for Hadley: "It helps you feel how it was as you look at it. Using local miners as models also helps tie in a sense of bonding between the townspeople and the statue."

4. Inclusionary, female for Hadley: "...even though she is an outsider to this community the townspeople can feel a special affinity for her sculpture. Hadley has grown close to them in understanding the disaster."

5. Inclusionary, male for Peters: "Then I realized how his creativity would not only brighten up the town, but also give recognition to the deceased....Peters' statement that 'joy exists alongside tragedy' best sums up what his sculpture will bring to the town...he is satisfying the people by recognizing and honoring the dead and also creating recreation for the children."

6. Inclusionary, female for Peters: "Yes, it was a tragedy what happened to those twenty men, but if I was a family member of one of those men I would want life to go on. I would want to see our children play and laugh."

7. Inclusionary, female for Peters: "Whenever a parent takes his or her child to the park, he or she can explain the purpose of those 'monkey bars.' "

8. Inclusionary, female for Peters: "Peters also probably remembers seeing his grandmother struggling to clean the black clothes and his grandfather coughing all the time, much as I do. There is definitely a common bond between Peters and our town...A sculpture of this kind, where children are allowed to play, brings joy and illustrates freedom. People will not just drive by this sculpture. It will be something the children will want to go to. The meaning of the sculpture will be explained to the children who in time will bring their children to it."

All four of the inclusionary thinkers (both male and female) cited who chose the Hadley sculpture did so because of a unique bond of understanding established between artist, miners, and survivors. Male 1 recognizes the complexity of "warmth" and "chill" operating in the mines as "love" or "need" and "anxiety." Inclusionary thinkers 2, 3, and 4 focus on the bond that will be established between artist and townspeople.

Inclusionary thinker 5, a male who chose Peters' playground, recognized the paradox of joy in tragedy, as did all three of the female inclusionary thinkers cited. Indeed, female inclusionary thinkers found in themselves empathy for the townspeople. Of the three cited, however, only #8 went so far as to envision herself as part of the imaginary town in the Writing Prompt.

We have just begun to think of the pedagogical implications of what we are discovering. We think, however, that the teaching of Critical Thinking needs to recognize the validity of inclusionary thought processes even as it re-thinks the generally exclusionary tasks presented. It is no longer a question of introducing "women's ways" into the curriculum that tends to follow traditionally "masculine ways"; it is a question of whether or not we will teach to all persons in our classes, regardless of gender, by including other ways of knowing.

George Hammerbacher is Professor of English and Chair of the English Department, King's College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Mildred Lawson is Assistant Professor of English, King's College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

A Critical Evaluation of Attitudes Toward Mother-in-Law and Stepmother: A Cross-Cultural Study

Leonore Loeb Adler

Florence L. Denmark

Ramadan A. Ahmed

In a recent chapter Usha Kumar (1989) discussed the relationship between mother-in-law, son, and daughter-in-law, and described the triadic relationship in an Indian Hindu joint family. While in English-speaking countries and in Egypt and other Arab countries jokes about the mother-in-law were common, Kumar (1989) noted that such jokes were extremely rare in Hindu society, where such relationships were considered as serious business. On the other hand, Radcliffe-Brown (1950) had observed that research on the relationships of mother-in-law/daughter-in-law interactions had been neglected across cultures. And, some 4 years later, another survey in Western societies reported that the mother-in-law was the most disliked of all relatives (Duvall, 1954). Another recent study by Fischer (1983) compared the interpersonal relationships of mother-in-law/daughter-in-law to those of mother/daughter with regard to the orientation around the child i.e. how the birth of a baby affected these relationships). However, even before the birth of the grandchild, strained relationships with in-laws were apparent.

In the Hindu family there existed, as described by Kumar (1989) a coalition of the mother with her son against the daughter-in-law. She wrote that "the basic assumption of the triad theory is that the relationship between any pair of actors can best be understood by examining their conjoint relationship with a significant third party. In the relationship between affinal relatives the connecting spouse is likely to be the significant third party. Thus we may understand the relationship between a daughter-in-law and a mother-in-law by examining the relationship of each to the man between them."

This comment might have provided some insight about the negative reputation which surrounded the image of the mother-in-law. However, it also opened up new questions that concerned attitudes in general toward the mother-in-law. For example, was the image of the mother-in-law the same negative schema across cultures? Another point has to be taken into consideration: the mother-in-law is not the only family member with a bad image. For example the stepmother has long had a bad reputation. Children are brought up with stories, like the one of the scheming stepmother, who gives preferential treatment to her own two daughters and treats Cinderella like a servant. There are many other fairytales that have circulated for centuries, such as Sleeping Beauty and Snow White. and give the stepmother an unpleasant character and identifies her as the "wicked stepmother." In the popular context, a disadvantaged child is compared to being "treated like a stepchild."

While in former times young families were disrupted by the death of a spouse - - many women died in childbirth - - today, with divorces on the increase in Western cultures, there are more and more families where one or both spouses have remarried. In many such situations the children are being raised entirely or on a specified time basis by a stepparent, who frequently is the stepmother (depending on the custodial arrangements made by the courts). Of course many of the children who were reared by the "second wife," the stepmother, had a loving relationship with her. So why does the myth of the "bad stepmother" persist? And another question can be asked. namely: does this negative image persist across cultures?

In order to find the answer to these queries, the present research was conducted. Since the senior author had successfully used a projective nonverbal method in the past to assess attitudes cross-culturally (Adler & Graubert, 1975; Adler, 1978; Graubert & Adler, 1982), the figure-placement procedure was again the tool used to examine schemata relating to the "mother-in-law" and the "stepmother," with comparisons to the "mother" and the "grandmother," who were generally portrayed as loving and kind.

The method used to measure projected interpersonal distance followed much of the literature on interpersonal spacing, in that a projective measure of distance was obtained by the use of symbols which were manipulated by the subjects. The technique measured attitudes in a way that did not need to be articulated or even recognized by the subjects and could therefore tap attitudes at variance with the subjects' verbally stated beliefs.

In the past the figure-placement task was used to measure projected interpersonal distance as the result of the interaction between subject and object properties. Kuethe (1964) described regularities in subject/object spatial relations as expressions of social schemata, which have been learned through social experience. The more fundamental the schemata, the more widely they were shared to the extent that the experiences they represented were the same or similar, which meant that the schemata were more independent of idiosyncratic or transitory differences among subjects.

It had long been established that interpersonal space could serve as a protection, against threat, either to the subject's physical integrity or to the self-esteem (Dosey & Meisels, 1969). On the other hand Little (1965) and Mehrabian (1968) found that distance was a significant index of the subject's positive or negative attitudes toward a specific object. In addition, in a study by Adler and Iverson (1975), it was verified that there was a clear parallel between the physical interpersonal spacing (using measures in inches/centimeters) in the laboratory situation and the projected social distances in response to ascriptions of the stimulus persons (measured in millimeters). The implication of such a consistency probably stems from the possibility that subjects possess an underlying social schema, which has a generalized effect on both their projected and actual interpersonal spacing. The same results were previously reported by Kleck, Buck, Goller, London, Pfeiffer, and Vukcevic in 1968. They found correspondence in their comparison between the physical interpersonal distance and the projected interpersonal distance, which subjects established from stigmatized stimulus objects; in their study these were ascribed epileptics.

The objective of all interpersonal distance research was to locate significant schemata and to determine the degree of their generality in the social world. In their cross-cultural study in eight countries on five continents, Graubert and Adler (1982) reported that the clearest finding of their research using the figure-placement task was the impressive similarity of responses across countries. Although the means varied somewhat, the overall trends were the same in each country. Constituting an expansion of the previous research, the present study serves to investigate the schemata relating to several members of a family, such as "Mother," "Grandmother," "Mother-in-Law," and "Stepmother."

The current paper reports on the attitudes toward various family members comparing the responses by both male and female college and university students from four countries: the USA, Egypt, Kuwait, and the Sudan. Different patterns of mate-selection are customary in these countries. For example, it is most often the custom in Arab countries for the parents to influence the mate-selection by their adult children, while in the USA men and women choose marriage-partners more or less independently for themselves. Could these customs influence behavior patterns and attitudes toward family members?

Two Hypotheses were advanced:

H1. Participating subjects -- both men and women from different countries and cultures -- will place greater projected social distances between themselves and the stimulus persons with the ascription of "Mother-in-Law" and "Stepmother."

H2. Near/close projected spacing by the present subjects will be observed between "self" and the stimulus figures "Mother" and "Grandmother."

Method

Subjects

Following the methods described by other researchers (Sechrest, Fay, Zaidi, and Flores, 1973; Lonner and Berry, 1986), special attention was given to the selection of the subjects, in order to draw equivalent samples. A total of 458 undergraduate students participated in this research. All of these college men and women attended science and psychology classes at their respective colleges and universities. The distribution was as follows: There participated 146 students from the USA; of these 77 were women and 69 were men; of the Egyptian sample, with a total of 103 subjects, 76 were women and 27 were men; the Kuwaiti population of 109 subjects included 53 women and 56 men; there were 100 college students representing the Sudanese sample of 60 women and 40 men. The majority of the students were between 18 and 25 years, though some were older and a few were 17 years old. The overall mean was 22 years for all subjects combined. All participants were tested in their native tongue.

Figure-Placement Task

Projected interpersonal distances were measured (in millimeters (mm)) by means of a figure-placement task similar to that used by Adler (1978). Originally this measuring technique was called the "figure-placement test." However, since students sometimes felt some apprehension with the word "test," it was changed to "figure-placement task." All participants were given a test-booklet of 25 pages, with one item per page. There was a face sheet with room for the name and some demographic information, besides the instructions. The translation into Arabic, and then a back- translation for additional confidence in the accuracy of the translation, was necessary for the Sudanese, Kuwaiti, and Egyptian students.

The experimental items of the test-booklets were constructed as follows: In the center of each page (21.6 x 28 cm = 8.5 x 11 inches) of white paper a round sticker/dot (19cm = 3/4 of an inch in diameter) was attached. The stickers were color-coded for different countries (i.e. green, orange, etc.). Across the top of each page was a typed sentence identifying the sticker. Four items are discussed in the present paper. These are the stimulus items identified as "Mother," "Grandmother," "Mother-in-Law," and "Stepmother." Each test-booklet had a card attached with an equal number (i.e. 25) stickers, also in the same shape (i.e. round), and color as those on the test-booklet's pages. The instructions identified the stickers on the card as "Your Self." The participants were also advised not to change their responses nor to leaf back through the test-booklet. Usually the data were collected during class-time from all the students as a group. Completion of the entire task took about 10 to 15 minutes.

For the analyses each page in the test-booklet was measured for the projected social distance. The shortest distance, from the edge of one sticker to the edge of the other sticker, were recorded in mm for each item.

Results and Discussion

In the present research projected social distances were measured and compared cross-culturally -- following the procedures of previous social distance studies -- as a means of investigating college students' attitudes toward different family members, e.g. the mother-in-law and the stepmother. It had been reported frequently in recent years that the physical, as well as the projected interpersonal spacing was a good index of positive or negative attitudes with regard to the stimulus person. In general, close or near spacing revealed attitudes that were warm, congenial and often led to intimate relationships. On the other hand, large or far distances revealed negative attitudes that often led to antagonistic and distant or cool behavior. The generality of these findings were tested in this research, and then demonstrated in the resultant schemata of the four countries where this investigation was conducted: the USA, Egypt, Kuwait, and the Sudan.

Some statistical procedures were performed and are mentioned here. See Table 1 for the results of the descriptive statistics. Then a series of ANOVAs were performed. Several interesting findings could be identified. For example, it became obvious that the schemata of the attitudes toward specific family members were similar in all four populations, regardless of cultural background. (See Table 1.)

In some previous studies (Adler, Denmark, and Ahmed, 1988; Adler, Davis, Ahmed, Mrinal, Mukherji, & Morgan, in press) the "Mother" figure always elicited close spacing, while the respondents consistently emitted large social distances to the stimulus person "Mother-in-Law." However, in the present study, the greatest projected distances were found, without exception, for the "Stepmother." Inspection of Table 1 shows the uniformity of the schemata throughout, for both college men and college women.

Table 1. Projected Mean Distances (in mm) Between "Self" and Female Family Members

WOMEN	U.S.A., *n*=77	EGYPT, *n*=76	KUWAIT, *n*=53	SUDAN, *n*=60
1. Mother	7.68 (2.22)	9.29 (2.71)	5.34 (2.49)	3.15 (1.75)
2. Grandma	16.15 (2.77)	15.88 (3.20)	7.86 (3.15)	10.40 (3.59)
3. Ma-Law	40.08 (4.40)	33.34 (4.21)	30.73 (4.84)	43.45 (6.36)
4. Stepma	56.94 (4.84)	100.17 (4.16)	108.34 (4.94)	92.62 (5.34)

MEN	U.S.A., *n*=69	EGYPT, *n*=27	KUWAIT, *n*=56	SUDAN, *n*=40
1. Mother	15.28 (3.33)	12.52 (4.62)	2.80 (.95)	12.61 (5.95)
2. Grandma	22.33 (4.06)	14.85 (3.89)	11.90 (3.71)	12.76 (4.46)
3. Ma-Law	36.86 (5.00)	75.04 (9.26)	48.61 (5.64)	46.63 (6.96)
4. Stepma	64.00 (6.12)	106.39 (8.04)	64.31 (5.94)	70.87 (7.38)

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses.

In all four countries the subjects perceived "Stepmother" significantly farther distanced than the other three stimulus figures: "Mother," "Grandmother," and "Mother-in-Law." (See Table 2.) The only variation that occurred in these analyses was whether the "Mother" and the "Grandmother" were, or were not, significantly farther distanced. -- The significances in this study were set at $p<.05$, which represented the customary dividing point for statistical significances. The results depended, however, on the perceived closeness of these two stimulus persons. With both men and women respondents there was an extensive overlap of means between these two family members in terms of perceived closeness to the "Self." (See Table 3.) On the other hand, there was no over-lap of ranges either with "Mother-in-Law" or "Stepmother" with the women's responses. Except for the Egyptian men's responses toward "Mother-in-Law," which was far more distant than any of the other population's responses in this study, there was no overlap in the ranges of the means in the other three men's samples.

Table 2. Items Significantly Distant From Other Items

WOMEN	U.S.A., n=77	EGYPT, n=76	KUWAIT, n=53	SUDAN, n=60
1. Mother	o,2*,3*,4*	o, -,3*,4*	o, -,3*,4*	o,2+,3*,4*
2. Grandma	1*, o,3*,4*	-, o,3*,4*	-, o,3*,4*	1+, o,3*,4*
3. Ma-Law	1*,2*, o,4*	1*,2*, o,4*	1*,2*, o,4*	1*,2*, o,4*
4. Stepma	1*,2*,3*, o	1*,2*,3*, o	1*,2*,3*, o	1*,2*,3*, o

MEN	U.S.A., n=69	EGYPT, n=27	KUWAIT, n=56	SUDAN, n=40
1. Mother	o, -,3*,4*	o, -,3*,4*	o,2+,3*,4*	o, -,3*,4*
2. Grandma	-, o,3*,4*	-, o,3*,4*	1+, o,3*,4*	-, o,3*,4*
3. Ma-Law	1*,2*, o,4*	1*,2*, o,4+	1*,2*, o,4+	1*,2*, o,4+
4. Stepma	1*,2*,3*, o	1*,2*,3+, o	1*,2*,3+, o	1*,2*,3+, o

Note: + = $p<.05$; * = $p<.01$

Table 3. Ranges of Means (in mm) from a Total of 458 Subjects
from the U.S.A., Egypt, Kuwait, and the Sudan

	WOMEN	MEN
1. Mother	3.15 -- 9.29	2.80 -- 15.28
2. Grandma	7.86 -- 16.15	11.90 -- 22.33
3. Ma-Law	30.73 -- 43.45	36.86 -- 75.04
4. Stepma	56.94 --108.34	64.00 -- 106.3

All in all, the results affirmed that both Hypotheses could be accepted. H1. stated that the participants, both men and women, from different countries and cultures would place greater/farther projected social distances between their "Self" and the stimulus persons with the ascription of "Mother-in-Law" and "Stepmother." H2. proposed that the ascriptions of "Mother" and "Grandmother" would elicit near/close spacing from their "Self" by the same subjects. In all four countries, though the subjects came from different cultural backgrounds, they perceived these same four family members in the same way. It seemed certain that the different types of mate-selection did not have any influence on the perceptions of the mother-in-law. The schemata of these populations were in agreement, though at times there were some idiosyncratic differences when the means were compared.

While the projected social distance schemata were similar in all four participating countries, the underlying reasons for these behavior patterns were still obscure. All subjects projected closeness and positive attitudes toward the "Mother" and "Grandmother." Was that because children were reared and nurtured by mothers and grandmothers? They shared feelings of belonging and were secure as part of a loving and caring family, namely as "insiders" of the family. Obviously, the mother-in-law and the stepmother were "outsiders," who came into the family most often fairly abruptly. Without being kin, they held positions of high status in the family, and were related by marriage only. Certainly it could be that the resultant projected social distances were the results of the perceptions by the members of the "in-group" toward the "outsiders." It is likely that mother and grandmother were perceived as family members, who were understanding and often permissive, while the "new" additions to the family circle often may have behaved or conducted themselves in different manners and customs, that may have appeared strange or inappropriate to the members of the "old" family-clan.

While a difference of opinion between a mother and daughter or son may have been interpreted as more or less helpful suggestions with the acceptance of advice, the same behavior may have been refused when coming from a mother-in-law while interpreted as criticism, and may have been rejected when coming from a stepmother and being translated as a reprimand. A. Kremgold-Barrett (1989) reported on the divided loyalty and indebtedness by the mother-in-law toward the daughter-in-law who shares the son. On the other hand, one could explain the attitudes expressed by the daughter-in-law, as well as the son-in-law, and the stepdaughter, as well as the stepson, in terms of their perceived responsibility and indebtedness to their own mother, to show and give the loyalty due their own kin and natural mother (birthmother) over and above the newcomers. It could be that such misplaced loyalty could stand in the way of a warm and close relationship with the parents-in-law and the stepparents. -- On the other side, J.M.Thies (1980) cautioned that the children had to resolve the grief over the loss of a parent who was loved and trusted.

Obviously, expressions of love and affection come readily and freely from the mother and the grandmother, but not generally, at least not at first, from the mother-in-law and the stepmother, when such demonstrations could be interpreted (or misinterpreted) as insincere or ingratiating.

However Lewittes (1988) reported that a close relationship could be possible. She described the steps that made the roles of stepmother and stepdaughter acceptable, giving attention to the nurturing qualities,that resulted in successful interactions in the author's life.

Most of the subjects in the present study were unmarried students and therefore did not interact with their own mother-in-law. And following the same thought, it was most likely that the majority of students were brought up by their own natural mothers and never had to adjust to a stepmother. Adjustment problems occurred for "live-in household" family members, or those who were periodically visiting, or else were visited by the new member of the family-clan. Then why are stepmothers so negatively perceived? The research findings by A.-M. Ambert (1986) showed that the locale of residence of stepchildren could -- as a variable -- affect stepparents' marital life, the attachment of stepchildren and the stepchildren's relationships with their stepparents' own children. The stepmother's relationship was more positive when the stepchildren had a live-in relationship, than when they lived elsewhere. The same was the case for stepsiblings when they lived together, rather than visited periodically. This researcher also found that the arrival of a baby to the remarried couple had a different impact on the stepparent-stepchild relationship, depending on some of the variables mentioned above.

On hand of the results of his investigation, M.A. Fine (1986) suggested that increased exposure to the members of stepfamilies attenuated the negative stereotype of stepmothers through increased sensitivity to the situation and familiarity and appreciation of the stepmother.

Certainly more research focusing on these interpersonal relationships is needed. And perhaps it is necessary to learn how to approach and interact, with an open and accepting mind and manner, with the new member of the family-clan, who is related by marriage only.

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Authors Note

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Leonore Loeb Adler is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Institute for Cross-Cultural and Cross-Ethnic Studies at Molloy College, Rockville Centre, NY.

Leadership, Authority and Power

Two symposia were organized for the 1989 conference that dealt with concerns about leadership, power and authority, each with four participants. This section of the 1989 Conference Proceedings presents papers on this topic submitted by the panelists.

Leadership: The Will to Power? Or the Triumph of Collective Wisdom

In introducing the panel topic to be discussed by her colleagues from Widener University, David Ward, Kenneth Schuler, and Darlene Mammucari, Antonia D'Onofrio evoked justice, responsive leadership and rational decision making as both social and individual ideals, and discussed contrasting ideologies of leadership power. One of these ideologies models organizational leadership on these social ideals, and another argues that effective leadership draws its prerogative from the ability to induce members of an organization to espouse perceptions of value leading to courses of action that may not be congruent with their interests. The summary description of the issues to be discussed by the panelists prepared by Dr. D'Onofrio is included as an introduction to the collection of papers representing this panel discussion.

Abstract

Several current explanatory models of leadership power are rooted in the argument that effective leadership draws its perogative from the ability to manipulate both perceptions of value and probable conditions of value. These models may also attribute successful outcomes of leadership to the ability of leadership to induce selective perceptions of interest, cost and risk in others. One may term arguments like these forms of political realism. Political realism persuades us that notions like justice, responsiveness and rationality are fictions of organizational life and culture--insofar as justice, responsiveness and rationality can only be characteristics of individuals and cannot be valid attributes of nonsentient entities like factories, corporations, schools and the like. "Political Realism" also persuades us that authenticity cannot be a characteristic of a leader within an organization. This is because the effectiveness of that leader is dependent upon the ability to induce perceptions of value leading to courses of action that may not be in all circumstances congruent with the interests of most individuals.

To be outraged, to insist that an act is unfair, may be an important clue that human beings have made sentient judgements. Thus, a competing theory of the use of power within organizations would counter that a theory of political realism is essentially nihilistic, in that leaders and followers would ultimately destroy of an organization because of their attempts to induce perceptions of value and risk in others. The counterargument would find this form of realism overdrawn, and individual and group cognitions are reified and simplistic.

Concepts of justice, responsive leadership, and rational decision making persist as descriptors of the "good" collective life. It is predictably bothersome to some critics of culture when these traits are found absent in leadership. History suggests that justice and rationality are most sought after when they are the hardest to find; and their absence lamented in most cultures and in more than one historical period. Although the nature of the virtuous leader may differ from culture to culture, one can even reasonably argue that it is collective life itself that brings the concept of the virtuous leader into being.

Deconstructionism, according to David Ward in *Critical Thinking and Deconstructionism* calls into question the possibility of philosophy itself, insofar as philosophy "presumes the efficacy of careful reasoning in reaching objective knowledge." In his discussion, he identifies crucial epistemological issues underlying the distinction between things that are "true by nature" and things that are "true by agreement;" that is, by convention or custom. Without that

distinction, knowledge is impossible. Post-modernists deny that there are discoverable, objective laws of human behavior. According to Foucault, it is not autonomous rational theorizing which explains behavior; rather canons of scientific practice and reasoning themselves come to be explained in terms of power relationships in society. Human experience is fragmented and discontinuous; attempts to find universal patterns constitute expressions of political power relationships. The possibility and efficacy of reasoning toward universal truth is denied, and power makes right. Derrida claims, according to Ward, that philosophy (and thus concepts crucial to critical thinking) has always been and can be nothing more than literary criticism. Precisely because there can be no objective starting point, the canons of rationality themselves must be called into question.

Kenneth Schuler's paper, *"Power or Authority: Toward a Reconception,"* builds upon David Ward's analysis of Foucault, asserting that "any attempt to clarify the concept of power is completely contingent upon the existing power structure in which the clarification is attempted...Meaning is the product of the dominant social, political and economic environment." The meaning of a concept is contingent upon the context within which it operates. Schuler uses the concept of "power" itself to illustrate the point. "Power," classically used only in a political sense, "has been extended to all political sociological, organizational, and institutional contexts." According to Derrida, meanings are dispersed throughout the academic disciplines. "Conceptual definitions eventually deconstruct and the power structure stipulates the meaning." The resulting distortion requires question, challenge, and rational reconstruction through critical discourse, according to Habermas. Schuler suggests that the definition of power should be analyzed in the context of other related terms, such as coercion and influence. In discussing the leadership authority, he distinguishes between power and rational persuasion to the extent that the latter presupposes the possibility of dialogue. A person *in* authority can only exercise leadership power, as opposed to coercion, to the extent that he or she is respected as *an* authority, with goals and understandings collaboratively shared .

Darlene Mammucari, in *Why Consider a Study in Leadership*, claims that, in a democratic society, all citizens share the responsibility for leadership; circumstances and situations may call any citizen to serve in a leadership position. The right to serve as a leader, and the responsibility for exercising authority, in turn, implies the need for all to prepare for this responsibility. Who actually becomes a leader in any given situation is determined by contextual factors; social role, formulaic identification, and social opportunities to demonstrate relevant personality traits.

In *"Reflections on the Will to Power and an Aristotelean Rebuttal,"* Antonia D'Onofrio inquires as to the risk involved in non-collaborative leadership, referring primarily to leadership in educational institutions. Vested authority residing in a role, and regulatory language establishing authority relationships may separate an administrator from the "contextual, collective reality of the group." The risks, here, are those of discounting contextual information, and reliance on the shaping of the values of others and persuasive argument toward those values.

Critical Thinking and Authority

In an interdisciplinary symposium on Critical Thinking and Authority organized and moderated by Judith Waters, the concept of authority and its social manifestations are explored. The abstract submitted for this panel discussion is included as an introduction to the papers by Waters, Mechanic, Rothblatt, and Drew.

According to Judith Waters, in *Authority: Impact on Critical Analysis and Problem Solving*, as knowledge has expanded, so too has the need for reliance on expertise in various fields. In many cases, the source of the knowledge held by experts as "authorities" may be withheld, and the processes through which it has been acquired and the expertise developed is closely guarded. Authority figures may take on mystical qualities, becoming charismatic leaders and attracting followers seeking solutions to pressing problems, particularly when under severe stress. Often, the "solutions" offered address infantile needs for security, order, and structure, rather than proposing potential ways of solving complex problems.

Paradoxically, in contemporary American society, the tendency to abdicate decision making responsibility in deference to the perceived authority of charismatic leaders coexists with a tendency toward defiant disrespect for persons "in authority" by virtue of their social roles, acquired expertise, or years of experience. Through the educational process, Waters suggests, emphasis on the process through which claims to authority are justified, and the criteria upon which these claims may be warranted, may help students develop the critical abilities to identify illegitimate claims to authority and abuses of legitimate authority, as well as "comprehend the basis for their own authority and define areas of appropriate challenge."

Jean Mechanic extends the discussion of the controversy surrounding the use and abuse of authority, obedience, and criteria for questioning obedience to authority, in *The Legitimation of Authority*. A critical thinking approach to exploring the nature of legitimate authority requires that individuals in possession of authority present reasons and criteria for the acceptance of their authority in accordance with established standards, and that individuals subject to that authority actually review these claims in a context of open and reasonable assessment. Structurally, authority is vested in the "bearer" of that authority, acknowledged by other members of the group, and related to specific domains and values. Mechanic distinguishes between epistemic authority (being "an authority"), and "performatory" authority (role-related authority), such as that of a teacher, parent, or political leader. The two are not mutually exclusive; however, the relevant claims to authority rest on different sources of justification. These claims must be understood and may be challenged on different grounds. Similarly, the bases for the decisions made by authorities, differentially justified, must be evaluated according to appropriate criteria, carefully considered in the light of socially accepted standards and values.

Morris Rothblatt, in *"The Limits of Dissent and Disobedience,"* discusses public attitudes toward civil liberties such as freedom of speech. Despite support for such principles in general, the "mass public" tends toward lack of support in particular concrete instances in which expression of these principles is at issue. Reflecting the concerns expressed by Winston, Rothblatt inquires as to whether the rights to freedom of expression should be extended to extremist groups whose arguments are offensive to other members of society. While such freedoms are generally respected, actions based on these extremist beliefs may more often be restricted. Rothblatt presents and discusses various criteria for the justification of civil disobedience and for its exercise, such as its public nature, reliance on moral principles, willingness to accept penalties, non-violence, and refraining from interference with the rights of others.

Benjamin Drew presents a controversial analysis of gender roles in the context of social attitudes and cultural values. In *"Who's the Boss in Your Culture,"* he presents the claim that "universally, women's primary roles are determined by the structure of the family, and consequently, their activities are related to domestic life. Since power and authority are conferred in public life and public life is the concern of men, it is men's activities, interests, and attitudes that tend to dominate the values of every society." In the United States, he notes, women are rarely influential at the national level, although they may exercise informal power, through the exercise of "feminine wiles,"and other "passive-aggressive" actions including wheedling, manipulating, nagging, sulking, or neglecting her household. In many non-Western societies, however, women have considerable economic and therefore political influence.

Drew's presentation of his controversial universal claim is modified and contradicted by his discussion of the role of women in some non-Western societies and by his reference to changes in the traditional roles of women in current Western society. He concludes that women who participate in economic production "can achieve higher status, greater power, and even opportunities to fill positions in the social, political, and business arenas that carry with them the exercise of real authority." By omitting a discussion of socio-historical factors, including restrictions and limitations placed on such participation in traditional male-dominated Western society as the source of his initial "universal" claim, his argument stands as an invitation for rebuttal. Responses, anyone?

Critical Thinking and Deconstructionism

David Ward

The subject of this paper is critical thinking, power, and objectivity. I wish to discuss the Greek history of the idea that rules for rational thought and discourse are possible, and to compare the disputes between the sophists on the one side, and Socrates and Plato on the other, with current disputes pitting deconstructionist post-modernists such as Jacques Derrida and Michael Foucault against much of traditional Western philosophy. The primary point I wish to make is that the attack on the possibility of objectivity by the deconstructionists is in important respects identical with the Sophistical positions with which Socrates and Plato had to contend, and that the deconstructionist "program" significantly threatens the foundations of Western thought.

Many of the hard-won insights of the Greeks which were necessary to get Western civilization "off the ground" are again brought into question by these theorists. Deconstructionism calls into question the possibility of philosophy itself, insofar as philosophy presumes the efficacy of careful reasoning in reaching objective knowledge. I hope to show that, like the doctrines of the Sophists, the Deconstructionists' claims are self-defeating; that they undercut the possibility of their own justification.

In order to begin an attempt to justify my alarming, even apocalyptic claims, I turn to an examination of exactly what the crucial epistemological issues were which the Greeks faced, and on which so much hangs. The first issue involves a distinction so basic that we moderns have difficulty imagining being without it. That is the distinction between the natural and the conventional, or, in Heracleitus' terms, between the *nomos* and the *logos*. The former denoted all those things that were "true by nature"; the latter all those that were true by agreement --by culture or other convention. That stones roll downhill and that water won't burn are both "true by nature". That one should worship the gods of one's city or follow, the eating customs or marriage rules of one's society are matters of convention and not nature, Heracleitus tells us.

Failure to recognize this distinction, Plato as well as a number of the Pre-Socratics recognized, leads to a vicious relativism--a relativism which makes any knowledge impossible. The argument is that if one fails to distinguish customs from facts, then the variability of customs from place to place and time to time will appear to one as palpable evidence that *truth* and *knowledge* vary from place to place and time to time. As W. T. Jones notes, "Xenophanes' discovery that every man makes god his own image... led others to the conclusion that god is only a figment of the human mind. If the Ethiopians judged god to be black because they were so, and the Thracians said that god is fair because they were fair, did it not follow that the Greek god was but a reflection of the Greek mind?"[1] The concept of the *nomos*, however, suggests a realm independent of human preference, thought, or desire. It suggests that there exists *something to be known*, though it does not yet tell us how we might come to know.

The Sophists were travelling teachers, offering to teach primarily rhetoric, or the art of getting others to agree with you. The independence of truth from conventional opinion was just what was denied by the most important of the Sophists (Protagoras, Gorgias, Thrasymachus and Callicles). Truth was what you could convince others of; virtue was facility in debate and oratorical skill. And justice, according to at least one Sophist (Thrasymachus), was determined by what one could get away with--a literal "might makes right" view.

Not only was there no objective reality, there were no objective standards of reasoning, according to the Sophists. A good argument was an effective argument. If the audience could be swayed by appeals to pity or prejudice, or by threats, or by *ad hominem* argument, or even by arguments using what are now recognized by every freshman in a college critical thinking course to be formal fallacies, such as affirming the antecedent or denying the consequent, there was no point in calling those arguments "bad" the sophists thought. To call an argument "bad" even though it was effective would imply that there was some standard by which arguments could be judged other than whether they successfully convinced their audience. And, as we have seen, this is precisely what the Sophists denied.

There were two stages in the struggle against the views of the Sophists. The first was to show that their views were internally inadequate, that they involved incoherence. This Plato did in the *Dialogues*, where time and again Socrates shows the views of his interlocutors to be inconsistent. The second part of the answer to the Sophists involved providing a positive alternative to their skepticism and to their metaphysical relativism. How successful Plato was in these arenas is to be disputed. The Theory of Forms would, if true, provide a firm and objective metaphysical footing. Obviously, though, Platonic realism has been and remains philosophically contentious. And as for epistemological advance, it was left to Aristotle to found formal logic, to systematize rules of correct reasoning. Thus is systematic human knowledge--science-- made possible.

The possibility of objectively justifiable and universal rules of correct reasoning (and discoursing) has suffered periodic attacks in Western thought. The tradition which culminates in the deconstructionist attack on objective knowledge originates in Nietzsche, thence through Heidegger, whose pupil Derrida was, to Levi-Strauss and the structuralists, and then to Derrida and Foucault themselves.

A small detour into structuralism is useful here. It is difficult to give a precise characterization of structuralism, for the structuralists themselves reject the philosophical precision we need here. As Passmore says, "The structuralists, indeed are often wilfully obscure, or wholly silent, precisely at the epistemological and ontological points where the Anglo-American philosopher seeks illumination."[2] He continues,

> What then, is structuralism? That is very hard to say, as hard as it was to define 'existentialism'...It is easy enough to recognise the structuralist vocabulary--'structure', 'signs', 'differences'--and its allusive, precious style, with its deliberately anti-Cartesian preference for the obscure and the indistinct. To set out the operating principles of structuralism...is much more difficult.
>
> We might, no doubt, follow Piaget by describing as 'structuralists' only those who go in search of systems containing law-governed transformations which neither offer results external to the system nor employ elements external to it... the philosophical significance of structuralism lies in the fact that it reduces to a minimum the role of human intentions, the human being as a free agent. It does not do this, as others have done, by arguing that human actions are determined by physical laws; rather, what determines them is a differentiating and differentiated system.[3]

Levi-Strauss, himself a structuralist but not a "post-modernist", lays the foundations for post-modernism by rejecting the idea of the self and of subjectivity. He denies the primacy of, and even the importance of, consciousness, of the 'first-person' standpoint. The truth about human beings is not to be found in our consciousness, but in the products of human culture (including linguistic products such as schema of categorization of objects in the world), compared across cultures, considered as anthropological artifacts. And, as Robert Solomon says of Levi-Strauss,

> "He agrees that there is no escaping our own cultural and conceptual context,...We are not first of all consciousnesses but rather social creatures, products of genetics, language, and culture bound education. The subject-object distinction that is taken as a premis or a problem in philosophy is itself an anthropological curiosity, and Levi-Strauss intends to have done with it, not by redefining it but by ignoring it altogether...Structuralism is the scientific search for objective laws of all human activity, beginning with the classification of its basic elements (actions and words and the ways in which they are combined).[4]

I said at the beginning of the previous paragraph that Levi-Strauss was not yet a 'post-modernist'. That is because he still holds that there *are* objective laws of human behavior, and that they are discoverable.

Levi-Strauss did not realize the significance of his subordination of consciousness to cultural system, and of the relegation of systems of reasoning to the role of mere anthropological data. That realization is left to the two thinkers in whom we are primarily interested, Foucault and Derrida.

What these thinkers realized was that the abandonment of the transcendental perspective, of the "I", renders objectivity unobtainable. Foucault thus rejects the structuralist goal of deriving general laws of human behavior and human nature. The fundamental explanatory concept for Foucault is that of power. It is not autonomous rational theorizing which explains behavior; rather canons of scientific practice and reasoning themselves come to be explained in terms of power relationships in society. Speaking of Foucault's history of madness, Solomon says,

> "He points out that in the seventeenth century the insane were often classified (and interned) with the poor, the sick, and the homeless, and this should be understood not as bad medical science, but rather as early experiments in social control, which Foucault links to the laws, ethics, and economics of France at the time. These are themes that will pervade all of his works: the centrality of language in understanding social practices, the 'illusion of autonomous discourse', the discontinuity of history, the systematic oppression of people through classification and confinement, and the central place of political power in what the authorities prefer to present as scientific knowledge."[5]

While other philosophers and social scientists preserve the illusion of rationality, Foucault characterizes his work as "archaeology". The force of the metaphor is to deny that there is any necessary pattern of meaningfulness or logic in the cultural layers excavated. The truth, Foucault says, is that human experience is fragmented and discontinuous. Any attempt to find universal patterns would constitute merely one more expression of political power relationships, one more piece of anthropological data needing explanation while itself explaining nothing. Foucault emerges then as a twentieth-century Thrasymachus, denying the possibility and efficacy of reasoning, and holding that power makes right.

Derrida's views are even more radical than Foucault's, and show a more complete understanding of the skeptical implications of Foucault's views than does Foucault himself. Foucault, in a treatise of social science, denies that there is any truth in social science *other than* the social science of Michel Foucault. Derrida chides him for this inconsistency, pointing out that no one, Foucault included, can escape from his historical and cultural context. Foucault's 'archaeological' work is itself just another expression of power relationships, just another bit of anthropological data. That is, Derrida sees clearly that Foucault's work (and his own) count against the possibility of *any* systematic theory being justifiable, against the possibility of any 'objective' theorizing. (Foucault in return called Derrida '*le petit pedagogue*').

Derrida makes the point in a number of ways, the first being his his paradoxical insistence that 'there are no texts, only interpretations'. But of course this means (as he knows) that there are no Derridean texts, either. Further, he warns us that he is using the terms of traditional philosophy 'under erasure'--that is, while he uses the methods and concepts which his own view holds to be radically inadequate to show the defects of traditional philosophy, he himself doesn't (and could not, by the logic of his position) offer a systematic positive alternative. Any such alternative would be vulnerable to just the *ad hominem* arguments he employs against others. As Solomon puts it, "Derrida's style is not to offer a counter-hypothesis but rather, as in guerilla warfare, to attack quickly and run back to puncture and parody, and to defuse through refusing to take a thesis seriously. Derrida has called this way of doing philosophy 'deconstruction', though he insists that this is not a method...for methods are already biases..."[6]

Passmore calls Derrida an anti-philosopher who wishes to replace philosophy with literary criticism. Derrida's thesis is in fact stronger. It is not just that he is recommending replacing philosophy with literary criticism; he is claiming that philosophy has always been and can be nothing more than literary criticism. Precisely because there can be no objective starting point, the canons of rationality themselves have been called into question.

Notes

1. W. T. Jones, *A History of Western Philosophy., vol. 1* (Harcourt Brace & World: New York, 1969), pp. 65-66.
2. John Passmore, *Some Recent Philosophers*, (Open Court: La Salle, IL, 1985), p. 26.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29.
4. Robert Solomon, *Continental Philosophy since 1750*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1988). pp. 196-197.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 201

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David Ward is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Widener University.

Power or Authority: Toward a Reconceptualization

Kenneth W. Schuler

Given the almost incomprehensible title toward which this panel is supposed to direct its remarks, certain concepts emerge as crucial for our even understanding the title-yet alone the topic. For example, what do we mean when we talk about leadership? about power? and, about collective wisdom? This segment of the panel will attempt a cursory clarification of these conceptual confusions and conclude with the introduction of several arguments for your deliberation.

Conceptual clarity is, however, not as easy to come by now as it was in the not too distant past when linguistic analysis (or better yet, Oxfordian Philosophy) was in vogue. Dr. Ward's points pertaining specifically to Foucault are especially relevant in this context. For, if Dr. Ward is correct and if my understanding of Foucault even slightly resembles what Michael meant, then any attempt to clarify the concept of power is completely contingent upon the existing power structure in which the clarification is attempted. A major thesis in practically all of Foucault's writing is that meaning is the product of the dominant social, political and economic environment. In Foucault's view, we (as individuals) are an integral part of this macrosocial process and our "conceptual repertoire"[1] is shaped accordingly. One's conceptual repertoire is, according to Foucault, acted-out initially in one's "discursive practices."

> "Discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them."[2]

Despite the difficulties that these Foucaultian points pose for any pure philosophical analysis of any concept (yet alone the concept of power), and despite the dangers inherent in any Foucaultian facade such as the ones to which Dr. Ward alluded, one must admit that there is a certain amount of "truth" in what Foucault seems to be saying. For, Foucault does describe the evolutionary stages of our discursive practices in which the changes in the meaning of a concept that occur are so minute that at any precise minute they are practically imperceptible. Foucault also shows us that during this evolutionary process, the power structure begins to slowly shape us such that initially we become "objects" of the power structure and then ultimately "subjects" of that same structure as we engage in what we consider to be "meaningful" discursive practices. Foucault puts it this way

> "Truth is a thing of the world.····· Each society has its regime of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned, the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying that which counts as true"[3]

Accordingly, the meaning of a concept is now contingent upon the context, i.e. the political, social and economic conditions that determine the power structure in any historical setting. As an example of how a power structure can affect the meaning of a concept, a la Foucault, let us examine the concept/context of the term, power. Traditionally, since Aristotle, power has been a concept that has been associated with the political context. It has been the case, that from Aristotle to Hobbes, political theorists have been more concerned about power relations within the community than they were about definitions of power. However, with the rise of the modern nation-state, and with the growing importance of Empiricism, political theorists have found it necessary to define power so that they could differentiate among nation-states by measuring their power.

Max Weber both reflected this tradition of Empiricism and opened the way for an expanded use of the concept of power with his sociological analysis. According to Weber,"power is the probability that one actor within a social arrangement will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance and regardless of the basis on which the probability rests.[4] This definition permitted Weber to conclude that "the concept of power is highly comprehensive from the point of view of sociology. All·····conceivable combinations of circumstances may put the actor in a position to impose his will in any given situation."[5] It seems to follow then that the nation-state is no longer distinguishable merely because it employs power. Consequently, a concept- power - that had been classically purely political becomes a much broader sociological concept. What was once a rather common activity,i.e. the use of power by the nation-state, now becomes a seemingly (and sadly so, so I suspect) common activity within the society-at-large.

It should be obvious that the concept of power has been extended to cover a very broad range of human relations. At the most general level, power in modern social science terminology refers to "subsets of relations among social units (the responsive units, R) depend on some circumstances on the behavior of other units (the controlling units, C)."[6] Recent organizational theorists expanded even further the scope of possible power relations to include organizational dynamics and bureaucratic, heirarchical authority. Some of these theorists, most notably Wilfredo Pareto, Thomas Parsons, Phillip Selznick and Peter Blau, have even suggested that the closest analogy to a "power relation" was a "causal relation," e.g. "C" has power over "R" is analogous to "C"'s behavior caused "R"'s behavior. In fact, some of these organizational theorists, namely Wilfredo Pareto, have even argued that the mechanical metaphor is the most appropriate model for organizations and institutions. Power, then, in accordance with this model, is the equivalent of work divided by time. Ergo, if one is in a supervisory position over another in the workplace such that S (the supervisor) can direct the activities of W (the worker) over a period of time, then S (the supervisor) has power.

It seems that power has taken its place in all political, sociological, organizational and institutional contexts. To borrow from Wittgenstein, power is an integral part of the "language-games" played by all members of the polity in all of the contexts. Yet, I have a sneaky suspicion that in each of these extensions of the use of "power" that seem to "power" their way into our everyday activity, we may find a self-destructing "power." In order to make my suspicion less sneaky, abeit still less than substantive, it is necessary to return to Foucault.

Foucault's psuedo-partner during this emerging era of post-structuralism is Jacques Derrida, a deconstructionist to which Dr. Ward also alluded in his paper. Derrida argues that meanings are dispersed and deferred throughout our languages and our disciplines. He claims that many disciplines, e.g. political science, sociology, organizational theory (my examples), make rhetorical claims that cannot be supported by either the logic of the language or by the logic of their arguments. Derrida becomes Foucault's partner because Derrida insists, as does Foucault, that the reason for the divergence between rhetoric and logic is related to the power relations within society, institutions and the disciplines. How can, asks Derrida,"the meaning of a word be clear if it simply points to another definition composed of multiple words that point to more words"[7]-ad infinitum! At some point, Derrida argues, the definition must deconstruct and the power structure stipulates the meaning. This is precisely what I have attempted to demonstrate is happening and has happened to the concept of power. Its meaning has been stipulated by those particular disciplines which represent the power in the disciplines, i.e. the sciences and in this specific case, the social sciences.

However, in his book titled *Positions* , Derrida states "I have attempted to systemize a deconstructive technique aimed precisely against the authority of meaning·····."[8] But, if Foucault and Derrida are correct in their other arguments, then this system of deconstructive techniques must have as its main target the very power system that Foucault and Derrida have argued is responsible for the meaning that Derrida is about to deconstruct. It is at this part in the argument that, in my view, the Foucault/Derrida partnership begins to part and that in part Derrida and Jacques Habermas teamup together. Habermas is frequently related to the post-constructionist movement because he too believes that meaning is associated with the power structure. But, he believes, as does Derrida, that these meanings must deconstruct. Ironically, even though both Derrida and Habermas see deconstruction as necessary, they see it as such for different reasons. Derrida wants deconstruction because of inherent analytic instability in definitions; whereas, Habermas wants deconstruction because he believes the power structure distorts the meaning. In fact, just as Derrida attempted to develop a system for deconstruction, Habermas developed a theory for "the rational reconstruction of universal, species-wide language competencies"[9] which results from critical discourse.

Critical discourse is required, according to Habermas, when assertions made during normal discourse/discursive practices are questioned and challenged. Perhaps an example with reference to the concept of power would be helpful at this point. John Kenneth Galbraith tells us in his *Anatomy of Power*," one's first thought on being confronted with an exercise of power is not always, and perhaps not normally to seek means to resist it. Rather, it is how to achieve is dissolution - to say that the exercise of power is improper, illegitimate, unconstitutional oppressive or evil and to insist that it be curbed or prevented."[10] Now if Galbraith is correct about this, and if Habermas is correct that the power structure distorts meaning, and if Derrida is correct that definitions are analytically unstable, then the concept of power is in desperate need of some critical discourse and rational reconstruction.

What became increasingly evident in our previous investigation into the extension of power relations was that social science investigators had not clearly explicated the array of alternative models that could be proposed to explain their data simply because they had not clearly specified the criteria to which they appeal to even determine their paradigmatic model. Instead of continually expanding the notion of power, and seeking a single broad conception of power such that related concepts such as control, conflict, convince, con, persuade or even teach fall under it, may I suggest that a more "rational reconstruction" or a more appropriate conceptual model would be to think of the diverse uses of the concept of influence and how power is related to, yet different from, other methods of influence. The " family resemblances", to borrow again from Wittgenstein, could be arranged in accordance to a coercion continuum - at one pole where coercion is necessary and prevalent would lie power with its coercive force aimed at domination; somewhere in the middle would lie authority; while at the other pole would lie persuasion; (or better yet rational persuasion) for to offer reasons to someone for doing something is not to exercise power over him/her even though it may influence him/her.

One distinguishing criterion, then, between power and persuasion, in the family of related influence terms, is that power implies a difference of opinion/standing between two parties, the one controls and the other reacts. Rational persuasion, on the other hand, to the extent that it criticizes and invites criticism, presupposes the possibility of dialogue. And, to the extent that this dialogue is really rational, the influence is never that of the persuader's power but always his/her arguments, i.e. the same arguments from anyone would do as well, to the extent that it criticizes and invites criticism, and presupposes the possibility of dialogue. And, to the extent that this dialogue is really rational, the influence is never that of the persuader's power, but always his/her arguments, i.e. the same arguments from anyone would do as well.

This analysis would be consistent with Richard Peters view of the concept of authority - another related concept in the family of influence terms. The basis of Peters' argument was developed a generation ago in *Authority, Responsibility and Education*[11], and significantly sophisticated two decades ago in his *Ethics and Education*[12], for us now to recognize the conceptual difference between being "an" authority and being "in" authority. A person is "in" authority by virtue of his/her position. There is nothing implicit in the position to guarantee that s/he is "an" authority, i.e. one who attains his/her authority not by virtue of his/her position but by virtue of his/her knowledge. Add to this analysis, the basic premise of the ALCU that anyone who is "in" a position of authority is automatically held suspect by the person(s) over whom s/he has authority, and it becomes obvious that it would be very difficult for someone who is "in" a position of authority to be a leader. People simply do not choose to follow anyone of whom they are inherently suspicious. Contrast this suspect condition with the apparent respect that naturally follows from being "an" authority. For instance, if I want to know more about x and Chips is "an" authority on x, then I, quite naturally, go to Chips to get to know more about x. I respect Chips' knowledge of x, therefore, I follow Chips' instructions, I follow Chips' suggestions, and I take Chips' advice because Chip knows x, and I want to know x.

Now, since it is not natural to follow those of whom you are even the least bit suspicious, those persons sitting simply "in" positions of authority who, therefore, have power can *never* become leaders simply because of their position although many may feel it to be necessary to follow them. "Following" is done for all kinds of reasons, e.g. bureaucratic design in an organization, minority position in a democracy, economic necessity in an enterprise or psychological compulsion in any coercive environment. All of these are examples of power relations, but leadership is contingent upon only one kind of "following" - that which is the result of the respect of the follower for the leader's knowledge, and the recognition of the follower that s/he can best get to where s/he wants to be by following this "an" authority. Please take note at this point in the argument that being "in" authority and being "an" authority - although not jointly exhaustive - are certainly not mutually exclusive. The argument is quite simple and straightforward - to be a leader one must be "an" authority.

Part of the significance of the "an" authority condition of "leadership" is the emphasis that it places on the nature of the "followship". If, for example, to be "an" authority implies respect of another group of people because of the knowledge-base of the "an" authority, then it follows that this other group, i.e. followers must know much about how much the "an" authority really knows. In other words, (1) there must be some understanding on the part of the followers as to the intentions of the "an" authority/leader; and, (2) there must be some agreement on the part of the followers with the intended destination, objective or goal of the "an" authority/leader; and, (3) there must be a voluntary rational decision on the part of the followers that this particular person is the most able person to "lead" them to this mutually agreed upon destination, objective or goal. Now each of these conditions of "followership" needs, admittedly, to be discussed separately, and in deeper detail.

Let us begin, therefore, with the initial claim that since leadership implies being "an" authority and being "an" authority implies having the respect of those over whom one has authority, then those who respect, i.e. the followers, must have some understanding of the leader's intention. The obvious reason for this condition is to rule from the realm of possibility any appeal to force, coercion, threat, indoctrination or conditioning (all forms of power) as indicative of leadership. But the less obvious reason is to make the claim leadership involves an epistemological relationship with the leader's followers. The nature of this relationship can be best captured by what Jane R. Martin described as Verstehen in *Explaining, Understanding and Teaching* when she discussed the concept of understanding. Accordingly, "to understand human beings and their actions, we must put ourselves in their position, for example, to think their thoughts, and feel their feelings - we are able to do this because we too are human; that is to say we understand others on an analogy with ourselves".[13] Understanding is always a context-bound affair for there is always someone who must do the understanding. Also, understanding is something one must do for one's self, i.e. others can point things out for you, give you relevant information, enlarge your conceptual repertoire and explain their position (all of which are incumbent upon the leader to do); but in the final analysis you have to come through and do the understanding for yourself. Surely the explainee, unlike the explainer, can be passive throughout this entire encounter. But this is saying no more than that there can be explaining without understanding even though there cannot be any "leading" without understanding.

What *is* necessary for leadership, therefore, is a special kind of explaining - one that rests on a version of the Verstehen theory. According to the Verstehen theory, one who explains something to someone must take the explainee's point of view into consideration (and, vice versa). In the context of leadership, Verstenhen does have logical force. For it does not simply contain methodological or psychological advice that a good/effective way of getting people to follow you is to put yourself in their position. The claim is much stronger: one must put oneself in the other person's position if one is to adapt/adopt his/her position/destination.

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Kenneth W. Schuler is Assistant Professor of Education at Widener University.

Why Consider a Study in Leadership

Darlene Mammucari

Tracing back to the Golden Age of Pericles and Athenian Government, the concept of citizenship has implied both leadership and followership. The good and virtuous citizen was recognized as one who leads and one who follows recognizing at any given point in time, circumstances and situations may call the follower to a position of leadership. In a democratic society it is naturally implied that all members of the citizenry share in the responsibility of citizenship. One might affirm that no socially elite class of inheritance or theology supersedes an individual's responsibility for this citizenship.

Further historical review characterizes the rulers of the dynasties of Europe, as arbitrary and self-serving, were later replaced meritoriously, based on the individual's ability, rather than by inheritance.

The American Revolution worked to reaffirm the Athenian ancient model of participatory decision making. With a reaffirmation of the rejection of autocratic rule came the baffling task of identifying which members of the citizenry were to lead and which were to follow. More perplexing was how this process of leadership and followership would be regulated. Concomitant with the acquisition of the right to authority is the acquisition of the experience of leadership. Acquisition by right with no acquisition of experience may be viewed as of no value.

James McGregor Burns (1978) states: "The call for leadership is one of the keynotes of our time." An answer to this call promotes and fosters the idea of moral responsibility. The ideal moral leader would seemingly exhibit the following characteristics: *Universalism* - A morally gifted leader would have to exhibit a universalism that is considered to be characteristic of the higher stages of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1973; Weinreich-Haste and Lock, 1983). A universalist moral standard such as "the greatest good for the greatest number" presupposes an ultimate good. *Cognition and Moral Responsibility* - A leader cannot act in a morally responsible way unless he or she is well informed about the environment in which the action must take place. *Initiative* - A morally gifted leader must be able to resist the everyday distractions in order to free up energies for the case in hand. The leader must envision a need and how to do something about it. *Moral Passion* - To be a morally gifted leader requires having a commitment to prolonged steady work. "A leader who exhibits extraordinary moral responsibility has high levels of moral reasoning, concerns for issues of great impact, strong moral passion and courage, and a propensity to translate thought and feeling into effective action. Such is a leader who takes moral initiatives rather than only responding to situations that are thrust upon the leader" (Gruber, 1983).

Two common themes emerge and characterize this call to leadership. One is, that we do not really know just what leadership is. ("Why are the leaders not leading?" is often asked by organizational experts.) An answer to this question might be: that many of us don't have the faintest concept of what leadership is all about. The other theme is: the need for moral uplifting, transcending leadership. A leadership of broad based ideas and direction and strong task commitment. It is the leader who must offer the followship moral leadership. John Gardner (1984) states: "They can express the values that hold society together. Most importantly they can conceive and articulate goals that lift people out of their petty preoccupations, carry them above the conflicts that tear a society apart and unite them in the pursuit of objectives worthy of their best efforts." Presumably, one can lead others downward, down the "primrose path" or down the "road to barbarism." Yet leadership rightly has the connotation of leading people upward, to some higher values or purpose or form of self-fulfillment.

A set of assumptions that portrays leadership as a process, focusing on skills training and on situational small group orientation, is commonly, yet unknowingly accepted by many.

Many other definitions of leadership may be found. There is a large body of literature that views leadership as functional. This view states that there are formal, social roles sanctioned by the structural characteristics of an organizational or social setting. Here leaders are molded by the predetermined demands of their bureaucratic roles. The leader serves principally as the most influential member of the politic in the distribution of organizational power and resources.

Historically, a formula for the reliable identification of leaders has been sought and pursued. The military, corporations, and political groups have worked actively to select those individuals who show leadership promise, usually from within their own ranks, rather than to wait for them to emerge naturally as perhaps a result of circumstances and/or individual initiative.

It has been assumed that leadership emanates from select character traits. Consequently, elaborate personality instruments have been introduced to assess the individual's leadership potential. Research shows that such assessment has been done primarily with young adults and adult populations. It follows that this population has been targeted because leadership is to a degree, a developmental phenomenon that is not easily evidenced until late adolescence and early adulthood (Piaget, 1972). It is at this time that individuals are beginning to gain access to such social situations that permit one to demonstrate levels of personal initiative and decision making recognized as characteristic of leaders.

The view that leadership is better understood through a set of dichotomies such as direct and indirect, and active and reflective, emerges from the trait theory of leadership. Clustering of leadership categories suggests great variety of styles of leadership. Some leaders are easily recognized for their ability to persuade and influence people through social interactions, while others may be viewed as influencing followers through innovative and oftentimes unconventional ideas. (Different leadership styles indicate that they have certain things in common, for example, high levels of personal energy, yet the particular skills and abilities necessary to one or another, may be quite distinct.)

Leadership may also be considered in terms of small group interaction. In this design, leaders influenced the group to attain its goals by both task and process behaviors. A leader who is identified as a task oriented leader focuses on first getting the task defined, then taken through a breaking down through sequential analysis, while working through completion. These process oriented leaders target in on maintaining a solid functional group process.

In situational leadership experiences, the leader is viewed as manipulating the individual into acceptable behavioral patterns thereby legitimizing the leader's activities in a predetermined fashion. One may consider social role theory as elaborated by structuralists such as Etzioni (1964) and symbolic interactionists such as Blumer (1969). Consideration of this view demonstrates the de-emphasis of personality variables, small group skills, and social attributions as explanations of the dynamics of leadership. Instead it relies upon the legitimizing of the power and authority of the leader through role formalization as sanctioned within the organization itself. It is here that the function of leadership is relatively status and purposely maintaining, rather than a process of change within the system.

According to Max DePree, "The art of leadership is liberating people to do what is required of them in the most effective and humane way possible." Resultantly, a successful leader actually serves his followers by removing the obstacles that prevent them from using their skills effectively.

As Maxine Greene (1987) tells us, the starting point involves (in order to attempt to incorporate power into the knowledge base of leadership) "a critical understanding that institutions are fabricated by human beings and that they embody particular attitudes and interpretations that serve particular cognitive and political interests." The object here is demystification of the norm of promoting linear instructional and social models and it is insufficient.

Throughout the study of the mystery of leadership, one might view a compartmentalization of the leader's behavior into two distinctive systems, the world of values and the world of facts. The nature of the leader's activities include what he desires as well as what he is. What follows is a consideration of leadership, a necessary union of facts and value in the generating of new ideas in working through a decision making process. The evolutionary "rightness" of an idea is a function of matching the form of growth in general practice within the system in which an organism lives. To digress for the sake of further clarification, in biological terms, we see, for example, that although replicative growth is necessary to the life of simple protozoa that live in a relatively independent existence, this kind of growth within the "social" context of multicellular organism produces a cancer. By practicing replicative growth, these cells are practicing nonmutualistic "unfitting" growth in a mutualistic society.

> "A brief examination of the growth of human systems of economics, politics, law and organizational development shows a natural transformation into mutualistic values. It also demonstrates, in fact, that these progressions have been so intrinsically "right" that, by and large, they have been taken for granted and even now remain substantially unquestioned (Greene, 1987)."

So, too, we see that political systems, once based exclusively on the inherited "Divine Right" of monarchs and the absolute power of the feudal lords, have also emerged with "a new concept." Into the intricacies of governmental structures came the idea of "inalienable rights of the individual and of earned leadership."

In all of the cases of developing mutualism, lower growth forms cannot be maintained when the demands of evolution by natural selection always press for the realization of the benefits of mutual facilitation. We simply do what is "right" and "good", and this inevitably turns out to be a higher, more mutualistic form of growth.

To summarize one might formulate the following assumptions regarding leadership.

- Leadership has fluidity. It shifts among participants constantly. One might say all people are both leaders and followers.
- No one can be truly viewed as a leader without the willing consent of the followers.
- We only truly follow ourselves. We lend our support to others when they lead, specifically when a mutualistic union of fact and value is evidenced.

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Darlene Mammucari is Assistant Professor of Education, Widener University.

Reflections on the Will to Power and an Aristotelean Rebuttal

Antonia D'Onofrio

David Ward has spoken of the magic of rhetoric that found its way into modern sophistry: Arguments that judge the merits of leadership on the basis of style and self-presentation. Kenneth Schuler has raised our consciousness sufficiently to inquire whether the coercive powers of formal authority have any congruence with a concept of educational leadership. Darlene Mammucari delivered a constructive message that speaks to the greater value of power residing within collaborative effort. In the notation of systems theory, each participant retains individual integrity. This integrity is projected to a higher level of influence, as personal skill and ability are assimilated into improved forms and structures of collaborative decision making.

There remains the task of exploring questions of risk. To ask what is risked by leadership that does not heed lessons of virtue that bind leaders to followers in reciprocal ways? Or to inquire if the language of persuasion, found in arguments of entitlement, arising from coercive power, impose an implicit risk to the integrity of collective life. What is the nature of this risk?

The rhetoric of modern theories of leadership does not always have thoroughly conscious ethical antecedents. This is particularly true of behavioral conceptions of leadership that claim that they are a-theoretical by design. These conceptions tend to separate the administrator from the cognitions of other members of the workplace philosophically. In the behavioral paradigm of leadership, vested authority and overt regulatory language often permit administrators to impose authority residing in a role (i.e., principal, director, dean, etc.) on the collective reality of a group as it experiences its problems at close hand and in context.[1]

For example, the singular interpretations of an administrator may supersede socially construed perspectives on a problem or the means to its solution. The administrator in this setting may adopt the view that he/she is vested as "the authorized problem solver," and therefore will remain detached from any sense of interlocking decision-making or determination of outcomes. Specifically the authorized problem solver is free to consider all other views as biased, and is therefore free to discount contextual information. Group valuations may even be interpreted as barriers to achieving a specified outcome.[2]

Since the consequences of coercive power can quite clearly lead to despotism --and often do-- formal limitations are generally placed on authority. Regulation of power ideally refers individual authority back to collective ideals. Limitations, imposed by the collective of followers on one's ability to intervene, conversely stand the chance of creating an impasse. Any impasse felt by leadership could be viewed as a probable opportunity for serious conversation about mutual obligation. One could even see this as a welcome opportunity to arrive at collectively determined goals and mutually acceptable divisions of responsibility.

But ethical soul-searching doesn't have to occur. In fact, a burgeoning popular literature advises managers "to go for it"; to feel "effective" rather than feel "good"; to set goals and to devise strategies to achieve goals, setting aside considerations of group values. In this context, Black and English map out for school administrators facetious strategems that include:

Forcing democracy on dopes
Et tu Brutus: Knowing who wants your job
The truth never gets in the way of a good lie

or bromides like:

All bureaucracies run on a kind of bachsheesh, and

Loyalty is the sign of a dull mind.[3]

The fields of school administration, human resource management (a possible oxymoron), and leadership training institutes, as well as banter provided by highly paid management consultants, focus on self-actualization theories that boast that effectiveness is good for you. By implication, there is an underlying structure of argument in much of this. It goes like this:

> I do have not the individual authority to achieve my ends.
>
> To succeed I must convince those who lead me and those who follow me to yield.
>
> Therefore, I will discover what values they espouse and I will appeal to those values.
>
> And if I cannot bring myself to agree with a particular set of values, then I will resort to shaping the value perspectives of others through the skillful use of language.[4]

This is sophistry, and it is embedded in much administrative theory and action of our day. From a psychological standpoint, these arguments also have elements of good behaviorism.

Embedded in this collection of claims is an implicit theory of individual sufficiency. Its protagonists, consciously or unconsciously, are grappling with an important ethical problem that contrasts freedom and necessity. Sophisticated management theorists would acknowledge the ethical content of individual sufficiency which predictably appeals to:

> a. Natural law - i.e., it is proper to effect adaptive results for oneself since in a final sense the social milieu will determine the successful course of action. One could not have chosen it spontaneously.
>
> b. Principles of construction - i.e., One is motivated to forge a conclusion, and skillful reasoning can predetermine the outcome.
>
> c. The superiority of logic over value - i.e., Reasoning alone will afford a transition from contextually determined choices to the selection of outcomes. (Note 1)

Such models of leadership effectiveness draw their perogatives from the ability to manipulate both perceptions of value and conditions of value. That is, the ability to induce selective perceptions of cost and risk in others (bosses and subordinates).

What is sacrificed by this style of argument? And does the argument have an intellectual history?

Conscious decisions to manipulate the outcomes of collective effort, by manipulating participant perceptions of contextual "reality" run the risk of collective outrage. One may even term these arguments forms of primitive political realism. Primitive political realism would persuade us that notions like justice, responsiveness and rationality are fictions when applied to organizational life and culture, insofar as justice, responsiveness and rationality can only be characteristics of individuals. They cannot validly be characteristics of nonsentient entities like factories, colleges, corporations, schools and the like. This theory of realism also persuades that authenticity cannot be a characteristic of leadership, because leadership effectiveness is dependent upon the ability to induce perceptions of value. These perceptions may in turn lead to courses of action that may not in all circumstances be congruent with the motivation or desires of followers.[5]

The authority of leadership in this model is largely self-actualized. (Formal authority rarely includes the induction of perceived value as part of a job description). Thus, in organizations where any model of governance is forced "on dopes (cf. Black and English), the expression of collective outrage could be a plausible result. The following scenario is a putative example of how this might work. Teacher empowerment is introduced into a school district as part of a state mandate, without proper exploration by faculties of the nature of authority or of reciprocal authority. In the same district, teacher empowerment could be misunderstood as an opportunity to shape teacher perceptions. Conceivably the teachers would see teacher empowerment as just another ploy, and their lack of engagement might lead to its failure--possibly even to attempts to sabotage staff development by resistance and obstruction. The failure of teacher empowerment to be successfully enacted would be interpreted as a failure of teacher empowerment as an idea. It would then be relegated to the burial ground of notable educational fads.

The intellectual history of leadership by self-actualized authority can be traced to the modern philosopher, Neitzsche. In the essay, "Concerning Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense", Neitzsche proposes that reasoning is a vehicle fashioned for self-preservation and self-satisfaction.[6] He argues that the rational man seeks prudence and safety. Everything else is poetry. The chief means of prudence is deceit which, while not morally excusable, is nonetheless unavoidable. His reasons refer to an even deeper level of construction. Language cannot refer to things as they are. Rather language serves as a system of metaphorical representation for reality. This reality is grounded in individual perception and is, therefore, completely subjective. Thus, any possibility of establishing truth is obviated, and with it any hope of achieving public criteria for judging the worthiness of choice and decision.

The most consistent argument, concerned with morality, in the evolving corpus of Neitzsche's writing on the individual and the collective (or the impossibility of morality) resides in the claim that everything is perception. Those who act prudently on this rubric are admitted pretenders. However, anyone who pretends to explore the moral implications of a decision also acts subjectively, and is equally deceitful. One only has to choose one's poison.

In "Human All Too Human", a forthright conclusion emerges.[7] Neitzsche claims that it is absurd to think that an act of will could be anything but the will to master others. The hero-one of self-actualizing power- is not properly an instrument for social reform or order. Neitzsche continues: Governance of institutions ought never be arranged in ways that diminish opportunities for heroes to emerge.

Neitzsche sought justification for his thoughts from the material world. In "Beyond Good and Evil", the philosopher argued: Life itself appropriates.[8] The will to power (to control) is the will to life itself. If Neitzsche makes no claim that his argument is just, he still contends that it is justifiable on the basis of natural laws. Neitzsche was critical of Darwin's theory of natural selection. This criticism is not so difficult to comprehend when one considers that Darwin's concept of "the fit" is grounded in the matrix of biological reality. New norms for survival, from an evolutionary perspective, cannot be separated from the problematical context of the environment.

In Darwin's sense of the fit, new norms for survival are not self-asserting norms. The individual does not master the environment. In human terms, this principle can be transposed to argue that a collective of followers in part defines what is required of those who are entrusted with power. Conversely, Neitzsche asserts that the form of leadership prescribed by his arguments would be constituted as an aristocracy of individuals. This new order of aristocrats should be accorded leadership because they have asserted themselves over others through the power of reasoning. At this point, I cannot help but conclude that Neitzsche may serve as the missing link between the Sophists and modern deconstructionism.

The notion of responsive leadership persists as an important characteristic of the "good" collective life. It bothers us when leadership is not "virtuous". Its absence has been lamented in every historical period. To be outraged, to insist that acts of leadership are unfair, may be important clues that judgements have been made that virtuous leadership is absent. Likewise, a theory of individual sufficiency can be construed as essentially nihilistic in that attempts to induce perceptions of value and risk in others would ultimately destroy the integrity of organizational structure.

I should like, in conclusion, to mention Aristotle, a philosopher whom ironically Neitzsche admired. Aristotle examined the nature of virtuous leadership in both autocratic and democratic forms of government.[9] To begin with, Aristotle was not put off by the concept of virtue. He concluded that political virtue arose from a principle of equality that applied even to autocratic leaders. The autocrat he argued will be seen as virtuous when accepting the constraints of collectively felt laws. In other words, the principles that govern collective life should also govern leadership. Ideally leaders and followers cannot be separated on points of value, and commonly held principles for conduct would obviate the need for sophistry.

Aristotle conceived of possible limitations on the extent to which leadership could engage in subterfuge. Like Neitzsche, Aristotle considers that some individuals are better than others at the task of governance. Therefore the majority should willingly accord them the authority to govern. Unlike Neitzsche, Aristotle does not despise the populace. Although autocrats were not directly accountable to the populace, they could be held accountable by the populace when they violated principles that govern equally. Failures in virtue correlated with loss of authority. Aristotle also provided modern debate with a timely caveat:

> Virtuous leadership is only possible when the skill and spirit (idea) for government are held at a premium in the conscious values of a society.

Note 1

These rules are reconstituted from Neitzsche's principles for conducting a test of the coherence of an ethical argument, as explored in:

Neitzsche, F. "On the Predjudices of Philosophers", in "Beyond Good and Evil", translated by W. Kaufman, from the C.G. von Neumann edition, Leipzig, 1886. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.

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Antonia D'Onofrio is Assistant Professor of Educational Psychology at Widener University, and is Director of Graduate Education at the Center for Education, Widener University, Chester, PA.

Authority: Impact on Critical Analysis and Problem Solving.

Judith Waters

Before we begin our discussion of some of the issues associated with the exercise of authority, power, and leadership and the critical thinking process, we have a short preamble.

> 1. It is the dream of most academics to find topics that have not been adequately addressed in the scientific literature of their disciplines so that the voids can be filled and, incidently, the authors can build their reputations. We are here to tell you that authority, power, and leadership are *not* those topics. Virtually every philosopher, beginning with the early Greeks, has written something about subjects such as types of authority, processes of legitimation, uses and abuses of power, conformity, dissent and disobedience, and cultural and sex differences in authority structures.
>
> 2. It is more than probable, in this short period of time, that we may leave out one of the issues that you feel is more important than the subjects that we will cover. Please take the opportunity to apprise us of our errors of omission at the end of the session when we open the floor for discussion.
>
> 3. It is also possible that all of us, the speakers and audience alike, cannot be completely objective about a topic such as authority since we are living with the problems as well as examining the issues. Let me give you an example of what I mean from a recent issue of *The New York Times*. Alice Furlaud (1989), a writer and broadcaster living in Paris, wrote an article about an exchange that she had with a younger colleague, also a writer for radio. Ms. Furlaud had been asked by this colleague to look over a script about the contemporary music world that included a reference to Pierre Boulez, the renowned (or so Ms. Furlaud thought) former conductor of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra. The young reporter, who had interviewed Boulez about electronic music, did not know of his other accomplishments. When Furlaud told her of Boulez's impressive credentials, her response was one that upset Alice Furland, and would have bothered me as well. The reporter retorted, "I have only *your* word for that, Alice," and she left the script unchanged. Furlaud summed up her feelings by saying, "What I minded in that little scene was not my friend's having a whole interview with this great artist without knowing who he was, but her disdain of my attempt to put her in the picture" (p.20). I empathized with her feeling of being rejected. Our sense of discomfort or even outrage at being confronted, challenged, or, worse, ignored, should alert us to how political figures feel about the same treatment and the danger of subjective bias.

There is little doubt that every generation has experienced challenges to its authority and has complained about the lack of respect for its achievements. Perhaps it is our narrow perspective that the questioning of, and defiance toward, authority figures, seems to be a greater problem today than ever before in recorded history. In addition, even if there are actually more challenges to authority in contemporary society, not every educational philosopher would see those challenges as being destructive. Critical thinkers, for example, might suggest that the questioning of, and defiance toward, authority are, in fact, healthy attitudes when one compares them to unquestioning deference or subservience. Most teachers probably do not want students to accept every pronouncement that they make on blind faith. Classroom instructors on every level do, however, fear that the questioning and defiance are not based on informed, well examined positions concerning issues. All too frequently student differences of opinion reflect uninformed, egocentric, and, sometimes, adolescent need for rebellion for its own sake. Certainly, that is the argument that Bloom (1987) and others have proposed. At any rate, we are here today to examine the relationship between critical thinking and perspectives on authority structures.

Authority and critical thinking

One of the early stages in critical analysis and problem solving involves information gathering and the weighing of opinions and advice. On technical issues, we frequently expect to get information, advice, and, perhaps, total solutions to our problems from experts. The public, as novices, appeal to authority figures in medicine, law, psychotherapy, politics, and even fashion and interior decorating to evaluate their problems and supply them (us) with the "right answers." The disrespect for authority may have arisen because the experts in these fields have oversold their credentials to analyze issues, to be able to identify the differences between relevant and irrelevant input, to know the latest developments in technology, and to be able to evaluate alternative solutions successfully. These experts often promise that they can supply answers to questions and reach the decisions that the public wants without bothering that same public with such trivia as facts, details, and interim steps.

Stanley Milgram, the late social psychologist, once pointed out that as society became more complex, people would begin to suffer from stimulus overload (i.e.,too many questions, too many issues, too many conflicting viewpoints, and, what is *most* dangerous, gaps in information that can only be filled by experts who have the power to withhold either the missing information or keep the underlying bases for decisions "close to the vest"). In order to survive, he wrote, people need to simplify and organize their personal universes. Systems that are sorely taxed, shut down to a lower level of functioning or, as I would like to suggest, totally discontinue functioning. One way to reduce the pressure is to seek assistance and to delegate tasks, especially to those who seem specialized in problem solving. Membership in many problem solving professions is kept almost as a "closed corporation." Only the privileged few are allowed to share the information. This practice, of course, increases the mystique about certain authority figures and distances them from the rest of the public, including authority figures in other areas of inquiry. Their advice takes on an almost magical quality. The public thinks that if it can only reach the "right" expert, all problems become simple and solvable. Under these circumstances, the average person acknowledges his ignorance and willingly defers to the opinion of the expert. Sometimes, this tendency to support and follow a leader even extends long after the leader has been publicly discredited, as it has with Jim Bakker and Jerry Falwell.

Recently, Connor (1989) examined the behavioral patterns of people who almost mindlessly follow leaders from a Freudian rather than a social psychological perspective. He suggested that one response to stress is that of regression to a more infantile mode of thinking. He further stated that along with regression to an infantile level of functioning goes a loss of ego autonomy that in turn raises the stress level and also reinforces the tendency toward the utilization of magical thinking (sounds familiar). A society that is typified by severe social and economic pressures , as was Germany after World War I, would be ripe for the development of "a crisis cult or revitalization movement," spearheaded by a charismatic leader. Clearly, charisma, by itself, is not a sufficient quality to attract a strong following. The message of the charismatic leader must appeal to the most basic needs, values, and emotions of the target population and provide solutions to its most pressing problems. Connor noted that charismatic leaders are often ones who appear to have received "a special spiritual message" and/or who address the paranoid tendencies of the group. Such a leader can and does provide simple answers to the needs for security, order, and structure in the lives of the member of those groups.

Actually, a paradox exists concerning public perceptions of authority figures, especially in contemporary American society. On the one hand, in this world that is filled with complex and conflicting political and moral issues, large numbers of people do abdicate their decision making responsibilities and search for charismatic leaders who, they hope, come equipped with simplistic and ready made solutions to their problems. On the other hand, this same public, aided and abetted by the media, take great pleasure in finding fatal flaws in authority figures from all walks of life. Thus, we find ourselves experiencing a behavior pattern that Crozier (1964) called "deference and defiance" when he described French political attitudes. The expectation is that deference or the tendency to conform, so ably demonstrated by such social psychologists as Sherif (1935), Asch (1956), and Kelman (1961) will probably increase in the future as the economy declines (VanLiere and Winkels, 1989). People will feel the need to follow the rules of social conduct that are espoused by authority figures in order to achieve advancement, especially within a corporate community. This need will be felt more keenly as jobs become even more scarce than they are today. If the jobs are not forthcoming, then we can expect more of the defiance we see in the communist bloc countries now.

To anyone who reads a newspaper, watches a television news program, or faces a class of students, there is no doubt that disrespect for authority has reached crisis proportions. The breakdown in respect for authority has occurred not only in the United States but also, to some extent, throughout the world. The erosion of respect for authority is, of course, not a new issue (Marshall, 1937; Bantock, 1965; Boas, 1957; Benne, 1970). Politically, there have always been "Young Turks." What concerns us as educators is the extent and depth of the problem at the present time. In *Closing of the American Mind*, Bloom (1987) criticized "cultural relativism," a state of affairs he felt is prevalent in the academic world, which, when taken to extremes, implies that all opinions are of equal value regardless of the basis in knowledge of each viewpoint.

The problem of challenges to authority appears to be all pervasive, touching not only educational institutions but the family, the church, and the state, and, in particular, law enforcement agencies. Examples of the dishonesty of public officials, civil injustices, and the repressive nature of society have often been cited in an attempt to explain, and perhaps justify, the blatant disrespect for traditional authority figures. Adams (1976) postulated, however, that "... the structure of authority is crumbling... not so much because of injustice and repression as because of the erosion of its intellectual foundations." These intellectual foundations include the "raisons d'etre" for the establishment of authority in the first place such as the need for expert opinion and the rules for the "right ways" of doing things (Weber, 1947).

The accumulated wisdom of experience, for example, no longer appears to be as valuable as it once was. Senior executives and faculty members, are being replaced by less experienced and, what is probably more important, lower priced "new hires." Years of experience no longer appear to be worth their weight in gold. People think that they can retrieve the information they need from databases available to anyone with computer skills. Within the family, the deterioration of attitudes towards parental authority has long been a topic of discussion both in scientific literature and in the popular press (Byrne, 1965; Hess, 1963; Marshall, 1937). Parents no longer appear to have the answers to complex issues facing our society. Children often see the decisions and the actions supported by their parents' generation as being destructive of the environment and detrimental to their own well being. Therefore, any teacher, acting "in loco parentis," is not necessarily cloaking himself or herself in a mantle of authority.

In summary, while respect for authority is eroding, the search for the "good life" and the simple solutions that will lead to that "good life" continues. The uninitiated, in their quest for quick success, often turn to authority figures for assistance. The considerations just raised frame a fundamental question: What is *legitimate* authority and how is it legitimized? The question is more readily answered in traditional societies than in the rapidly changing and pluralistic social context within which we presently teach. If children cannot see the basis in the legitimation process that warrants the authority of their teachers, parents, and other experts, it is unlikely that the function that authority figures play in education can be sustained. This problem is especially crucial since so many other claims to authority (those of peers, culture heroes, and the mass media) also tend to undermine school authority in both content and style. Understanding legitimate claims to authority and seeing the justification of the criteria for the legitimate uses of authority are both required, if illegitimate claims to authority and resultant abuses of authority are to be criticized (Arendt, 1956; Ladenson, 1972;

Lasky, 1919). Finally, an understanding of legitimation will, hopefully, enable students to comprehend the basis for their own authority and will thus define the areas of an appropriate challenge to authority.

Today, we have chosen to examine legitimation processes, justifiable uses and clear abuses of authority, (although that depends on one's perspective), conformity, obedience, dissent, and disobedience. We will close with a cross-cultural view of women in the power hierarchies of several societies. We could have included a discussion of how authority figures respond to being challenged, but since we have recently been privy to the events in China (and because we may be too subjective about the problem), we decided to leave that topic for another time.

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Judith Waters is Professor of Psychology at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

The Legitimation of Authority
Why Should One Follow the Leader?

Jean Mechanic

Infamous events, such as the murderous actions of the Nazi regime and its systematic program to annihilate the Jews, the violence of the death squads of the military regime that ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983 (Elon, 1986), the Mai Lai massacre of unarmed children, women, and old men, the Watergate scandal, the Iran-Contra affair, have led many researchers (Milgram, 1974; Kelman and Hamilton, 1989) to inquire into the reasons why men act immorally under the guise of obeying authority. There is a sharp divergence in public reactions to individuals accused of these immoral actions. Some people revile them and treat them as criminals. They are faulted for their failure to stand up to the authorities who ordered such actions. At the same time large segments of the population defend and support the people who have engaged in these actions as obedient members of society, applauding their devotion to duty even though it required them to perform controversial actions.

The controversy surrounding the legitimate use of authority, its abuse, the duty to obey authority, and criteria for questioning obedience will be the focus of this paper.

Legitimation

"Legitimate" can mean "based on logical reasoning," "rightful," "in accordance with established patterns or standards," or simply "justified". A critical thinking approach to discussions of authority requires that individuals in positions of authority legitimate their demands for the acceptance of their authority, that is, present reasonable criteria which are in accord with established standards. It also suggests that individuals subject to authority be made aware of these criteria in a manner that is open to rational acceptance. Individuals in positions of authority must make their claims in a context of open and reasonable assessment (Weinstein, 1988).

The word "authority has been used in many ways. We can speak of a person as *being* an authority, as when we say "Einstein was an authority on the principle of relativity;" we can speak of someone *having* authority, as "She has the authority to practice psychotherapy;" we can speak of things *embodying* authority, as when we speak of the "authority of the law." People can also speak *with* authority (De George, 1976).

No one use is more basic or primary than the other. We can, however, delineate a formal structure which most of the uses exemplify. Authority is a triadic relational quality (Jenkins, 1976, De George, 1976). First, authority is vested in the bearer of the authority; second, it is acknowledged by subjects; and third, it is related to some fields or areas of application or toward definite values or goals. These areas can be civil, military, legal, religious, or moral. The essential point to be noted is that the three elements that form the basis of this relationship are equally significant.

We can divide authority into two broad classifications. One pertains to belief or knowledge. We call this "epistemic" authority. The second, relates to position or actions and may be called "deontic" or "performatory" authority (De George, 1976, Adams, 1969). These types are not mutually exclusive. For example, the same person may exercise paternalistic or deontic authority over his children by virtue of his position and he may also be accepted by them as an epistemic authority by virtue of his expertise on a topic. In each case, legitimation varies, as does the kind and the extent of the authority.

Epistemic authority may be based on knowledge, superior judgment, skill, or competence. It is in virtue of his knowledge that we say, "Professor Jones is an authority on Kant." It is rational, if one is not an authority on a given subject, to defer to the beliefs of those who are. It would be irrational to prefer one's own judgment. There seems to be considerable irrationality in this world.

Parents as experts, teachers, doctors, and lawyers can be considered epistemic authorities. Children initially do well to believe adults because children have less knowledge and experience than their parents. One does not yet have to be licensed to be a parent. Doctors, lawyers, and teachers are certified as authorities by medical schools, law schools, or by state examinations made up and graded by those considered competent in medicine, law, and education. The talented amateur is rarely granted the right to act in these professions.

It is not irrational to confer authority if one believes that someone else's judgment is more reliable than one's own. Every musician in an orchestra would be capable of exercising his own judgment, but unless the conductor is very bad, the musicians will play better as an orchestra by acting on the conductor's judgment rather than on their own.

Authority is also justified by reference to an inequality of skill between a superior and his/her subordinates. An apprentice, we may be told, does not know his trade. He/she can learn it only under the direction of a master craftsman.

Competence may also give rise to legitimate authority. When a person without official standing takes charge in an emergency, his authority will depend on his being the most competent to direct the efforts of the rest.

In the realm of deontic or performatory authority, we can mention imperial authority, that exercised by a state through its government and various organs, paternalistic authority exercised by a parent over his/her minor children, and, by extension, the authority of anyone standing in *loco parentis* over those not completely competent to care for themselves. Deontic authority involves the ability to formulate, apply, and enforce commands, that is, the use of power (Martin, 1976).

It has been suggested that deontic authority depends logically on the consent of those subject to it (Watt, 1982). This can be sustained in cases of membership in a voluntary association. If I have joined a club voluntarily and can resign at will, the office bearers may claim that I have subjected myself to their authority and to the club rules by my consent.

Voluntary associations, from which members may resign at will, are not the only kind of situations in which subordination is accepted voluntarily. A soldier, enlisting in the army, may subject himself to military authority for a stipulated period of time (Watt, 1982). The same soldier if drafted, is compelled to subject himself to authority. Once in the army, it scarcely matters whether one is a volunteer or not.

Hobbes insists that civil authority can originate only in the consent of those subject to it (Leviathan, 21). Authority is Leviathan and must be so if it is to serve the purpose of those whose consent created it. Hobbes also claims that each person's consent must extend to his future coercion. Thus, an individual is the author of all of the sovereign's acts, not excluding acts of coercion against himself. The word "consent" does not always refer to the actual consent of specific persons, but sometimes to what a person, marked sometimes by enlightened altruism or self interest, might be imagined to consent to under ideal circumstances of complete information or oppositely under a veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971).

Watt (1982) notes that my consent will give rise to genuine rights and obligations and to legitimate authority only if it is clear that the matter was one in which consent was rightfully mine to give or withhold. If banditry is a wrongful activity, bandit authority cannot be legitimate.

Legitimate authority has not always been thought to rest on consent of those subject to it. The needs of children are the usual justifications of the authority of parents. Human beings spend many years unable to fend for themselves and their rearing can only take place in a state of subordination. The abuse of children by parents has led to the development of a new role, the child advocate.

Civil authority has also been justified by the good it does or the evil it prevents (unless one is reading Machiavelli). Hobbes states that without it there would be civil disorder--the war of all against all.

It is by reference to some activity that every instance of authority may be understood and where justification is needed, justified. The limits of any authority are likewise understood by reference to the activity within which it operates. And because every human activity has limits of some kind, every instance of authority has corresponding limits. The notion of unlimited authority is incoherent.

The Abuse of Authority

Whatever lacks reason or justification cannot be authoritative. Usurped authority is not a variety of authority; an official exceeding his authority is no longer acting authoritatively; a person lacking the knowledge he is believed to have cannot be called an authority (Watt, 1982).

The word "authoritarian," as opposed to authoritative, is considered to be derogatory. When applied to persons, it may be replaced by some less ambiguous word such as "severe", "domineering", "intolerant." "harsh," or "unjust." Adorno et al., (1950), in their classic work, "The Authoritarian Personality," wrote that the authoritarian is a bully. He is marked by conformity, rigidity, intolerance, cruelty, superstition, suspicion, power orientation, and unimaginativeness. Authoritarians are said to be "potentially fascistic". Such persons are represented as being interested in domination and submission whether rightful or not. Authoritarianism is certainly authority exceeded or abused.

Even a legitimate authority may be abused or used inappropriately. A learned man may make pronouncements beyond his sphere of competence. An authoritative work or reference may be inaccurate in some particular or may mislead a person who consults it inexpertly. An experiment director might instruct his participants to perform cruel acts. A government official might force his subjects to act against their wills. A military officer might command soldiers to act immorally.

Authorization may override moral values by invoking a transcendent mission. Authorities sometime see themselves as agents of a larger set of corporate purposes that place them outside the realm of ordinary morality. In the case of civil authority, this concept derives from a theory of the state that asserts it is not subject to moral law in the promotion of its own interests. National security, for example, was the justification (or rationalization) for the White House operations that led to the Watergate break-in (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).

Genocidal policy and military authority are contexts in which authority was abused. The crimes of the Nazi regime and the My Lai massacre are examples. The sales of U.S. arms to Iran and the diversion of profits from these sales to the Nicaraguan Contras provides an example of abuse of the authority of the Oval office.

To indicate that abuse of authority is not restricted to official settings, whether military or political, one can cite the practice in which executives at Chrysler assembly plants routinely took new cars off the assembly line and drove them for 400 miles with the odometers disconnected. The odometers were then reconnected and the cars sold without informing the buyers of the accumulated mileage. In addition, some cars were damaged in "testing" and only superficially repaired before being shipped to dealers to be sold (Holusha, 1987). It was later discovered that the company had been in the practice of regularly disconnecting odometers since 1949 (Einstein, 1987). Millions of cars had been sold with inaccurate mileage readings. Lee Iacocca, Chairman of Chrysler Corporation, apologized. He called the company's actions "dumb," but he continued to insist that the practice was not illegal (Holusha, 1987). Perhaps "dumb" only because they were caught and embarrassed.

Even more scandalous were the actions of the Ford Motor Company. During the 1971-1976 model years, Ford marketed a Pinto that contained a faulty design which would cause the gas tanks to rupture in rear end crashes (Dowie, 1977). Engineers knew of the problem and made suggestions for correcting it. For Ford executives, the safety issue was evaluated in relation to the cost of modification. In the course of later investigation, the explicit cost-benefit analysis which Ford made became public. The company had compared the cost of the modifying the gas tank design (estimated at $11 per car) to possible payments anticipated due to deaths, injuries, and property losses (estimated at $200,000 per death). It had callously opted to retain the defective Pinto. Over 1.5 million of these cars were sold.

Conformity and Obedience

A distinction must be made between conformity and obedience. Conformity refers to the action of a subject in accord or harmony with a standard or norm (Baum, 1985). It may also imply going along with one's peers who have no special right to direct one's behavior (Milgram, 1974). Conformity leads to homogenization of behavior as the influenced person comes to adopt the behavior of his/her peers. He/she interprets his/her behavior as voluntary (Milgram, 1974). No obligation or coercion is felt.

Obedience refers to the action of an individual who complies with authority. It involves a hierarchial structure in which an individual believes that the person above has the right to prescribe behavior. The prescription for action is explicit, taking the form of an order or command (Milgram, 1974).

In an authority situation, individuals feel obligated to obey the orders of the authority, whether or not the commands correspond with their personal preferences. They see themselves as having no choice as long as they accept the legitimacy of the orders and of the authority who gives them. The basic structure of a situation of legitimate authority requires subordinates to respond in terms of their role obligations rather than their personal beliefs. An important corollary is that the actors do not see themselves as personally responsible for the consequences of their actions. They are not personal agents but merely extensions of the authority (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).

People become involved in an action without considering its implications and without making a decision. Once they have taken the initial step, they are in a new psychological and social setting in which the pressures to continue are powerful. Many forces that might have originally kept people out of a situation reverse directions once they have made the commitment (Lewin, 1947).

A crime of obedience is an act performed in response to orders from an authority when the act is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community (Kelman, 1989). It is a consequence of authority run amok.

In some cases, one finds individuals who tend to question the obligatory character of the authority situation. They believe that the behavior demanded of them is incongruent with their interest or values. They are likely to believe that the authority is illegitimate under these circumstances. They, therefore, refuse to obey the orders in question (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).

Kelman and Hamilton present five questions a person should ask to determine whether a particular demand is legitimate:

1. Is the demand within the "sphere of competence" of the authorities--within the domain in which they are entitled to issues demands?
2. Does the demand conform to the procedures for exercising authority prescribed by the rules to which the authorities are subject?
3. Is the demand being applied equitably to the different individuals and subgroups that make up the population?
4. Is the demand consistent with the larger normative framework the authorities share with other citizens?

5. Is the policy in which this demand is embedded congruent with the stated values of the political system--values on which its perceived legitimacy ultimately rests? (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).

According to these authors, a negative answer to one or more of these questions constitutes grounds for challenging the legitimacy of the authority and for refusing to obey it. Having criteria for challenging the legitimacy of authority is implicit in the concept of legitimacy (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).

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Jean Mechanic is Professor of Philosophy at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

The Limits of Dissent and Disobedience

Morris Rothblatt

There are approximately 150 countries in the world and of these only about 30 are liberal democracies tolerating dissent and some civil disobedience (Dahl, 1981). The urge to restrict dissent is universal and it appears contrary to human nature to tolerate fundamental disagreement on the part of others (McCloskey and Brill, 1983). That some political systems are willing to tolerate revolutionaries, dissenters, and heretics is one of the most extraordinary developments in human history.

The fragility of freedom has been seen recently in China where a group of students engaged in peaceful protest were massacred by the Chinese army in Tiananmen Square on June 4th of this year. Rallies to commemorate the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet tanks in 1968 were brutally repressed two months later on August 21st. Dissenting voices have only recently been permitted in such Communist countries as the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary. However, there is still complete censorship in other Communist countries such as East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam.

In the United States, on the other hand, there are fewer legal restrictions on freedom of speech and press than in any other country. As Lee Bollinger, Dean of the University of Michigan Law School, put it: "People are at liberty to advocate the violent overthrow of the government, to urge the violation of legitimate and valid laws, to speak obscenity in public places, and to argue for discrimination against racial and religious groups. No other free society permits this kind of speech activity to nearly the same degree" (Bollinger, 1986).

Dissent was not always tolerated in the United States. Indeed such tolerance is a relatively recent development. Despite the existence of the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech and press, dissenters were often imprisoned for their speech. After World War I, such dissenters as Eugene V. Debs, the leader and presidential candidate of the Socialist Party, and Abraham Gitlow, another socialist leader, were imprisoned for their speech, despite appeals to the United States Supreme Court. As recently as 1951, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of the eleven top leaders of the Communist Party for conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence (Dennis *vs.* U.S., 1951). But in the 1960's, the Supreme Court became very protective of the rights of political dissenters. This culminated in the decision in Brandenburg *vs.* Ohio in 1969, a case involving the rights of members of the Ku Klux Klan, in which the Court announced its most libertarian interpretation of the First Amendment to date, stating that the government may not forbid the advocacy of the use of force or violence "except where such advocacy is directed to producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Under this libertarian standard neither Debs nor Gitlow, nor probably the leaders of the Communist Party, could have been convicted.

Social scientists have found that while the average American supports such principles as freedom of speech, press, religion, and freedom from racial discrimination, there is far less approval when one moves from these abstract concepts to concrete problems. Many Americans, like people elsewhere, are not very tolerant of groups they dislike. Herbert McCloskey and Alida Brill (1983) conducted a national opinion poll in the late '70s and found much greater support for dissent and disobedience among elite groups than among the mass public. They contend that elites are more libertarian than the masses because the norms of our political culture are libertarian and elites have learned these norms to a far greater extent than the masses. Elites have had more years of education in which they have been exposed to alternative modes of thought and conduct to an extent not found among the mass public.

If the mass public is generally less supportive of dissent and disobedience than elites, how do civil liberties survive? The answer may be that many people do not act on their beliefs. And those, such as office holders, who can act on their beliefs, are more likely to agree with libertarian norms. Also, while people are willing to deny *some* group the right to speak, there is disagreement over which group that should be. When there was widespread agreement, such as during the "red scare" of the late 1940s and early '50s, groups such as socialists and communists found themselves in some difficulty. Finally, judges act to protect civil liberties from attack. They are insulated from public opinion and see their role as protecting dissenting minorities (Wilson, 1989).

An example of the split between the mass public and the elite can be seen in the recent Supreme Court decision over the constitutional protection to be provided to those who burn the American flag. Ten years ago, McCloskey and Brill had posed the following question in their survey: "Should a person who in public burns or spits on the flag be fined or punished in some way?" 72 percent of the mass public believed such persons should be punished; 61 percent of the community leaders favored punishment, while only 50 percent of the legal elite responded affirmatively (1983).

Therefore, it was not surprising to find an outraged public reaction to the recent Supreme Court decision reversing the conviction of Gregory Lee Johnson for burning an American flag at a demonstration near the Republican National Convention in Dallas in 1984 (Johnson vs. Texas, 1989). Johnson had been charged with a crime "Desecration of a Venerated Object" and was convicted and sentenced to one year in prison and fined $2,000. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the majority declared: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

The minority on the Court saw the issue differently. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not view flag burning as speech. For him, "flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that... is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea but to antagonize others."

This case caused a surprising rift among conservative elites. Two of the most conservative members of the Court--Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy--joined with three liberal justices in voting to reverse Johnson's conviction. The next day, President Bush attacked the decision and urged Congress to propose a Constitutional amendment to override it. But this idea was vigorously opposed by such conservative columnists as George F. Will and James Jackson Kilpatrick. Also, when Congress began hearings on the proposed amendment, Charles Fried, a noted conservative law professor and former solicitor general of the United States under President Reagan, suggested to the congressional committee that it do nothing with regard to the decision--neither a Constitutional amendment as the President wished, nor a statute as the Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives had proposed.

These varied reactions indicate that elite status today may be a more important indicator of support for civil libertarian norms such as freedoms of speech and press than political ideology--i.e. whether one is liberal or conservative.

An even more controversial issue than the symbolic speech involved in flag burning is whether we should tolerate extremist speech. Should the intolerant be permitted to exercise freedom of speech? The prominent philosopher, Karl Popper, has noted that there is a "paradox of tolerance" which is that tolerance of the intolerant leads to intolerance. Popper's concern is that by permitting extremist groups to exercise freedom of speech, the mass public may be won over and bring about a government in which freedom of speech is absent. Popper believes this paradox can be resolved by limiting tolerance to the tolerant (Popper, 1966).

In Western Europe and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights there is agreement with Popper's view and the speech of racists is outlawed. But in the United States, the First Amendment has been interpreted to protect extremist speech. This is an unpopular position among the American public. McCloskey and Brill asked the following question in their opinion survey: "Should a community allow its civic auditorium to be used by... the American Nazi Party to preach race hatred against Jews and other minorities?" An overwhelming 89 percent of the mass public said no; 74 percent of the community leaders, but only 51 percent of the legal elite, also believed that Nazis should not be permitted to use public facilities to preach race hatred (1983).

This issue became a legal dispute when the American Nazi Party attempted to march in Skokie, Illinois. The reason Skokie was chosen as the site was because of the large number of survivors of Nazi concentration camps living there. The village of Skokie was ordered by the courts to permit the march (Collin v. Smith, 1978). In Western Europe such a march would have been prohibited. In the United States it was protected by the First Amendment. This case caused great divisiveness among liberals. The American Civil Liberties Union, which supported the right of the Nazis to march, lost 30,000 members and over $500,000 in contributions (Bollinger, 1986).

More recently, the split among liberals on the issue of offensive speech has taken place with regard to universities where there have been attempts to limit speech offensive to feminists, homosexuals, blacks, and other minorities. Many universities have established codes of conduct prohibiting behavior in academic settings which create an "intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment" for educational pursuits or extra-curricular activities (Finn, 1989). Such a policy at the University of Michigan was attacked by the American Civil Liberties Union on the ground that it violates rights to free speech. The ACLU of Michigan filed suit in court against the code and this led the University to suspend its provisions.

Should we permit extremist speech? One argument in its favor is that we are taught to be tolerant by permitting such speech (Bollinger). Also, if we prohibited racist speech it would create considerable difficulties for courts in separating protected from unprotected speech. This would lead to self-censorship among prospective speakers and the dangers of such inhibitions might well outweigh the benefits in prohibiting extremist speech.

Thus, in the United States we have opted for a very large degree of freedom of speech and press. The government may not prohibit dissenting views from being expressed--no matter how hateful such speech is to prevailing public opinion. But the fact that such speech is protected should not be taken to mean that large numbers of Americans avail themselves of this freedom. As Mark Twain put it: "It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have two unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech and conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them" (cited in Bollinger 1986).

The reason many American do not take advantage of all of our freedom is that they fear penalties other than fines or imprisonment. While we do not impose restrictions on speech we find offensive, there are many other coercive measures at our disposal such as dismissal from employment. Many political dissenters were blacklisted or lost their jobs during the "red scare" of the 1940s and 1950s. We also practice any number of forms of censure, ridicule, or harassment to express disapproval of views with which we disagree.

We are required by the First Amendment to tolerate extremist speech, but can we justify civil disobedience? By civil disobedience we mean "a public, nonviolent, and conscientious act contrary to law usually done with the intent to bring about a change in the policies or laws of government" (Rawls, 1968). Thus, nonpayment of taxes in private because one disapproves of defense spending is not a legitimate form of civil disobedience; it must be public. In addition, civil disobedience must rest on moral principles rather than self or group interest. Further, one must be willing to pay a penalty such as fine or imprisonment for one's actions. By doing so one is manifesting respect for legal procedures.

The classic form of civil disobedience requires that it be nonviolent. The strength behind it, according to Mahatma Gandhi, "lies in absolute adherence to the morality of the question"(1963). Thus, it is intended to address the majority's sense of justice and, therefore, is incompatible with violence. The question which has arisen recently is whether antiabortion protestors who interfere with the rights of women seeking abortions are actually practicing civil disobedience. Similarly, those who protest Central Intelligence Agency recruitment on the college campus in a way that prevents students from attending class raises the same question. It would seem that interfering with the rights of others is incompatible with acting civilly.

When is civil disobedience justified? The noted philosopher, John Rawls, has suggested four justifications for civil disobedience (1968). The first condition, occurs when normal political appeals to the majority have been made and rejected. Hence, civil disobedience must be undertaken only as a last resort when there has been a failure of the democratic process. There has been a grave injustice and the majority refuses to correct it.

The second condition, which is closely related to the first, is that civil disobedience must be directly related to substantial and clear violations of justice and especially those injustices which, if rectified, will lead to the abolition of other injustices. For example, if a majority denied a minority the right to vote and participate in the political system, this would be such a violation of the principles of equal opportunity that civil disobedience would be clearly justified.

Thirdly, those who practice civil disobedience must be willing to affirm that everyone else who experiences a sense of injustice has the right to dissent in a similar way and accept similar consequences.

Finally, there is the question of prudence. Civil disobedience should be used only if one believes that it will do more good than harm. It should not be used for "ego massage" while provoking the majority to greater repression of those one wishes to help.

As a society, we have become increasingly tolerant of minor forms of civil disobedience and often those who practice it are not punished at all or are given a minor penalty.

In the past few decades we have become far more tolerant of dissent and disobedience. This is in part due to the increasing numbers of Americans who have had some higher education. The highly educated in our society in recent years have been the most tolerant of dissent and disobedience. Some critics, like Allan Bloom, bemoan the fact that tolerance has become our primary virtue (1987). Conservative critics argue that such tolerance goes along with a decline in authority in our society (Morgan 1984). They point out that courts have been handing down decisions reducing educator control over students (Wynne, 1981), wardens over prisoners, and government officials over citizens. Hence, an increase in freedom has been accompanied by a decrease in authority. Conservatives are alarmed and wish to reassert the authority of an earlier age (Bloom, 1987). Liberals are encouraged by these developments and hope to see them continue. However, one views these issues, there is little doubt of the trade-off required between greater freedom and increasing disrespect for authority.

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Morris Rothblatt teaches political science at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

Who's the Boss in Your Culture?

Benjamin Drew

Women have been defined in many ways, but always in terms of the attitudes of their societies toward them and the values assigned to them. What a woman is and what is expected of her in any society, depends on this cultural definition. Personality traits may also be associated with gender roles and they too vary according to the cultural definition. For example, upper class women of the Victorian period were defined as maternal, gentle, and nurturing, a definition that is still current in many subcultures in Western society. However, modern feminists define women as strong, vigorous, and ranging from assertive to aggressive.

Despite great diversity in the cultural definition of what is, or is not feminine, there appear to be some universal regularities that exist in the assignment of gender roles. Universally, women's primary roles are determined by the structure of the family, and consequently, their activities are related to domestic life. Since power and authority are conferred in public life and public life is the concern of men, it is men's activities, interests, and attitudes that tend to dominate the values of every society (Hammond and Jablow, 1976). Women appear to be placed almost automatically in subordinate roles. It is quite true that in all societies there are women who may be powerful because of personality factors or because of whom they marry or even because of the powerful and/or authoritative role that their fathers might have in that society. Even the strong minded woman who simply will not be subservient, or the bad-tempered shrew who henpecks her husband, will occasionally rise to wield power in any group. But, though some may be powerful, relatively few women have authority and that authority is restricted to the domestic or private sphere. In any event, any woman may have some degree of power commensurate with the network of people with whom she has influence. It is the social organization of the society that determines and regulates the network of relationships a woman can build (Kessler, 1976).

The exclusion of women from participation in public life in most societies has always been explained away, or rationalized as being so, because women are perceived to be less competent, too emotional, or a source of danger and pollution; a belief that is almost universal (Hammond and Jablow, 1976). The female body and its natural effluvia have always been considered dangerous and, consequently, threatening to the well-being of communities in general and to men in particular (Read, 1954). A broad range of taboos and sanctions have arisen in societies all over the world to warn men of the danger of contact with women and these have served to exclude women from most of the culturally valued activities of the society, particularly those that confer power and authority. The wide-spread idea that contact with women is in some way defiling, has frequently resulted in religious approval of and support for their subordinate positions. Because women are considered unclean and profane, they are therefore considered appropriately subordinate to men.

At least for the last 6,000 years, or for what constitutes recorded history, women's primary roles have been family oriented. The domestic sphere of family life has generally become the world with which the woman has become most familiar and the one in which she was considered by both men and women to be fully competent and comfortable (Kessler, 1976). Almost everywhere in the world, the training of young girls emphasizes the development and mastery of domestic skills. They are usually not permitted to explore, experiment, or even play as freely as their brothers or other males. Very early in their lives, they are channeled into a rather narrow, limited set of activities that prepare them for the only career open to them; prospective wives and mothers, and society defines what a good daughter, a good wife, and a good mother should be. Women are never in control of social life or public authority even in matrilineal societies. Most matrilineal societies are patrilocal. One outstanding exception that has survived into the twentieth century was that of the Nayars of India but even there, all authority rested in the hands of the eldest male of the clan who exercised all the authority (Gough, 1959).

Events in nineteenth century France demonstrated that women could exercise power and rule indirectly under strong men, as well as directly in the absence of strong men, not through legally delegated authority, but by using their feminine wiles. Charles VII had many "left-handed queens" as they were known, and several of these women exerted their influence right up to and through the reign of Henry IV. When he died, female regencies took over until the reign of Louis XIV when royal mistresses or "left-handed queens" reappeared in the royal court. Throughout the nineteenth century, Frenchmen were susceptible to feminine lures and wiles and the influence and power of women remained quietly strong right through the twentieth century (de Riencourt, 1974).

Although the "behind the scenes" activities of women have generally gone unrecognized, there are data that suggest that women do, in fact, exert informal power in various ways. The well known "left-handed queens" of the French royal court have already been mentioned. In traditional societies, such as Mexican villages, for example, women have an indirect impact on events through influence on their close male relatives (husbands, sons, etc.). Despite their subordinate positions, wives can, and do, resort to time honored ingratiation, techniques of wheedling, charming, and manipulating or making their husbands thoroughly miserable by nagging, sulking, or burning what they are cooking. If nothing is successful, a wife may run "home" to the household of her mother and father. The chaos created by her temporary absence from her own household may help to make her point (Chinas, 1973). Among the Burundi of Africa, if a wife is angry or resentful about something, she may simply refuse to cook. Allport in his classic book, *The nature of prejudice* (1954) delineates some of the best known passive aggressive strategies, headaches being a contemporary ploy.

In the United States, the successful campaign for women's suffrage posed a threat to masculine authority that made many an old time politician fearful of dealing with a new female voting bloc. However, the fear subsided when it became obvious that female voting was, to a large degree, an extension of the male vote. Even as late as the late 1940's, reliable polls indicated that less than five percent of wives voted independently of their husbands. There also seemed to be a strong reluctance for women to vote other women into office. Although many women are influential at the local level, they are rarely influential at the national level in any country, except where they have inherited (as widows or daughters) the political influence or the political position of their former husbands or fathers (de Riencourt, 1974).

The power and authority that has long eluded women in many societies may finally become a reality (albeit a minor one) inching their way through economic changes in subsistence patterns around the world. In many West African, as well as some South African tribes, young men and boys no longer hunt and engage in warring activities as they did in the past. They now clear ground in preparation for women to plant, sow, weed, and harvest cash crops. Most of the crops that a man's wife raises are needed to support her family, but she can do as she pleases with any surplus (Boserup, 1970). The Yoruba of Ghana, as well as the Swazi and Igbo, produce sufficient surplus to sell in the market. Since women are allowed to keep the money they earn from selling surplus crops, they can acquire a good deal of wealth in this way. This "wealth," accumulated by some 70 percent of adult women in tribes throughout West Africa who engage in market activities, has been translated into some considerable power in these otherwise, male-oriented societies (Boserup, 1970). Since land is tribally owned and distributed, a man with several wives can put more acreage under cultivation and this ability adds to his wealth and prestige. More important for this discussion, the marketing activities bring women into contact with other women and, as a group, they can, and do, wield considerable power by concerted action. Furthermore, in a polygynous society, a wife who chooses to can, and does, influence her husband's choice of future wives by agreeing to contribute to their bride price. In this way, she has important input and influence in choosing only compatible co-wives. Since she may also contribute to the bride price for her son's future wife, the actual choice of a bride for her husband or her son will be hers rather than one her husband might choose for his own personal or political reasons (Boserup, 1970). Nupe women of Nigeria have had access to the outside world through marketing activities and, as they traveled far from home, they learned about such things as contraceptives and even had opportunities for illicit sex (Nadel, 1952). With compatible and competent co-wives to rely on for child care, a woman could expand her marketing activities to include non-agricultural products and thus become a business woman who buys and sells goods and comes in contact with all sorts of strangers of both sexes. Her role in the economic system of her society brings a woman considerable status, freedom, and power. She is important to her own family because her marriage brings them bride-wealth and she is valuable to her husband because she may represent a significant amount of goods or money, which brings him high status and importance (Kessler, 1976). Chinas (1973) found that Zapotec women of Mexico also have considerable power and are highly respected as a result of their marketing activities. But, although they do have power, they have no authority. They themselves regard the likelihood of a woman becoming a member of local government as ridiculous an idea as the possibility of a woman becoming a priest (Chinas, 1973).

Women who create a necessary commodity for their particular society may also achieve power and status. Butter is not only an important part of the diet for nomadic pastoralists of Tibet, but it is also used as the measure of price in weight units (Ekvall, 1968). The value of commodities, and even currency, is quoted in units of butter. Even when unfit for human consumption, it is used to soften hides and sheepskins used for clothing. Butter is the preferred gift in the gift exchange system and it is the preferred offering in religious observances because it fuels the millions of butter-lamps in shrines. In Tibet, one of a man's wives becomes the "tent mistress," and she, (and only she), can make butter. These women are in a position of power. They play an active and important part in business transactions and are consulted before herd animals are sold. They are not secluded nor compelled to observe any particular behavior patterns in the presence of outsiders (Ekvall, 1968). Among the Bemba of Zambia in Africa, beer-making has comparable economic importance to women, in terms of status, prestige, and power (Kessler, 1976).

In modern, technological societies, the "need" to keep ahead of creeping and, at times, galloping inflation and the "need" to maintain a decent standard of living under these circumstances, often necessitates the accumulation of homes, goods, and appliances that reflect a "decent" standard of living. This encourages and sometimes compels many women to become the other half of the two wage-earner family. This pattern is true not only in the United States and in Europe, but also has recently been reported in the Wall Street Journal (August, 1989) as a new development among families in Japan. Along with this change from the traditional role of wife, mother, and housekeeper has come a new respect and new power for the economic advantages that the second wage-earner has to offer her family, in particular, and society, in general, in terms of increased purchasing power, among other things. There has even been an increase in the number of positions of authority available to women.

It is safe to say that women who contribute to and participate in the production of wealth, in societies that tend to measure individuals in terms of their contributions, can achieve higher status, greater power, and even opportunities to fill positions in the social, political, and business arenas, that carry with them the exercise of real authority.

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Benjamin Drew is Professor of Anthropology at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

Critical Thinking Theory

Critical thinking theorists have drawn from both Philosophy and Psychology as the basis for both the issues developed and the style af analysis and argument through which issues are conceptualized and addressed. In this section both sorts of presentations are offered, displaying the contrasting yet complementary perspectives that these essential disciplines play in supporting critical thinking theory and recommendations for practice.

Barry Curtis, in Wittgenstein *and Critical Thinking,* addresses the central role of dialogue in critical thinking. Theories of dialogical reason have been at the center of critical thinking since its inception, such theories have had an enormous influence on critical thinking practice which is as frequently as not seen as centered in classroom discussion. Curtis, in developing a rationale for the role of dialogue sees the pedagogy of critical thinking "closely tied to the philosophy of mind." Despite the centrality of dialogue, Curtis sees Cartesian assumptions affecting "mainstream critical thinking pedagogy (which) tends to be individualistic and inwardly directed, using exercises and activities designed to be carried out either "in one's head" or with pencil and paper, outside the context of group discussion."

Curtis presents an alternative to this "mainstream" view, which draws from Wittgenstein's notion of language game where "discussion, dialogue and debate, on this model, are among the basic paradigms from which children learn to reason, as well as to speak." Seeing critical thinking as fundamentally a social activity, Curtis draw implications for critical thinking pedagogy, " For if it is primarily through discussion that children naturally learn to reason and to think critically, then the method of discussion deserves top priority in the pedagogy of critical thinking."

David Kennedy, drawing on the work of Gadamer has similar concerns, but develops them through a contrasting philosophical perspective. In his *Critical Thinking, the Community of Inquiry, and the Unteachable Knowledge: Gadamer's Dialectic of Dialogue, Kennedy* sees the notion of "universal logos" as represented in the ancient Greeks, Hegel and Heidegger, as supporting a common consciousness that, as the basis for the community of inquiry which offers "the setting for the dialectical emergence of rationality, not from the analytic, predicative, subjectivity of self-consciousness, but in the dialogical structure of language, through whose play truth (in the sense of Heidegger's aletheia) emerges."

Kennedy explores the dialectic of dialogue seen as the "fusion of horizons of the members of the community of inquiry, the multiplicity of unfinished and partial interpretations are carried toward the unity of full understanding;" the discipline of dialogue in which " each member of the community of inquiry submits to the dynamic of listening and responding through which the play of question and answer makes its claim upon him or her; and the ethical dimension of dialogue, resulting in *phronesis* or practical wisdom whose outcome is "an entirely new kind of education, in which the concern is "not so much with learning something as with turning the whole soul around."

Both of the philosophers just introduced see the locus of critical thinking to by the community and the method to be dialogue. Psychologists, by contrast, look more closely at the individual cognitive processes that underlie critical thinking. Edith D. Neimark, in *Critical Thinking as the Cognitive Psychologist Approaches It,* boldly states a strong version of the cognitive science agenda: ""Contemporary cognitive psychologists view the mind as a machine." The machine metaphor and its reliance on information processing models is presented as a useful basis for an essentially pragmatic focus for critical thinking theory. Her concern is "how the cognitive approach leads to identification of reasoning mechanisms and the conditions under which they go astray."

Neimark contrast descriptive and normative approaches to cognitive functioning and then presents a image of how cognitive processing works, drawing on the analysis of deductive reasoning the relies on "models or theories" that direct computational processes. She concludes that we might well help, "help students to become aware of what they are in fact doing so that they compare it with the prescriptions of the normative model, or, perhaps devise a new model that might work successfully with already mastered calculational procedures."

Psychologists have also developed theoretic analysis based on the understanding of brain functioning. Ira Finkel, in *A New Vision of the Synergistic Reality of Critical Thinking And Creative Problem Solving that Is Whole Brain Compatible: Confronting the Roadblocks - Developing a Different Model*, sees recent models of the brain reflected in Growth Motivation Theory as providing "a key to understanding attitudes and behavior that jam the brakes on critical thinking."

Such a model enables students to "overcome apathy, complacency, laxity, mediocrity," through a partnership between critical and creative thinking that actively engaged "both brain hemispheres." Finkel calls for a "new vision of the reality of critical thinking and creative problem solving" one that moves us "toward a holistic brain compatible paradigm and away from the traditional reductionist mechanistic view."

Both philosophical and psychological theoretical models have been developed with the aim of clarifying practice within and across the disciplines. William E. Murnion, in *The Structure of Critical Thinking Implicit in the Division of the Curriculum into Disciplines* , draws upon Aristotle to identify four basic questions that underlie "both the unity and the differentiation of a curriculum." The focus on one of these four distinguishes four main disciplinary types: technology and the sciences; criticism and mathematics; history and philosophy; and ethics and foundations (or metaphilosophy). Underlying this multiplicity of perspective is the unity provided by the analysis. Murnion argues "just as the structure of questioning unfolds into the multiplicity of the disciplines, so also do the disciplines cohere through the structure of questioning into a single curriculum."

A psychological perspective on the curriculum is offered by Wayne Rambo, in *Developing Critical Thinking Skills: A Differentiation Between Consumptive and Productive Cognitive Behaviors*, who takes as his concern the work of Benjamin Bloom. Rambo sees Bloom as committed to the assumption that "the most important aspects of cognition are consumptive, replicative, associative, and interpretative, and that consumptive cognition is in itself the primary end of education." What he attempts to show is that "the productive behaviors of critical thinking are significantly more complex than the consumptive behaviors of critical evaluating.

He offers "an expanded taxonomy of educational objectives to include both consumptive and productive cognitive behaviors," arguing that in order to "organize and sequence instruction in critical thinking content," educational taxonomies must include "both the consumptive and the productive behaviors of critical thinking."

A perennial concern of philosophers has been the analysis of reasoning and argument underlying critical thinking. This concern has often been associated with informal logic which attempts to broaden the characterization of reasoning strategies to include concepts and rules that transcend formal logical analysis. The last two papers in this section are attempts at such foundational accounts of argument strategies.

Bertram Bandman turns to Wittgenstein in his paper, *The Role of "Stand-Fast" Propositions for Judging Religious Beliefs*. Focusing on religious thought Bandman tries to show how "Wittgenstein uses "stand-fast" propositions as ordinary criteria of critical thinking to examine extraordinary religious beliefs." Distinguishing between "inner processes" and "outward criteria," stand-fast propositions are identified as "river-bed thoughts, scaffoldings, bedrock propositions, hinges, axis."

Bandman proposes to use this discussion to show how Wittgenstein uses such propositions in order to suggest "criteria of critical thinking for judging religious beliefs." The analysis of these basic propositions to reasoning offers an framework against which critical thinking occurs while limiting the extent to which criticism applies

Gordon E. Whitney, in his paper *The Use of Analogy in Legal Reasoning: A Form of General Problem Solving Skill*, attempts to first "evaluate the use of analogy in the reasoning process used in arriving at legal decisions," and then to "show that this method has value as a general problem solving skill."

Whitney develops two distinct forms of analogy in legal reasoning: precedent from "Case Law"; and doctrine from "Statutory Law." Using examples from Rabbinic rulings, classical Roman jurists and U.S. Supreme Court cases, Whitney generates an applies "a schema and method for analogical arguments." The particular arguments, seen against the general account offers insight into the central role of analogical arguments in supporting critical inquiry.

Wittgenstein and Critical Thinking

Barry Curtis

The pedagogy of critical thinking is closely tied to the philosophy of mind. Our ideas about the nature of thinking and reasoning have everything to do with our views about how these activities should be encouraged or taught. Traditional philosophies of mind stemming from Descartes treat reasoning as an internal process--something carried out by each individual in the privacy of his own mind. In harmony with this view, mainstream critical thinking pedagogy tends to be individualistic and inwardly directed, using exercises and activities designed to be carried out either "in one's head" or with pencil and paper, outside the context of group discussion.

Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind provides an alternative to the traditional philosophical model of thinking, and hence to much of mainstream pedagogy. Thinking, on Wittgenstein's view, has its natural home in a *language-game*--a rule-governed social practice involving the use of words or symbols. Discussion, dialogue and debate, on this model, are among the basic paradigms from which children learn to reason, as well as to speak. Critical thinking, on this view, is fundamentally a social activity. Reasoning or critical thinking "in one's head" is parasitic on this more basic public process.

This model of thinking and reasoning has important implications for the pedagogy of critical thinking. Above all, it suggests greater emphasis on the use of discussion in the teaching of reasoning skills. For if it is primarily through discussion that children naturally learn to reason and to think critically, then the method of discussion deserves top priority in the pedagogy of critical thinking.

Language-Games

Wittgenstein introduces the notion of a language-game by means of an example involving a builder and his assistant. The builder calls out the names of building stones ("Block!", "Pillar!", "Slab!", "Beam!") and the assistant fetches the stones when he hears the names. Such an activity, "consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven," is a language-game. He calls such activities "games" not to trivialize them or make fun of them but, as he puts it, to "bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI, 23). It is by means of such activities, he says, that children learn their native language (PI, 7), and it is out of such primitive language-games that the rest of our language is constructed (PI, 18). While Wittgenstein's paradigm involves commanding and obeying there are many other possibilities, including "questioning, recounting, chatting," which, Wittgenstein says, "are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (PI, 25).

If anything is clear from the rest of what Wittgenstein says about language and language-games, it is that a language-game must have rules. Such rules need not be strict rules (BB, p. 25; PI, 100), nor do they have to be taught explicitly--they need only be taught by example and learned through practice (PI, 31, 208). But there must at least be some identifiable circumstances in which it is correct or incorrect for a word to be used in a particular way. Otherwise the use of a given sound or mark is not a use of language. (This is the heart of the "private language argument" (PI 243-293), but Wittgenstein also emphasizes this same point elsewhere--PI 207, p. 147n.; Z, 118). These rules are what Wittgenstein calls "grammar" (PI, 496-497; 664).

The grammar of the language-game of the builder and his assistant is very simple. The rules are straightforward, and the number of possible "moves" in this game is very small. The same is true of Wittgenstein's other examples--all of which are meant to illustrate "a language more primitive than ours" (PI, 2). But Wittgenstein clearly intended these "primitive" examples to serve as models for more complex cases--ones involving complex rules and multiple "moves." One such case is what I will call the language-game of discussion.

The Language-Game of Discussion

By discussion, I mean something more than "chatting" (an example which Wittgenstein himself mentions elsewhere--PI, 25). Unlike a chat, a discussion is usually about something important. It also has a *point* (PI, 564)--i.e., to understand a problem or to resolve an issue. The number of possible moves in the language-game of discussion is large and probably open-ended, and the rules for a given move are almost always subtle and complex. Comparing the language-game of discussion to the language-game of commanding and obeying is a little like comparing chess with tic tac toe. There are enormous differences as well as underlying similarities. One of the similarities is the existence of "moves"--rule-governed activities which define the practice. Among the possible moves in the discussion-game are these:

taking a position--
asking for reasons; and giving them--
calling reasons into question--
giving reasons for one's reasons--
questioning assumptions--
pointing out implications--
criticizing, e.g., by use of counter-examples
    or *reductios*--
defending one's position against criticism--
acknowledging criticism and modifying or
    withdrawing from one's position--
assenting to or dissenting from someone
    else's view--
proposing alternative views.

This is not intended to be an exhaustive list. Many other moves--and variations on these moves--are possible, and new moves may always be introduced as a discussion goes along, or as the practice of discussion itself progresses and changes over long periods of time.

The Socratic dialogue is one paradigm of what I am calling the "language-game of discussion," but not the only one. For a conversation need not be philosophical to qualify as a discussion in my sense. PTA meetings to discuss school policy, sales conferences to discuss marketing strategy, conversations among friends about sports or sex or money--all qualify as discussions in my sense so long as they are serious and include at least some of the "moves" mentioned above. The topic need not be one of peculiarly philosophical interest, such as the good, the true or the beautiful.

Nor does discussion, in the sense I mean it, always have to take exactly the same form. There may be considerable variation among people of different cultures, interests and temperaments or at different times in history. The rules, e.g., for a scriptural discussion among Tibetan monks may differ significantly from the rules which govern a post-game discussion among American sports fans. But so long as the conversation contains at least some of the items I mentioned earlier on my list of "moves" in the language-game of discussion, then it will qualify as a discussion in my sense. It need not contain them all.

Discussion and Critical Thinking

What does the language-game of discussion have to do with critical thinking? If Wittgenstein is right, the answer is "everything." For critical thinking *just is* the disposition to make the "moves" I have mentioned, either in conversation with others, or in the solitude of one's own mind. Consider once again what these "moves" consist in: giving reasons, questioning assumptions, pointing out implications...and so on. Everything we want students to learn to do in order to become critical thinkers is contained in this list--and if it isn't, the list can be expanded to include it, and the result will still be a list of "moves" in the language-game of discussion. For being a critical thinker and being a master of the rules of discussion are one and the same thing. Moreover, as I read Wittgenstein, the public activity of discussion is both logically and pedagogically prior to the solitary activity of thinking things out "in one's head." Our mistake--a *philosophical* mistake--was to see discussion as a byproduct, an epiphenomenon, of critical thinking. This is a good example of what might be called "putting the cart before the horse" in philosophy.

The Argument

My argument takes the form of a *reductio*, and resembles the Wittgenstein's "private language" argument in the *Philosophical Investigations* (243-293). If critical thinking were fundamentally a "private" mental process, then it should be possible to imagine a tribe where there is no public practice of discussion but where individuals nevertheless engage in critical thinking "in the privacy of their own minds." If the Cartesian picture of thinking is the right one, then there shouldn't be any problem with this, should there? *Ex hypothesi*, people should be able to do all the things we normally think of as examples of "critical thinking"--take positions, give reasons, question assumptions, criticize ideas and so on--*by themselves*, without recourse to any public practice.

One difficulty that comes to mind is that some of the activities involved in critical thinking appear to be definitionally related to the public process of discussion. "Taking a position," for example, presupposes a setting in which contrasting positions are possible; "giving reasons" implies the existence of someone to give them to, and so on. Strictly speaking, then, these activities can't be carried out "in private." But perhaps this difficulty can be overcome by the substitution of some more "neutral" terminology--e.g., "adopting a view," or "avowing reasons."

Still, a graver difficulty remains. For if someone were to try to carry out the activity of critical thinking "privately," without appeal to the rules of our public language, he would have no independent criterion for when a given "move" in his thinking was correct or incorrect. He would, in this sense, be "flying blind" in empty space. Anything that seemed to him to be correct would be correct. Whatever seemed like a counter-example would be a counter-example. Anything that seemed like a reason would be a reason. He could constantly change his mind or forget what he thought a moment ago, and yet his reasoning would be beyond dispute.

But is it right to call such an activity "reasoning"? No, for reasoning is a normative process. For an activity to qualify as reasoning, or critical thinking, it must at least be capable of being done correctly or incorrectly. There must be a set of standards independent of the reasoner for what counts as a correct or incorrect step. But no such standards are possible in the case of "private reasoning." For here there is no court of appeal outside the mind of the thinker for deciding what is correct or incorrect. This "private reasoning," whatever it is, is not the rule-governed process we ordinarily mean by "reasoning." If anything, it would be like the "reasoning" that sometimes happens in a dream--a line of thought that seems right at the time to the dreamer, but turns out to be crazy when we wake up. But even this analogy fails. For in the case of "private reasoning," there would be no "waking up"--no independent criterion by which we could discover the craziness of our thinking.

Conclusion

The conclusion is that the public language-game of discussion is logically prior to the individual mental activity of reasoning or critical thinking. The kind of reasoning we do "in our heads" or with pencil and paper is logically parasitic on the public practice of taking positions, giving reasons, raising objections and so on. Thus, the best picture of reasoning is not Rodin's *The Thinker*--where a man sits alone, chin in hand, staring into the middle distance. For such a man might be doing anything--or nothing--"in his head." A much better picture would be Reginald Rose's TV play and movie, *Twelve Angry Men*--where a jury deliberates over a verdict and displays all the moves of critical rationality right out in the open. (Yes, people can be angry and reason with each other at the same time.) If you want to know what critical thinking is, one might say, go and watch a serious discussion like this one. Better yet, join in.

There is a pedagogical message here. If people must be acquainted with the rules of the language-game of discussion in order to engage in the practice critical thinking, then any meaningful program in critical thinking must include discussion as an integral part. *Pace* deBono and others who wish to minimize the use of discussion in critical thinking programs (*CoRT III Teachers Notes*, 1975, p. 21; 1976, p. 176), discussion should be actively encouraged. Indeed, discussion should be seen as the *point* of our mental and paper-and-pencil exercises, and not the other way around.

If, as I have argued, the rules of discussion are the rules of critical thinking, then students should not only be exposed to the practice of discussion, but immersed in it, in its richest and purest form. That means encouraging students to play this language-game in the classroom with their peers, and not just with their teacher. It also means encouraging the use of all the rules of the game, or as many rules as possible, instead of focusing solely on the "simplest" moves, such as stating a position or giving reasons. (Even very small children--second graders--will employ such "sophisticated" moves as the *reductio ad absurdum* without prompting if given the opportunity to do so, and will continue to make such moves appropriately, if encouraged.)

Most important, perhaps, is the encouragement of an attitude of respect among students for the language-game of discussion itself. Mere facility with its "moves" isn't enough. For only if students respect the practice will they turn to it outside the classroom for guidance in thought and interaction. The only way to teach respect is to show respect, and that means recognizing, in practice, the intrinsic value of discussion both in the classroom and out of it.

As it is, students--especially children--are largely shut out from the language-game of discussion. As a result, they never really learn its rules. So their thinking takes place in a "semi-private" realm, only partially conditioned by the rules of our public language. In this realm, the difference between "correct" and "incorrect" is understood only vaguely, if at all. Much of what passes for "thinking" here is therefore like the "thinking" in a dream: illogical, incoherent, confused. But these sleepers can awaken. And if my reading of Wittgenstein is right, discussion is a necessary means to wake them up.

Endnotes

1. Wittgenstein's works are cited according to the following scheme of abbreviation. Numbers refer to the numbered "Remarks" in the text except where a page reference is indicated.

PI: *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970).

Z: *Zettel* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1967).

BB: *The Blue and Brown Books* (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1964).

Barry Curtis teaches philosophy at the University of Hawaii at Hilo.

Critical Thinking, the Community of Inquiry and the Unteachable Knowledge: Gadamer's Dialectic of Dialogue

David Kennedy

The idea of a community of inquiry represents a gathering of modern trends of thought in a move beyond constructivism in a theory of knowledge. By this I mean a move beyond both the individual constructivism of the Piagetian sort, *and* social construction of knowledge, at least of the sort which is generally understood by that term. A move beyond does not deny either of these terms, but rather posits a third. I want to suggest that this third is a form of knowledge which can only be arrived at through a dialectical process of collective dialogue and inquiry and that it is not invented, but discovered. And I want to explore this third kind of knowledge in the context of Hans-Georg Gadamer's work on dialogue and hermeneutics.

The commonality of all understanding

Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics is a theory of dialogue. For him, the hermeneutical stance is inherently dialogical and dialectical. It is dialogical because it demands a moment of negativity, or self-lessness before the point of view of another, indicated by a willingness to place one's own point of view at risk in the interests of the truth. It is dialectical because it follows a pattern in which something unexpected and yet recognizable as true emerges from that moment. Both of those moments--of negativity and of emergence--may be included in the one well-known term from his work, "fusion of horizons."

Those who know Gadamer only through his somewhat inaccessible metatheoretical book *Truth and Method* (1975), can find him actually doing what he talks about doing in that book in his work on Hegel, Plato, and Aristotle. In these works-- *Dialogue and Dialectic* (DD), *Hegel's Dialectic* (HD), and *The Idea of the Good in Plato and Aristotle* (IGPAP)--as well as in his *Reason in the Age of Science* (RIAS), and *The Relevance of the Beautiful* (RB) he demonstrates the fusion of horizons with texts that have become strange, and their reappropriation through dialogue. What I want to do in this paper is to show how what Gadamer reappropriates from Hegel and the ancient Greeks, respectively, can play a key role in our understanding of the kind of thinking that goes on in the operation of the community of inquiry. Specifically, I want to claim that the epistemological event of the community of inquiry is a paradigmatic example of what he calls the "structure of dialogue."

Gadamer actually reappropriates the thought of the ancient Greeks through Hegel and Heidegger. From Hegel he takes a particularly strong interest in an immanent dialectic at work in the world; from Heidegger, an idea of truth as openness to view, a self-revealing of being, and a new epistemological and ontological appreciation of language. It is through his dialogue with both of these thinkers that he comes to reclaim the ancient Greek *logos* philosophy, the idea of a reason in nature, which is hidden from view, and which plays itself out, is revealed in time and its processes. This reclamation of a universal *logos* is grounded, however, rather than in a divine, all pervasive *nous* (although such a thing is certainly not ruled out in Gadamer's work--rather it is simply not taken up explicitly), in the commonality of all understanding which is intrinsic to its grounding in language. That is, language itself is the event structure in which and through which rationality emerges, and truth reveals itself.

Gadamer, following and building upon Heidegger, recognizes language as, not just a sign system, a referral tool or even merely a communications system, but the medium in which consciousness and world are joined, or the essential modality of the self-presentation of being, in which "that which is assumes its form for us" (IGPAP 3). He also makes us see that language is communal through and through--that "we are continually shaping a common perspective when we speak a common language and so are active participants in the communality of our experience of the world" (RIAS 110). It follows then, that implicit in Gadamer's notion of language is "the overcoming and surpassing of the subjective spirit, of the individual consciousness, in the direction of common consciousness" (RIAS 33). It is no longer in the "subjectivity of self-consciousness" (HD 12) that we find the ground of knowledge, but in our participation in its self-constitution through conversation. Truth can no longer be thought of as predicative, analytically derived, or as something that can be known apart from its expression in language. Truth emerges in the *play* of language, the back and forth, the structure of question and answer of language, that is to say, dialogue.

This allows us to see dialogue as an ontological form of thinking. The kind of thinking that occurs in dialogue, and the kind of knowledge that emerges from it, can emerge in no other way. Gadamer goes as far as to say, "a single idea by itself is not knowable at all. . . . In any insight an entire nexus or web of ideas is involved." (DD 119) And in another essay he adds "the *logos* always requires that one idea be 'there' together with another. Insight into one idea per se does not yet consitute knowledge. Only when the idea is 'alluded' to in respect to another does it display itself *as* something."(DD 152). [1]

Travelling apart toward unity

The truth which emerges through dialogue is an *ever*-emerging and never finished rationality. "The labor of dialectic, in which the truth of what is finally flashes upon us, is by nature unending and infinite." (DD 121) In dialogue we are always *beginning* to grasp reason (*logos*) in nature, and to see in nature and history "the realizations of one and the same 'reason'." Nor is this by any means an automatic emergence and grasp; it does not come about through the Hegelian movement of immanent Reason in History, but in the risky, contingent, historical, intersubjective context of the human drive to bring things to a commonality of understanding, and the progressive, forever incomplete emergence of reason--and as we shall see, therefore justice--from that event. Through the fusion of horizons of the members of the community of inquiry, the multiplicity of unfinished and partial interpretations are carried toward the unity of full understanding. (Bontekoe, 1987)

Gadamer is quite clear about the fact that full understanding is an "infinite task." He emphasizes over and over again the reality of human finitude, of what he calls "the incompleteness characteristic of all human thinking" (DD 153), which makes systematization an impossibility. He insists that "a simultaneous positing and being present of *all* relationships is fundamentally impossible" (DD 154). Where there is something, there is (not) present an is not (DD 153), and this essential element of necessary partiality, indeterminacy, indefiniteness, concealment, incompleteness and paradox pervades everything. Thus dialogue is not a method so much as what Aristotle called a *hexis*, a way of being, or disposition. As Ambrosio (1987) has so succinctly put it in his paper "Gadamer, Plato, and the Discipline of Dialogue," (GPDD) "Method is but the image at the level of reflection of a prereflective discipline operative at the level of existence and freedom" (31).

This "prereflective discipline" which is the movement of the community of inquiry does not have the character of having begun anywhere, or of finishing anywhere. The occasion for dialogue--what gets and keeps the conversation going--is in fact an *aporia*, an insoluble question intrinsic to existence itself. We are, Gadamer says, responding to questions that "come from beyond ourselves."

> . . . there is hidden in the speculative utterance an *aporia* which is to be taken seriously. It is the irresolvable contradiction of the one and the many which, in spite of the problem it confronts us with, is a rich source of advancement in our knowledge of things. (HD 26)

The inherent contradictions in which reason entangles itself through its expression in language, "force" or "summon" us to thinking. They move us to "compel one another to get clear about what is right and to put up an argument" (DD 114). The way out of these contradictions is the way through--through undergoing the fundamental moment of negativity which they pose to our understanding, in the discipline of questioning and searching. Through the self-unfolding of the subject matter in the logic of question and answer, dialogue calls forth a knowledge which is always partial, but necessarily implies a whole knowledge.

The dialogue is actually a form of suffering--the *pathos tou logou*, or "suffering of the word" (HD 24). Gadamer characterizes it as a "travelling apart towards unity." The experience--the *pathos*--of the dialectic always bears a negative element, a necessity that one be refuted in order to learn what one does not know. The *dia* of both words--dialogue and dialectic-- stands for the process of differentiation, of a going through in which there is implicit a taking things assunder (IGPAP 98). It is specifically, Gadamer says, Eleatic, in that it is "the skill of developing the consequences of opposed assumptions even while one is still ignorant of the *ti estin*, the 'what' of what one is talking about" (DD 94). Its logical structure is simultaneously *synopsis* (seeing things as together) and *diahairesis* (division, differentiation) (IGPAP 59). According to the logical differences inherent in the structure of the subject matter, one thing is marked off from another, and we experience "the removal of the things meant from everything which is not meant" (HD 26; IGPAP 98). Some of what is contained in each perspective is confirmed, while some is cast into doubt (RIAS 15). In the dialectic of dialogue, each member of the community of inquiry submits to the dynamic of listening and responding through which the play of question and answer makes its claim upon him or her (GPDD 31). This involves placing our preconceptions, our own horizon of meaning, at risk. (RIAS 15) Gadamer insists that only in dialogue--with oneself or with others--can one get beyond the "mere prejudices of prevailing conventions," and through all differentiations until an understanding is reached with others as well as oneself (IGPAP 98). Nor can we make deductions in advance about the truth which will emerge from the play of question and answer.

The exigence toward the good

We do know of this truth at least that it will be personal and therefore of ultimate concern. To think that it would be merely "information" (whatever that is) is naive. This truth is not something already given, which we are merely disintering, like archeologists, or determining in its substantial outlines like scientists or metaphysicians; nor is it whatever we want it to be. Truth, in the Heideggerian sense of "openness to view," is, in Gadamer's reappropriation of Plato, one of the three structural components (with beauty and symmetry) of the "beautiful mixture" which he calls "the good." (IGPAP, 115)

The implicit direction of all thought, its "exigence," is toward the good. This is because it is towards unity, or the one, and "the good can simply be called the one, and the one the good" (IGPAP, 31). Gadamer defines the one as "that which on any given occasion provides what is multiple with the unity of whatever consists in itself." True dialogue is a risky, often agonistic, emergence towards the good. For Gadamer, who in his dialogue with Greek thought reappropriates the ancient fusion of moral theory and ontology, the ethical and logical aspects of true dialectic are seen to be inseparable (IGPAP, 99).

Such is the good as *telos*, as the direction of the dialectic of dialogue. This is a good which "is in everything and is seen in distinction from everything only because it is in everything and shines forth from it" (IGPAP 116). But the good is also, in action and relationship, "measure." "The good is limitedness (measuredness, *metriotes*) in the midst of constantly threatening indeterminacy and limitlessness" (IGPAP 20). It is the exercise of virtue, of the *aretai*, in a world in which the human capacity for choice casts the very possibility of the truth and good into doubt. "It is characteristic," says Gadamer, "of the human soul that it must endeavor to maintain its own order" (DD 32). We both make our way towards the good and hold to the good through an intra- and interpersonal landscape in which both seductive pleasure (*hedone*) and "limitless drives" on the one hand, and reason (*nous*) as "the source of all measuring and measured restraint," on the other, are always present (IGPAP 111).

The danger that lurks in discourse

Ours is a "mixed" realm, a third thing distinguished either from the "noetic world of numbers and pure relationships," or "its dialectical opposite, the *apetron*," the unbounded, the unknown. The *aretai* are necessary because of the "hidden danger" we always undergo from the distortions which arise from limitless drive. The "hidden danger in what is charmingly pleasant" (IGPAP 65) demands the chief among the virtues, courage (*andreia*). We need courage in order to resist, not only the subtle hedonic pleasures of flattery and conformism, but wrong separation or combination of ideas, confusion, as well as, and perhaps especially, "the dazzling art of the forceful answer" (IGPAP 98), which is an abuse of power. All of these make for sophism, the "eristic dialectic which only confounds and does not instruct." (DD 9)

In fact, for Gadamer, "danger lurks in *logos* (discourse) itself." (IGPAP 98) At one point he refers to it as "the danger of sophistic verisimilitude." There is an ever present danger of the "corruption of discourse," in that philosophical language can fail to live up to itself, can "get caught in purely formal argumentation or degenerate into empty sophistry" (RB 139).

This is not all. If it were the only danger, life would be very different. But it is only a reflection of a deeper tendency within existence itself, a tendency which is articulable on several levels. On one level it can be associated with what has already been called "limitless drive." Gadamer refers to the "blindness of the life urge." (IGPAP 110). Robert Corrington (1987), in his book *The Community of Interpreters* (CI) describes it as "the unbridled will to live" which is found in all beings, forces them to "struggle against each other for domination," and gives rise to the "corrosive forces of solipsism and aggressive individualism" (CI 25-26). This manifests in the community of inquiry as an inability to decenter from one's own position to the point of being able to follow a counterargument, i.e. an inability to let go within the dialectic movement of the community. For the community depends for its forward movement on a loss of self. In that, as Corrington says, ". . . the community and not the self forms the horizon of each hermeneutic act," (CI 31) it is necessary to overcome the unbridled will to live, which resists the process by which each of my statements is altered in the act of its being heard by another. Dialogue contravenes the natural self-assertion of one's own point of view in that it is, as Corrington describes it, an ". . . asymmetrical process in that one cannot go back from I^1 to I, for both temporal and interpretive reasons. Temporally, the past is altered in its translation into the present. Interpretively, a sign interpreted is a sign changed" (CI 41).

Even this danger is, in theory anyway, avoidable. But when Gadamer refers to the "distortion which any knowing implies," he is refering to another, even deeper level of danger--a blindness which is a result of our inexorable situatedness in discursivity itself. P. Christopher Smith, Gadamer's translator, shows how this insight is an appropriation of Heidegger's epistemology:

> . . . any insight which we can have emerges in finite human discourse and therefore, only partially. It is clearly "there," but all the while embedded in what is not clear, in what remains concealed. Our insights, in other words, are limited by our discursivity. What is given to us to know is given from hiddenness (*lethe*) and in time lapses back into it. Thus our human truth, (*aletheia*), is never absolute. (DD 103, n.16)

The "intrinsic distortion-tendency" of discursivity lies in the fact that in the process of bringing something else into presence, it asserts itself instead of fading out of view. For language is something besides the thing it is presenting. In presenting itself, it suppresses what it wishes to display in it. Thus the very identity of language as a representational system creates this distortion: since the representation is not what it represents, thus what it represents is to a degree forever inaccesible. [2]

We must add to this even a further level of "the danger that lurks in discourse": the fundamental semantical ambiguity of language. Gadamer refers to what he calls "the possibility of renaming, which is implied in any giving of a name and designating with signs," which "demonstrates that the sound by which the word names the thing does not carry its meaning in it unambiguously. (DD 108). To the possibility of an unambiguous coordination of sign and thing designated, "the fruitless undertaking of defining things atomistically," (DD 109) we must oppose "the *logos*, as the *koinonia* of the ideas." This follows from a point made earlier, that "it is not possible to define an isolated idea purely by itself, and that the very interweaving of the ideas militates against the positive conception of a precise and unequivocal pyramid of ideas." (DD 110) A direct and univocal coordination of the sign world--i.e. of the world of which we are the master--with the world which we seek to master by ordering it with signs, is not language. The whole basis of language , the very things which make it most what it is, are the displacements and ambiguities of metaphor.

These four, progressively more fundamental, dangers that "lurk in discourse" make of the operation of the community of inquiry a constant struggle against the tendencies of illusion, disorder, and measurelessness. "It appears that it is *the* human task to constantly be limiting the measureless with measure." (DD 155) The one who wishes to understand the "truly good" and the "truly bad" must at the same time understand what Plato called the "falsity and truth of the whole of reality" (DD 117). Given the inevitability of this mixture of the false and the true, we welcome the suffering of the word in the agon of the dialectic; in fact we turn it to our advantage. As did the Greeks, we consider it, not a "burdensome" but a "productive ambiguity. The productivity of this dialectic is the positive side of the ineradicable weakness from which the procedure of conceptual determination suffers" (DD 111).

We welcome the opposition we find inherent in dialogue because it is an ontological principle. "Just as resistance is inevitably encountered in the ordering and shaping of the world, so too is it inevitably encountered in any discourse which would display the thing under discussion" (DD 121). One aspect of the courage we are called upon to show is in the recognition and welcoming of the understanding that "the labor of dialectic, in which the truth of what is finally flashes upon us, is by nature unending and infinite" (DD 121). For the Greeks as for Hegel "the adequate formulation of the truth is an unending venture, which goes forward only in approximations and repeated attempts" (HD 33). Thus we welcome as the royal road of the universal order itself, the

> . . . shared inquiry which never ceases in its effort to more sharply define one word, concept, intuition, in respect to another and which willingly puts all individual opinions to the test while abjuring all contentiousness and yielding to the play of question and answer--that shared inquiry should make possible not only insight into this or that specific thing, but, insofar as is humanly possible, insight into all virtue and vice and the whole of reality. (DD 121-122)

Word and deed

It is important to keep in mind that the insight referred to here, the revealing which is the "achievement of all speech," is not just of a word (*logos*), but a deed (*ergon*). They are inseparable. What results from dialogue is the ideal of a life harmonized rightly in a word which directs us to a deed, to choosing what is right in the moment of choice. For Gadamer, "thinking always points beyond itself," to a unity of theoretical and practical reason in *phronesis*, or "practical wisdom"--a kind of thinking "oriented toward choice which flows directly over into action." Phronesis is not a "general and teachable knowledge," because it emerges from the event where desire and reason come together, and as such is a form of moral knowledge. As Corrington, in his interpretation of Gadamer's thought, points out:

> The practical dimension of understanding is the drive toward the unconditional source of value that keeps communal life from sinking into the demonic and nongeneric. Gadamer insists that the ethical core of dialogue saves hermeneutics from becoming a detached purview of mere structures. The drive to interpret is in essence the drive toward healthy social life. . . For Gadamer, each interpretation must point beyond its object . . . and must illuminate something fundamental for social life. (CI 44)

Through the back and forth, free play of argument and counter-argument, the community of inquiry is led to right decisions. The telos of the individual and the telos of the group converge--if not always smoothly--in the conversation of the community of inquiry. As "every individual thing strives for its own good, its own measure" (IGPAP 144), so the drive of the community of inquiry is toward the expression of a universal truth in the concrete situation which has been taken up. "The telos is not a goal that belongs to some faraway order of perfection. In each case, the telos is realized in the particular existent itself, and realized in such a fashion that the individual contains the telos." (IGPAP 177). Through the "unending venture" of the community of inquiry, "which goes forward only in approximations and repeated attempts," we learn to choose the good.

The unteachable knowledge

The unending venture of the Socratic dialectic was proclaimed by its founder to be "an entirely new kind of education, in which the concern is not so much with learning something as with turning the whole soul around." (IGPAP 83). What emerges from the dialectic of dialogue is a form of knowledge which is neither merely technical nor informational, nor pure "value" split off from "fact," and which transcends the sphere of control of scientific method. As such, "dialectic is not general and teachable knowledge" (IGPAP 37). One thing which makes it unteachable is that it is a result of dialogue, which is an ontological form of thinking, and from which knowledge emerges which can emerge in no other way. For another it has, as Gadamer says, "the structure of the sum number of things which precisely as that thing which all of them together have in common cannot be attributed to any of them individually" (DD 133).

Perhaps its closest analogue is to the dialectical journey of the self in religious formation.[3] For someone involved in religious experience, the negative character of human experience is understood as a *positive* phenomenon for human life. (Risser, 1986). The person involved in this formation welcomes the moment of negativity which is characteristic of all experience as a renouncing of positivity of self. For the person Marcel called *homo viator*, a transcendence of subjectivity leads dialectically to a reencountering of a subjectivity newly aware of its finitude, and its dependence on an other which is ontologically prior to its own self presence (Pax, 1988). The self involved in religious formation emerges from the moment of self-loss with a new understanding of self as a gift, and as a form of openness to possibilities which come to it from outside itself (Johnson, 1984), and thus even more open to experience, and committed to meaning and to action.

Thus, in dialogue, the experience of undergoing the necessary contradictions of reason is a positive phenomenon for human life. For it is only in what Corrington calls the "overcoming of the self-forgetfulness of each subjective horizon," which in turn requires its "self-humiliation in the face of that which is never a horizon or even a horizon of horizons," (CI 64) that the "whole soul is turned around towards noetic reality." And it is only in the turning (*metanoia*) of the whole soul--of desire--towards noetic reality that critical and practical rationality meet, and the world changes. This is the promise of the community of inquiry.

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Endnotes

1. For a brilliant, extended further comment on this "mirror-play. . . through which the matter of thought is immanently and dynamically articulated," see *The Relevance of the Beautiful*, Ed. Robert Bernasconi, trans. Nicholas Walker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 137-138.

2. ". . . the state of the soul which we call knowledge or insight into the truth must also be of such nature that it asserts itself and thereby conceals the thing itself." (DD 112) "That which is

meant to *present* something cannot *be* that thing. It lies in the nature of the means of knowing that in order to be means they must have something inessential about them."

3. This has been pointed out by Patricia A. Johnson, "The Task of the Philosopher: Kierkegaard-Heidegger-Gadamer," *Philosophy Today* 28 (Spring 1984): 3-18.

David Kennedy is Assistant Professor in Child Studies at Northern Michigan University, Marquette, MI.

Critical Thinking as the Cognitive Psychologist Approaches It

Edith D. Neimark

Two questions are foremost among the persisting issues confronting instructors responsible for the advancement of critical thinking: What works? Why does it? The first question is an empirical one that, ideally, should be answered on the basis of data from properly conducted research that isolates potential directing variables and compares their effect to some control baseline. The second question is a theoretical one to be answered by detailing of a mechanism or mechanisms. Both questions fall naturally within the province of Psychology which has been concerned with human thought from the inception of the discipline. My first message to you today is that current psychological research has much valuable information to offer the instructor of critical thinking but, it seems to me, that information has not been nearly as central to the enterprise as it should be. In an attempt to remedy that state of affairs I would like to tell you about one contemporary approach that has much to offer and show you how it applies.

Contemporary cognitive psychologists view the mind as a machine. Thus, they begin with the theoretical problem of detailing a possible mechanism and exploring its operation. A very natural candidate for the potential mechanism is the computer. This is not to assert that a) the mind operates exactly as does the digital computer, or b) that the mind is nothing but a computer. Each approach would be both too literal and too constraining. Rather, the initial approach is to use a machine about which much is known as a potential model of another mechanism, the human mind, whose workings remain mysterious. By pursuing the analogy in sufficient detail to see where it applies, as well as where it does not, perhaps we can shed more light on the nature of thinking processes.

What must this hypothetical machine do in order to serve our purposes? It must *compute*. Although we generally use the term "compute" to describe arithmetic operations, its denotative realm in current usage is far broader, extending to a wide range of transformations of information from one state into another in the process of attaining a goal. That goal might be the answer to a problem, a sensible decision, a convincing argument, a new invention, the ramifications of an idea, or a work of art -- to name just a few possibilities. The raw material upon which transforming operations are performed is "information". *Information* is used not in the dictionary sense but more technically; it refers to reduction in uncertainty. *Uncertainty* is a function of the number of available alternatives and of the probability associated with each alternative. It is greatest when the alternatives are all equi-probable. Before you assume that you are in for a snoozer and quietly doze off, let me point out some implications of these preliminary assumptions. The central concept is uncertainty; without alternatives there can be no information -- by definition. As we shall see shortly, one of the ways in which thinking commonly goes astray is failure to encompass all of the appropriate alternatives. Another way in which thinking goes astray results from assigning incorrect weightings to the alternatives.

To complete the rudiments of a machine that transforms information, we need a few more basic assumptions. Information, first of all, must be *represented* in some fashion in order to be operated upon. How information is represented is generally a determinant of the adequacy of the computational outcome. Some forms of representation are richer and more conducive to goal attainment than others. How might this arise? One answer is that at any given moment in time there are limits upon the effective operating space of the computer. All of the information available at any given moment is represented in a part of the computer variously referred to as "working memory", "buffer", or "central store"; one does little violence to view this working space as immediate consciousness or, even, the clear part of the work table. There is, of course, much information that could be called up and used. That information, we can call it knowledge, is in storage in long term memory. Thus, among the continuing activities of the computing mind are processes of storing and retrieving represented information. One popular model for memory storage is a drawer --or a set of drawers such as a filing cabinet. That analogy is not altogether apt but it does have some useful implications. One obvious one is finite capacity: each of us is well acquainted with drawers so jam-packed with stuff that not another thing will fit in. A second implication has to do with organization: a good filing system promotes accessibility while a poor one impedes it. An inappropriate implication of the analogy is that the contents of the drawer are unmodified by inclusion in it: e.g. a sock remains a discrete independent entity. That assumption is unlikely to be true of the contents of memory which are related by a system of *associations*, where change in the network of associations affect the meaning of its elements. Again, our rough and ready image of "associations" is likely to be something analogous to velcro patches or scotch tape strips binding independent entities in a set of what the Gestaltists called "and connections". There is much current speculation as to the nature of associative networks, with little agreement. But we do know that some forms of organization can transform many bits of information into an economical *chunk*. A commonly used example of chunking is the observation that the immediate memory span can encompass about seven letters, or seven digits, seven unrelated words, or seven related phrases. Thus, constraints upon immediate memory span are defined not in terms of amount of information per se but, rather, in terms of number of chunks. A useful illustration for present purposes is that a good general theory that encompasses a wealth of potential instances is a far better means of storage than an enumeration of each of those instances. This example illustrates another property of retrieval from long term memory storage: retrieval is often a process of reconstruction (i.e., computation) rather than direct read-out. Thus, with respect to retrieval as well as storage, computation occurs rather than a mechanical putting in or taking out of unmodified information.

Some examples from deductive reasoning

To give you a more concrete understanding of the power of the relatively simple computer model outlined above, I would like now to consider some specific applications with which to show how this approach leads to testable hypotheses about thinking and its potential pitfalls. Ideally, commonly observed errors should be explainable in terms of normal operations of the computer -- and many of them turn out to be. I'll start with formal logic, a neat domain about which much is known. One empirical generalization I can offer you at the outset is that the rules of formal logic do not provide an accurate description of the way people reason in the laboratory or in logic classes.

Consider the quantifiers of formal logic: *All*, *No*, *Some*, and *Some Not*. Logicians have developed a number of useful devices for representing them. An intuitively appealing representation is the Euler circles shown below.

. **All Possible Relations Between Two Sets, *A* and *B***



No is represented by only one of the alternatives shown, number 5, while *All* is represented by two of them, numbers 1 and 2. Both universal quantifiers are simpler in the sense of alternative representations than the particular quantifiers *Some Not*, numbers 3, 4, 5, or

Some, numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4. If one assumes that the more alternatives that must be processed the greater the processing time and the greater the likelihood of error, then one would predict that universal quantifiers should pose less difficulty for interpretation than do the particular quantifiers. That prediction is borne out by a great variety of experimental evidence. In some of my own data comparing the performance of students of grades 7 - 12 and college, while there was steady improvement with age in interpretation of all quantifiers, there was a marked difference in performance between the universal and particular quantifiers. About 70% of the seventh graders's interpretations of *All* and *No* were correct (and *No* was somewhat better than *All* throughout the age range) but less than 40% of the college students correctly identified all the possible realizations of *Some* and *Some Not*. The nature of the errors made is instructive and, again, predictable from the simple model. The most common response of the youngest students was to represent *Some* and *Some Not* in terms of a single alternative, number 4. The unique alternative error declined with age and was made by almost none of the twelfth graders. The choice of more than one alternative, generally 2 and 4, or 3 and 4, correspondingly increased with age to account for 60%-80% of the choices of the oldest subjects. Even at the highest age levels the alternative most likely to be omitted for *Some* was number 1 (a possible representation of *All*), and for *Some Not* number 5 (a representation of *No*). That these alternatives should be least accessible might be predicted from the fact that they are already assigned early-on to universal quantifiers. A structurally similar model based upon number of possible alternatives and the uniqueness or overlap of their function can be used to account for a wide variety of phenomena in psychology. Thus, a phenomenon familiar to every teacher of logic is predicted by a model that also accounts for behavior in a wide variety of other areas.

If you have successfully followed me through this first illustration you may even have begun to anticipate the next one. Given that people make highly predictable errors in construal of the quantifier in a single proposition, when several premises are put together in construction of an argument the nature of errors in a conclusion should be, at least in part, predictable from the errors in construal of the individual premises. That prediction, too, is supported by a wide variety of evidence. I'll illustrate it by a single example taken from the work of P. Johnson-Laird.

Although there are a number of psychologists whose research is applicable here, I have chosen the work of Johnson-Laird because he is most explicit and systematic in pursuing the position espoused here: that people construct representations that serve as models, or theories, directing their computational processes and that errors arise directly from their models. Johnson-Laird's explanation assumes that each premise is represented by a set of examples of individual instances. For instance, the premise "All scientists are skeptics" would be represented as:

$$\text{scientist}_1 = \text{sceptic}$$

$$\text{scientist}_2 = \text{sceptic}$$

$$(\text{sceptic})$$

where the token in parenthesis represents a sceptic who is not a scientist (alternative 2 in the Euler circle representation system) because both the premise and general knowledge leave that possibility open. Given an additional premise "Anne is a scientist", the information added to the model would take the form:

Anne = scientist = sceptic.

The next task is to find a relation in the model that was not explicitly expressed in the premises and formulate a conclusion:

"Anne is a sceptic".

Finally, one must search for an alternative model of the premises that falsifies this conclusion. If no such model exists, then the conclusion is valid; if no model is found but the search is not exhaustive the conclusion may or may not be valid; if a falsifying model is found then the conclusion is not valid and a new model must be constructed for testing. The example given does not depend upon general knowledge, and since it is finite, it is readily seen that the conclusion is valid. The main prediction of the theory is obvious: the greater the number of different models that have to be constructed to draw a valid inference, the harder the task will be. A second example illustrates a difficult inference. Again, the form of representation is a group of possible individual instances.

This particular example involves archeologists, biologists, and chess players:

None of the archeologists is a biologist.

All of the biologists are chess-players.

What conclusion validly follows? The right answer for correct reasons requires construction of at least three models. One representation takes the form:

archeologist$_1$

archeologist$_2$

----

biologist$_1$ = chess-player

biologist$_2$ = chess-player

(chess-player)

where the line separating acheologists from biologists translates the first premise. The second premise is represented in the same manner as the earlier example with possible non-biologist chess-players on the same side of the line. As a result, one is unlikely to see that any chess-player could be an archeologist and, therefore conclude that:

None of the archeologists is a chess-player.

Sixty percent of the college students to whom the premises were given reached that conclusion. If the model is scanned in the opposite direction it yields the converse conclusion:

None of the chess-players is an archeologist.

Ten percent of the students tested reached that conclusion. Neither conclusion is valid as is evident from consideration of a second model:

archeologist$_1$

archeologist$_2$ = chess player

- -

biologist$_1$ = chess-player

biologist$_2$ = chess-player

(chess-player)

The two models together support two possible conclusions:

Some of the archeologists are not chess-players (10% reached this one).

Some of the chess-players are not archeologists (no one reached this).

the first conclusion is, however, refuted by a third model:

archeologist1 = chess-player

archeologist2 = chess-player

- -

biologist1 = chess-player

biologist2 = chess-player

(chess-player)

If models are scanned in their order of construction, a reasoner going from the first model in which no archeologist was a chess-player to the third in which all are would have to conclude (as did 20% of the subjects) that no valid conclusion is possible. If, on the other hand, the models were scanned in the opposite direction, there is a possible valid conclusion:

Some of the chess-players are not archeologists.

None of the subjects reached this conclusion. As a final bit of evidence from the study being cited, American university students made 92% correct valid conclusions to problems requiring construction of only one model, 46% valid conclusions to problems requiring two models, and only 28% valid conclusions to problems requiring three models. Comparable results for eleven year-old British school children are 63%, 26%, and 2%, respectively.

Some general conclusions

I began with the assertion that psychologists can be very helpful in providing answers to the questions "What works?" and "Why does it?". The first question is an empirical one best answered by research that, ideally, is directed by theory to answer the second question by detailing possible mechanisms. I have sketched out one theory derived from contemporary cognitive psychology to show how it leads to specific predictions about several aspects of errors in deductive reasoning and to show that the predictions are supported by experimental evidence. The models employed are applicable to the broader domain of thinking and they lead to advice that is not often heard in these meetings. That advice is that one must begin by formulating possible theoretical mechanisms of what students are doing in the course of thinking to see if we can account for their observed performance and then tailor remediation to the problems that are diagnosed in explicit detail as a result. One diagnosis identified by this procedure is that people rarely formulate all the possible alternatives that must be considered. A second, which in some sense is a reiteration of the first at higher levels, is that the computational operations employed may be as defective as the information base to which they are applied, again, often because of failure to encompass all alternatives.

This approach, I submit, differs from an enumeration of *n* specific skills to be strengthened through practice, exhortation, or examples of inspired teaching -- whatever that may be. My own predilection for description of inspired teaching is that not only should we behave like scientists, but, also. we should assist our students to do the same. That entails, among other things, the explicit formulation of possible theories or models in order to explore their implications and associated constraints. One general approach to theory that has proven useful over the past thirty years is to ask "What kind of machine might perform the task in question?". Such a question leads to objective examination of a number of alternatives and comparison of their respective outcomes. In earlier times the sort of machine that served as an analogical model might be a clock or an engine; today's machines are more powerful and sophisticated but it is not the form of machine that makes for an advance. Rather, it is the focusing quest for a theoretical mechanism.

Theories are of two functional classes: normative and descriptive. A normative theory is an idealization, an algorithm of how things might work under optimal conditions; the rules of formal logic or of game theory are possible examples of normative theories. A descriptive theory, on the other hand, details how things do -- or do not -- work. One generalization, supported by a wealth of evidence, is that normative theories rarely, if ever, provide adequate description of human performance. The two examples I have given from deductive reasoning illustrate that point. But what do we, as instructors do in practice? We drill our students in the normative theory -- an approach that rarely works satisfactorily. Students can eventually master the examples in which they have been drilled but they are poor at generalizing beyond normative procedures or incorporating them into their computational repertoire. What if, instead, we helped students to become more aware of what they are in fact doing so that they might compare it with the prescriptions of the normative model or, perhaps, even devise a new model that would work successfully with already mastered calculational procedures? I doubt that the results of such an approach would be any worse than what we currently obtain; they might well be superior. Certainly the possibility is worth considering and pursuing. I hope I have convinced you to try it.

Reference Notes

I have abandoned the scholarly tradition of providing specific references for each point in favor of suggesting only two general works that embody the approach advocated in sufficient breadth and detail to advance understanding:

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Edith D. Neimark is professor of Psychology at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, NJ.

New Vision of Synergistic Reality of Critical Thinking/Creative Problem Solving That Is Whole Brain Compatible

Ira Finkel

Conventional and unconventional echoes resounding through the halls of our universities, colleges, and public schools today address the imperative for developing critical thinking throughout our society. Each asserts that our essential responsibility as educators is to make a personal commitment to give to our students the gift of critical thinking.

Believing that all aspects of the complex phenomena of critical thinking can be taught and understood by reducing it to its constituent parts, the conventional voices argue the narrow view that learning micro-logical skills will suffice, and as a result they prophesy students's ability to think critically in a wide variety of areas. However true it is that a few students might inherently possess the aptitude for acquiring some degree of critical thought taught in this manner, the absurdity in this approach is that it teaches critical thinking as discrete intellectual competencies and as such, is an advocacy of an exclusionary educational process with the potential for continued massive failure. It is exclusionary in the sense that while a gifted few might embrace it, the larger population fails to incorporate into its modus operandi skills of thinking that remain extrinsic to them. This becomes exceedingly significant when we realize that our survivability as a culture will depend more than ever upon the collective shape of values, decisions, and sense of morality of all the individuals who make up the living substance in the tenor of our daily lives than upon the personal virtue of a gifted few.

There is little if anything in this methodology that may enhance and enrich the confluence of our knowledge and emotion, and it faces failure because it rarely gets integrated with our basic values. Thinking skills disemobodied from the "whole" and from the "self" can become the basis for bad thinking that ends up in corrupting our ethics, compromising our morality, and often reducing our reason and judgment to pernicious nonsense. The configurations of behavior that emerge from learning differentiated thinking skills isolated from our feelings and attitudes usually become atrociously ugly since they are ultimately born out of self deception. We often see them manifest themselves as behavior laced with selfishness, envy, greed, arrogance, indifference, and aggression.

In contrast to the development of mechanistic reasoning, unconventional voices allying themselves with the phenomenological aspects of field psychology, and being keenly aware that individuals have idosyncratic means of perception, conceive of critical thinking as macro-logical skills interacting with the emotional as well as the intellectual life of the individual. They believe that "students, lacking the ability to reason dialectically in this strong sense, will be intellectually, emotionally, and morally heteronomous."[1] Fearing that students, governed more by other people than by themselves, will be likely to affirm illogical conclusions, accept slogans based on dogmatic distortions, and unquestioningly acquiesce to propaganda, they seek for education to commit itself to develop intellectual, emotional, and moral autonomy.

But what is it we must really do to free ourselves to reason and choose wisely? It is not enough to merely be free. The indispensable ingredients of freedom is having both the opportunity and the ability to construct rules of conduct from within through the coordination of different viewpoints. The essential doctrine of autonomous man is that he must live free, comprehending and controlling his cognitive and affective processes while choosing actions for himself that affirm his freedom. Those choices of actions will be our own only when, as Bronowski says, ".... we can disregard the expected and the predictable; when we can break out of the compulsion of instinct and appetite and social ritual in which nature has imprisoned every other creature."[2] Breaking out of constraints that exist as our essential constituents, however, is not the only problem. Throughout our social development, we have elaborately designed and built our own roadblocks.

The assumption that teaching critical thinking will develop autonomous individuals fails to consider that many students, having acquired macro-logical skills, may still be swayed to accept what they are told for a variety of perceptual, cultural, and psychological reasons. They may find themselves imprisoned despite our emancipatory efforts. The reasons may stem from their inability to see problems in a fresh light from their true perspective, their unwillingness to overcome apathy, complacency, laxity, mediocrity, or they may derive themselves from a need to be liked, to be accepted, to respect authority, to emulate someone, to gain approval, or to achieve esteem. When we realize that need gratification is the single principle underlying human development, then the distinction between deficiency and growth needs begins to hold great implications for understanding some of the attitudes and behaviors that often jam the brakes on critical and autonomous thinking.

Lacking gratification of basic needs for safety, security, belongingness, love, and respect, individuals feel threatened and lack autonomy. The fact that most of these deficiency needs can only be satisfied by other people, seen primarily as needs gratifyers, leads to dependence on the environment and to reliance on others to help in thinking and choosing when difficulties are encountered. The fixative and regressive power of ungratified deficiency needs creates a deficit motivated person who tends to be self-centered, with a tendency to being other directed.

In contrast, the growth motivated person who has had these lower level needs met, enjoys growing, moving forward, gaining new knowledge, skills, and creative capacities. Since growth needs are idosyncratic, they are satisfied more autonomously and therefore tend to make the individual more problem centered and self-directing.

How discerning will students be of the structure and logic of reasoning as opposed to content when they are stifled by perceptual and cultural roadblocks or driven by physiological and psychological needs that only others can fulfill? These human fallibilities have always served to obscure the light of understanding, and unless confronted and resolved they will continue to inhibit any methodical process we design to lead us to reasoned judgment and truth.

In the absence of any innate talent, we must acquire specific skills to help us impose some sense of regimen upon our subliminal psyches. This should become a systematic educational procedure and possess the potential for becoming a self-renewing process without blocking our spontaneity or pre-conscious freedom so essential to creativity.

The vision of teaching macro-logical thinking skills is to be applauded for breaking with the conventional reductionist view. However, its conceptual framework will remain incomplete if, like other theories about thinking, it fails to synthesize the divergent thinking skills inherent in creativity with the convergent thinking skills found within its own processes.

Most of what we call educated humanity, while imbued with respect for teaching students to reason critically, neglects creativity, considering it rarely teachable and not quite compatible with the learning process. Reason is worthy of all respect, and is nowhere more respected than among creative people, but any one avenue of reason may well become a rut. Are critical thinkers people who travel an undeviating path with such intent and precision that they lose the ability of turning their heads to see the surrounding environment? To look upon the mind in this way is to make reality as pictured by critical thinkers the single model of life. The completely logical mind of Star Trek's Spock may look enticing, but we should not forget that psychologically he was incompletle. Human beings, unlike Spock, are not emotionally and creatively sterile. Human life is not a commitment to reason only. Creative people know that life is a whole, comingled of reason, intuition, imagination, and the objective-subjective world of all phenomena. To be aware of life as a totality, involves spiritual and aesthetic understanding that is often above reason. Reason then, becomes a tool, and not an accomplishment.

While any culture could become more of what it is capable of becoming if it were based on the triumph of the Socratic ideal, it would be illusory to believe that a commitment to this singular process for developing logical thought would quickly attend to the unsatisfactory state of our society and address its inequities, deficiencies, and problems.

Now, more than ever, the general population must learn to control self-annihilating practices and redirect its thinking and behavior toward social justice, respect and honor between men, or we will continue to turn out people who contribute more to the causes of the world's great problems than to their solutions. Given the massive failures of critical thinkers in the larger social arena, of the ineptitude of critical thinkers in dealing with a world overrun with pollution, of the inability and unwillingness of critical thinkers to deal with the ugliness of bigotry and racism, there should be a sense that while an investment in teaching a hierarchy of critical thinking skills is undoubtedly worthwhile and highly desirable, it is almost certainly questionable as an infallible source for reaching established wisdom for mankind.

We should not be duped into believing that only critical thinking is the height of human intellectual capability and that cultivating it as such will be sufficient for the present and the future. We should not be quick to sanction any educational model designed as an advocacy for rational reasoning that has an inherent bias against the whole. We should explicitly avoid acknowledging the value system on which such a model is based otherwise we will tacitly accept the highly imbalanced set of values that dominates our culture and is embodied in our social institutions. Promoting skills of critical thinking as the only effective problem solving approach is derived from a belief that is, by any current standard, archaic, primitive, and downright dangerous because it is fraught with consequences that continue to threaten our survival.

The rational, linear, sequential mind lives by rules and by logic, resisting speculative and intuitive ideation. It tends to be suppressed and inhibited by the very qualities that make it useful. People who rely heavily upon it at the expense of divergent and metaphoric skills of the creative process often encounter difficulty in entertaining ideas that are foreign to the problem solving rules they have acquired. Unable to transpose their everyday ways of looking at and responding to the world, they fail to make new connections and miss the opportunity to effectively engage in the innovative process.

Critical reasoning seeks exactness and correctness and, as a result, in its attempt to make the strange familiar, convergent thinking is pervasive throughout the process. On the other hand, in making the familiar strange, creativity seeks unusualness and novelty, involving its participants in divergent thinking and parading a kaleidoscope of alternatives before them. While the processes are different, they are not incompatible. To argue for one at the expense of the other is to continue a cultural bias that fails to see their complimentary effect.

The emphasis on the analytical and logical at the expense of the analogical and intuitive is indeed historically cultural, and still dominates modern thought. It emanates from an outdated world view of reality that can no longer be understood in sequential terms because we live in a globally interconnected world in which disciplines are all interdependent and in which problems are all interrelated. To describe the natural world appropriately we need to see it anew, intimately linked with cyclical processes and wholistic realities.

The notion of critical/creative thinking as separate entities is an idealization that may be useful for descriptive purposes, but it has no fundamental validity in practice. And the immediate value of balanced thinking becomes obvious when we realize that the more fully both thinking processes are invited into equal partnership, the more readily will we create a coherent theory and philosophy about critical/creative thinking that overcomes the breach that exists between them in contemporary education.

Analysis and synthesis are after all two sides of the same coin. Both are needed to explain and interpret events in human terms. In explaining the nature of light, Newton, using the prism, analyzed and broke it down into its spectrum of component colors. As a result of this process did he destroy our poetic or artistic expression of a rainbow? On the contrary, if anything, he enhanced our vision and appreciation of it by enriching the confluence of our knowledge and feelings.

No one argues against a curriculum that can turn out a rational person; but "the curriculum of the future will also have to focus on the intuitive imaging mind as the intervening factor in creative intelligence, and feature mind skills that expand ordinary and traditionally limited concepts of intelligence and thinking."[3] How we teach and what we teach will have to integrate a host of introspective skills whose covert presence we have often overlooked in academic circles.

To the question from where will the burst of this new ardor in implementing this synergistic partnership come, we must seek the answer within a multidimensional framework. The love of dispassionate search for the truth, the flowing together of the rational, conceptual, and logical with the intuitive and analogical, must be carried forward not only by those who reason analytically and who are concerned with man's desire to think critically without prejudice, but by those who seek to synthesize and reveal through art, literature, poetry, drama, or music, the essential harmony in the apparent diversity of things. If we are to gain a sense of ownership of the skills and methodologies that spring from the synergistic relationship between critical and creative thinking we must be informed in a many valued personal and intense way rather than an impersonal and exact way. Through the skill and art of teaching, the classroom practitioner must tap the deep wells and secret springs that lie buried within us to help us reach levels of feelings and understandings that critical thinking alone could not achieve.

Critical/creative thinking must be looked at as a synergistic process without any exclusionary tenet that precludes skills and strategies that have traditionally been viewed as unique to one or the other. Both brain hemispheres involved in learning must become actively engaged in the process.

A new vision of the reality of critical thinking and creative problem solving must emerge that begins to move us toward a whole brain compatible educational paradigm and away from the traditional mechanistic view which has led to the fragmentation characteristic of our general thinking about a host of problems facing mankind. We must begin to seek solutions to the myriad problems that beset our society through a holistic human agenda.

Our education and our culture have traditionally been biased against the whole, and as a result we have nurtured only a relatively small part of our thinking ability. In confronting this bias, Bob Samples has spoken eloquently. "But in silence the metaphoric mind has preserved the forgotten parts. The ghost of genius of all humans lies within each of us. The cyclic time, the natural rhythm of the universe is still within each of us. And there is little doubt that the time has come to unite what we have become with what we have postponed. We have always been here, awaiting these seasons of synergy."[4]

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Ira Finkel, Ed.D. is Associate Professor of Graduate Education, Secondary Education Coordinator, Dowling College, Oakdale, L.I., N.Y.

For the Reform of Education: A Critical Philosophy of Education

William E. Murnion

As once again the uncertain trumpet sounds for educational reform, the need is ever more evident for a critical philosophy of education. For there is consensus about the necessity for reform, but controversy about the kind of reform. This is made clear in recent discussions of the issues raised at President Bush's "educational summit" and in the report of the National Endowment for the Humanities on college education.

Issues in Educational Reform

The purpose of the "educational summit" to which President Bush summoned the nation's governors in September, 1990 was the reform of primary and secondary education. The charge was that schools on these levels failed even to teach the basic skills students needed to become productive workers and keep the American economy competitive.[1] This is a charge business has been making for some time.[2] The "radical reform" proposed by the president and the governors was a paradoxical combination of national educational standards and parental choice of schools.

A standardized national curriculum is now something both the public and educators seem to think is necessary to bring local schools into line,[3] but the question remains whether this curriculum is just supposed to supply the basic literacy students need for the workplace,[4] or should rather communicate the "cultural literacy" they will need in history, literature, and the sciences to become responsible citizens.[5] And while parental choice is the fix teachers and parents now agree they need to circumvent a recalcitrant educational bureaucracy,[6] they differ about whether the way to exercise this choice is through open enrollment[7] or school-based management.[8]

As if the failure of American schools were not problem enough, a week after the "educational summit" Lynne Cheney, chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, published an indictment of American colleges. A Gallup Poll had shown, among other things, that more than half of a sample of college seniors had scored less than fifty percent in a test of their historical and literary knowledge.[9] This had happened, Cheney charged, because colleges had abandoned a traditional core of liberal arts requirements for a hotchpotch of often trivial electives. Colleges had forfeited their responsibility, Cheney claimed, by shifting their focus from liberal education to vocational training, while allowing professors to concentrate upon research instead of teaching.[10] The appropriate reform, Cheney therefore argued, was for colleges to reintroduce a core curriculum, centered on the humanities and Western civilization, and to redirect the energies of their professors from research to teaching.

A reform of this kind would indeed address the cultural illiteracy of college graduates, but it would not compensate for the lack others see in them of a critical literacy[11] or a commitment to social justice.[12] Nor does it face the claim others have made that the way for colleges to become more effective is less by revising the content of the curriculum than by restructuring the mode of pedagogy. The claim of these critics is that a college education must cease to be a transmission of information from professors to students and become a collaborative and interactive pursuit of learning by teachers and students alike.[13]

It is not clear, therefore, from these proposals for educational reform whether the need of reform is greater in schools or in colleges, whether it betokens a lack of literary and critical skills or an ignorance of history and literature, and whether it is to be achieved by imposing national standards and core curricula or by turning to local control and a collaborative pedagogy. And these are the dilemmas that surface whenever a crisis is faced—or declared—in American education. To answer them, therefore, it is necessary to have a critical philosophy of education, one capable of determining the ends and the means of education.

Before I make my own proposal for such a philosophy, I want to make a critique of a number of popular proposals that are, I believe, inadequate. Then, to lay a foundation for a critical philosophy of education, I will sketch a theory of knowledge. That will enable me to indicate some of the implications of a critical philosophy for the reform of college education. This will not, it is true, be a comprehensive response to the issues I have raised about the crisis in American education, but I hope it will suggest some of the value of critical thinking for the reform of education.

Alternative Philosophies of Education

The approaches to the reform of American education have taken three forms: traditionalism, modernism, and futurism. Each of them proceeds from a distinctive worldview; each gives a different diagnosis of the crisis; and each has its own solution. They are all one-sided, however, and ultimately inadequate.

Traditionalism presupposes that the current crisis in education is a cyclical recurrence of the crises periodically affecting education.[14] The occasion for the crisis may be novel, but the nature of the crisis in no way signals anything radically different about the modern world or American society, much less is it a harbinger of an unparalleled or unprecedented transformation of history. The crisis is to be met, therefore, by drawing upon the wisdom of the West, the knowledge we have gained as a civilization by surmounting similar crises in the past.[15] The fonts of wisdom are the classics of our culture; a humanistic education consists in learning the lessons they have to teach. In its pure form, a classical education might be a Great Books program, like one Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler once established at the University of Chicago and is still followed at St. John's college at Annapolis and in Santa Fe. In a modified form, however, it is exemplified in an emphasis upon the humanities as the basis of a liberal education; in the institution of common requirements in schools and of general education, ideally a core curriculum, in colleges; and, at a minimum, in the integration of disciplinary majors and professional training into the liberal arts, the ideal being a delay of professional training until graduate school.[16] It is the kind of education Allan Bloom believes American colleges and universities have largely abandoned and must now restore.[17]

The clear advantage of traditionalism is that it brings the wisdom of the ages to bear upon the present crisis. It supplements the modernist reliance upon science with a concern for history; it makes values as well as facts integral to education. If its recourse to the classics for the study of (what it believes are) perennial and universal values can be balanced, as E. D. Hirsch advocates, with the cultural literacy necessary to make sense of modern American society, if its veneration for Western antiquity can broaden into an appreciation of other cultures, it is capable of promoting a modern and global humanism.

But the disadvantages of traditionalism are equally obvious. It scants the value of modern science.[18] It subordinates inquiry, experiment, and discovery to recollection, discussion, and refinement. It tends to be elitist and ethnocentric; at its worst, it is racist and sexist.[19] It simply begs the question of whether the present crisis of culture is cyclical and, more generally, of whether any culture is an inertial system. Traditionalism appeals, therefore, to those who value the heritage of Western civilization and have the most to gain from the preservation of traditional values.

Modernism, by contrast, has most of what traditionalism lacks. It takes the crisis in education as arising from something specific to modern culture: the conflict between traditional values and Enlightenment rationalism.[20] It supposes, therefore, that the crisis is to be met by imparting to everyone an appreciation of the power of reasoning, a grasp of scientific method, a familiarity with modern technology, and a specific professional skill.[21] On the primary and the secondary level, it supposes an inculcation of basic skills; in college, a concentration upon critical thinking, either as a generic skill or, more commonly, as disciplinary mastery.[22] The paradigm of this approach is the German educational system, with its division of higher education into the university and the technical institute. In the United States, modernism is reflected in the horizontal division between graduate and undergraduate education, with college becoming a place to specialize in a disciplinary major while the university becomes a research facility, and in the vertical partitioning of colleges and universities alike into departments in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and (as a residual category) the humanities. In general education, modernism is the inspiration behind the shift from a core curriculum to distribution requirements among the various disciplines. More recently, it has been the impetus for the creation of graduate business schools and the diversion of undergraduate instruction from the liberal arts to business education. It is the kind of education of which the Cambridge axis of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is the avatar.[23]

The benefits of modernism are many. It represents the triumph of science: not just the creation of the modern sciences and the crystallization of scientific method, but the extrapolation of the ideal of science from the study of nature to the study of history, with the consequent development of the social sciences and the humanities as scientific disciplines. It is liberating in its emphasis upon individual research, rigorous in its requirement of consensual validation. In demanding specialization, it has increased knowledge exponentially; in marrying science to technology, it has fructified the pursuit of knowledge. No wonder science has become the focus of education in every culture and is taught the same way the world over.

But modernism in education has its downside as well. By focussing on method, it neglects history; by emphasizing facts, it overlooks values. It has fragmented knowledge into atomistic disciplines. It has precipitated a dualism between what Edmund Husserl called the "physicalist objectivism" of the sciences and the "transcendental subjectivism" of the humanities, between the study of the facts in their concreteness and an appreciation of our common life-world.[24] "Merely fact-minded sciences," Husserl said, "make merely fact-minded people."[25] This facticity conceals from modernism its own ideology: a disdain for the past and a disregard of the future. Modernism is responsible for the rape of nature as well as the wealth of nations, for the totality of modern warfare as well as the internationalization of trade and commerce. Modernism appeals, therefore, to those who appreciate the rationality of modern science and have the most to gain from the benefits of modern technology.

To this ideological hermeticism, one reaction has been, of course, the crystallization of classical humanism into the ideology of traditionalism; the other, the emergence from postmodernity of the ideology of futurism.[26] Futurism supposes that the crisis in education is unprecedented and unparalleled: for the first time it affects every class and every country. Within the West, it arises from those who have borne the brunt but not enjoyed the benefits of modern capitalism; in the socialist bloc, it expresses the yearnings of those for whom revolution has brought only new forms of oppression; and in the Third World, its springs from the resistance of indigenous cultures to either capitalist or socialist colonialism. Throughout the world, the crisis derives from the menace of war and poverty to hopes of peace and justice. Just as a global culture has become a feasible prospect, the threat has also loomed of human self-extinction. To this crisis, the only adequate response is felt to be an evolutionary leap, a revolution in human consciousness, a great transformation.[27] The import for education is to conceive of it as innovative, experimental, and practical;[28] as interdisciplinary and intercultural:[29] without inner divisions or external bounds. This is a vision institutionalized in the new colleges of the late Sixties and early Seventies.[30] It is also embodied in programs in environmental studies, women's studies, black studies, ethnic studies, peace and world order studies, and, of course, in future studies.[31]

Futurism has the advantage of taking the current crisis on its own terms. It counteracts the nostalgia of traditionalism and the self-referentiality of modernism with a fresh and open perspective. Education becomes a means to retrieve the lost pasts of oppressed minorities, to sample the alternative presents of other cultures, and to anticipate a multiplicity of possible futures. While it dissolves the walls between disciplines, it becomes something people do for themselves. It thereby empowers people to shape their own lives. A futuristic education, therefore, can be self-critical, creative, and socially responsible.

Yet to the extent futurism neglects tradition, it becomes prone to waves of enthusiasm and despair, to vacillation between utopia and apocalypse. It can also spin off into sensitivity training and airy speculation without a due regard for the methodological sophistication of modern science. Its problem-centeredness tends to leave it without methods for conducting inquiry or standards for judging theory. It remains an esoteric approach to education. The appeal of futurism, therefore, is to those who look to the future for a better life and have the most to gain from a transformation of values.

Traditionalism, modernism, futurism: these are, of course, ideal types. I could instead have called these philosophies conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism. But I am less interested in their social roots and political implications than in the cultural visions they represent. They each have a specific set of assumptions; they each give a different diagnosis of the crisis of education; they each have their own program of reform. Each has its own advantages. Yet each has the inherent shortcomings of a partiality of perspective.

The trouble with all these philosophies of education is that they are not critically founded. Each of them represents an intuition about the crisis of education rather than an analysis of the function of education. If the crisis is indeed a cyclical phenomenon, endemic to our culture or common to every culture, traditionalism will do to meet it. But if the crisis is really the price of progress, a problem peculiar to the triumph of modern Western culture, then only modernism has the answer for it. And if the crisis is, rather, something unprecedented and unparalleled, an occasion for prophecy, then nothing but futurism will suffice. But there is no way to tell from any of these philosophies whether the intuition it represents about the nature of the crisis of education is correct. The failure of any of them to win common acceptance suggests that though each may have glimpsed a facet of the crisis, none of them has comprehended it as a whole.

The proper philosophy for a reform of education, therefore, is not one depending upon the power of intuition. At the very least, it should be a critique of such philosophies of education. But a critique of alternatives is not enough; it must have a positive program of its own. Such a program presupposes a critique of knowledge because education in the strict sense is the acquisition and communication of knowledge.

A Critique of Knowledge

Before attempting a reform of education, it is necessary to ask what education should be. This incorporates into the project of reform the question raised by crisis to which it is supposed to respond. In the strict sense, education is the acquisition and communication of knowledge.

In the broad sense, it is true, education can be said to encompass the entire process of human development— in all of its aspects: physical, emotional, intellectual, and moral; in both of its dimensions: individual and social. It includes, therefore, learning not just how to adapt oneself but how to create and maintain an economy. It entails establishing a personal identity and also collaborating with others in the formation of a culture. It means developing a sense of social responsibility and working within a community to constitute the norms and sanctions necessary for a stable society. It flows from a wonder about the world and appropriates timeless myths and universal archetypes. In this broad sense, education is the medium of personal development and the function of society as a whole and of every institution within it.

But in the strict sense of the term, education is simply the acquisition and communication of knowledge, and it is for education in this sense that society has instituted schools. Hence, a philosophy of education entails a philosophy of knowledge, just as a philosophy of knowledge implies a philosophy of education. In fact, it could more precisely be said that while philosophy is developed for sake of education, education serves to communicate a philosophy. That is how philosophers from Socrates to Dewey have conceived of their role; it is what society has sought from philosophy.

Therefore, to philosophy we turn for a critique of the knowledge we seek as learners to acquire and as teachers to communicate. A critique of knowledge should supply an account of the origin and goal, of the process, and of the perfection of knowledge.

For the origin and goal of knowledge, three philosophers have given analyses that have become classic for American philosophy: Aristotle, Kant, and Peirce. The first sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is, "All men by nature desire to know."[32] To substantiate that all of our knowledge originates from this pure desire to know, Aristotle pointed to the origins of philosophy.

> For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation were present, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for himself and not for another, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for itself.[33]

So Aristotle claimed that knowledge begins in wonder, the pure desire to know, and can end only in wisdom, the satisfaction of that desire. Though concrete and utilitarian concerns may at first preoccupy us, eventually, when we have satisfied them, we become free to pursue knowledge for its own sake. Philosophy is, therefore, the only free science, he said, because it is the pursuit of knowledge for itself.

But if Aristotle thought there was no better motive for the pursuit of knowledge than the delight of knowledge itself, he thought the entire content of knowledge originated from experience. For the delight of knowledge is evident, he said, first, in the exercise of our senses, particularly sight; then, in the experience we gain, through memory and imagination, from sense knowledge; and, after that, in the arts and sciences we develop from experience. The only difference he recognized between an art or science and the relevant experience was that the art or science was a grasp of *why* something was *what* from experience we already knew it was. Hence, he thought anyone who learned a theory only as a verbal formula without the relevant experience would be incapable of applying it. And, as we have already seen, though he assumed philosophy was the peak of the arts and sciences, he thought it developed from analysis of the arts and sciences rather than out of pure speculation.[34] Therefore, Aristotle assumed that we could get to know things as they really are if we persisted in the quest for knowledge until we were sure we had really made sense of things.

The major difficulty with Aristotle's account of the origin and end of knowledge is that he presumed that, in principle, we could begin with a grasp of concrete things themselves and end with a grasp of the nature of the universe. He tacitly abandoned any such claims in the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, but as modern science exposed the empirical untenability of his cosmology, the metaphysics of his theory of knowledge was discredited as well. Kant was the one who tried to give an account of the origin and end of knowledge that would square with the empiricist bias of modern science. While Aristotle thought all of knowledge originated with the mind but from experience, Kant thought just the opposite, that it originated *with* experience but *from* the mind.

That is, Kant thought knowledge originated *with* experience in the sense that experience supplied us with the jolt we needed to begin to think about the world around us.

> There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our sense partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.[35]

But Kant thought that knowledge did not originate *from* experience, in the sense that the categories we needed to interpret experience reflected the structure of reason and imperceptibly shaped the content of experience.

> But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge supplies from itself. If our faculty of knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it.[36]

The task Kant, therefore, set for himself in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was to distinguish within experience between the raw material of sensory intuitions and the categories of pure reason. But while he argued for the validity of scientific and mathematical knowledge as a picture of how things actually appeared to us, he held that the categories we used to interpret empirical data prevented us from knowing things as they were in themselves. Theoretical reasoning, Kant contended, led in the end to paralogisms and antinomies; only through practical reason could we postulate the necessity of free will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.

From Kant, therefore, modern philosophy inherited the dilemma of rationalism or relativism. On the supposition of a fundamental distinction between the phenomena and the noumena, between appearances and reality, our knowledge can be objective only if it is a grasp of things-in-themselves beyond the veil of appearance, but must be irremediably subjective if it remains merely an interpretation of how things appear to us. The dilemma is that rationalism would indeed guarantee the objectivity of knowledge, but is clearly indefensible in theory (that is, in supposing things beyond the bounds of knowledge can yet be known), while relativism seems only too obvious, but would condemn knowledge to subjectivity (although knowledge, by definition, is opposed to the subjectivity of mere opinion).

With his pragmaticist theory of knowledge, Charles Sanders Peirce offered a way out of this dilemma, one that has generally proved congenial to American philosophers. Peirce did credit Kant with setting modern philosophy the task of the critique of knowledge, but he thought Kant had balked any solution to the critique by making too rigid a distinction between intuition and discourse.

> [Kant] drew too hard a line between the operations of observation and of ratiocination. He allows himself to fall into the habit of thinking that the latter only begins after the former is complete; and wholly fails to see that even the simplest syllogistic conclusion can only be drawn by observing the relations of the terms in the premises and conclusion.[37]

As against Kant's supposition that reasoning began only after the categorization of empirical data, Peirce argued that knowledge originated in an act called abduction that was at once an insight into and a hypothesis about the meaning of the data.

> Abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them; or, in other words, our first premises, the perceptual judgments are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences, from which they differ in being absolutely beyond criticism. The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of *insight*, although of an extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation.[38]

And just as Peirce contended that knowledge originated from the indeterminacy of experience, so did he also claim that it terminated in a quest for consensus. *Reality* was, he agreed, whatever was, is, and will be so, regardless of what we might think of it, but *realism*, he argued, was to be achieved through consensus among a community of investigators. Practically, that might mean, here and now, the consensus a particular community would settle for, but, teleologically, it meant the consensus an ideal community would have to come to, with world enough and time.[39]

By thus defining the origin and end of knowledge, Peirce went through the horns of the dilemma between rationalism and relativism. He did not suppose knowledge had to begin from or end in a paradoxical grasp of things-in-themselves. Instead, he argued that it began from hypotheses about the meaning of empirical data and terminated asymptotically in consensus about the validity of these hypotheses. This preserved Aristotle's depiction of knowledge as an inquiry into the meaning of experience, without buying into Aristotle's metaphysics. It also acknowledged the value of Kant's critique of the rational categorization of experience, without falling into the dichotomy Kant made between appearances and reality. The resultant pragmaticism makes for a theory of knowledge conducive to a critical philosophy of education.[40]

But a theory of knowledge must explain not just how knowledge begins and ends but how it gets from beginning to end. This is where Aristotle is particularly helpful. He argued that the process of knowledge consists in a ramification of the wonder at the origin of knowledge into a set of four kinds of questions. These questions direct the operations of knowledge and define the kinds of answers we seek. The outcome is for knowledge to become a self-corrective process of learning.[41]

What we want to know, Aristotle said, are facts, causes, nature, and existence. To get to know a *fact*, we ask *what* is this x that is happening to y. To learn the *cause*, we ask *why* x happens to do that. To judge the *nature* of our hypothesis, we ask *whether* x really does what we suppose. And to decide about the possible *existence* of the fact in question, we ask *if* x can exist. To illustrate his point, Aristotle gave the example of getting to know about a solar eclipse (table 1).[42]

Table 1
Aristotle's Framework for the Development of Knowledge

Questions to be Asked	Answers to be Sought
What is this x that is happening to y (e.g. What is this darkening of the sun?)	Fact: This darkening of the sun is an eclipse.
Why is x (e.g. this eclipse) happening?	Cause: The moon is coming between the sun and the earth.
Is this really an x (e.g. an eclipse)?	Nature: Yes, look how the circular edge of darkness advances and recedes over the face of the sun.
Is x (e.g. an eclipse) possible?	Existence: Everything has a natural explanation.

Clearly questions of fact and of cause complement each other, as do those of existence and of nature, and these two sets of questions complement each other as well. That questions of fact and of cause are complementary is evident from the fact that if we want to know, for example, *what* kind of darkening that is of the sun, we also have to know *why* it is happening, and only if we do know *why* do we understand *what* the darkening is. The same complementarity is evident between questions of existence and of nature. If we want to know *whether* an eclipse is really occurring, we have to know *if* there can be such a thing, and *if* we are to consider the possibility, we have to know *whether* such a thing is really taken to be happening. And the complementarity extends to the two sets of questions themselves. The immediate questions of fact and existence interact with each other, for we have to decide *if* there can be an eclipse if we are to consider it may be *what* is happening to the sun, just as we have to think it may be *what* is happening if we are to ask *if* such a thing is possible. And the mediate questions of cause and nature are also reciprocal, for we can judge *whether* an eclipse really is happening if we know *why* it is what is supposed to be happening, while we refine our understanding of *why* it is supposed to be happening in response to testing *whether* it really is what is happening. Hence, the knowledge of an event can be analyzed as a set of answers corresponding to an interacting set of questions.[43]

The framework of a set of questions can also be devised for practical knowledge. Aristotle himself did not do so, but it is easy to see how it might be done (table 2).

Table 2
The Framework for the Development of Practical Knowledge

Questions to be Asked	Answers to be Sought
Should I do x to y?	Cases
Why should I do x to y?	Values
Is x really what I should do to y?	Norms
Is x good to do?	The Nature of the Good

Briefly, in the practical order, facts become cases; reasons, values; nature, norms; and existence, goodness. So we wonder if something is good when we are confronted with a case of whether we should do it, and we think it may be the thing to do if we believe it is good. And to answer these questions we have to settle why it might be good to do and whether it is really the best thing to do under the circumstances. Thus the process of practical knowledge in each case is similar to the process of theoretical knowledge for each event.[44]

If this is a correct account of the process of knowledge, how are we to conceive of the perfection of knowledge? The perfection of knowledge will be the development of the framework of questioning from a self-corrective process of learning in any event or case into a dynamic structure of learning for all conceivable events or cases. This structure may be conceived of as originating in the interaction between wonder and experience, and continuing through the reciprocation of imagination and reflection, until it results, progressively and interminably, in the perfection of knowledge (table 3).

Table 3
The Dynamic Structure of Knowledge

Questions	Operations	Answers
What is that?	Experience	Facts/Cases
Why is that so?	Imagination	Causes/Values
Is that really so?	Reflection	Nature/Norms
Is that possible?	Wonder	Existence/Goodness

In other words, whatever we know is the outcome, immediately, of what we wonder about the data of experience. But the impact of wonder upon the data is for us, first, to become aware of whatever problems they may present and, then, to imagine why they may have arisen.

Conversely, the impact of experience upon wonder is, first, for us to question if things are as they appear to be and, then, to reflect upon the evidence available for whatever hypotheses we may imagine to explain them. The outcome is the confirmation or refutation of our hypotheses.

The perfection is provisional in each event or case, but it is progressive and interminable for knowledge as a whole. We can always raise new questions, and the data will continually present new problems. Likewise, we can always imagine alternative explanations for old problems and original explanations for new problems, while we consider and reconsider the evidence for all of our explanations. So if enough must be enough in the short run, there is the necessity in the long run of meeting what Bernard Lonergan has called the transcendental imperatives arising from wonder and active in each of the other operations of knowledge.[45] To learn the facts and grasp each case, pay attention. To understand causes and appreciate values, use your imagination. To know what really is happening and what must be done, think twice. And to know at all, keep an open mind, but use good judgment. The result of obeying these imperatives will not be to become a know-it-all, but to develop the rationality capable of being articulated as a method for the pursuit of learning.[46]

This account of the perfection of knowledge has immediate epistemological implications. Objectivity is something to be attained, not in a crucial experiment or a technical fix, but in protracting experience to a self-corrective process of learning. Meaning is no more to be found in immediate self-consciousness than in a formal system, but in the cultivation of rational self-development. Truth is to be found neither in the bare facts nor in a consummate theory, but in a critical evaluation of evidence and an openness to collegial criticism. And wisdom is the fruit neither of an ineffable vision nor of existential *angst*, but of trust and persistence in the unmitigated desire to know.

This has been a critique, therefore, of the origin and end, of the process, and of the perfection of knowledge. The contention has been that knowledge originates in inquiry into the meaning of experience and ends in the pursuit of consensus about the nature of reality. The process of carrying out this pursuit is a framework of questioning, theoretical and practical, that is a self-corrective process of learning in each event or case and a dynamic structure of learning, animated by transcendental imperatives, for knowledge as a whole. And the perfection I have argued that is consonant with such a process is provisional in the short run and progressive but interminable in the long run. What remains to be seen are the implications of this critique of knowledge for college education.

A Critical Philosophy of College Education

The implications for college education of conceiving of knowledge as a dynamic structure of learning are threefold. First, a college education must match the desire of students to what they need to know. Secondly, the structure of the curriculum should correspond to the set of questions constituting the structure of knowledge. And, thirdly, there must be a dialectic between liberal and professional education.

If knowledge originates in the desire to know the meaning of experience and tends to culminate in a consensus about the nature of reality, a college education must strike a balance between critical thinking and cultural literacy. Of its very nature education represents an unfolding of the innate potentialities and a fulfillment of the personal needs of students. Tapping the interests of students is necessary for communicating to them the knowledge they need to cope with the demands of modern society. Simply requiring blocks of knowledge, whether as general education or in a disciplinary major, is not the way to do it. Into the communication of even the most basic and the most standardized of subjects must be infused a spirit of critical thinking that will enable students to participate in the quest for learning from which the content of these subjects originated. Thus the desire of students to learn has to be converted into an ability for critical thinking.

Yet the function of a college is to communicate to a student the cultural literacy a student needs to be a productive and responsible member of contemporary society. College must inculcate the skills, the information, the methods and procedures, the principles and the perspectives for an adult to cope with the demands of modern American society. A college doesn't ask students what they want to know; it has to tell them what they need to know. Cultural literacy requires a college curriculum based upon the wisdom of the past, geared to the needs of the present, and open to the possibilities of the future.

This complementarity between the poles of critical thinking and cultural literacy means that a college curriculum must appeal to students' interests while it meets students' needs. For the faculty of a college, this implies a responsibility, not just of each for one's own courses, but as a scholarly community for the entire curriculum. To develop critical thinking, the faculty is responsible, not just as individuals for making their own courses interesting, but as a community for making the entire curriculum experimental, participatory, and investigative. And to meet the demands of society for cultural literacy, the faculty is responsible, not just as individuals for being expert in their own fields, but as a community for a consensus about the correspondence of the content of curriculum to the nature of the real world. How the faculty meets this dual challenge will determine whether the education a college imparts as a whole is greater or lesser than the sum of its parts.

Secondly, because knowledge develops as a dynamic structure of learning, the framework of the curriculum should reflect the framework of learning. For one thing, this means that since knowledge originates in a dialectic between wonder and experience, a college education means learning both *how* to know things and *what* should be known about them. That is, the curriculum must have both a methodological and an informative dimension. The methodological dimension originates from the unfolding of the primordial desire to know into the interlocking set of four questions that constitutes the dynamic structure of knowledge. The informative dimension, on the other hand, originates from the concrete context of the life-world within which we happen to be born, live, and die. Analytically distinct, these two dimensions are nevertheless complementary: methods are context-dependent because we wonder about concrete problems; information can only be acquired methodically because we learn only what we need to know. While a curriculum is transmitting fields of knowledge, it must also inculcate methods of learning. Again, critical thinking and cultural literacy are complementary. And this complementarity should be evident not only in each course or each discipline but in the structure of the curriculum as a whole.

What that means in detail may be understood by considering the implications of the dynamic structure of learning—in its methodological and informative dimensions, in its theoretical and practical functions—for the structure of a curriculum. Since this structure comprises the operations of experience, imagination, reflection, and wonder, one function of education is develop the abilities (what both Aristotle and Peirce would call the 'habits') corresponding to these operations. Corresponding to experience there is research and literacy; to imagination, phenomenology and insight; to reflection, history and judgment; and to wonder, critique and commitment. For experience develops as an ability both to acquire and to utilize information. Imagination develops as an ability both to manipulate and to understand symbols. Reflection develops as an ability both to discover and to assess evidence. And wonder develops as an ability both to appreciate and to uphold rationality. (table 4).

Table 4
The Abilities Corresponding to the Operations of Knowledge

Operations	Abilities	
	Methodological	Informative
Experience	Research	Literacy
Imagination	Phenomenology	Insight
Reflection	History	Judgment
Wonder	Critique	Commitment

For a college education to foster the development of the dynamic structure of learning, it must develop the abilities, methodological and informative, of each of the operations of knowledge.

Now all of these operations are necessary for every act and every kind of knowledge, if knowledge is indeed to be a self-corrective process of learning, but each of the operations can lead to a specialization of knowledge by becoming the focus of the rest of the operations. For example, science is the specialization that results from a focus upon experience, with a subsequent development of the ability to do research and acquire literacy in a particular field. At the same time, since the operations of knowledge have both a theoretical and a practical function, any specialization of knowledge can take either a theoretical or a practical form. Hence a focus of learning upon experience can result in the specialization not only of science but of technology. The outcome of developing each of the foci of the dynamic structure of learning is a set of functional specialties into which the curriculum can be divided (table 5).[47]

Table 5
The Division of Learning into Functional Specialties

Operations	Functional Specialties	
	Practical	Theoretical
Experience	Technology	Science
Imagination	Art	Mathematics
Reflection	History	Social Theory
Wonder	Epistemology	Metaphysics

Just as a focus upon experience results in technology and science, a focus upon imagination results in art and mathematics; a focus upon reflection, in history and social theory; and a focus upon wonder, in epistemology and metaphysics. A complete education would be a knowledge of all of these functional specialties and their complementary contributions to the development of knowledge.

What is reasonable to expect from a college education, I believe, is a general familiarity with the entire set of functional specialties and a specific competence in at least one of them. To insure an appreciation of the dynamic structure of learning, a college education should include instruction in all of the functional specialties. Both the method definitive of each specialty and the body of knowledge for which it is responsible should be a requirement of general education. Whether case studies or surveys should be the medium of instruction would have to depend upon which, under the circumstances, proved to be pedagogically more effective. And to complement a general education of this kind, there should be a thorough grounding in a particular specialty. Not only would such a specialization develop competence in a particular field; it would enable an appreciation of the magnitude of what remains to be learned in the other fields of knowledge.

While the structure of the curriculum, given its derivation from the dynamic structure of learning would be relatively invariant from era to era, from culture to culture, and from college to college, the functions of the structure would vary with the progress of knowledge, diversities of culture, and differences among students. The same configuration of the curriculum would not necessarily be appropriate for North America and South America, for the North and the South in the United States, for an urban and a rural college—or even for every class of student in the same institution.

Hence, the concrete implications of basing a college curriculum upon the dynamic structure of learning would have to be worked out at each college and university. This conception of a college education does, however, rule out any simplistic dichotomy between "two cultures" of the sciences and the humanities, just as it transcends the conventional division of academic disciplines into the physical sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. At the same time, it would prohibit the dissolution of the curriculum into a congeries of interdisciplinary programs without methodological sophistication or a coherent view of education. This conception of a college education is, therefore, not a recipe but a viewpoint for reform.

The third implication of the critique of knowledge for a college curriculum concerns the relationship between liberal and professional education. John Henry Newman, in *The Idea of a University*, is a paradigmatic representative of the position that the function of higher education is simply to give a liberal education without regard to specific professional training. "To open the mind," he said, "to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, eloquent expression, is . . . [the] object of a Liberal Education."[48] Nevertheless, Newman thought that a liberal education in this sense would be the best preparation for a career.

> [G]eneral culture of the mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study, and educated men can do what illiterate cannot; and the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyze, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not at once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or a man-of-business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of these Sciences, or callings I have referred to, or any other for which he has taste or special talent, with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger. In this sense then . . . mental culture is emphatically useful.[49]

Therefore Newman believed, not that a liberal education had no practical function, but that it was practical precisely because it communicated an ability to think, judge, and act. In fact, he said that "if a liberal education be good, it must necessary be useful too."[50] This is a position to which many business people today would subscribe: their sharpest complaint about college and high-school graduates is that they do not have the basic literary and critical skills necessary for learning the specific skills of a particular profession or occupation.

Yet without professional focalization liberal education is, in this day and age, pointless. Newman could afford to ignore the plea to incorporate professional training into the curriculum of his university because in his time and place the university had already adapted itself to prepare the scions of the propertied classes for careers in academe or government. But it had, up to that point, neglected the needs of business, and blinded itself to the technical functions of the liberal arts.

Alfred North Whitehead was one of the first to recognize the complementarity between a liberal and a professional education.

> The antithesis between a technical and a liberal education is fallacious. There can be no adequate technical education which is not liberal, and no liberal education which is not technical: that is, no education which does not impart both technique and intellectual vision. In simpler language, education should turn out the pupil with something he knows well and something he can do well.[51]

In his address at the opening of the Harvard Business School, Whitehead sought to allay any suspicion that the professional function of the school would derogate from the mission of Harvard University to give a liberal education.

> The novelty of business schools must not be exaggerated. At no time have universities been restricted to pure abstract learning. The University of Salerno in Italy, the earliest of the European universities, was devoted to medicine. In England, at Cambridge, in the year 1316, a college was founded for the special purpose of providing 'clerks' for the King's service. Universities have trained

> clergy, medical men, lawyers, engineers. Business is now a highly intellectualized vocation, so it well fits into the series.[52]

Whitehead's point was that integral to a liberal education is a professional education appropriate to a given era and culture.

There is, then, no conflict in principle between a liberal and a professional education; the only problem is one of practice. The challenge is to clarify the practical import of a liberal education and the liberal function of a professional education. The establishment of business majors and business schools in liberal arts colleges can, therefore, assure a critical perspective for business education while it gives a professional focus to a liberal education.

There are at least three implications, therefore, of a critique of knowledge for the reform of college education. A college education should combine the development of critical thinking with the inculcation of cultural literacy to enable students to become responsible and productive members of society. To do this, the curriculum should join a general education in the functional specialties of the learning process to a concentrated education in one of these specialties. And the resultant specialization should facilitate the integration of professional with liberal education. These are not all of the implications of a critique of knowledge for the reform of college education, much less for the reform of education as a whole, but they do point to a specific way to undertake the reform of education.

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William E. Murnion is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies in the School of American and International Studies at Rampo College of New Jersey.

Developing Critical Thinking Skills through Reading and Writing: A Proposal to Expand Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives to Differentiate Between Consumptive and Productive Cognitive Behaviors

Wayne Rambo

For years educators have generally agreed that learning to think productively is much more important as an educational objective than rote memorizing and reciting of quantities of factual material. Even if general courses in critical thinking are offered to students, it has generally been assumed that thinking skills should be taught throughout the school curriculum. Educators also have often agreed that teaching students how to think, not what to think, better serves the objectives of educating students in a democratic society. But in spite of the consensus on the importance of critical thinking that has been achieved, educators usually admit that thinking skills are very poorly developed in students, and that school programs in practice do very little about it.

"Critical thinking is reflective and reasonable thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or what to do" (Ennis, 1985). According to Brookfield (1987), critical thinking is a "productive and positive. . . an emotive as well as rational. . . process. . . the manifestation of which varies according to the contexts in which it occurs; thus, the critical thinker identifies and challenges assumptions, challenges the importance of their context, imagines and explores alternatives, and is skeptical of universal truth and ultimate explanations." As I have defined and will be conceptualizing it, the critical thinker, in addressing his questions, problems, or concerns, operates in one of these major contexts: (1) he critically applies the formulations of the academic disciplines to a question, problem or concern within the academic disciplines; (2) he applies his own knowledge, background, experience, beliefs, and values to any question, problem or concern.

Because it is extremely difficult for processes such as critical thinking to be taught abstractly, a body of content is often selected as a medium through which to teach how to think, not necessarily what to think. In general courses in critical thinking, a wide variety of content from the academic disciplines is often drawn upon, but when critical thinking is taught within an academic discipline, the constraints of knowledge within that discipline often determine the parameters of the course content. A major curriculum problem in each case is the determination of course content: in courses in critical thinking, content of general applicability must be selected through which to teach critical thinking processes; but in the academic disciplines, the content of the specific discipline is constrained in that it often does not formally recognize standards outside the discipline from which it can be critiqued. While disciplinary courses provide a greater opportunity to teach prescribed subject matter more rigorously, certainly interdisciplinary courses are able to offer a broader content base through which to teach critical thinking skills: a course in Western civilization which includes such disciplines as philosophy, psychology, economics, geography, history, religion, morals and ethics, for example, is likely to provide the student more opportunity for critical thought than simply a traditional "History of Western Civilization."

Whether courses are disciplinary or not, two of their most common components are reading and writing. Because of this, then, "each and every teacher must be a teacher of reading" (Ediger, 1984) and writing. In the context of developing critical thinking through reading and writing throughout the content areas, reading will be discussed as the words, thoughts and ideas students consume or receive; writing will be discussed as the words, thoughts and ideas students produce; and critical thinking will be discussed as the words, thoughts and ideas students apply to current problems and transfer to later ones. Since Benjamin Bloom's *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives* (1956) has been widely acclaimed as a means of formulating and sequencing instructional objectives in reading and writing (Galloway, 1976; Snider, 1978; Lindquist, 1982; Healy, 1984; Wilson, 1988; and Zarnowski, 1988), the extent to which it accommodates the behaviors of critical reading, critical thinking, and productive writing should be reviewed.

Readers Consume Knowledge

Better teachers have generally recognized that the quality of content, organization, and thought demonstrated in student writing is often controlled in large measure by a student's reading capability. Students who have severe reading problems ordinarily will manifest even more severe thinking and writing problems because a certain proficiency in reading is a necessary, though not necessarily a sufficient prerequisite, for success in the more complex productive behaviors of thinking about, and then writing about what was read. Critical thinking about ideas in print does require that students possess a variety of word recognition and identification skills to derive meaning from a meaningful content (Heilman, et al., 1981), to facilitate comprehension at the hierarchical levels identified by Dale (1965):

1. literal comprehension, i.e., reading the lines;
2. analysis, i.e., reading between the lines to draw inferences, and discover implications;
3. evaluation, i.e., reading beyond the lines to make critical judgements about worth and value.

Students, of course, cannot be expected to be able to write critically and productively if they are unable to employ, at least to some extent, the necessary prior critical and creative reading and thinking skills identified subsequent to Dale's hierarchy:

1. connecting new learning with previous experience (Duffelmeyer, 1980; Balajthy, 1988);
2. reconstructing new learning into meaningful organizational frameworks (Olson, 1984; Balajthy, 1988);
3. examining ones own thinking and learning strategies (Olson, 1984; Balajthy, 1988):
4. questioning meanings, concepts, and ideas (Newton, 1978; Lindquist, 1982; Brunner, 1983; Ediger, 1984);
5. drawing inferences and discovering the implications (Newton, 1978; Duffelmeyer, 1980);
6. determining how the ideas can be used (Ediger, 1984);
7. developing generalizations or broad understandings supported by facts (Ediger, 1984);
8. judging relative value according to explicit criteria (Newton, 1978);
9. appreciating emotionally or aesthetically the reading (Duffelmeyer, 1980; Lindquist, 1982).

In summary, a reader as a consumer of words, thoughts, ideas; in short, a receiver of knowledge; recalls, comprehends, applies, analyzes, values, synthesizes and appreciates given information; even critical reading in which the student's mind interacts with a passage is a process in which the student receives the knowledge which he is given.

While in general secondary students often write in response to prompts or topics, in response to specifically assigned readings, or in response to their inner-self, it should also be recognized that better students frequently write in response to readings that have not been specifically assigned. Because better readers and writers have assigned more meaning to the various cultural-linguistic symbols of language, their written thoughts, words, and ideas are more mature, more thoughtful, and more critical than the thoughts of those pupils who are not acculturated. The more prompting through language and culture a student is specifically given in any instructional setting, the easier it should be for him to generate ideas to incorporate into an essay. In general, the greater the repertoire of student knowledge at his command, the more likely it should be that he can write a substantive essay exhibiting critical thought.

Writers Produce Knowledge

Yet a writer as a producer of knowledge discovers, hypothesizes, theorizes, formalizes, generates and evaluates knowledge to prepare an overt product, such as an essay, that contains ideas that may be new to him, if not new to everyone. According to Flower and Hayes (1981), writing is among the most complex of all human mental activities. Philosophically and logically, then, critical reading skills and behaviors must hierarchically precede their correlative productive writing skills.

According to Balajthy (1988), writing is a productive thinking activity in that it helps students not only to independently connect new learning experience with previous experience and reconstruct new learning into meaningful organizational frameworks, but also examine their own thinking and learning strategies for increased metacognitive control.

Specifically, Guth (1969) recommends that in connecting, reconstructing, and examining knowledge, students who may have already formed tentative conclusions in response to their readings should allow their opinions to reshape in the process of gathering and organizing material; that they should be prepared to change their minds in the light of new evidence; and finally, they should make sure that their finished papers spell out clearly the results of their thinking rather than detail the evolutionary process the fermenting of their opinions travelled. In concert with both Balajthy (1988) and Guth (1969), Olson (1984) described the writing process as productive:

> To produce a composition, writers must tap memory to establish what they know, review the information they have generated and translate it into inner speech or print, organize main ideas into a logical sequence, discover specific support for those main ideas, re-see the whole to find a focus, construct a structural framework for communicating an intended message, transform their network of thought into a written paper, and evaluate the product.

In summary, a writer is a producer of knowledge because his work is a result of "productive thinking carried out with pen in hand, at chalkboard, with a word processor, or typewriter" (Balajthy, 1988).

Critical Thinkers Apply and Transfer Knowledge

A reader as a consumer of knowledge recalls, comprehends, applies, analyzes, values, synthesizes and appreciates given information, but a critical thinker and writer as a producer of knowledge, discovers, hypothesizes, theorizes, formalizes, generates and values knowledge: the critical thinking which must also occur throughout the reading-writing process operates more specifically in these contexts: (1) the critical thinker applies the formulations of an academic discipline to a question, problem, or concern within the same discipline; (2) the critical thinker applies his own knowledge, background, experience, beliefs, and values to a question, problem or concern which he was given; (3) the critical thinker identifies and applies the formulations of an academic discipline to another discipline; (4) the critical thinker applies his own knowledge, background, experience, beliefs, and values to a problem, question, or concern which he himself has identified.

In the first two contexts, students are often given or at least directed to the questions, problems, and concerns they are being asked to address, and they are sometimes directed to some of the learning resources, such as the readings they will need to confront to respond to the assignment; in the third and fourth context, students must transfer and bring their own intellectual resources to the question, problem, or concern. In the first and second context, better students with encouragement and support will be able to bring their prior intellectual resources to a problem; in the third and fourth contexts, students will be "forced" to do so. When students are "forced" to locate, select, and apply on their own the instructional resources that are brought to bear upon a problem, the more difficult the instructional task, and the greater the likelihood that critical thinking will occur as cultural content is transferred from one area to another. Because students in the first two contexts are given or directed not only to the concerns they will address, but also the resources they will utilize to address them, instructors run a greater risk of teaching students what to think than how to think; because students in the third and fourth contexts are "forced" to address their concerns with all of the intellectual resources they can muster independently to address them, instructors provide greater opportunity for student practice in independent critical thought.

In applying the formulations of an academic discipline to a problem within the same discipline (category one above), in given readings the students will relate the written symbols to sounds to words to acquire meaning, apply the words by extrapolating relevant ideas, concepts or principles; the students will analyze the relationships of the parts to the whole, value the readings by accepting their most noteworthy thoughts, ideas and concepts; the students will synthesize these noteworthy thoughts, ideas, and concepts by combining these parts to form a whole.

Also, in applying the formulations of an academic discipline to a problem within the same discipline, given a problem the students will hypothesize to suggest a unique solution to it; the students will theorize to construct a unique response to the problem; the students will formalize or begin to organize, perhaps in writing, their own unique ideas; the students will generate, or perhaps write an essay expressing those ideas; and finally, the students will evaluate or posit the acceptability not only of their ideas thus generated, but also the acceptability at least to themselves of their essay discussing those ideas.

In applying the formulations of an academic discipline to a problem within another discipline (category three above), students will do all that they did in applying the formulations of an academic discipline to a problem within the same discipline: they will, in short, recognize symbols, acquire meaning, apply the words; students will analyze the relationships, value the academic resources; the students will synthesize these noteworthy thoughts, ideas, and concepts.

But, in applying the formulations of an academic discipline to a problem from another discipline, students will first identify the problem; students will hypothesize, and theorize; the students will formalize; students will generate a product expressing those ideas; and finally, the students will evaluate, or posit the acceptability of their ideas, and their products.

Although students still may be directed to some of the learning resource materials they employ to achieve a task, students should be "forced" on their own to bring to bear the intellectual resources that they themselves will locate, select, and apply to a specific problem, question, or concern.

In applying their own knowledge, background, experience, beliefs, and values to a context which they are given (category two above), students as they are being instructed are given precious few resources with which to work, for students must bring not only all of the intellectual resources they can muster to the problem.

In applying their own knowledge, background, experience, students are, perhaps, engaged in the highest form of productive critical thinking because they must not only identify and define the problem, but must also hypothesize its solution. With the possible exception of language and culture, given not so much as a reading or a prompt, the students relying upon their own backgrounds and experiences which may include knowledge in general gained through prior reading or other language experiences not specifically assigned in conjunction with the instructional question, problem, or concern, will begin to sort, define and organize their attitudes, ideals, and beliefs; in doing so, students will discover or isolate a problem; students will hypothesize, or suggest their unique response or solution to it; students will theorize, or construct a unique response to the problem or situation they have defined; students will formalize, or begin to place in writing their own unique ideas; students will generate or write a work expressing those ideas; then students will not only evaluate, or posit the acceptability of ideas thus generated, and the acceptability of their written products discussing them, but after sorting through their attitudes, ideals, and standards will seek to reconcile any inconsistencies they uncover in their persona and in their emerging world views. In short, then, students writing in response to their inner-self are engaged in the highest level of productive writing and critical thinking.

Differentiating Between Consumptive and Productive Cognitive Behaviors

In the mid-1950's Benjamin Bloom and their associates introduced their now famous *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. The Classification of Educational Goals: Handbook I: Cognitive Domain* which identified six major categories of educational goals that were proposed as hierarchical. Arranged from least to most complex, these six cognitive categories are (1) memory, (2) comprehension, (3) application, (4) analysis, (5) synthesis, and (6) evaluation. The first three, the least complex of the six cognitive categories, memory, comprehension, and application, are generally assumed to represent lower-level cognitive learning, while the later three, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation, the most complex of the six; are considered to be the cognitive behaviors of critical thinking.

Although it would be "difficult to find a more influential work in education today" (Paul, 1985) than Bloom's *Taxonomy* which has not only been used to teach critical and creative thinking (Treffinger and Huber, 1975; Wilson, 1988) but also which has been widely used across the curriculum in an attempt to organize logically and systematically course content and objectives (Gagne, 1965; Ellis et al., 1979), that *Taxonomy* has not been without its criticisms. Ennis (1985) found the "concepts in the *Taxonomy* too vague as they stand" to "provide the guidance we need" in teaching higher-order thinking skills. In its use to teach students to think critically, a major criticism of the *Taxonomy* is that critical thinking is more complex than learning how to ask and answer questions of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (Paul, 1985).

Bloom's *Taxonomy* is simplistic because it fails to specify a full range of cognitive processes; the fundamental problem with Bloom's *Taxonomy* is that it fails to distinguish adequately between the knowledge that students consume, and the knowledge that students produce. Given any body of knowledge, students may function in all six stages of the *Taxonomy* without demonstrating any critical thinking, or any productive thought: students may memorize knowledge, comprehend it, apply it, analyze it, synthesize it, and even evaluate given knowledge. The processes of productive cognitive behavior are, however, even much more complex than even Bloom's original triad of highest-order objectives, that is, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation: it is not until students discover knowledge, hypothesize and theorize concerning it, formalize and generate a product, such as an essay, and then internalize that knowledge that students begin to engage in productive critical thinking. Thus, it seems clear that if a taxonomic approach to writing and critical thinking is to be employed, the hierarchical process objectives of discovering knowledge hypothesizing and theorizing concerning it, formalizing it in theory and practice, generating a written document concerning it, and internalizing it into the persona--behaviors which I have identified as productive cognitive behaviors--must be added to the upper end of the *Taxonomy*.

"According to most advocates of critical thinking, there is no neat set of recipes for fostering critical thinking in students" (Paul, 1985). Because critical and creative thinking are often randomly operating processes, the steps one actually follows in solving a problem or creating a solution, since these steps are not always logically ordered, can best be described *ex post facto*. Yet teachers are held accountable for organizing systematic courses of study and designing logical lesson plans. While a recipe, such as a Taxonomy, may not describe adequately the sequence of steps employed in problem solving outside of the classroom, such a Taxonomy can be used to select and organize instructional activities so that students at least receive systematic instruction in the processes of critical thinking.

If Bloom's Taxonomy is to be used to organize logically and systematically course content and objectives from simple to complex as recommended by Gagne (1965) and Ellis *et al.* (1979), and if the Taxonomy is to be used to teach critical thinking as recommended by Treffinger and Huber (1975), then Bloom's Taxonomy must be modified and expanded to accommodate these productive behaviors: discovering, hypothesizing, theorizing, formalizing, generating, and internalizing.

Facilitating Critical Thinking

(1) Students must be given significant educational opportunities over time in the academic disciplines to read broadly and write critically concerning the major questions, problems and concerns of the academic disciplines. Within the academic disciplines, students must be given access not only to the major ideas, thoughts, and concepts, but should also be given access to the related knowledge outside of the discipline which reasonably may be brought critically to bear upon the discipline's major questions, problems, and concerns; inter-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary courses organized around man's major questions, his perpetual problems, and his enduring concerns should also be developed in order to approach academic problems apart from the inherent boas of any specific discipline; as Abraham Maslow once noted, "Given only a hammer as a tool with which to work, a carpenter is likely to believe that every problem can be solved by driving a few more nails."

(2) Given significant educational opportunities over time in the academic disciplines to read broadly and to write critically concerning the major questions, problems and concerns of these disciplines, students must be given significant educational opportunity to apply their knowledge, their backgrounds, their experiences, and their values to the issues under consideration. As students apply their own knowledge, their own backgrounds, their own experiences, and their own values to the problems, questions, and concerns under consideration, it can be expected that the students will change in their perceptions as their knowledge expands and develops, and perhaps students will be surprised by the conclusions they have reached through exploration and critical thinking.

(3) Students must be given access not only to the major ideas, thoughts and concepts shared in common between and among the disciplines, but students should also be given access to related knowledge outside if that discipline which reasonably may be brought to bear critically upon that discipline's major questions, problems, and concerns. In each of their courses and subjects, students must be expected not only to apply the major thoughts, ideas, and concepts within that course, but must also be able to transfer those ideas, thoughts and concepts they select as appropriate to other subjects or to other bodies of content. Students, as they accumulate knowledge, develop intellectual skills, and formulate attitudes and values; must continuously sort, and continually clarify their own knowledge and background if they are to become critical thinkers, and if they are to become producers of new knowledge.

(4) Given significant educational opportunities over time in the academic disciplines to read broadly and to write critically concerning their major questions, problems, and concerns, and given significant educational opportunity to apply their knowledge, their backgrounds, their experiences, and their values to the major questions, problems and concerns under consideration, students will be better able to identify and explore their own academic questions, problems, and concerns whether theoretical or empirical, that arise from their own consideration of disciplinary knowledge. Again, as students seek to apply all of their intellectual resources, and their values and beliefs that they themselves muster to the problems, questions, and concerns they themselves have raised for consideration, then it can be expected that the students will change in their perceptions, and again be changed by the tentative conclusions they have reached through exploration and critical thinking.

In summary, students in order to begin to learn independently and to learn to think critically, must begin to accumulate knowledge, bringing it with them to each new instructional experience and activity. Thus, in each of their courses and subjects, students should be expected to bring to bear to the topics, issues, problems, and concerns raised in the course all of the relevant intellectual resources they have accumulated to date. Using as a guide the productive objectives of the proposed addition to Bloom's *Taxonomy*, i.e., to appreciate, to discover, to hypothesize, to theorize, to formalize, and to internalize, students will be asked to approach the problems of the discipline not only from the vantage point of the discipline itself, but also from the vantage points of other disciplines. Thus, academic woodworking problems, so to speak, will no longer be treated by carpenters and their helpers, but academic problems will be treated by the students through the eyes of many trades and crafts persons.

Appendix

Although levels 1.0 through 4.0 in the proposed expansion are summarized essentially from Bloom's original Taxonomy (1956), level 2.0, comprehension, "the interpretation, explanation, or summarization of knowledge" has been changed to "interpret, explain, or summarize given knowledge" to differentiate between consumptive and productive interpretation, explanation, and summary. Levels 5.0 and 6.0 of the proposed expansion reverse Bloom's original order and redefine Bloom's original synthesis and evaluation categories. In the revision, Bloom's synthesis category is divided into two: a consumptive synthesis, level 6.0 on the expanded taxonomy in which valuable elements of given knowledge are combined; and a productive synthesis, level 12.0, generation, on the expanded taxonomy which includes the preparation of a unique product. In addition, Bloom's evaluation category is divided into two: a consumptive valuing, level 5.0 on the expanded Taxonomy; and a productive evaluation, level 13.0 in which a "final" judgement on knowledge consumed can be made. Levels 7.0 through 11.0, to appreciate, to discover, to hypothesize, to theorize, and to formalize, are added as multiple hierarchical writing process objectives. And finally, level 14.0, internalization from Krathwohl's *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. The Classification of Educational Goals: Affective Domain* (1964) has been added as the productive correlate of the consumptive objective, 7.0, appreciation.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the expanded Taxonomy is a proposal, and as such, is subject to further exploration, empirical testing, revision, and modification.

A SUMMARY of Bloom's Original *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: Cognitive Domain*

1.0 KNOWLEDGE, Recall of Information
  - terminology
  - specifics
  - conventions
  - trends and sequences
  - classifications and categories
  - criteria
  - methodology
  - universals and abstractions
  - principles and generalizations
  - theories and structures

2.0 COMPREHENSION
  - translation of knowledge from one form to another
  - interpretation, explanation, or summarization of knowledge

3.0 APPLICATION
  - extrapolation of relevant concepts, ideas, principles from a knowledge base
  - application of concepts, ideas, and principles to particular and concrete situations

4.0 ANALYSIS
  - analysis of elements of a particular field, system, or source
  - analysis of relationships between or among elements in a particular field, system
  - analysis of organized principles in a particular field, system source

5.0 SYNTHESIS
  - production of a unique communication
  - production of a plan for operations
  - derivation of a set of abstract relations

6.0 EVALUATION
  - judgements in terms of internal evidence, external consistency
  - judgements in terms of external evidence, consistency with knowledge acquired elsewhere

A PROPOSED EXPANSION of Bloom's *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: Cognitive Domain*

0.0 SUBJECT MATTER SPECIFIC TAXONOMIES

Consumptive Objectives

1.0 TO RECOGNIZE, RECALL, RECITE (KNOWLEDGE)
- terminology
- specifics
- conventions
- trends and sequences
- classifications and categories
- criteria
- methodology
- universals and abstractions
- principles and generalizations
- theories and structures

2.0 TO COMPREHEND
- to translate knowledge from one form to another
- to interpret, explain, or summarize given knowledge

3.0 TO APPLY
- to extrapolate relevant concepts, ideas, principles from a knowledge base
- to apply concepts, ideas, and principles to particular and concrete situations

4.0 TO ANALYZE
- to analyze elements of a particular field, system, or source
- to analyze relationships between or among elements in a particular field, system
- to analyze organized principles in a particular field, system source

5.0 TO VALUE
- to determine the relative usefulness of thoughts, ideas concepts, and principles in one or more given fields, systems, or sources

6.0 TO SYNTHESIZE
- to combine valuable elements, relationships, or principles from one field, system or source
- to combine valuable elements, relationships, or principles from more than one field, system or source

7.0 TO APPRECIATE
- to recognize gratefully the significance of elements, relationships, or principles from one field, system or source
- to recognize gratefully the significance of elements, relationships, or principles from more than one field, system or source

Productive Objectives

8.0 TO DISCOVER
- to isolate a problem within a field or system
- to isolate a problem between and among broad fields or systems

9.0 TO HYPOTHESIZE
- to suggest a solution to a problem in a field or system
- to suggest a solution to a problem between or among broad fields or systems

10.0 TO THEORIZE
- to construct an idea involving the elements, relationships, or principles within a field or system
- to construct an idea involving the elements, relationships, or principles between or among fields or systems

11.0 TO FORMALIZE
- to draw a conclusion or formulate a solution to a problem or produce a product based upon an idea within a field or system
- to draw a conclusion or formulate a solution to a problem or produce a product based upon an idea involving broad fields or systems

12.0 TO GENERATE
- to produce a new idea or product based upon knowledge within a field or system
- to produce a new idea or product based upon knowledge of broad fields or systems

13.0 TO EVALUATE
- to posit the acceptability of the ideas or products of others through the establishment of theoretical criteria
- to posit the acceptability of the ideas or products of others through the empirical observation and testing
- to posit the acceptability of one's own idea or product
- through the establishment of theoretical criteria
- to posit the acceptability of one's own idea or product
- through the empirical observation and testing

14.0 TO INTERNALIZE
- to commit oneself to a value or value complex
- to respond consistently with an interrelated set of values, a value structure, a world view
- to be characterized by a value or value complex

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Wayne H. Rambo is a member of the Academic Skills Department of Camden County College, Blackwood, NJ. He also teaches Occupational Writing at Glassboro State College.

Role of Stand-Fast Propositions as Criteria of Critical Thinking For Judging Religious Beliefs

Bertram Bandman

1. Introduction.

An advantage of critical thinking over the narrower field of logic and scientific method is that critical thinking provides, or aims to provide, principles of reasoning, whose purpose is to help us resolve controversial issues on rational grounds.

One may single out five types of controversial issues, which partially overlap, and reflect differences of religious beliefs. The first of these issues is the quantity vs. quality of life. The abortion issue illustrates quantity v. quality of life issue. Women who seek the right to choose are generally oriented by quality of life considerations. Their opponents who seek to assure the right to life, emphasize the quantity of life. Differences in religious beliefs affect people's choices of quality vs. quantity of life.

The second issue about which religious beliefs are divided, that affects health care and society at large, is freedom of action v. prevention of harm. An example is an unsteady, elderly patient's wish not to have a locking waist-belt. This patient's desire to be free is opposed by the efforts of some health team members to prevent the patient from falling and thereby causing self-inflicted injury.

A third issue that affects health care and human activities generally is truth telling v. deception. Does a health professional tell the truth to a terminal patient, the telling of which results in harmful consequences to the patient or to the health professionals? A fourth related issue that affects human activities is the desire for knowledge v. opposing religious, political, economic and ideological interests.

Research about cigarette smoking, or about a sugar or animal fat substitute may provide evidence that conflicts with economic interests. A recent example of knowledge v. opposing religious interests is the issue of whether to teach Creationism in addition to or as an alternative to teaching traditional biological theories of evolution. One again finds that different religious beliefs are pivotal in deciding what to teach.

A fifth related issue is conventional, scientifically based therapy or form of teaching v. non-scientific therapies or forms of teaching. Some health care examples include the use of Laetrile or faith healing as alternatives to chemotherapy for cancer. Another example is the Navajo Indian use of the magic medicine man as an attempted cure for infantile tuberculosis. A further example is the use of Christian Science as a rival to conventional science.

The last three issues-truth telling v. deception, knowledge v. alternative interests, conventional science v. alternatives to science-are, in the late I.I. Rabbi's terms, between the cultures and forces of science-technology and those of anti-science-technology. Each side of these controversies implies values. Anti-science-technology includes such sects as Jehovah's Witnesses, who refuse blood transfusions; and the Amish, who, in addition to rejecting electricity, reject modern physics, astronomy, chemistry and biology in favor of Fundamentalist values, such as farming guided and sustained by a continuing reverence to a Supreme Being unaided by scientific intervention.

For the purpose of resolving these five kinds of issues, several kinds of principles have recently been found to be useful in critical thinking. One of these is the principle of charity. A further principle is integrity or candor, which holds that the truth matters.
To supplement and also strengthen the use of these other principles of charity, candor or integrity, I want to discuss a relatively neglected topic in critical thinking, namely the role of Wittgenstein stand-fast propositions as criteria for probing ultimate questions and extraordinary religious beliefs.

Wittgenstein asked far ranging questions about the ultimate significance of things, God, immortality, miracles. Wittgenstein is pictured as a Fideist, one who believes, with Pascal, that faith overrides reason. I will argue that Wittgenstein's later work is not Fideistic. I will try to show that Wittgenstein uses ordinary language criteria to examine extraordinary religious beliefs.

2. *Some Common Themes in the Early, Middle and Later Work.*

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein remarked that "Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answers to questions of this kind, but only point out that they are nonsensical" (TLP,4.0003). Later, "...even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched" (TLP,6.5.2). Wittgenstein searches for a criterion to distinguish sense from nonsense. For example, in his later work, "philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence"5 (PI,#109); later in that work, "an inner process stands in by means of language" (PI,#109); and later in that work, "an inner process stands in need of outward criteria" (PI#580). This is hardly a sign of a Fideist.

3. *Examples of Extraordinary Religious Beliefs.*

Wittgenstein is ready with examples. "An Austrian general said to someone: 'I shall think of you after my death..." Ludicrous to some, Wittgenstein thought, while not so to others (LCA,p.53). Someone believes in the Last Judgment. Wittgenstein compares this to a German airplane overhead, or to weather forecasting. Smith, killed in battle, is later seen lecturing in Cambridge. Wittgenstein's rejoinder: Insufficient evidence. In Lourdes, a credulous believer says "There we see blood coming out of something. He says, 'There you are. . .How can you doubt?" Wittgenstein considers other explanations. "I'd try to convince him that he'd seen nothing of any consequences"(LCA, 60-61). Humans are created in the image of God (implicit in LCA,p.59, henceforth abbreviated I). Finally, there is this example: "God's eye sees everything" (LCA,p. 71, henceforth abbreviated E).

4. *Wittgenstein Casts Doubt on the Fideist Use of Religious Beliefs.*

Wittgenstein pictures and queries the notion of God as a person. "God is among the earliest learnt-pictures. But not the same consequence as with pictures of ants" (LCA,p.59). Pictures have a place in forming beliefs. Wittgenstein says that E uses a picture. Smythies says E doesn't only "associate use with a picture." Wittgenstein challenges him:" What conclusions are you going to draw?.. .Are eyebrows going to be talked of, in connection with the Eye of God?" (LCA,p.71) Wittgenstein reminds anyone who says E that if a being that sees resembles a person, then surrounding features of a being that sees are called for. Wittgenstein probes for pertinent criteria. He employs Positivism of another kind, Therapeutic Positivism. One doesn't initially assert that "God exists" has no meaning. One points out that E is embedded within a system of pictures and beliefs, some of which are rationally examinable.

5. Framework Beliefs Provide Criteria For Probing Religious Claims

Later, Wittgenstein discusses key propositions which "are the inherited background against which" to "distinguish between true and false" (OC#94). Even when Wittgenstein does not appeal to true/false, he appeals to a neighboring concept, a Framework Belief (henceforth abbreviated FB); which he refers "bedrock" (OC#498); "river-bed"thoughts (OC#97); the "axis" (OC#152); "hinges,"(OC#341); and "scaffolding"(OC#211). (Tractatus thoughts didn't desert Wittgenstein). According to T. Kazepides, commenting on Wittgenstein, propositions near the core of certainty are foundational to "all thoughts,judgments and actions." These propositions are the "unmoving foundations" (OC$403) that "we inherit without any attempt to explain demonstrate, doubt or justify." Some examples of FB's are:"I believe I have forebears...I believe that there are various cities..." About these Wittgenstein says,"If I wanted to doubt the existence of the earth long before my birth, I should have to doubt all sorts of things that stand fast for me" (OC#234). According to Kazepides, 'commitment to the river-bed propositions is not optional. Only people who are 'insane' [#468],' mad' [#0C281], 'demented' [OC#155], 'idiotic' [OC#662], and 'half wits' [OC257] would express doubts about such propositions and their doubt would be 'hollow [OC#312], 'senseless' [OC3101" and be "without consequences. '"

Wittgenstein says "It is quite sure that motor cars don't grow out of the earth. If someone could believe the contrary, he could believe everything that we say is untrue and could question everything we hold to be sure." Moreover, "someone who could believe that does not accept our whole system of verification"(OC#279). Wittgenstein is probing for the suitable criterion. His reference to true/false, and to FB's shows him not to be a Fideist.

One might add other FB's to those cited, such as that blood does not come out of wine. FB's do not include a belief in Judgment Day; or the Austrian general's belief that after he dies he will speak to someone living. Neither of these is an FB, a belief one would have to hold if one believed anything at all.

FB's require no further justification. To the question, "What holds the pear tree up?" Wittgenstein once remarked, "The earth." But the question, What holds the earth up?" has no place. The examples of religious beliefs cited have no FB's to secure them. Wittgenstein shows how the search for the criterion is not as sure footed as are FB's for showing that there are numerous cities on earth, or that our heads are not full of saw-dust. Wittgenstein transforms the older,cruder Logical Positivist criterion of meaning into Therapeutic Positivist criteria. When told E, he doesn't say, "That we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (TLP#6.54). Rather, Wittgenstein asks about God's eyebrows.

6. The Paradigm Case Argument.

There is a further argument that shows Wittgenstein not to be a Fideist. He adapts Moore's Paradigm Case Argument, (henceforth abbreviated PCA). Fideism asserts that religious beliefs cannot be demonstrated to be true or false, or be reasoned about. Appeal to the PCA, fashioned by Moore and Wittgenstein, shows that religious beliefs are true or false, or can be reasoned about. The PCA undermines Fideism. Moore's use of the PCA is more stident than Wittgenstein's. Moore differs from philosophers who hold "that there is a good reason to suppose that there is a God. . .or that we...shall continue to exist and to be conscious after the death of our bodies."11

A non-Fideist standard for judging religious beliefs is that (a) religious beliefs make claims about the world intended to be taken seriously by believers, initiates and skeptics alike. (b) A claim intended to be taken seriously is true or false. The conjunction of (a) and (b) implies that (c) religious beliefs are true of false. If religious statements are not true or false, then their use is to tell stories and fairy tales. If statements or beliefs are not true or false, then they are not true either. Some religions claim that they aim at a higher truth. But if the higher truth is not connected to an ordinary truth, it is not clear how this higher truth can be a truth at all.

7. *The Role of T/F in Judging Religious Beliefs.*

Religious beliefs fit into a scheme of value statements. Some of these statements are true or false. A central claim Moral Realists make is that moral statements are true or false. They cite examples, like "Hitler is evil." One may say that "Hitler is evil" is right, and to disbelieve this is wrong. One need not, however, thereby concede the Moral Realist claim that any moral statement is true or false. Only formal and factual statements are true or false. On this view, to say, "The Mona Lisa is beautiful" is not true or false. One reason is that the above judgment is not like "The Mona Lisa is about a young woman" and "The Mona Lisa hangs in the Louvre;" or even "The Mona Lisa is regarded by millions of admirers as beautiful." Although predicates like true/false don't readily apply, Moral Realists succeed in showing that moral and aesthetic statements are open to reasoned evaluation.

Ethics is related to neighboring fields, like science, the arts, religion and epistemology. A promising approach to the attempt to justify values, introduced by Aristotle in his practical syllogism, and developed more recently in the works of Dewey, Stevenson and Frankena, consists in assembling facts and values in a conjunction. One has a goal and a means of achieving the goal. Jones has a cold. He wants to get better. So, he rests and takes vitamin C and fluids. To get better depends on his acting on the assumption that the premises are true, that fluids, vitamin C and bed rest are conducive to Jones recovering. So Jones says he ought to fulfill the conditions for achieving his goal. The conjunction of facts and values, with some facts being true rather than false, gives a good reason to imply and justify a given conclusion instead of its contradictory conclusion. On this view, moral values are not true or false; but there are factual statements that,along with value statements, help imply or justify an evaluative conclusion as to what is worth believing or doing.

In addition to factual statements which may be used to make scientific claims about the nature of things, there are also religious and metaphysical claims, which purport to be true or false. They refer to a state of affairs, such as the Austrian general's claim that he will think of someone after he dies.

In considering examples of religious beliefs, Wittgenstein may have left an aspect of "beliefs" stranded. He does not tell us whether I and E are logically unbelievable. These examples involve beliefs. Some of these claims are either true or false. The values of a religion depend on the truth of these claims. If these claims false or are not demonstrably true, then the values on which they are based are undermined. In a time that stresses the need for trust, there is such a thing as trusting too much. To believe that it is neither true or false that cigarette smoking is harmful is to hold a belief that is easily undermined. Indeed such a belief is self-undermining. The power of prayer depends on the claims of a given religion being believable. If there is no truth value in a prayer, then it is undenied.

To be unbelievable may mean (1) "I can't (bring myself to) believe it." (2)"It is not rational to believe;" or (3)"It is logically unbelievable;" or all three. To be unbelievable in the logically strong sense includes (1) and (2) as well. For a statement to be logically unbelievable means it is irresponsible to believe it. If it is irresponsible to believe a statement, that implies that one has an obligation not to believe it." One might even say exhortatively that one has no right to believe.

To believe the logically unbelievable-despite Kierkergaard's claim that a Christian is one who believes the unbelievable-is to believe in a contradiction, a consequence of Fideism. A reason for the untrustworthiness of Fideism is that it is a source of contradiction.

Wittgenstein avoids the Fideist difficulty if one interprets his remarks as seeking external criteria for judging an internal process. Inner process include extraordinary religious beliefs, imaginings, thoughts. Outward criteria consist of FB's.

Questions occur as one is told E. Does one who sees all see at once or in a succession of acts? How does anyone see the one who sees all? Wittgenstein probes religious beliefs, like E and I. Wittgenstein questions the sense of this or that proverb, and thereby undermines its use.

8. Conclusion.

Wittgenstein was too involved in the search for criteria to be a Fideist. He was perhaps disenchanted by earlier views expressed in the *Tractatus*. But this is a far cry from a disavowal of its central themes. Anthropology, life experiences and concentrated philosophical thinking influenced Wittgenstein to develop the PCA and consequently attempt to solve the deeper religious and metaphysical problems of life.

Wittgenstein uses FB's to probe religious beliefs and proverbs; and asks, for example, for the connection of eyebrows to the "Eye of God." The use of FB's, by degrees, undermines and rebuts the Fideist use of extraordinary religious beliefs. For Wittgenstein, to do philosophy is to search for a criterion and use it to investigate an inner process.

FB's intersect forms of life, and provide criteria for judging them. In addition to the principles of charity and candor or integrity already found to be useful in critical thinking, Wittgenstein's use of FB's provides a criterion of critical thinking for judging religious beliefs.

Notes

1. E. Bandman and B. Bandman, *Critical Thinking in Nursing*, E. Norwalk, CT. , Appleton Lange, 1988, pp. 159-160; and E. Bandman and B. Bandman, *Nursing Ethics Through the Life Span*, Second edition, E. Norwalk, CT., Appleton Lange, 1990, pp. 4-6.

2. E. Bandman and B. Bandman, *Critical Thinking in Nursing*, p.300.

3. R. Mendelson and L. Schwartz, *Basic Logic*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1987, p. 279.

4. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus, Logico-Philosophicus*, (London, 1974).

5. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford,1 955).

6. L. Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief* (Oxford, 1966).

7. L. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, (New York, 1969).

8. Kazepides, T. , "Wittgenstein and the Rationalists in Learning and Teaching," in *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society* (1987), pp. 323-335.

9. Kazepides, (1987) *Ibid.*
A. Stroll identifies FB's as "context independent propositions" in "Context Independent Propositions" Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 1989.

10. S. Toulmin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, (Cambridge,1951), p. 206.

11. G.E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers*, (London, 1959), p. 52.

12. B. Bandman, *The Place of Reason in Education*, (Columbus, Ohio, 1967), pp. 95-132.

13. For a related example, see G. McCord (ed.) *Essays in Moral Realism* (Ithaca, N.Y.,1988), pp. 1-23.

Bertram Bandman is Professor of Philosophy at Long Island University.

The Use of Analogy in Legal Reasoning: A Form of General Problem Solving Skill

Gordon E. Whitney

For cases in reasoning related to matters in science, C. S. Peirce showed the interrelationships of Abduction, Induction and Deduction (Buchler, 1955:150-156). However in actual legal cases it is not methods of this type but rather that of analogy between examples which is used. This paper is limited to analogical reasoning from examples. To standardize the presentation a method is defined for the analysis of analogy. This is then applied to cases from a variety of legal contexts.

A Schema and Method For Analogical Arguments

The purpose of a schema for analogical arguments is to lay a foundation for a theory of interpretation of analogy. This method could provide a basis for analysis of arguments from diverse fields of knowledge. In part, this effort is an attempt to contribute to our understanding of human reasoning.[1] Analogy is argument based on examples. It is able to interpret the world of nature and human experience. An analogy is a relationship between a source example and a target example in which some source-attribute is identified and possibly transformed into a proposed-attribute. The analogical argument makes a claim that the assignment of the proposed attribute to the target-example has analogical validity. This is not a claim of mathematical certainty but a means of contrasting some analogies which are deemed valid with others where the analogy is false or irrelevant. However, without some means of classification, analogy can not be systematically analyzed. The relationship of a proposed-attribute to its source-attribute is defined as follows:

The relationship is called --

Iconic: when the pair of attributes are identical; the single term "Shared-attribute" covers both source and target.

Indexical: when the source-attribute points to a superset which contains the proposed-attribute as a member.

Symbolic: when the relationship is arbitrary, imaginative or figurative as in an allegory.[2]

These types of analogy are illustrated in Figure 1, sub-figures A, B and C. For a pair of examples to have analogical validity, the source-attribute must serve as either an Icon or an Index in its relationship to the proposed-attribute. As an Icon, it has a strong similarity in the context of both examples. As an Index, the source-attribute must refer to a more inclusive principle (a superset) which contains both attributes among its members. An Indexical analogy is weakened to the extent that the inclusive principle referred to is not made explicitly clear by the one providing the argument. If the source-attribute is merely symbolic in its relationship to the proposed-attribute, then the analogy has no validity but is merely a literary device which appeals not to reason but to the imagination. The process of analysis consists of Definition, Formation of Legal Icons, and Evaluation as follows:

Definition: The source-example (E1), the target-example (E2), the source-attribute, and the proposed-attribute are selected and defined. Either example with its associated attribute may be constructed hypothetically to aid the argument.

Formation of Legal Icons: The similarities and dissimilarities between the examples are collected into a pair of composite Icons. These generic pictures have characteristic features (similarities) which capture the essence of the argument for providing legal weight. These icons should have opposing images, one representing the image presented by the plaintiff the other a distinctly different image presented by the defendant.

Evaluation: The two icons are weighed relative to their legal force as judged by the one making the argument. See Figure 1, sub-figure D for the model esteemed in law for judging relative legal weight. The weighing will consist of evaluative argument based on the respective Legal Icons. The decision will be largely prejudged by the manner and character in which the selected facts and hypothetical examples have been constructed and the identification of their characteristic features.

Two analogies from astronomy follow as examples of the schema.[3]

Rotation of Earth :: Rotation of Venus

It is known that the earth rotates on its axis as it travels in its path around the sun. It is also known that Mars has this same attribute, i. e. axial rotation. Let this axial rotation be our "proposed-property". Then our analogical argument is that since Venus is like both earth and Mars in other respects, it is a valid analogy to assign to Venus this proposed-property, i.e. axial rotation. What is unique here is that the source-example is composite, consisting of two individual examples. According to our schema:

Shared-attribute: Axial rotation of a planet.

Icon-1: The composite-source (earth, Mars) and the target revolve around the sun in nearly circular orbits; they are nearly spherical in shape; they are large relative to our own moon.

Icon-2: Each planet has a mass uniquely different from any other; each travels in an orbit which sweeps out an area unique to itself; at any time, the position of one planet is independent of the others, i.e. their motions are not synchronized.

Evaluation: All of the factors in Icon-1 are aspects dependent of the physics of motion and support the proposed shared attribute of axial rotation. The factors of Icon-2 are common properties in the motion of any planet and do not have bearing on the issue of axial rotation. They are not only differences relative to Venus but also between earth and Mars, and these differences do not affect the axial rotation shared by the pair.

The analogy is valid for assigning the proposed-property to the target example, (i.e. for Venus to rotate on its axis) since Icon-1 is found to be significantly of greater weight than that of Icon-2. Note this argument has only the force of analogy and is not a scientific demonstration. At best it is a probable hypothesis subject to scientific verification.

The Sun : Moon :: Church : State

A classic example of false analogy was one common in the middle ages, which claimed that the relationship of the sun to the moon was analogous to the relationship between the church and the secular state. It was claimed that as the moon had no light of its own but only reflected light from the sun, so the secular authority, like the moon, has no independent authority but derived all its authority from the church, which is analogous to the sun.[4] In our schema:

E1: the light of the moon comes from the sun.

E2: the authority of the state comes from the church.

Source-attribute: derived light.

Proposed-attribute: derived authority.

Evaluation: The analogy is merely symbolic, hence there is no need to define the Legal Icons. The analogical argument claims that there is a valid relationship in which "derived light" symbolically represents "derived authority." Since there is no iconic or indexical relationship between the source-attribute and the proposed-attribute the analogy is merely "symbolic" and lacks objective validity. Further analysis is unnecessary. The "rule book" for translation of the source-attribute into the target-attribute is supplied by the creator of the analogy not by any principle necessarily shared by the interpretive community.

The fallacy here is that the relationship between the examples is one of imaginative speculation and not one of semantic force. This is a case where the claimed analogous relationship lacks relevance.

I. Use of Analogy in Roman, Jewish and American Law

The case of the triplets born to a slave woman, Arescusa, is from the classical period of Roman law.[5] The case from Jewish law relates to freedom for a multilated slave.[6] The case from American law relates to responsibility in an accidental death.[7]

Freedom For Arescusa's Fourth Child

The slave woman Arescusa in some way pleased her Roman master. In his "Last Will" he ordered that she was to receive her freedom after having given birth to three offspring for his estate. According to current Roman Law, any children born to her as a freed-woman would have the status of free-born. The legal question arose when Arescusa first bore one child and then triplets. It is necessary to construct a hypothetical example for four births which is more explicit in its details than the requirements of the Will. The construction of a hypothetical example is necessary in reasoning from a statute or a will in contrast to reasoning from a specific legal example (precedent).

Consider the following definitions:

Hypothetical E1: Arescusa could have successively conceived and given birth to one child four times. After the third delivery she was technically or potentially free, but we assume that due to unusual legal delays she conceives again and immediately before the birth of her fourth child, she formally receives her manumission.

Actual E2: Arescusa gave birth to one child and then to triplets.

Shared-attribute: the fourth child was to be reckoned free-born in the actual as well as in the hypothetical case.

Icon-1: The actual fourth child is reckoned "free born" although delivered between Arescusa's technical and formal freedom.

Icon-2: The actual fourth child is born a slave because Arescusa was only technically free.

Evaluation: In order to increase the weight of Icon-1, we appeal to E1. Suppose the formal freedom were further delayed, so that the hypothetical fourth child was like the actual in that, it was born during a period of formal slavery and technical freedom. The difference then would be one in the length of time, minutes versus months, during which the child was free technically but not formally. There was in Roman law a principle called "to favor liberty" which was called upon to settle disputed cases of status, free versus slave. Combining this principle with E1 and its further hypothetical modification, gives adequate weight to Icon-1 to result in the rejection of Icon-2.

Freedom as Compensation

In this case the rabbis applied the interpretive principle of "Building a Family" to achieve both limitation and generality of a composite statute. The case relates to a slave permanently injured during punishment:

> If a man hits [a slave] in the eye and destroys it, he must let him or her go free to compensate for the eye. And if he knocks out the tooth [of a slave], he must let him or her go free to compensate for the tooth. (Exodus 21:26-27)

The rabbis argued that out of these two situations it is possible to build a general principle that freedom is to be given to a slave as compensation for permanent multilation, of which loss of an eye is provided as an explicit example. However the case of the loss of a tooth is ambiguous, because unlike the eye, if the victim is young, the tooth lost may be a "milk tooth" and its loss is only temporary since it will "come again." However while "eye" is to be taken literally it is also indexical as it represents the class of any part of the body "which can not come again." There is a positive similarity between the eye and a permanent tooth but a negative difference between the eye and a milk tooth. In our schema:

E1: A slave, during punishment, has one eye destroyed.

Hypothetical E2: A slave, during punishment has a finger permanently destroyed.

Shared-attribute: Freedom as compensation for mutilation.

Icon-1: The slave whose finger is destroyed has been permanently mutilated, and is thus like one who lost an eye.

Icon-2: A finger is not an eye or a permanent tooth thus freedom is denied by the letter of the law.

Evaluation: As an Indexical Analogy (Fig. 1B) the weight favors Icon-1. The eye and permanent tooth are specific limit cases which point to a general principle -- "permanent mutiliation deserves freedom as compensation" and this is what the rabbis viewed as the intention of the lawgiver by the specific limit examples given.

Hynes v. New York Central Railroad

The facts in this case are these: A child named Hynes was bathing in public waters in a river. He climbed out of the water onto a diving board. The board was mounted in the bank which was at the edge of the property of the railroad. While standing on this board, Hynes was struck by electric wires which fell from railroad poles and was killed. The falling wires were due to defective maintenance by the railroad of a support for the wires. The deciding opinion was written by B. N. Cardozo, Chief Justice of the N.Y. Supreme Court. He overturned the ruling of two lower courts. Cardozo's reasoning placed in our schema follows:

> Hypothetical E1: A person, would have been possibly killed, (a) if he had been standing in a boat in public waters under the falling wires; or (b) if he had been hanging from a tree, on public land, but within inches of Hynes.
>
> Actual E2: Hynes, acting as a bather in public waters, was inadvertently trespassing while standing on a diving board, and was killed by falling wires.
>
> Shared-attribute: Classification of this activity as "bathing in public waters" not as trespassing.
>
> Icon-1: Hynes was a legal bather, killed in a public place.
>
> Icon-2: Hynes was a trespasser on private property and thus was responsible for his own death.

Evaluation: Cardozo's own words are the most eloquent summary: "every act of Hynes from his first plunge into the river until the moment of his death was in the enjoyment of public waters . . . [the technical trespasser argument] disregards consequences to a 'dryly logical extreme'."[8] From our approach, we say that the iconic force of the legal bather is stronger as a time sequential picture of Hynes than the weaker trespasser icon.

Cardozo notes that the diving board was the agent which became a "trespass on the public ways" and we might add for emphasis the "death-dealing falling wires" were a trespass as well. This case is an excellent example of the interplay of complex legal factors.

II. The Difficulty of Finding Analogy in Supreme Court Decisions

Two famous cases are selected for analysis, one concerning education, the other concerning abortion. In the former, the Court was unanimous and in the latter, divided seven against two. However we find these cases so different from those above and so difficult, we will use a simplified schema with a Critical Evaluation. In part this becomes an admission that some cases are not suited for schematic analysis by analogy yet even this is a result with some value for critical thinking. It could be used as one way of identifying arguments which seem to follow no obvious prior pattern.[9]

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

In *Brown* the Supreme Court ruled that racially segregated public education was, by its nature, never equal and was therefore illegal. Chief Justice Warren said:

> In approaching this problem, we can not turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted . . . We must consider public education in . . . its present place in American life.

Critical Evaluation: It is possible there may be an indexical analogy here, by which the Fourteenth Amendment "points to" a higher unstated principle which in American Life of the year 1954 would include among its rights a principle of "desegregated public education" and further that such a right is not to be denied by the states either in theory or in practice. However, the opinion of the Court does not make clear exactly what the higher principle is. This case warns us that even a unanimous decision of the Court may not be subject to standard methods of analysis because of the highly creative character of the decision itself.

Blackmun on Roe v. Wade (1973)

In *Roe*, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court. Rhenquist's dissent and the Stewart's concurring opinion are analyzed in the sections that follow.[10]

In searching through the opinions filed on *Roe* we have come to the conclusion that the ability of our schema for analogy to deal with this reasoning has reached an inherent limit. Supporting this negative sounding position is the fact that a considerable volume of legal scholarship has been devoted to a critical review of the legal reasoning in *Roe*.

The content of the opinions does not lend itself to analysis as analogy. The cause could be: our schema not robust enough, or the case departs from standard legal reasoning, or both. To deal with the scope of this five opinion case, probably a blend of rhetorical and argumentation theory is required as though one were dealing with justification of proposed legislation. Also, the provision in the opinion for three distinct time periods has no basis in legal analogy and must be justified on a basis partly medical and partly social, largely independent of prior legal reasoning. One senses that we have entered a different world of reasoning than in the examples given above. To condense the discussion we limit analysis to the first of the three time periods defined in the opinion. According to Blackmun the examples and attributes of our schema are as follows:

E1: The right of privacy, though not mentioned in the Constitution, has been established by legal precedents in the areas of contraception, interracial marriage, and freedom of parental choice both in education and in child rearing.

E2: "For the period of pregnancy prior to approximately the first trimester (13 weeks), the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."

Source-attribute: Liberty must not be withheld from any person "without due process of law."

Proposed-attribute: The right to a first trimester abortion is to be granted as a privacy right.

Critical Evaluation: The connection between E1 and the source-attribute seems to have been deliberately altered to make the argument appear more logical. All the examples cited were decided on the basis of an appeal to "due process" not to "privacy." False analogy has been concealed under a legal sounding phrase. The source-attribute does not serve as an index to any higher legal principle which would include the proposed-attribute. Thus the analogy is merely symbolic and by our definition invalid. Tushnet (1988: 210-211) agrees but states his criticism in different terms.

Rhenquist on Roe v. Wade

Because Blackmun sought support for his opinion in precedent based on "due process," but made a claim of precedent which was *discovered to contain* "a right of privacy," Rhenquist took pains to hold the opinion up to ridicule. He claimed that this opinion accomplished the seemingly impossible task of "leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it." He also criticized the opinion for its specific content which he said, "is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a judical one."

Rhenquist's dissent, written more for legal experts than the public, has limited exposition of examples cited. We find his chief legal argument in one small section. This we give in our schema as a source and target example:

> E1: The majority of the states have current laws that restrict abortion in some way and these laws have been in effect in some form for over a century.
>
> E2: Since there is no constitutionally protected group that has its freedom hindered by these laws, the local laws should be left to stand and allowed to change according to the accepted political process.

Critical Evaluation: The principles of "majority rule" and "let the decision stand" sweep too broadly. Rhenquist has not shown a balanced approach by which he is able to draw the line when a local law is unconstitutional and when it is not. Also the Court's ruling in *Brown* (see above) was unanimous and it ruled that during 100 years, society had so changed that new rights must be considered fundamental. Rhenquist seems to appeal to state rights rather than to an unchanging moral principle. He seems to argue as though "life begins at conception" but seems to view this as lacking legal force and hence hides his position in his reasoning.

Rhenquist's source and target examples are not really examples at all but just abstract reasons and an abstract conclusion. There is no exposition of precedent for E2. Appeal to majority rule is a political and not a judicial principle. We cannot evaluate an analogy in his reasoning because he does not give an exposition in this form.

Stewart on Roe v. Wade

Stewart wrote as a response to Rhenquist's dissent. Separating himself from Blackmun's reasons, he supported the majority opinion with what he deemed a better argument. In part agreeing with Rhenquist's criticism he based his reasoning on "due process" without appeal to "privacy." His source and target examples follow:

> E1: The opinions in *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965) and in *Eisenstadt v. Baird* (1972) grant to the individual, married or single, the right to decide "whether to bear or beget a child."
>
> E2: The right in E1 "necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide "whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."

Critical Evaluation: Stewart has used a rhetorical device to aid his reasoning. The phrase in E1, "bear and beget" is not accurate. The precedents granted access to contraceptives not to abortion. Even if one believes that abortion is one form of contraception, this principle is not found in the cited examples. Stewart disguises the circularity of his reasoning by wording favorable to his position.

In our terms, he claims an iconic analogy but the critical step depends on the very issue debated -- is abortion to be allowed when pregnancy was unintentional? He would argue that the woman should have the right to be pregnant only when she wants to be. This is not found in his examples.

Of the three opinions only this one has a clear analogy yet it is either ambiguous or invalid. As an example of critical thinking, *Roe* is a debate in which the content of the topic seems to overpower general reasoning methods. Even the brief analysis given here may fail to meet the criteria of objectivity in the minds of many readers. This leads one to question how many more very hard problems in reasoning lie in the opinions of the Court?

Conclusion

The schema has been used in the above examples, the principle of source and target attributes and a variety of legal icons have been illustrated. The variety of the examples indicates that the components of the schema are necessary and in some sense consistent.

Our problems with *Brown* and *Roe* show the need for an open ended method. We suggest that no single method will have universal applicability even when the field of knowledge is limited to law. We also observe that reasoning at the Supreme Court level is "special" because standard forms of legal reasoning would have been used in the lower courts if that could have resolved the dispute. The Court rejects appeals of this type as adequately resolved and unworthy of further debate. The reasoning employed might be termed "hyper-legal" and is not suited for use by lower courts as they lack the mandate for creative "law making". One source of cases which might be suited for critical thinking are those which when appealed, the Supreme Court refuses to hear and thereby judging that the lower courts had used suitable legal reasoning.

Endnotes

1. Govier (1985) has used analogy in the form of parallel logical structures to reveal weak arguments. Reese writing on "Analogy" (1980: 13) gives an index to its use in philosophy. Alexy (1989: 274-284) deals with precedent, but his excessive interest in various formulas of implication leads him away from insight into the method of arguing from examples. Gutteridge (1987) has warned us about the unintended assumptions of prior knowledge required to read and understand selected texts. Here references should give adequate background. Van Eemeren's "Components of argumentation analysis" (1987: 60-61) provides some general guidelines. Golding (1984:118-110) defines analogy in its traditional algebraic notation. For the schema there is no direct prior literature. This work extends earlier work, see Whitney (1989).

2. This triad was discovered by Peirce (Buchler, 1955: 102-103) but he did not apply it to analogy. For the influence of Peirce on legal theory see Kevelson (1988: 239-281) where Holmes (1881) is viewed as mediating the Pragmatic tradition. Cardozo (1921, 1928) seems to be in the same school.

3. The Venus example was given by Peirce (Hartshorne, ed. *Collected Papers*; 1931-35: Vol. 2, Sect. 733).

4. See "Analogy," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1980: I.337; 1985: 1.367). This is an analogy of proportion which is not directly used in legal reasoning. For further extensions of this general pattern see "Analogy," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (1968: 1.60-70).

5. The Arescusa case is given by Watson (1987: 12), who supplies for this example the clarifying comment from the Roman jurist, Tryphonius: "For nature does not permit two infants to emerge from the mother's womb at the same time, by the same push, in such a way that the order of birth . . . is uncertain." For an expansion of the scope of Roman law beyond slavery see Frier (1989).

6. For "Freedom as Compensation" see Doeve (1954: 67-68).

7. For an exposition of this case as reasoning by analogy see Murray (1982) and Carter (1984:168-177) who are in agreement with our approach but do not use the icon/index classification.

8. 231 N.Y. at 232-234, 131 N.E. at 899-900 (1921). Cardozo's approach (1921, 1928) to the law was from the point of view of its effects on society rather than from hair-spliting logic.

9. The opinions of the Court and the dissents are given in Cushman (1984); quotations not otherwise marked are from the indicated opinion (i.e. Warren, Blackmun, Rhenquist, or Stewart). Levi (1949) is often referred to; he deals extensively with themes in the the evolution of case law based on examples that were milestones at the appeal level. However he has no schema for analysis and his emphasis on change in the law over time so simplifies the factors that his generalizations are hasty and excessive. Mersky (1969) gives a through index to the literature of law through 1968; MacCormick (1978) presents a theoretic approach; Harnett (1984) gives an introduction; Baum (1985) covers the Supreme Court; and Bell (1986) attempts to guide the evaluation of legal arguments. Tushnet (1988:201) gives a summary of the debate on *Brown*.

10. Milbauer (1983) has Blackmun's opinion including the footnotes (pp. 308-318), critical excerpts from Stewart's opinion (p. 58), and a list of relevant law review articles through 1981 (pp. 350-352). Perry (1980) gives an indirect criticism of *Roe* which Tushnet (1988: 205-208) tries to answer with a less absolute approach to law. Browne (1989) gives a critique of both the opinion and the dissent of *Roe* from the point of view of weak/strong sense critical thinking. This effort encouraged the writer to include Roe in this paper. We both offer critical comment on the majority opinion and on the dissent as arguments.

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Gordon Whitney is a former member of the Technical Staff at AT&T, Bell Laboratories, Princeton, N.J. He is now retired.